Open-source AI Security Operations Center: alert fusion, LLM-agent triage, MITRE ATT&CK investigation, and a replayable decision ledger for every agent step. Self-hostable, runs with no API keys, MIT licensed. Ships an MCP server for Claude, Cursor and Continue.
Python agentic-aiai-securityalert-triageblue-teamcybersecuritydetection-engineeringincident-responselanggraphllm-agentsmcpmitre-attackmodel-context-protocolpurple-teamsecurity-operationsself-hostedsiemsoarsocthreat-detectionthreat-intelligence
fix(api): case status ladder, agents-proxy auth, ledger-backed investigations list
Alexandru Mateescufca5faf6f9a7
diff --git a/.env.bak-202610021531 b/.env.bak-202610021531new file mode 100644index 000000000..3f6df55c1--- /dev/null+++ b/.env.bak-202610021531@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@+# AiSOC Environment Variables+# Copy this file to .env and fill in your values+#+# ╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗+# ║ YOU DO NOT HAVE TO EDIT THIS FILE TO GET A WORKING STACK. ║+# ║ ║+# ║ make up creates .env from this template and fills the four ║+# ║ generated secrets — AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY, SECRET_KEY, ║+# ║ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN, AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN — with ║+# ║ real random values. ║+# ║ make env does only that, if you want to look before you start. ║+# ║ ║+# ║ Those three ship EMPTY here rather than as `replace-me-…` prose. A ║+# ║ placeholder is not a neutral default: a non-empty AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY ║+# ║ that is not a valid Fernet key made every connector save answer HTTP 500, ║+# ║ so copying this template used to break the product while skipping the copy ║+# ║ left it working. `scripts/check_env_placeholders.py` now fails on any ║+# ║ placeholder shipped here, and `make doctor` reports them in your .env. ║+# ║ ║+# ║ Optional, and worth setting: ║+# ║ OPENAI_API_KEY a hosted provider key for better AI triage. CORE ║+# ║ ships a local model, so this is an upgrade, not a ║+# ║ requirement — see "AI / LLM" below. ║+# ║ POSTGRES_PASSWORD the dev default works out of the box; change it for ║+# ║ anything shared. ║+# ╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝++# ─── Image Pinning ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Tag pulled by every `image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-*:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}`+# in docker-compose.yml. Docker pulls this tag on first boot and skips the+# local build (~90 s vs ~15 min). Pin to a release tag (e.g. v12.0.0) for+# reproducible deploys; leave as `latest` to track the newest release.+AISOC_VERSION=latest++# What `pull_policy:` resolves to for every first-party image. `missing` means+# "use what is local if there is one", which is right for an immutable release+# tag and wrong for `latest`, which is republished on every merge — so+# `make up` refreshes the images itself whenever AISOC_VERSION names a moving+# tag, and skips it when the tag is pinned.+#+# Set this to `never` on an air-gapped host: Compose then refuses to contact a+# registry, and `make up` skips its refresh for the same reason. `always` makes+# Compose itself re-check on every container start.+# AISOC_PULL_POLICY=never++# ─── Core Configuration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# `development` enables the dev auth bypass in services/api/app/api/v1/dev_auth.py.+# Set `production` for anything network-reachable; docker-compose.yml reads this+# value, so changing it here is enough.+# Production is the default because the value of this variable used to+# decide whether an uncredentialed request was served as an administrator.+# For the developer conveniences, layer the overlay rather than editing+# this line: docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f infra/compose/docker-compose.dev.yml up -d+ENVIRONMENT=production+LOG_LEVEL=info++# HS256 signing key for console sessions, shared by the API and the connectors+# service. Left empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py` — see the+# note on AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY below for why a placeholder is not used.+SECRET_KEY=1fd76079684f5b19cb24294429815bcbd570131b30f65d89edf6368b07e8b7d0++# Base URL `make bootstrap` prints as the sign-in address, and the origin the+# console is reached on. Leave it at the default for a laptop; set it to the+# address operators actually browse to for anything else, or the printed+# credential arrives with the wrong URL beside it.+AISOC_CONSOLE_URL=http://localhost:3000++# ─── Where the stack is reachable from ────────────────────────────────────────+# Every host port is published to 127.0.0.1 by default, which is right for a+# laptop and fatal for a server: nothing outside the machine can reach it,+# including the browser you meant to use.+#+# Set this to publish the console on all interfaces. It is the only port a+# browser needs — the console proxies to the API, the agents service and the+# realtime gateway over the internal network — so the datastores and the+# development passwords in this file stay on loopback.+#+# AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0+#+# Put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front before exposing it to a network+# you do not control. See apps/docs/docs/deployment/single-host.md.+AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0++# Moves EVERY published port, datastores included. Only for an isolated+# network: it hands Postgres, Redis, Kafka and Neo4j — with the development+# passwords in this file — to anything that can route to the host.+# AISOC_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0++# Whether this deployment is a demo. Read at run time by both the API and the+# console, and reported at GET /api/runtime-config so it can be checked from+# outside rather than inferred from the page. Leave false unless you are+# running a public demo; `make demo` is the opt-in that loads synthetic data.+AISOC_DEMO_MODE=false++# Shared HS256 secret used ONLY for short-lived realtime WS/SSE tickets+# (Issue #239). The API mints tickets at `POST /api/v1/realtime/ticket` and the+# Node realtime service (`services/realtime`) verifies them on every WebSocket+# upgrade and SSE request — both sides MUST read the same value. This is+# intentionally separate from SECRET_KEY so the realtime edge can be rotated+# independently and a leaked ticket can never forge a full API session.+#+# `make up` generates this. There is no development fallback any more: both+# sides used to fall back to a constant committed to this repository, and no+# manifest passed either the real secret or the variable the production check+# read, so that constant was the effective key in every deployment. Unset, the+# ticket endpoint fails closed (503) and realtime rejects every connection.+AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET=U_XjLpDZdXAj8zOYhL5Hv8eN3UOeTkUD6Ws_0dPsDLk++# HS256 key for the session tokens the SAML and OIDC callbacks issue, and the+# bearer that guards /metrics. Both are generated by `make env`. The API+# refuses to boot without them now that ENVIRONMENT defaults to production:+# in a development-class environment `enforce_secure_defaults` only warns,+# which is why neither was generated before.+JWT_SECRET=6zbpUL_SA81S17OmYi56IWMCyUBtNJKBigUqsCmyC9E+METRICS_TOKEN=7cUq7f5gLU-8rrVkd8b0bY8cZsMT2a4hu0qExcwe1HI+# Time-to-live (seconds) for minted realtime tickets. Kept short so a leaked+# ticket is only briefly useful; the frontend re-mints on every (re)connect.+# Clamped to a 60s ceiling by the ticket endpoint regardless of this value.+AISOC_REALTIME_TICKET_TTL_SECONDS=60++# Application-layer encryption key for connector credentials and other+# secret payloads stored in Postgres.+#+# LEAVE THIS EMPTY. `make up`, `make env` and `./install.sh` all run+# `scripts/ensure_env.py`, which writes a freshly generated key here the first+# time. Generating it by hand works too:+# python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"+#+# It ships empty rather than as a `replace-me-…` string on purpose. A non-empty+# value that is not a valid Fernet key is *worse* than no value: the vault takes+# its development path only when the key is empty, so a placeholder reached+# `Fernet()`, raised, and turned every connector save into an HTTP 500 —+# minutes after `cp .env.example .env`, with nothing linking the two. Empty is a+# value the vault understands.+#+# Treat a real value like a database password: never commit it, never reuse it+# across environments, never share it.+AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY=n-NAjH2x0NgryRcZrvSrQH-rp66MsI1HxDQr09j6L5w=+# Comma-separated list of previous credential keys to support zero-downtime+# rotation. Leave blank unless you are mid-rotation.+AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM=++# Internal URL the API uses to reach the connectors microservice for+# catalog lookups and "Test connection" actions in the click-and-connect+# wizard. ``http://connectors:8003`` is correct for docker-compose;+# use ``http://localhost:8088`` when running the API on the host while+# connectors is exposed via the docker-compose port forward.+CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL=http://connectors:8003+CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=15++# ─── Database ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Two roles, and the distinction is load-bearing rather than tidy.+#+# aisoc owner. Superuser (the postgres image makes POSTGRES_USER one),+# owns every table, applies the migration chain. No service+# connects as it.+# aisoc_app runtime. SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE and nothing else, so+# that the schema's row-level-security policies apply to it. A+# superuser ignores those policies even under FORCE ROW LEVEL+# SECURITY, which is why running the services as `aisoc` left all+# 92 of them filtering nothing.+#+# POSTGRES_PASSWORD is the owner's; AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD is the runtime role's.+# Both are interpolated by docker-compose.yml, so changing them here rotates+# them across the stack. They are deliberately different values: they are+# different privilege levels.+#+# Empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py`, like the secrets+# above. This file used to ship `POSTGRES_PASSWORD=aisoc_dev_secret`, and+# `docker-compose.prod.yml` guarded it with+# `${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?… the development default is a published literal}` —+# a guard that rejects an *empty* variable and cannot look at a value, so the+# one input its message named was the one input it accepted. A production+# stack booted on a password printed in this repository while the file said+# it could not. `preflight-secrets` in that file now refuses the value, and+# shipping these empty means a fresh install never has one to refuse.+POSTGRES_PASSWORD=440c43cf18f78e66a2885f12480c7551c934331b5a88eedc+AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD=03b5366c74c98fde62b1656d433f367e7cff75035d82cf4c++# What every service connects as.+DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/aisoc++# DDL only: `python -m app.scripts.run_migrations` uses this and nothing else+# does. Leave it unset and migrations fall back to DATABASE_URL, which is+# correct for a deployment that has not split the roles and fails loudly+# ("permission denied for schema public") on one that has.+# aisoc-db-role: owner — the migration chain applies DDL; the runtime role holds none+DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/aisoc++# Generated alongside the Postgres pair, and referenced rather than repeated:+# these two used to spell the password out inside the DSN, so rotating+# REDIS_PASSWORD left a stale copy here that still worked.+REDIS_PASSWORD=12b5ff3f51c1cbb8a68b887b73ff3368cc3b30a4fa9b693d+CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=61dd17f85342f5f3a4850dab1da5a13a4c1bd682dd3dc70b+REDIS_URL=redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@localhost:6379/0+CLICKHOUSE_URL=http://aisoc:${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD}@localhost:8123/aisoc++# ─── Messaging ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS=localhost:9092++# ─── Search ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+OPENSEARCH_URL=http://localhost:9200+QDRANT_URL=http://localhost:6333++# ─── AI / LLM ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Empty, and empty is a working configuration: CORE ships Ollama with a small+# local model, so a default install does real AI triage with no key at all. Set+# a hosted provider key here to upgrade the quality — the gateway picks it up+# and routes the aliases to the hosted model instead.+#+# It is empty rather than `sk-your-…-here` because a bogus key is not the same+# as no key: the gateway would send it upstream, get a 401, and the deployment+# would look configured while producing nothing.+OPENAI_API_KEY=+# OPENAI_MODEL affects the "explain this alert" / BYOK path only. Task workloads+# (triage, recon, investigation, copilot, summary, report, NL) request a logical+# alias instead — see the LLM gateway block below.+#+# It ships as an alias, not a concrete model, because the default deployment+# routes through the bundled gateway and the gateway 400s anything+# infra/litellm/config.yaml does not define. It used to read+# `gpt-4-turbo-preview`, which no gateway config here has ever defined, and the+# auto-triage worker treated it as a per-tenant BYOK override — so it replaced+# `aisoc-triage` on the highest-volume path in the product.+# scripts/check_llm_model_routing.py fails the build if this names a model the+# gateway does not define. Set a concrete model only when calling a provider+# directly (see "ENABLE LIVE LLM" option (b) below).+OPENAI_MODEL=aisoc-summary++# ─── LLM gateway (LiteLLM) — issue #478 ───────────────────────────────────────+# Since #478 AiSOC asks for a logical task alias (aisoc-triage,+# aisoc-investigation, …) for every live LLM call — there is no hardcoded default+# model. The alias → real-model map lives in infra/litellm/config.yaml, so you+# swap local/hosted models there without changing AiSOC. The gateway service is+# defined in docker-compose.yml.+#+# Key that AiSOC uses to authenticate to the gateway (also LiteLLM's admin key):+LITELLM_MASTER_KEY=sk-aisoc-local+# In-network URL of the gateway. docker-compose.yml sets this on the api and+# agents services, and both resolvers READ it — `resolve_base_url()` returns it+# for any aisoc-<role> alias, and `resolve_api_key()` returns LITELLM_MASTER_KEY+# to pair with it. That wire was missing: compose set this variable, the+# resolvers deliberately ignored it in favour of OPENAI_BASE_URL (which nothing+# set), and so the product's headline capability could not reach a model in the+# default deployment.+LLM_GATEWAY_URL=http://litellm:4000/v1+#+# ENABLE LIVE LLM:+# (a) Through the gateway — the default, and already wired. Put your real+# provider key in OPENAI_API_KEY above (the gateway reads it) and bring up+# the `full` profile, which is where the litellm service lives:+# docker compose --profile full up -d+# Nothing else to set. To point at a gateway somewhere else, or to send a+# different bearer, set OPENAI_BASE_URL/OPENAI_API_KEY and they win.+# (b) Direct to a provider, no gateway — pin each task role to a concrete+# model. A concrete pin is NOT rerouted to the gateway, so this keeps+# working with LLM_GATEWAY_URL set:+# AISOC_MODEL_PIN_TRIAGE=gpt-4o-mini+# AISOC_MODEL_PIN_INVESTIGATION=gpt-4o+# OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini # the BYOK/explain path, direct too+# With neither configured, AiSOC uses its deterministic offline path — which+# reports zero model calls and zero tokens rather than pretending to triage.++# ─── Threat Intelligence ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Open-source / community feeds (work out of the box, no key required for some)+TAXII_FEEDS=https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/taxii/,enterprise-attack,,+MISP_URL=+MISP_API_KEY=+OTX_API_KEY=+CISA_KEV_ENABLED=true+ABUSE_CH_ENABLED=true++# Free / freemium enrichment (recommended for everyone)+VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY=+ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY=+GREYNOISE_API_KEY=+SHODAN_API_KEY=+URLSCAN_API_KEY=+IPINFO_API_TOKEN=++# ─── Commercial threat intelligence (optional) ────────────────────────────────+# Cyble Vision — actor, malware, vulnerability, dark-web, brand-risk feeds+# Provision a key from https://cyble.com/cyble-vision/+CYBLE_VISION_API_KEY=+CYBLE_VISION_BASE_URL=https://api.cyble.com/v2+CYBLE_VISION_TENANT_ID=+CYBLE_VISION_FEEDS=indicators,actors,vulnerabilities,leaks,brand+CYBLE_HUNT_API_KEY=++# Recorded Future+RECORDED_FUTURE_API_KEY=++# Mandiant Threat Intelligence (formerly FireEye iSIGHT)+MANDIANT_API_KEY=+MANDIANT_API_SECRET=++# Crowdstrike Falcon Intelligence (separate from the EDR connector)+CROWDSTRIKE_INTEL_CLIENT_ID=+CROWDSTRIKE_INTEL_CLIENT_SECRET=++# Anomali ThreatStream+ANOMALI_USERNAME=+ANOMALI_API_KEY=+ANOMALI_BASE_URL=https://api.threatstream.com++# IBM X-Force Exchange+XFORCE_API_KEY=+XFORCE_API_PASSWORD=++# Flashpoint+FLASHPOINT_API_KEY=++# Intel 471+INTEL471_USERNAME=+INTEL471_API_KEY=++# DomainTools Iris+DOMAINTOOLS_USERNAME=+DOMAINTOOLS_API_KEY=++# RiskIQ / Microsoft Defender External ATP+RISKIQ_USERNAME=+RISKIQ_API_KEY=++# ─── Connectors ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# CrowdStrike Falcon+CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_ID=+CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_SECRET=+CROWDSTRIKE_BASE_URL=https://api.crowdstrike.com++# Splunk+SPLUNK_HOST=+SPLUNK_PORT=8089+SPLUNK_TOKEN=+SPLUNK_SCHEME=https+SPLUNK_VERIFY_SSL=true++# AWS Security Hub+AWS_REGION=us-east-1+AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=+AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=++# Okta+OKTA_DOMAIN=+OKTA_API_TOKEN=++# Microsoft Sentinel+AZURE_TENANT_ID=+AZURE_CLIENT_ID=+AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET=+AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID=+AZURE_RESOURCE_GROUP=+AZURE_WORKSPACE_NAME=++# ─── Frontend ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Where the console proxies browser requests. The browser itself never uses+# these: the bundle calls same-origin paths like /api/v1/alerts and the Next.js+# server forwards them, which is why one image works on localhost, on a LAN+# address and behind a reverse proxy without rebuilding, and why there is no+# CORS configuration to get wrong.+#+# The defaults are the Compose service names and are right for the bundled+# stack. Change them when the API lives somewhere else — a different Compose+# project, another host, or an existing deployment.+AISOC_API_URL=http://api:8000+AISOC_AGENTS_URL=http://agents:8084+AISOC_REALTIME_URL=http://realtime:4000++# NEXT_PUBLIC_* is NOT listed here on purpose.+#+# Next.js inlines every NEXT_PUBLIC_* value into the JavaScript bundle when the+# image is *built*, so setting one in this file has no effect on the image+# `docker compose up` pulls. This file used to list NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL,+# NEXT_PUBLIC_REALTIME_URL and NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL, which meant an operator+# pointing the console at their own host edited three variables, restarted,+# saw no change, and had nothing telling them the settings were inert. Use the+# three AISOC_*_URL values above; they are read at container start.+#+# To bypass the proxy and have the browser call another origin directly you+# have to rebuild the image with --build-arg NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=… and take on+# the CORS configuration that comes with it.++# Override the docs site base URL (default: https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/docs).+# Set this when serving docs from a custom domain like https://docs.tryaisoc.com/docs.+# NEXT_PUBLIC_DOCS_URL=https://docs.tryaisoc.com/docs++# ─── Service-to-service auth ──────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Shared bearer token for backend services that are NOT reachable from the+# browser (connectors, purple-team, honeytokens, ueba). Those surfaces execute+# privileged work — purple-team can start adversary-emulation operations against+# live hosts — and they fail closed: with no token configured and AISOC_DEV_MODE+# unset, they answer 503 rather than serving the route openly.+#+# Left empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py`. It is not optional+# in practice: the API presents it when it proxies the connector catalog and+# "Test connection" to the connectors service, so a blank value on one side and+# a configured secret on the other is a 401 the wizard used to report as the+# bare string "Connection test failed".+#+# `ingest` and `connectors` use it for the same purpose on the push path, and+# there AISOC_DEV_MODE does NOT cover it: POST /v1/ingest is a write into+# tenant-owned data and has no dev-mode shortcut. A direct curl/script push+# uses a per-tenant token from `make ingest-token` instead and needs nothing+# here. See apps/docs/docs/operations/ingest-authentication.md.+AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN=t0K34vZQE5T0MpeicQyZp4w6Js_8eISs38Kd5WMYy2c+#+# The actions service gets its own, because it is the one that can isolate a+# host or disable an account and should not share a credential with the+# read-mostly services above. `make up` generates it. Without it the actions+# service answers 503 on every mutating route, which is deliberate: it used to+# answer 200 to anyone who could reach the port.+AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN=B0N61vx6KgsmcH3UoZuKtIgd5Ot2uI_djKu1M-qiB6A+#+# The agents service gets its own too, and it is the one that could not fall+# back: eight modules in `services/agents` present it as+# `X-AiSOC-Service-Token` on the API's internal context routes, and+# `service_token_valid` on the API verifies THIS variable and no other — it+# does not accept AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN. Nothing generated it and no manifest+# passed it, so organisation memory, tenant skills, recent dispositions,+# identity context, knowledge-base runbooks, the MCP toolset, the playbook+# action bridge and SIEM writeback were all off on every default install, each+# logging a `no_service_token` warning and returning an empty result that+# reads exactly like "this tenant has none".+#+# The same value is verified in the other direction: the API posts a replay to+# the agents service as a bearer, and `app.security.tenant_scope` resolves+# `AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN` ahead of the shared one. `make up` generates it+# and compose passes it to both.+AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN=sCn5w7PhzIJVvY5_5gIZZDlswDbqCxSe63Wd54fWZyM++# Bearer for realtime's /internal/* fan-out routes (API/agents -> realtime),+# sent as the x-internal-token header. `make up` generates it. The guard used+# to treat an unset value as authorized, and nothing set it.+REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN=j3gjCbBj8yHEdE9BS8mQvlD0cR_waYn6Oc4YKzafuak+# Optional per-service overrides, if you'd rather not share one secret. Each+# is read ahead of AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN by the service it names, on both the+# presenting and the verifying side, so setting one narrows a single hop.+# `scripts/check_service_token_wiring.py` asserts every one of these that+# production code reads is listed here — four were not, which is how an+# operator would go looking for a variable the code uses and find nothing.+# AISOC_PURPLE_TEAM_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_HONEYTOKENS_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_UEBA_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_INGEST_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_FUSION_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN=+#+# Bearer the agents service presents to the ChatOps fan-out (slack-bot).+# Unset means no ChatOps notification is sent; the approval is still durable+# and visible in the console.+AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN=wXugJXuZwACNxpoQfeyNoV048qLTZQUfPNDz4UOUTfU++# Canonical agents -> core API credential (DB-backed aisoc_ key, minted 2026-10-02)+AISOC_AGENTS_API_KEY=aisoc_517c15dcbf96ea8ba64b64a92682ce276b3700e5ecb56ab4diff --git a/.env.bak.1790944801 b/.env.bak.1790944801new file mode 100644index 000000000..2ff5308f9--- /dev/null+++ b/.env.bak.1790944801@@ -0,0 +1,452 @@+# AiSOC Environment Variables+# Copy this file to .env and fill in your values+#+# ╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗+# ║ YOU DO NOT HAVE TO EDIT THIS FILE TO GET A WORKING STACK. ║+# ║ ║+# ║ make up creates .env from this template and fills the four ║+# ║ generated secrets — AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY, SECRET_KEY, ║+# ║ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN, AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN — with ║+# ║ real random values. ║+# ║ make env does only that, if you want to look before you start. ║+# ║ ║+# ║ Those three ship EMPTY here rather than as `replace-me-…` prose. A ║+# ║ placeholder is not a neutral default: a non-empty AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY ║+# ║ that is not a valid Fernet key made every connector save answer HTTP 500, ║+# ║ so copying this template used to break the product while skipping the copy ║+# ║ left it working. `scripts/check_env_placeholders.py` now fails on any ║+# ║ placeholder shipped here, and `make doctor` reports them in your .env. ║+# ║ ║+# ║ Optional, and worth setting: ║+# ║ OPENAI_API_KEY a hosted provider key for better AI triage. CORE ║+# ║ ships a local model, so this is an upgrade, not a ║+# ║ requirement — see "AI / LLM" below. ║+# ║ POSTGRES_PASSWORD the dev default works out of the box; change it for ║+# ║ anything shared. ║+# ╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝++# ─── Image Pinning ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Tag pulled by every `image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-*:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}`+# in docker-compose.yml. Docker pulls this tag on first boot and skips the+# local build (~90 s vs ~15 min). Pin to a release tag (e.g. v12.0.0) for+# reproducible deploys; leave as `latest` to track the newest release.+AISOC_VERSION=latest++# What `pull_policy:` resolves to for every first-party image. `missing` means+# "use what is local if there is one", which is right for an immutable release+# tag and wrong for `latest`, which is republished on every merge — so+# `make up` refreshes the images itself whenever AISOC_VERSION names a moving+# tag, and skips it when the tag is pinned.+#+# Set this to `never` on an air-gapped host: Compose then refuses to contact a+# registry, and `make up` skips its refresh for the same reason. `always` makes+# Compose itself re-check on every container start.+# AISOC_PULL_POLICY=never++# ─── Core Configuration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# `development` enables the dev auth bypass in services/api/app/api/v1/dev_auth.py.+# Set `production` for anything network-reachable; docker-compose.yml reads this+# value, so changing it here is enough.+# Production is the default because the value of this variable used to+# decide whether an uncredentialed request was served as an administrator.+# For the developer conveniences, layer the overlay rather than editing+# this line: docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f infra/compose/docker-compose.dev.yml up -d+ENVIRONMENT=production+LOG_LEVEL=info++# HS256 signing key for console sessions, shared by the API and the connectors+# service. Left empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py` — see the+# note on AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY below for why a placeholder is not used.+SECRET_KEY=1fd76079684f5b19cb24294429815bcbd570131b30f65d89edf6368b07e8b7d0++# Base URL `make bootstrap` prints as the sign-in address, and the origin the+# console is reached on. Leave it at the default for a laptop; set it to the+# address operators actually browse to for anything else, or the printed+# credential arrives with the wrong URL beside it.+AISOC_CONSOLE_URL=http://localhost:3000++# ─── Where the stack is reachable from ────────────────────────────────────────+# Every host port is published to 127.0.0.1 by default, which is right for a+# laptop and fatal for a server: nothing outside the machine can reach it,+# including the browser you meant to use.+#+# Set this to publish the console on all interfaces. It is the only port a+# browser needs — the console proxies to the API, the agents service and the+# realtime gateway over the internal network — so the datastores and the+# development passwords in this file stay on loopback.+#+# AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0+#+# Put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front before exposing it to a network+# you do not control. See apps/docs/docs/deployment/single-host.md.+AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0++# Moves EVERY published port, datastores included. Only for an isolated+# network: it hands Postgres, Redis, Kafka and Neo4j — with the development+# passwords in this file — to anything that can route to the host.+# AISOC_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0++# Whether this deployment is a demo. Read at run time by both the API and the+# console, and reported at GET /api/runtime-config so it can be checked from+# outside rather than inferred from the page. Leave false unless you are+# running a public demo; `make demo` is the opt-in that loads synthetic data.+AISOC_DEMO_MODE=false++# Shared HS256 secret used ONLY for short-lived realtime WS/SSE tickets+# (Issue #239). The API mints tickets at `POST /api/v1/realtime/ticket` and the+# Node realtime service (`services/realtime`) verifies them on every WebSocket+# upgrade and SSE request — both sides MUST read the same value. This is+# intentionally separate from SECRET_KEY so the realtime edge can be rotated+# independently and a leaked ticket can never forge a full API session.+#+# `make up` generates this. There is no development fallback any more: both+# sides used to fall back to a constant committed to this repository, and no+# manifest passed either the real secret or the variable the production check+# read, so that constant was the effective key in every deployment. Unset, the+# ticket endpoint fails closed (503) and realtime rejects every connection.+AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET=U_XjLpDZdXAj8zOYhL5Hv8eN3UOeTkUD6Ws_0dPsDLk++# HS256 key for the session tokens the SAML and OIDC callbacks issue, and the+# bearer that guards /metrics. Both are generated by `make env`. The API+# refuses to boot without them now that ENVIRONMENT defaults to production:+# in a development-class environment `enforce_secure_defaults` only warns,+# which is why neither was generated before.+JWT_SECRET=6zbpUL_SA81S17OmYi56IWMCyUBtNJKBigUqsCmyC9E+METRICS_TOKEN=7cUq7f5gLU-8rrVkd8b0bY8cZsMT2a4hu0qExcwe1HI+# Time-to-live (seconds) for minted realtime tickets. Kept short so a leaked+# ticket is only briefly useful; the frontend re-mints on every (re)connect.+# Clamped to a 60s ceiling by the ticket endpoint regardless of this value.+AISOC_REALTIME_TICKET_TTL_SECONDS=60++# Application-layer encryption key for connector credentials and other+# secret payloads stored in Postgres.+#+# LEAVE THIS EMPTY. `make up`, `make env` and `./install.sh` all run+# `scripts/ensure_env.py`, which writes a freshly generated key here the first+# time. Generating it by hand works too:+# python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"+#+# It ships empty rather than as a `replace-me-…` string on purpose. A non-empty+# value that is not a valid Fernet key is *worse* than no value: the vault takes+# its development path only when the key is empty, so a placeholder reached+# `Fernet()`, raised, and turned every connector save into an HTTP 500 —+# minutes after `cp .env.example .env`, with nothing linking the two. Empty is a+# value the vault understands.+#+# Treat a real value like a database password: never commit it, never reuse it+# across environments, never share it.+AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY=n-NAjH2x0NgryRcZrvSrQH-rp66MsI1HxDQr09j6L5w=+# Comma-separated list of previous credential keys to support zero-downtime+# rotation. Leave blank unless you are mid-rotation.+AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM=++# Internal URL the API uses to reach the connectors microservice for+# catalog lookups and "Test connection" actions in the click-and-connect+# wizard. ``http://connectors:8003`` is correct for docker-compose;+# use ``http://localhost:8088`` when running the API on the host while+# connectors is exposed via the docker-compose port forward.+CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL=http://connectors:8003+CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=15++# ─── Database ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Two roles, and the distinction is load-bearing rather than tidy.+#+# aisoc owner. Superuser (the postgres image makes POSTGRES_USER one),+# owns every table, applies the migration chain. No service+# connects as it.+# aisoc_app runtime. SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE and nothing else, so+# that the schema's row-level-security policies apply to it. A+# superuser ignores those policies even under FORCE ROW LEVEL+# SECURITY, which is why running the services as `aisoc` left all+# 92 of them filtering nothing.+#+# POSTGRES_PASSWORD is the owner's; AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD is the runtime role's.+# Both are interpolated by docker-compose.yml, so changing them here rotates+# them across the stack. They are deliberately different values: they are+# different privilege levels.+#+# Empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py`, like the secrets+# above. This file used to ship `POSTGRES_PASSWORD=aisoc_dev_secret`, and+# `docker-compose.prod.yml` guarded it with+# `${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?… the development default is a published literal}` —+# a guard that rejects an *empty* variable and cannot look at a value, so the+# one input its message named was the one input it accepted. A production+# stack booted on a password printed in this repository while the file said+# it could not. `preflight-secrets` in that file now refuses the value, and+# shipping these empty means a fresh install never has one to refuse.+POSTGRES_PASSWORD=440c43cf18f78e66a2885f12480c7551c934331b5a88eedc+AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD=03b5366c74c98fde62b1656d433f367e7cff75035d82cf4c++# What every service connects as.+DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/aisoc++# DDL only: `python -m app.scripts.run_migrations` uses this and nothing else+# does. Leave it unset and migrations fall back to DATABASE_URL, which is+# correct for a deployment that has not split the roles and fails loudly+# ("permission denied for schema public") on one that has.+# aisoc-db-role: owner — the migration chain applies DDL; the runtime role holds none+DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@localhost:5432/aisoc++# Generated alongside the Postgres pair, and referenced rather than repeated:+# these two used to spell the password out inside the DSN, so rotating+# REDIS_PASSWORD left a stale copy here that still worked.+REDIS_PASSWORD=12b5ff3f51c1cbb8a68b887b73ff3368cc3b30a4fa9b693d+CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=61dd17f85342f5f3a4850dab1da5a13a4c1bd682dd3dc70b+REDIS_URL=redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD}@localhost:6379/0+CLICKHOUSE_URL=http://aisoc:${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD}@localhost:8123/aisoc++# ─── Messaging ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS=localhost:9092++# ─── Search ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+OPENSEARCH_URL=http://localhost:9200+QDRANT_URL=http://localhost:6333++# ─── AI / LLM ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Empty, and empty is a working configuration: CORE ships Ollama with a small+# local model, so a default install does real AI triage with no key at all. Set+# a hosted provider key here to upgrade the quality — the gateway picks it up+# and routes the aliases to the hosted model instead.+#+# It is empty rather than `sk-your-…-here` because a bogus key is not the same+# as no key: the gateway would send it upstream, get a 401, and the deployment+# would look configured while producing nothing.+OPENAI_API_KEY=+# OPENAI_MODEL affects the "explain this alert" / BYOK path only. Task workloads+# (triage, recon, investigation, copilot, summary, report, NL) request a logical+# alias instead — see the LLM gateway block below.+#+# It ships as an alias, not a concrete model, because the default deployment+# routes through the bundled gateway and the gateway 400s anything+# infra/litellm/config.yaml does not define. It used to read+# `gpt-4-turbo-preview`, which no gateway config here has ever defined, and the+# auto-triage worker treated it as a per-tenant BYOK override — so it replaced+# `aisoc-triage` on the highest-volume path in the product.+# scripts/check_llm_model_routing.py fails the build if this names a model the+# gateway does not define. Set a concrete model only when calling a provider+# directly (see "ENABLE LIVE LLM" option (b) below).+OPENAI_MODEL=aisoc-summary++# ─── LLM gateway (LiteLLM) — issue #478 ───────────────────────────────────────+# Since #478 AiSOC asks for a logical task alias (aisoc-triage,+# aisoc-investigation, …) for every live LLM call — there is no hardcoded default+# model. The alias → real-model map lives in infra/litellm/config.yaml, so you+# swap local/hosted models there without changing AiSOC. The gateway service is+# defined in docker-compose.yml.+#+# Key that AiSOC uses to authenticate to the gateway (also LiteLLM's admin key):+LITELLM_MASTER_KEY=sk-aisoc-local+# In-network URL of the gateway. docker-compose.yml sets this on the api and+# agents services, and both resolvers READ it — `resolve_base_url()` returns it+# for any aisoc-<role> alias, and `resolve_api_key()` returns LITELLM_MASTER_KEY+# to pair with it. That wire was missing: compose set this variable, the+# resolvers deliberately ignored it in favour of OPENAI_BASE_URL (which nothing+# set), and so the product's headline capability could not reach a model in the+# default deployment.+LLM_GATEWAY_URL=http://litellm:4000/v1+#+# ENABLE LIVE LLM:+# (a) Through the gateway — the default, and already wired. Put your real+# provider key in OPENAI_API_KEY above (the gateway reads it) and bring up+# the `full` profile, which is where the litellm service lives:+# docker compose --profile full up -d+# Nothing else to set. To point at a gateway somewhere else, or to send a+# different bearer, set OPENAI_BASE_URL/OPENAI_API_KEY and they win.+# (b) Direct to a provider, no gateway — pin each task role to a concrete+# model. A concrete pin is NOT rerouted to the gateway, so this keeps+# working with LLM_GATEWAY_URL set:+# AISOC_MODEL_PIN_TRIAGE=gpt-4o-mini+# AISOC_MODEL_PIN_INVESTIGATION=gpt-4o+# OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4o-mini # the BYOK/explain path, direct too+# With neither configured, AiSOC uses its deterministic offline path — which+# reports zero model calls and zero tokens rather than pretending to triage.++# ─── Threat Intelligence ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Open-source / community feeds (work out of the box, no key required for some)+TAXII_FEEDS=https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/taxii/,enterprise-attack,,+MISP_URL=+MISP_API_KEY=+OTX_API_KEY=+CISA_KEV_ENABLED=true+ABUSE_CH_ENABLED=true++# Free / freemium enrichment (recommended for everyone)+VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY=+ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY=+GREYNOISE_API_KEY=+SHODAN_API_KEY=+URLSCAN_API_KEY=+IPINFO_API_TOKEN=++# ─── Commercial threat intelligence (optional) ────────────────────────────────+# Cyble Vision — actor, malware, vulnerability, dark-web, brand-risk feeds+# Provision a key from https://cyble.com/cyble-vision/+CYBLE_VISION_API_KEY=+CYBLE_VISION_BASE_URL=https://api.cyble.com/v2+CYBLE_VISION_TENANT_ID=+CYBLE_VISION_FEEDS=indicators,actors,vulnerabilities,leaks,brand+CYBLE_HUNT_API_KEY=++# Recorded Future+RECORDED_FUTURE_API_KEY=++# Mandiant Threat Intelligence (formerly FireEye iSIGHT)+MANDIANT_API_KEY=+MANDIANT_API_SECRET=++# Crowdstrike Falcon Intelligence (separate from the EDR connector)+CROWDSTRIKE_INTEL_CLIENT_ID=+CROWDSTRIKE_INTEL_CLIENT_SECRET=++# Anomali ThreatStream+ANOMALI_USERNAME=+ANOMALI_API_KEY=+ANOMALI_BASE_URL=https://api.threatstream.com++# IBM X-Force Exchange+XFORCE_API_KEY=+XFORCE_API_PASSWORD=++# Flashpoint+FLASHPOINT_API_KEY=++# Intel 471+INTEL471_USERNAME=+INTEL471_API_KEY=++# DomainTools Iris+DOMAINTOOLS_USERNAME=+DOMAINTOOLS_API_KEY=++# RiskIQ / Microsoft Defender External ATP+RISKIQ_USERNAME=+RISKIQ_API_KEY=++# ─── Connectors ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# CrowdStrike Falcon+CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_ID=+CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_SECRET=+CROWDSTRIKE_BASE_URL=https://api.crowdstrike.com++# Splunk+SPLUNK_HOST=+SPLUNK_PORT=8089+SPLUNK_TOKEN=+SPLUNK_SCHEME=https+SPLUNK_VERIFY_SSL=true++# AWS Security Hub+AWS_REGION=us-east-1+AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=+AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=++# Okta+OKTA_DOMAIN=+OKTA_API_TOKEN=++# Microsoft Sentinel+AZURE_TENANT_ID=+AZURE_CLIENT_ID=+AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET=+AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID=+AZURE_RESOURCE_GROUP=+AZURE_WORKSPACE_NAME=++# ─── Frontend ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Where the console proxies browser requests. The browser itself never uses+# these: the bundle calls same-origin paths like /api/v1/alerts and the Next.js+# server forwards them, which is why one image works on localhost, on a LAN+# address and behind a reverse proxy without rebuilding, and why there is no+# CORS configuration to get wrong.+#+# The defaults are the Compose service names and are right for the bundled+# stack. Change them when the API lives somewhere else — a different Compose+# project, another host, or an existing deployment.+AISOC_API_URL=http://api:8000+AISOC_AGENTS_URL=http://agents:8084+AISOC_REALTIME_URL=http://realtime:4000++# NEXT_PUBLIC_* is NOT listed here on purpose.+#+# Next.js inlines every NEXT_PUBLIC_* value into the JavaScript bundle when the+# image is *built*, so setting one in this file has no effect on the image+# `docker compose up` pulls. This file used to list NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL,+# NEXT_PUBLIC_REALTIME_URL and NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL, which meant an operator+# pointing the console at their own host edited three variables, restarted,+# saw no change, and had nothing telling them the settings were inert. Use the+# three AISOC_*_URL values above; they are read at container start.+#+# To bypass the proxy and have the browser call another origin directly you+# have to rebuild the image with --build-arg NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=… and take on+# the CORS configuration that comes with it.++# Override the docs site base URL (default: https://beenuar.github.io/AiSOC/docs).+# Set this when serving docs from a custom domain like https://docs.tryaisoc.com/docs.+# NEXT_PUBLIC_DOCS_URL=https://docs.tryaisoc.com/docs++# ─── Service-to-service auth ──────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Shared bearer token for backend services that are NOT reachable from the+# browser (connectors, purple-team, honeytokens, ueba). Those surfaces execute+# privileged work — purple-team can start adversary-emulation operations against+# live hosts — and they fail closed: with no token configured and AISOC_DEV_MODE+# unset, they answer 503 rather than serving the route openly.+#+# Left empty here and generated by `scripts/ensure_env.py`. It is not optional+# in practice: the API presents it when it proxies the connector catalog and+# "Test connection" to the connectors service, so a blank value on one side and+# a configured secret on the other is a 401 the wizard used to report as the+# bare string "Connection test failed".+#+# `ingest` and `connectors` use it for the same purpose on the push path, and+# there AISOC_DEV_MODE does NOT cover it: POST /v1/ingest is a write into+# tenant-owned data and has no dev-mode shortcut. A direct curl/script push+# uses a per-tenant token from `make ingest-token` instead and needs nothing+# here. See apps/docs/docs/operations/ingest-authentication.md.+AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN=t0K34vZQE5T0MpeicQyZp4w6Js_8eISs38Kd5WMYy2c+#+# The actions service gets its own, because it is the one that can isolate a+# host or disable an account and should not share a credential with the+# read-mostly services above. `make up` generates it. Without it the actions+# service answers 503 on every mutating route, which is deliberate: it used to+# answer 200 to anyone who could reach the port.+AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN=B0N61vx6KgsmcH3UoZuKtIgd5Ot2uI_djKu1M-qiB6A+#+# The agents service gets its own too, and it is the one that could not fall+# back: eight modules in `services/agents` present it as+# `X-AiSOC-Service-Token` on the API's internal context routes, and+# `service_token_valid` on the API verifies THIS variable and no other — it+# does not accept AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN. Nothing generated it and no manifest+# passed it, so organisation memory, tenant skills, recent dispositions,+# identity context, knowledge-base runbooks, the MCP toolset, the playbook+# action bridge and SIEM writeback were all off on every default install, each+# logging a `no_service_token` warning and returning an empty result that+# reads exactly like "this tenant has none".+#+# The same value is verified in the other direction: the API posts a replay to+# the agents service as a bearer, and `app.security.tenant_scope` resolves+# `AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN` ahead of the shared one. `make up` generates it+# and compose passes it to both.+AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN=sCn5w7PhzIJVvY5_5gIZZDlswDbqCxSe63Wd54fWZyM++# Bearer for realtime's /internal/* fan-out routes (API/agents -> realtime),+# sent as the x-internal-token header. `make up` generates it. The guard used+# to treat an unset value as authorized, and nothing set it.+REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN=j3gjCbBj8yHEdE9BS8mQvlD0cR_waYn6Oc4YKzafuak+# Optional per-service overrides, if you'd rather not share one secret. Each+# is read ahead of AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN by the service it names, on both the+# presenting and the verifying side, so setting one narrows a single hop.+# `scripts/check_service_token_wiring.py` asserts every one of these that+# production code reads is listed here — four were not, which is how an+# operator would go looking for a variable the code uses and find nothing.+# AISOC_PURPLE_TEAM_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_HONEYTOKENS_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_UEBA_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_INGEST_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_FUSION_SERVICE_TOKEN=+# AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN=+#+# Bearer the agents service presents to the ChatOps fan-out (slack-bot).+# Unset means no ChatOps notification is sent; the approval is still durable+# and visible in the console.+AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN=wXugJXuZwACNxpoQfeyNoV048qLTZQUfPNDz4UOUTfUdiff --git a/docker-compose.override.yml b/docker-compose.override.ymlnew file mode 100644index 000000000..f12e54cae--- /dev/null+++ b/docker-compose.override.yml@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@+services:+ agents:+ environment:+ # Agent tools authenticate to the core API with get_current_user, which+ # accepts only JWTs or DB-backed aisoc_-prefixed API keys - never the+ # raw AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN (that fails JWT decode with 401+ # 'Could not validate credentials'). Use a minted aisoc_ API key from+ # .env (scopes: connectors:read, actions:read, lake:query).+ AISOC_AGENTS_API_KEY: ${AISOC_AGENTS_API_KEY:-}diff --git a/docker-compose.yml.bak.20261002-115859 b/docker-compose.yml.bak.20261002-115859new file mode 100644index 000000000..5c61519d8--- /dev/null+++ b/docker-compose.yml.bak.20261002-115859@@ -0,0 +1,1564 @@+###############################################################################+# AiSOC - AI Security Operations Center+# Docker Compose - Full Development Stack+# AiSOC — open-source under MIT License+#+# SECURITY NOTE+# -------------+# All host port publishings below are bound to 127.0.0.1 so a default+# `docker compose up` does NOT expose Postgres / Kafka / OpenSearch /+# Neo4j / Redis (with their development passwords) to the network the+# host is attached to. This is intentional: the same passwords ship in+# every clone of this repo.+#+# DEPLOYING ON A HOST THAT IS NOT YOUR LAPTOP+# -------------------------------------------+# Loopback is the right default and the wrong one for a server: it makes a+# single-host install unreachable from anywhere, including from the browser+# you intended to use it from. Set ONE variable in .env:+#+# AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0+#+# That publishes the console on every interface and leaves everything else —+# Postgres, Redis, Kafka, Neo4j and their shipped development passwords — on+# loopback where they belong. One port is enough because the console proxies+# to every other service over the internal network, so the browser only ever+# talks to the console's own origin.+#+# `AISOC_BIND_ADDR` moves ALL of the bindings, including the datastores. It+# exists for an isolated network where that is what you want. On anything+# routable it hands out the passwords in this file, so reach for the console+# variable first and put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front.+#+# Per-service overrides still work through a docker-compose.override.yml, and+# there the list MUST be tagged `!override`:+#+# services:+# postgres:+# ports: !override+# - "0.0.0.0:5432:5432"+#+# The tag is not optional. Compose *appends* sequences when it merges, so an+# override without it publishes both the old binding and the new one — the+# 127.0.0.1 binding stays, and on a port that was already taken the conflict+# is still there. It looks like it worked and it did nothing. Use+# `ports: !reset []` to stop publishing a service on the host entirely.+#+# Rotate the password while you're there.+#+# TWO DATABASE ROLES+# ------------------+# `aisoc` owner / migrations. Superuser, because POSTGRES_USER is what the+# postgres image makes it. Applies the migration chain. NO SERVICE+# CONNECTS AS THIS ROLE.+# `aisoc_app` runtime. SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE and nothing else, and+# row-level security applies to it. Every service's DATABASE_URL.+#+# Until this split, every service ran as `aisoc`, and a superuser ignores RLS+# policies even under FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY — so all 92 policies in the+# schema filtered nothing. See services/api/migrations/061_runtime_app_role.sql.+#+# Every service below runs as the scoped role. Nothing needs a cross-tenant+# role: the policies are `tenant_id = current_tenant_id() OR current_tenant_id()+# IS NULL`, so ingest, fusion, the retention purge and the schedulers — none of+# which bind a tenant — keep seeing every tenant's rows. The per-service+# reasoning is tabulated in apps/docs/docs/operations/security.md.+###############################################################################++networks:+ aisoc:+ driver: bridge++volumes:+ tempo_data:+ postgres_data:+ redis_data:+ kafka_data:+ zookeeper_data:+ zookeeper_log:+ clickhouse_data:+ opensearch_data:+ qdrant_data:+ neo4j_data:+ neo4j_logs:+ # ~2 GB of model weights. Named so `make down` keeps them and only+ # `make clean` re-downloads.+ ollama_data:++services:++ # ─── Infrastructure ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────++ postgres:+ image: postgres:16-alpine+ container_name: aisoc-postgres+ environment:+ # The OWNER / migration role. Superuser, because that is what the+ # postgres image makes POSTGRES_USER, and it is what applies the chain.+ # No service connects as this role — see the DATABASE_URL entries below.+ POSTGRES_DB: aisoc+ POSTGRES_USER: aisoc+ POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}+ # The RUNTIME role's credential. `zz_runtime_role_password.sh` applies it+ # on first boot, after 061_runtime_app_role.sql has created the role with+ # DML-only grants. Rotate it the same way you rotate POSTGRES_PASSWORD;+ # the two are deliberately different values because they are different+ # privilege levels.+ AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:5432:5432"+ volumes:+ - postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data+ # The init hooks: 10_ applies the migration chain, 20_ gives the runtime+ # role its password. They live in one directory because Docker cannot+ # create a mountpoint inside a bind mount — binding a single file into a+ # bound `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d` fails the container at startup.+ # Only runs when the data directory is empty; an upgrade in place is+ # covered by app.scripts.run_migrations instead.+ - ./infra/postgres/initdb:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d:ro+ - ./services/api/migrations:/aisoc/migrations:ro+ networks:+ - aisoc+ healthcheck:+ test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U aisoc"]+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 5++ redis:+ image: redis:7-alpine+ container_name: aisoc-redis+ command: redis-server --appendonly yes --requirepass ${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:6379:6379"+ volumes:+ - redis_data:/data+ networks:+ - aisoc+ healthcheck:+ test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "-a", "${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}", "ping"]+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 5++ zookeeper:+ image: confluentinc/cp-zookeeper:7.5.0+ container_name: aisoc-zookeeper+ environment:+ ZOOKEEPER_CLIENT_PORT: 2181+ ZOOKEEPER_TICK_TIME: 2000+ # Kafka keeps its cluster id in `kafka_data`, which IS persisted, and+ # takes the authoritative one from ZooKeeper, which was not. So the+ # second `up` on a kept volume generated a fresh cluster id and the+ # broker refused to join it:+ #+ # InconsistentClusterIdException: The Cluster ID <new> doesn't match+ # stored clusterId Some(<old>) in meta.properties+ #+ # `make down && make up` — documented as "stop the stack, keep the data"+ # — therefore could not bring Kafka back, and every service that depends+ # on it stayed in `created`. Only `make clean`, which deletes the data,+ # recovered. Persisting both halves of the pair is the fix; persisting+ # neither would also be consistent, but it would discard the event log+ # on every restart.+ volumes:+ - zookeeper_data:/var/lib/zookeeper/data+ - zookeeper_log:/var/lib/zookeeper/log+ networks:+ - aisoc+ healthcheck:+ test: ["CMD", "nc", "-z", "localhost", "2181"]+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 5++ kafka:+ image: confluentinc/cp-kafka:7.5.0+ container_name: aisoc-kafka+ depends_on:+ zookeeper:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9092:9092"+ environment:+ KAFKA_BROKER_ID: 1+ KAFKA_ZOOKEEPER_CONNECT: zookeeper:2181+ KAFKA_ADVERTISED_LISTENERS: PLAINTEXT://kafka:29092,PLAINTEXT_HOST://localhost:9092+ KAFKA_LISTENER_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MAP: PLAINTEXT:PLAINTEXT,PLAINTEXT_HOST:PLAINTEXT+ KAFKA_INTER_BROKER_LISTENER_NAME: PLAINTEXT+ KAFKA_OFFSETS_TOPIC_REPLICATION_FACTOR: 1+ KAFKA_AUTO_CREATE_TOPICS_ENABLE: "true"+ KAFKA_LOG_RETENTION_HOURS: 168+ networks:+ - aisoc+ volumes:+ - kafka_data:/var/lib/kafka/data+ # Memory caps surface OOMKiller events as a clear container exit instead of+ # silent broker rebalances. Tune up if you raise KAFKA_HEAP_OPTS.+ mem_limit: 1536m+ mem_reservation: 1g+ healthcheck:+ test: ["CMD", "kafka-broker-api-versions", "--bootstrap-server", "localhost:9092"]+ interval: 15s+ timeout: 10s+ retries: 5++ kafka-ui:+ # full profile — Kafka topic browser. A debugging convenience, not a pipeline component.+ profiles: ["full"]+ image: provectuslabs/kafka-ui:latest+ container_name: aisoc-kafka-ui+ depends_on:+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8090:8080"+ environment:+ KAFKA_CLUSTERS_0_NAME: local+ KAFKA_CLUSTERS_0_BOOTSTRAPSERVERS: kafka:29092+ networks:+ - aisoc++ clickhouse:+ # full profile — Event lake. Backs /lake/sql and the hunt surface; alerting does not read it.+ profiles: ["full"]+ image: clickhouse/clickhouse-server:23.8+ container_name: aisoc-clickhouse+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8123:8123"+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9000:9000"+ volumes:+ - clickhouse_data:/var/lib/clickhouse+ - ./services/api/clickhouse:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d:ro+ environment:+ CLICKHOUSE_DB: aisoc+ CLICKHOUSE_USER: aisoc+ CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: ${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:-clickhouse_dev_secret}+ CLICKHOUSE_DEFAULT_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT: 1+ networks:+ - aisoc+ ulimits:+ nofile:+ soft: 262144+ hard: 262144+ mem_limit: 1g+ mem_reservation: 768m++ opensearch:+ # full profile — Full-text search over archived events. No CORE code path queries it.+ profiles: ["full"]+ image: opensearchproject/opensearch:2.11.0+ container_name: aisoc-opensearch+ environment:+ - cluster.name=aisoc-cluster+ - node.name=aisoc-node-1+ - discovery.type=single-node+ - bootstrap.memory_lock=true+ - OPENSEARCH_JAVA_OPTS=-Xms512m -Xmx512m+ - DISABLE_INSTALL_DEMO_CONFIG=true+ - DISABLE_SECURITY_PLUGIN=true+ ulimits:+ memlock:+ soft: -1+ hard: -1+ volumes:+ - opensearch_data:/usr/share/opensearch/data+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9200:9200"+ networks:+ - aisoc+ healthcheck:+ # Without this the only condition a dependant can express is+ # `service_started`, which is true the instant the container exists —+ # including for the ~40s before the node listens, and for a node that+ # is about to die. threatintel aborts its lifespan when this port does+ # not answer, so it needs the stronger condition.+ test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl -fsS http://localhost:9200/_cluster/health || exit 1"]+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 12+ start_period: 60s+ # A 512m heap is not a 512m process. OpenSearch 2.11 loads ~20 bundled+ # plugins (knn, ml, security-analytics, performance-analyzer) and settles+ # at ~1.05GB RSS with this heap — measured, steady-state, single node,+ # no indices. At `mem_limit: 1g` it was OOM-killed during bootstrap every+ # time (exit 137, OOMKilled=true, ~10s in), so the full profile shipped a+ # store that could never start.+ mem_limit: 2g+ mem_reservation: 1g++ qdrant:+ # CORE — the store `services/threatintel` writes collected indicators to,+ # and the one the console's /threat-intel page is served from. It moved in+ # with threatintel: see that service's comment for the reasoning.+ #+ # Measured: 245 MB image, 79 MiB RSS with the two threat-intel collections+ # created. It is by a wide margin the cheapest of the four stores — the+ # next one up, OpenSearch, is 2 GB of image and ~1.05 GB resident — which+ # is why it is the one CORE takes.+ image: qdrant/qdrant:v1.7.0+ container_name: aisoc-qdrant+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:6333:6333"+ volumes:+ - qdrant_data:/qdrant/storage+ networks:+ - aisoc+ healthcheck:+ # threatintel creates its collections at startup, so it needs the store+ # answering rather than merely existing. The image ships neither curl nor+ # wget; `/proc/net/tcp` is what is left, and a listener on 6333 (hex+ # 18BD) is the thing being asserted.+ test: ["CMD-SHELL", "grep -q ':18BD' /proc/net/tcp || exit 1"]+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 12+ start_period: 20s++ neo4j:+ # full profile — Entity graph. Backs graph traversals and blast radius, not alert generation.+ profiles: ["full"]+ image: neo4j:5.15-community+ container_name: aisoc-neo4j+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:7474:7474" # HTTP browser+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:7687:7687" # Bolt+ environment:+ NEO4J_AUTH: neo4j/${NEO4J_PASSWORD:-neo4j_dev_secret}+ NEO4J_PLUGINS: '["apoc"]'+ NEO4J_dbms_security_procedures_unrestricted: apoc.*+ NEO4J_dbms_memory_heap_initial__size: 256m+ NEO4J_dbms_memory_heap_max__size: 512m+ volumes:+ - neo4j_data:/data+ - neo4j_logs:/logs+ networks:+ - aisoc+ mem_limit: 1g+ mem_reservation: 768m+ healthcheck:+ test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:7474 || exit 1"]+ interval: 15s+ timeout: 10s+ retries: 10++ # ─── Application Services ────────────────────────────────────────────────────++ api:+ build:+ context: ./services/api+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-core-api:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-api+ depends_on:+ postgres:+ condition: service_healthy+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8000:8000"+ environment:+ # Two roles, on purpose. DATABASE_URL is the runtime role: DML only, and+ # row-level security applies to it. DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL is the owner,+ # used by `app.scripts.run_migrations` for DDL and nothing else. Running+ # the service as the owner is what made all 92 RLS policies inert, since+ # a superuser ignores them even under FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY.+ DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ # Read by the migration runner to (re)apply the runtime role's password+ # on an existing data volume, where the postgres init hook never fires.+ AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/0+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ # The lake client reads these five, not CLICKHOUSE_URL — nothing under+ # services/api/app reads that name at all. Supplying only the URL left+ # the settings at their defaults (localhost:9000, user `default`, no+ # password), so /lake/sql answered every query with+ # `Connection refused (localhost:9000)` while fusion archived to the+ # same store perfectly well over the native port.+ CLICKHOUSE_HOST: clickhouse+ CLICKHOUSE_PORT: 9000+ CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE: aisoc+ CLICKHOUSE_USER: aisoc+ CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: ${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:-clickhouse_dev_secret}+ OPENSEARCH_URL: http://opensearch:9200+ QDRANT_URL: http://qdrant:6333+ # The API owns the vault write path; the connectors service reads with+ # the same key. Passing it to one and not the other means a credential+ # saved in the console can never be decrypted at poll time.+ AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY:-}+ AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM:-}+ NEO4J_URI: bolt://neo4j:7687+ NEO4J_USER: neo4j+ NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:-neo4j_dev_secret}+ # Was a bare literal, so a SECRET_KEY set in .env was ignored and the+ # JWT signing key silently stayed on the dev default. It also has to+ # match whatever the connectors service verifies with, or the console+ # token the API forwards there fails its signature check.+ SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-dev_secret_key_change_in_production}+ # The API mints realtime tickets and calls realtime's /internal/* routes,+ # so it needs the same two secrets the realtime container reads. Neither+ # was passed to either side before, which is why both guards there were+ # running on a published constant or not running at all.+ AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET: ${AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET:-}+ # Both are required for the API to boot now that ENVIRONMENT defaults+ # to production, and neither was interpolated here — so a value in .env+ # could not reach the container, which is the same shape that once left+ # AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN unreachable to this one service.+ METRICS_TOKEN: ${METRICS_TOKEN:-}+ JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-}+ REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN:-}+ # The credential this service presents when it proxies the connector+ # catalog and "Test connection" to the connectors service.+ # `_service_token()` in app/api/v1/endpoints/connectors.py reads+ # AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN then AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN — and compose+ # interpolated the shared token into connectors, ueba, honeytokens and+ # purple-team but not into the one service that has to *send* it. There+ # is no `env_file` here either, so a value in .env could not reach it by+ # any route. The catalog call was answered 401 on every request and fell+ # back to the bundled copy; the fix that made the proxy read the right+ # variable shipped against a variable nothing ever set.+ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_CONNECTORS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ # The agents service's credential, on the verifying side. `alert_writeback+ # .service_token_valid` reads this and only this — it does NOT fall back+ # to AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN — so the internal context routes the agents+ # service calls (`/feedback/context-statements`,+ # `/tenant-skills/resolved/active`, `/kb/runbooks/for-triage`,+ # `/feedback/recent-dispositions`, `/graph/identity-context`, the MCP+ # registry and `/alerts/{id}/source-writeback`) refuse every caller until+ # it is set. Must match the value on `agents`.+ AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL: ${CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL:-http://connectors:8003}+ # Where GET /api/v1/threat-intel/indicators is served from. The console+ # has called that path since the IOC inbox shipped and nothing answered+ # it; threatintel is in CORE now and this is the wire.+ THREATINTEL_SERVICE_URL: ${THREATINTEL_SERVICE_URL:-http://threatintel:8005}+ AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_THREATINTEL_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ # Printed by `make bootstrap` as the sign-in address and used as the+ # console's public origin. Read from os.environ by+ # app/scripts/bootstrap_admin.py, which no compose service set — so any+ # deployment that is not a laptop printed the wrong address.+ AISOC_CONSOLE_URL: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_URL:-http://localhost:3000}+ # Was a bare literal, so `.env`'s documented ENVIRONMENT was ignored and+ # `production` changed nothing — including the dev auth bypass in+ # app/api/v1/dev_auth.py, which could not be switched off from .env at all.+ ENVIRONMENT: ${ENVIRONMENT:-production}+ # The bundled Postgres and Kafka serve no certificates, and+ # ENVIRONMENT now defaults to production — where a cleartext transport+ # is a boot refusal, not a warning. Without these two the documented+ # `make up` fails on a machine where there is nothing to fix, which is+ # exactly how a security default gets patched out downstream. Stated+ # here, in the file that chooses it, rather than weakened in the code+ # that enforces it: a real deployment that leaves either unset is+ # refused at boot.+ AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_DB: "1"+ AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_KAFKA: "1"+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-info}+ # Issue #478 — LiteLLM gateway. This service's live LLM endpoints+ # (translation, hunts, KB, phishing, NL-detection) route here by default:+ # `app.services.model_aliases.resolve_base_url` reads LLM_GATEWAY_URL for+ # any aisoc-<role> alias. It was previously read by nothing, so the+ # variable was set, documented, and dead — every alias went to the+ # provider default and 404'd. OPENAI_BASE_URL still overrides it.+ LLM_GATEWAY_URL: http://litellm:4000/v1+ # The bearer that pairs with the URL above. Without it AiSOC would send a+ # provider key to the gateway, which rejects it as an invalid proxy token.+ LITELLM_MASTER_KEY: ${LITELLM_MASTER_KEY:-sk-aisoc-local}+ OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY:-}+ # services/actions — where an approved response action is executed.+ # The API had no pointer to it at all: the one endpoint that called it+ # read the URL from os.environ and fell back to `aisoc-actions`, which+ # is the container_name, not the DNS name on this network.+ AISOC_ACTIONS_BASE_URL: http://actions:8085+ AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ # Phase 2.6 — use /readyz, not /health, so the orchestrator+ # only routes traffic once the lifespan has finished wiring+ # Postgres, Redis, Kafka, Qdrant, and Neo4j. (Not OpenSearch: this+ # service constructs no OpenSearch client. `services/threatintel` is+ # the only consumer of that store.)+ # /livez is what the restart policy looks at via `pgrep`-style+ # checks; we don't need a separate compose healthcheck for it+ # because the process being up implies it's alive.+ healthcheck:+ test:+ - CMD-SHELL+ - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8000/readyz',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 30+ start_period: 60s+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ ingest-worker:+ build:+ context: ./services/ingest+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-ingest:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-ingest+ depends_on:+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ postgres:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8081:8080"+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9090:9090"+ environment:+ # Interpolated, not a literal. `.env.example` tells an operator that+ # setting ENVIRONMENT=production is enough, and for every other service+ # it is. This one pinned `development`, and `envmode.Current()` reads+ # ENV *before* ENVIRONMENT — so ingest stayed dev-mode however the+ # operator set it, and `JWT_SECRET must be set in non-development+ # environments` never fired on the one service taking events off the+ # network.+ ENV: ${ENVIRONMENT:-production}+ # The bundled Postgres and Kafka serve no certificates, and+ # ENVIRONMENT now defaults to production — where a cleartext transport+ # is a boot refusal, not a warning. Without these two the documented+ # `make up` fails on a machine where there is nothing to fix, which is+ # exactly how a security default gets patched out downstream. Stated+ # here, in the file that chooses it, rather than weakened in the code+ # that enforces it: a real deployment that leaves either unset is+ # refused at boot.+ AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_DB: "1"+ AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_KAFKA: "1"+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ HTTP_PORT: 8080+ METRICS_PORT: 9090+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/1+ # The inbox webhook routes (/v1/inbox/*) mount only when this is set,+ # and no compose file set it, so the documented "push events straight+ # from your SIEM" path was unreachable on every local and CI stack.+ # This is a pgx DSN and is deliberately distinct from the SQLAlchemy+ # DATABASE_URL the Python services use.+ # sslmode=disable is correct *here* and nowhere else: the bundled+ # Postgres serves no certificate, so requiring TLS would break the+ # documented first run on a machine where there is nothing to fix.+ # A production deployment that leaves this is reported at boot by+ # warn_if_insecure_defaults, which also reports an *unset* sslmode —+ # libpq reads that as `prefer`, which downgrades to cleartext without+ # a log line, and is therefore worse than the honest `disable` below.+ DATABASE_DSN: postgres://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc?sslmode=disable+ LOG_LEVEL: info+ # A bare literal, and a published one: `dev_secret_key_change_in_production`+ # is in INSECURE_SECRET_KEY_DEFAULTS, so anyone who read this repository+ # held the key this service verified with. Interpolated now, and `make+ # env` generates it.+ JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-}+ # /v1/ingest requires a credential. Two shapes are accepted: a+ # per-tenant push token minted with `make ingest-token` (resolved+ # through DATABASE_DSN above), and this shared service token, which+ # `connectors` presents when it polls on behalf of many tenants.+ # Empty by default — with it unset the connector-poll path is refused+ # and only minted tokens work. The same variable must be set on the+ # `connectors` service. See apps/docs/docs/operations/ingest-authentication.md.+ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ ATTCK_DATA_PATH: /app/data/enterprise-attack.json+ # Graph-at-ingest needs Neo4j, which is a `full`-profile service. It is+ # off in CORE and switched on by the `full` overlay. It used to be+ # hardcoded "true" with a hard `depends_on: neo4j`, which is why the+ # minimal stack could not start without the graph database.+ AISOC_GRAPH_ENABLED: "${AISOC_GRAPH_ENABLED:-false}"+ AISOC_NEO4J_URI: bolt://neo4j:7687+ AISOC_NEO4J_USER: neo4j+ AISOC_NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:-neo4j_dev_secret}+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ enrichment:+ # full profile — Fuse-time threat-intel and vulnerability enrichment. Alerts fire without it.+ profiles: ["full"]+ build:+ context: ./services/enrichment+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-enrichment:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-enrichment+ depends_on:+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8080:8082"+ environment:+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/2+ VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY: ${VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY:-}+ ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY: ${ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY:-}+ GREYNOISE_API_KEY: ${GREYNOISE_API_KEY:-}+ SHODAN_API_KEY: ${SHODAN_API_KEY:-}+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ fusion:+ build:+ context: ./services/fusion+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-fusion:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-fusion+ depends_on:+ # Postgres was missing here, so during a cold boot fusion tried to write+ # alerts before the database accepted connections and logged the failure+ # exactly once.+ postgres:+ condition: service_healthy+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8003:8003"+ environment:+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/3+ # `tenant_scope` refuses outright when neither a console secret nor a+ # service token is configured and dev mode is off, and this service+ # received none of the three — the same trio `connectors` and+ # `threatintel` already carry.+ AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-}+ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ # The ClickHouse event lake is a `full`-profile capability: it backs+ # /lake/sql and the hunt surface, not alerting. CORE runs without it and+ # the writer disables itself.+ AISOC_LAKE_WRITER_ENABLED: "${AISOC_LAKE_WRITER_ENABLED:-false}"+ CLICKHOUSE_HOST: clickhouse+ CLICKHOUSE_PORT: "9000"+ CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE: aisoc+ CLICKHOUSE_USER: aisoc+ CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD: ${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:-clickhouse_dev_secret}+ # Fusion defaulted to http://localhost:8082, which inside its own+ # container is fusion itself — so fuse-time enrichment always failed and+ # the failure was swallowed at DEBUG. `enrichment` is a `full`-profile+ # service; in CORE this resolves to nothing and enrichment is skipped,+ # which is the same outcome as before but now deliberate.+ ENRICHMENT_SERVICE_URL: ${ENRICHMENT_SERVICE_URL:-http://enrichment:8082}+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ agents:+ build:+ context: ./services/agents+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-agents:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-agents+ depends_on:+ postgres:+ condition: service_healthy+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8001:8084"+ environment:+ DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/4+ CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000+ # Phase B1 — auto-triage every fused alert off the Kafka stream (copilot:+ # read-only triage, no response dispatch). Degrades to deterministic+ # triage when no LLM key is set.+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ KAFKA_TOPIC_ALERTS_FUSED: aisoc.alerts.fused+ QDRANT_URL: http://qdrant:6333+ NEO4J_URI: bolt://neo4j:7687+ NEO4J_USER: neo4j+ NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:-neo4j_dev_secret}+ OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY:-}+ ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}+ # BYOK / "explain this alert" only — never a task role. A task role asks+ # `app.llm.model_pins` for its aisoc-<role> alias, and this leaking into+ # that path is what replaced `aisoc-triage` with a model the gateway does+ # not define. Defaults to the summary alias so the explain path resolves+ # at the gateway too; set a concrete model only for direct-to-provider.+ OPENAI_MODEL: ${OPENAI_MODEL:-aisoc-summary}+ # Issue #478 — the LiteLLM gateway (below) is the single entry point for+ # live LLM calls. `app.llm.factory.resolve_base_url` reads this for any+ # aisoc-<role> alias, so the default deployment reaches the gateway with+ # no further configuration; OPENAI_BASE_URL still overrides it, and a+ # concrete AISOC_MODEL_PIN_<ROLE> is left pointing at its provider.+ LLM_GATEWAY_URL: http://litellm:4000/v1+ # The bearer that pairs with the URL above — see the api service.+ LITELLM_MASTER_KEY: ${LITELLM_MASTER_KEY:-sk-aisoc-local}+ ATTCK_DATA_PATH: /app/data/enterprise-attack.json+ # Where to post an approval card when triage raises one. Unset means+ # no ChatOps notification; the approval is still durable and visible in+ # the console and the responder app. slack-bot is a `chatops`-profile+ # service, so this only resolves when that profile is up.+ AISOC_SLACK_BOT_URL: ${AISOC_SLACK_BOT_URL:-}+ AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN:-}+ # Bearer for realtime's /internal/* fan-out. `app/playbook/engine.py`+ # reads it to publish step progress; unset, realtime refuses the call+ # and a running playbook is invisible in the console.+ REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN:-}+ # The three below are the same trio `connectors` and `threatintel`+ # already carry, and this service had none of them. `tenant_scope`+ # refuses outright when neither a console secret nor a service token is+ # configured *and* dev mode is off — which is what every tenant-scoped+ # route here answered: 503, with no credential material to verify+ # against and nothing in the image supplying any.+ AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-}+ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ # The agents service's own service credential, used in both directions:+ # presented as `X-AiSOC-Service-Token` on the API's internal context+ # routes, and verified by `app.security.tenant_scope` when the API calls+ # back (it resolves `AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN` before the shared one).+ #+ # Eight modules in this service read it and nothing produced it, so on a+ # default install organisation memory, tenant skills, recent+ # dispositions, identity context, knowledge-base runbooks, the MCP+ # toolset, the playbook action bridge and SIEM writeback were all off —+ # each logging its own `no_service_token` warning and returning empty.+ # `make env` generates it; it must match the value on `api` below.+ AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ # ─── LLM gateway (LiteLLM) — issue #478 ─────────────────────────────────────+ # Single entry point for every live LLM call. AiSOC requests a logical task+ # alias (aisoc-triage, aisoc-investigation, …); the mapping alias → real model+ # lives entirely in infra/litellm/config.yaml, so operators swap local/hosted+ # models without touching AiSOC. Per-task latency/tokens/cost/errors are+ # exported on /metrics (scraped as job `aisoc-litellm`). Lightweight and inert+ # unless a service is pointed at it via OPENAI_BASE_URL — see the note on the+ # `agents` service above.+ ollama:+ # CORE — the model behind the gateway.+ #+ # The gateway shipped in CORE and the models it pointed at did not: every+ # alias resolved to a hosted provider, so the default install could route a+ # key it did not have and otherwise did no AI at all. This closes that: a+ # clone with no account produces a real triage verdict, from a real model,+ # with real token counts.+ #+ # Promoted from infra/compose/docker-compose.airgap.yml, where this exact+ # pairing has been proven end to end. The model is pinned rather than+ # floating on `latest` for the same reason every other image here is.+ #+ # Measured: 6.92 GB image — by some distance the largest thing in CORE —+ # 2.02 GB of weights in the volume, and 9.6 MiB resident when idle.+ #+ # Quoting the idle figure alone would be the misleading half of the truth:+ # the model is mapped in on first inference and the container measured+ # 2.96 GiB while serving. That is what moved the README's memory figure to+ # 8 GB, not the idle number.+ image: ollama/ollama:0.6.7+ container_name: aisoc-ollama+ volumes:+ - ollama_data:/root/.ollama+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:11434:11434"+ deploy:+ resources:+ reservations:+ devices:+ - driver: nvidia+ count: 1+ capabilities: [gpu]+ healthcheck:+ test: ["CMD-SHELL", "ollama list >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 1"]+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 18+ start_period: 30s+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ ollama-pull:+ # One-shot: pull the pinned model, then exit. A cache hit is a no-op, so+ # this costs one `ollama list` on every `up` after the first.+ #+ # litellm waits on `service_completed_successfully` here rather than on+ # ollama's health: a gateway that is up before the weights exist answers the+ # first triage request with "model not found", and the first request is the+ # one a new user makes.+ image: ollama/ollama:0.6.7+ container_name: aisoc-ollama-pull+ depends_on:+ ollama:+ condition: service_healthy+ entrypoint: ["ollama", "pull", "${AISOC_LLM_LOCAL_MODEL:-llama3.2:3b-instruct-q4_K_M}"]+ environment:+ OLLAMA_HOST: http://ollama:11434+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: "no"++ litellm:+ # CORE, deliberately — see docs/decisions/0006-llm-gateway-in-core.md.+ #+ # This was `profiles: ["full"]` on the reasoning that the gateway is "only+ # needed when a provider key is configured". The reasoning skipped a step:+ # a CORE deployment *with* a key could not use it either, because every+ # `aisoc-<role>` alias resolves nowhere except here. So the documented+ # default install — what `make up` starts and what the quickstart walks a+ # new evaluator through — could not do AI triage at all, and the profile+ # table said it did "triage".+ #+ # With no key it boots, serves its seven aliases and answers /health;+ # AiSOC's deterministic path is unchanged and still honest. Measured cost:+ # a 1.67 GB image idling at ~451 MiB, which is why the RAM figure in the+ # README moved rather than staying put.+ #+ # It is also the only party that can say what a call cost — the real+ # figure comes off its response headers — so leaving it out of CORE left+ # the default install's cost dashboard permanently unmeasurable.+ image: ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:main-stable+ container_name: aisoc-litellm+ command: ["--config", "/etc/litellm/config.yaml", "--port", "4000"]+ volumes:+ - ./infra/litellm/config.yaml:/etc/litellm/config.yaml:ro+ depends_on:+ ollama-pull:+ condition: service_completed_successfully+ environment:+ # Clients authenticate to the gateway with this key (AiSOC sends it as its+ # OPENAI_API_KEY when OPENAI_BASE_URL points here). Override in .env.+ LITELLM_MASTER_KEY: ${LITELLM_MASTER_KEY:-sk-aisoc-local}+ # Which backend every alias resolves to. infra/litellm/config.yaml reads+ # these through `os.environ/...` instead of naming a model inline, so the+ # local→hosted upgrade is three variables in .env rather than an edit to a+ # mounted config file.+ #+ # The defaults are the bundled local model, which is what makes AI triage+ # work in a default `make up` with no account and no key. Set+ # OPENAI_API_KEY plus these two to openai/gpt-4o-mini and openai/gpt-4o —+ # and clear AISOC_LLM_API_BASE — to route to a hosted provider instead.+ AISOC_LLM_MODEL_FAST: ${AISOC_LLM_MODEL_FAST:-ollama_chat/llama3.2:3b-instruct-q4_K_M}+ AISOC_LLM_MODEL_DEEP: ${AISOC_LLM_MODEL_DEEP:-ollama_chat/llama3.2:3b-instruct-q4_K_M}+ # `-` and not `:-`, deliberately: an operator moving to a hosted provider+ # sets AISOC_LLM_API_BASE= (empty) in .env, and `:-` would helpfully undo+ # that by substituting the Ollama address back in.+ AISOC_LLM_API_BASE: ${AISOC_LLM_API_BASE-http://ollama:11434}+ # Upstream provider keys the aliases resolve against (os.environ/... in the+ # config). Empty is fine — the local model answers instead.+ OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY:-}+ ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:4000:4000"+ healthcheck:+ test:+ - CMD-SHELL+ - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:4000/health/liveliness',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"+ interval: 15s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 10+ start_period: 30s+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ osquery-tls:+ build:+ context: ./services/osquery-tls+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-osquery-tls:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-osquery-tls+ depends_on:+ postgres:+ condition: service_healthy+ # Host port 8007 was previously colliding with the `ueba` service's+ # 127.0.0.1:8007 binding; remapped to 8091 here. UEBA still owns 8007.+ #+ # The container side was 8007 too, and nothing has ever listened there:+ # this service's Dockerfile runs uvicorn on 9001 and EXPOSEs 9001. The+ # published port therefore resolved to a closed socket, and because the+ # service had no healthcheck either, the container still read as+ # `running`. Found by adding the healthcheck below and watching it sit+ # at `starting` against a port with no server on it.+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8091:9001"+ profiles:+ - osquery+ environment:+ # Two roles, the same split the api service uses. This service manages+ # its own schema through alembic, so it needs the owner to apply DDL and+ # must not serve requests as it. The marker on the second line below is+ # what tells scripts/check_runtime_db_role.py the owner is deliberate.+ DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ # aisoc-db-role: owner — alembic applies this service's chain; the runtime role holds no DDL+ DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ # Read by the postgres init hook on a fresh volume and by the api+ # migration runner otherwise. Passed here too so this service's own+ # DATABASE_URL and the role's actual credential come from one value.+ AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}+ AISOC_OSQUERY_TLS_ENROLL_SECRET: ${AISOC_OSQUERY_TLS_ENROLL_SECRET:-change-me-in-production}+ # `tenant_scope` refuses outright when neither a console secret nor a+ # service token is configured and dev mode is off, and this service+ # received none of the three — the same trio `connectors` and+ # `threatintel` already carry.+ AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-}+ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ # The ingest service is registered as `ingest-worker` in this compose+ # file; the previous `http://ingest:8080` would not resolve via DNS.+ AISOC_INGEST_BASE_URL: http://ingest-worker:8080+ # A detached consumer used to read as `running`. /readyz answers 503 when+ # the subscription is gone or the schema is not at head, so `docker compose+ # ps` and `make _wait` now see the difference.+ healthcheck:+ test:+ - CMD-SHELL+ - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:9001/readyz',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 20+ start_period: 90s+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ actions:+ # Response execution, and the only service that holds the read-only vendor+ # verbs an investigation pivots through.+ #+ # This was `profiles: ["full", "chatops"]` on the reasoning that nothing in+ # CORE dispatches to it. Two things were wrong with that. The `api` service+ # in CORE already sets AISOC_ACTIONS_BASE_URL to this hostname, so the+ # live-actions surface was enabled and pointed at a name that does not+ # resolve; and the investigation agent's vendor read tools dispatch here,+ # so on the default profile the agent had no way to reach a customer's EDR+ # or IdP at all. Measured cost of moving it: 48.3 MiB resident, 539 MB of+ # image. See docs/decisions/0007-connectors-and-actions-in-core.md.+ #+ # No `profiles:` key rather than a longer list: a service in no profile is+ # included in every profile run, so `chatops` still gets it and+ # slack-bot's dependency still renders.+ build:+ context: ./services/actions+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-actions:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-actions+ depends_on:+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8002:8085"+ environment:+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/5+ DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000+ # Must match AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN on the api and slack-bot+ # services. Unset in dev, where AISOC_DEV_MODE relaxes the check;+ # require_service_auth returns 503 on every mutating route without it+ # in any other environment, which is the intended failure.+ AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ connectors:+ # Scheduled vendor polling, the 84-connector registry, and the fan-out+ # target for federated SIEM search.+ #+ # This was `profiles: ["full"]` on the reasoning that CORE accepts events+ # over the ingest HTTP API instead. That is true of ingest and says nothing+ # about the other two jobs: `api` in CORE sets CONNECTORS_SERVICE_URL to+ # this hostname and AISOC_FEATURE_FED_SEARCH defaults on, so federated+ # search fanned out to a name that does not resolve. Measured cost of+ # moving it: 76.5 MiB resident, 586 MB of image. See+ # docs/decisions/0007-connectors-and-actions-in-core.md.+ #+ # The poll scheduler is per-instance, so a fresh install schedules nothing+ # until an operator saves a connector.+ build:+ context: ./services/connectors+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-connectors:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-connectors+ depends_on:+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8088:8003"+ environment:+ # app/scripts/serve.py binds PORT, defaulting to 8087. The mapping above+ # publishes container port 8003, so leaving PORT unset put the listener+ # on a port nothing forwards to: `connectors:8003` was refused from+ # inside the network and the published host port answered nothing.+ PORT: 8003+ # Without one of these the tenant-scope dependency fails closed and+ # every route answers 503, including the catalog the API proxies — so+ # the console silently fell back to the 26-entry catalog bundled in the+ # API image instead of the 84 connectors the registry actually has.+ SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-dev_secret_key_change_in_production}+ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ # The third way this service answered 503 to everything. `SECRET_KEY`'s+ # compose default is one of INSECURE_SECRET_DEFAULTS, so+ # `resolve_console_secret()` returns "" for it; with AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN+ # also blank, `require_console_or_service_auth` has no credential+ # material at all and fails closed — correctly. The dev-mode escape that+ # exists for exactly this case was set on actions, ueba, honeytokens,+ # purple-team and slack-bot, and not on connectors. Dev mode only applies+ # when nothing is configured, so once `make env` generates a real+ # AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN this flag stops having any effect.+ AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ ENVIRONMENT: ${ENVIRONMENT:-production}+ # The bundled Postgres and Kafka serve no certificates, and+ # ENVIRONMENT now defaults to production — where a cleartext transport+ # is a boot refusal, not a warning. Without these two the documented+ # `make up` fails on a machine where there is nothing to fix, which is+ # exactly how a security default gets patched out downstream. Stated+ # here, in the file that chooses it, rather than weakened in the code+ # that enforces it: a real deployment that leaves either unset is+ # refused at boot.+ AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_DB: "1"+ AISOC_ALLOW_CLEARTEXT_KAFKA: "1"+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/6+ DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000+ # The scheduler decrypts stored connector credentials through the vault+ # and refuses to start without this key. .env.example documents it as+ # one of the three required values, but no compose service forwarded it,+ # so setting it had no effect and every deployment lost the scheduler to+ # `connector.scheduler.start_failed` — while the container still+ # reported itself started.+ AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY:-}+ AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM: ${AISOC_CREDENTIAL_KEY_ROTATION_FROM:-}+ CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_ID: ${CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_ID:-}+ CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_SECRET: ${CROWDSTRIKE_CLIENT_SECRET:-}+ AWS_REGION: ${AWS_REGION:-us-east-1}+ AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID:-}+ AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY:-}+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ threatintel:+ # CORE — the only thing in the default install that puts *real*, externally+ # sourced security data in front of a new user on day one.+ #+ # `app/clients/cisa_kev.py` fetches the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities+ # catalog: authoritative, public, and needing no API key. It has been wired+ # as a scheduled handler the whole time and sat in a profile nobody starting+ # out runs. Meanwhile the console shipped a /threat-intel page calling+ # `/api/v1/threat-intel/indicators`, which had nothing behind it in CORE and+ # was for a while filled with five invented IOCs. The missing feed and the+ # fabrication were the same hole: there was no real data to show, so+ # something invented some.+ #+ # Measured: 1.4 GB image, 219 MiB RSS steady state.+ build:+ context: ./services/threatintel+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-threatintel:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-threatintel+ depends_on:+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ qdrant:+ condition: service_healthy+ # OpenSearch is deliberately NOT a dependency any more. It was one because+ # the lifespan called os_store.initialize() without a try/except, so an+ # unreachable node killed the container — which made a `full`-profile store+ # a hard requirement of a CORE service. Both that call and the pipeline's+ # bulk index are best-effort now: with OpenSearch present you additionally+ # get full-text IOC search, and without it the feeds still write to Qdrant,+ # which is what the console reads. `make up-full` starts it and this+ # service picks it up on its next restart.+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8005:8005"+ environment:+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/7+ # This service reads OPENSEARCH_HOST/PORT. It was given OPENSEARCH_URL,+ # which its Settings has no field for and `extra="ignore"` discards, so+ # the connection worked only because the defaults happened to match the+ # compose service name. Set what is actually read.+ OPENSEARCH_HOST: opensearch+ OPENSEARCH_PORT: 9200+ QDRANT_URL: http://qdrant:6333+ NEO4J_URI: bolt://neo4j:7687+ NEO4J_USER: neo4j+ NEO4J_PASSWORD: ${NEO4J_PASSWORD:-neo4j_dev_secret}+ # Same credential the API presents when it proxies /threat-intel/indicators.+ SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:-dev_secret_key_change_in_production}+ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ MISP_URL: ${MISP_URL:-}+ MISP_API_KEY: ${MISP_API_KEY:-}+ OTX_API_KEY: ${OTX_API_KEY:-}+ TAXII_URL: ${TAXII_URL:-}+ TAXII_USERNAME: ${TAXII_USERNAME:-}+ TAXII_PASSWORD: ${TAXII_PASSWORD:-}+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ ueba:+ # full profile — Behavioural baselining. Consumes its own topic; see docs/audit/REPOSITORY_REALITY.md.+ profiles: ["full"]+ build:+ context: ./services/ueba+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-ueba:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-ueba+ depends_on:+ postgres:+ condition: service_healthy+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8007:8004"+ environment:+ # Two roles, the same split the api service uses. This service manages+ # its own schema through alembic, so it needs the owner to apply DDL and+ # must not serve requests as it. The marker on the second line below is+ # what tells scripts/check_runtime_db_role.py the owner is deliberate.+ DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ # aisoc-db-role: owner — alembic applies this service's chain; the runtime role holds no DDL+ DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ # Read by the postgres init hook on a fresh volume and by the api+ # migration runner otherwise. Passed here too so this service's own+ # DATABASE_URL and the role's actual credential come from one value.+ AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/8+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ CLICKHOUSE_URL: http://aisoc:${CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD:-clickhouse_dev_secret}@clickhouse:8123/aisoc+ CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000+ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ # A detached consumer used to read as `running`. /readyz answers 503 when+ # the subscription is gone or the schema is not at head, so `docker compose+ # ps` and `make _wait` now see the difference.+ healthcheck:+ test:+ - CMD-SHELL+ - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8004/readyz',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 20+ start_period: 90s+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ honeytokens:+ # Gated behind the `extras` profile: image isn't published to GHCR yet, so+ # `aisoc serve` skips it by default. Opt in with `--profile extras`.+ # `pull_policy: build` used to be the only thing that worked here,+ # because the image this names had never been published; it is in the+ # publish matrix now, so `--profile extras` pulls like every other+ # service instead of spending ten minutes building one.+ profiles: ["extras"]+ build:+ context: ./services/honeytokens+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-honeytokens:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-honeytokens+ depends_on:+ postgres:+ condition: service_healthy+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8008:8005"+ environment:+ # Two roles, the same split the api service uses. This service manages+ # its own schema through alembic, so it needs the owner to apply DDL and+ # must not serve requests as it. The marker on the second line below is+ # what tells scripts/check_runtime_db_role.py the owner is deliberate.+ DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ # aisoc-db-role: owner — alembic applies this service's chain; the runtime role holds no DDL+ DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ # Read by the postgres init hook on a fresh volume and by the api+ # migration runner otherwise. Passed here too so this service's own+ # DATABASE_URL and the role's actual credential come from one value.+ AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/9+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000+ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ # A detached consumer used to read as `running`. /readyz answers 503 when+ # the subscription is gone or the schema is not at head, so `docker compose+ # ps` and `make _wait` now see the difference.+ healthcheck:+ test:+ - CMD-SHELL+ - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8005/readyz',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 20+ start_period: 90s+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ purple-team:+ # Gated behind the `extras` profile: image isn't published to GHCR yet, so+ # `aisoc serve` skips it by default. Opt in with `--profile extras`.+ # `pull_policy: build` used to be the only thing that worked here,+ # because the image this names had never been published; it is in the+ # publish matrix now, so `--profile extras` pulls like every other+ # service instead of spending ten minutes building one.+ profiles: ["extras"]+ build:+ context: ./services/purple-team+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-purple-team:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-purple-team+ depends_on:+ postgres:+ condition: service_healthy+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8006:8006"+ environment:+ # Two roles, the same split the api service uses. This service manages+ # its own schema through alembic, so it needs the owner to apply DDL and+ # must not serve requests as it. The marker on the second line below is+ # what tells scripts/check_runtime_db_role.py the owner is deliberate.+ DATABASE_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc_app:${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ # aisoc-db-role: owner — alembic applies this service's chain; the runtime role holds no DDL+ DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL: postgresql+asyncpg://aisoc:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-aisoc_dev_secret}@postgres:5432/aisoc+ # Read by the postgres init hook on a fresh volume and by the api+ # migration runner otherwise. Passed here too so this service's own+ # DATABASE_URL and the role's actual credential come from one value.+ AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD: ${AISOC_APP_DB_PASSWORD:-aisoc_app_dev_secret}+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379/10+ CORE_API_URL: http://api:8000+ ATTCK_DATA_PATH: /app/data/enterprise-attack.json+ AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}+ AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ # A detached consumer used to read as `running`. /readyz answers 503 when+ # the subscription is gone or the schema is not at head, so `docker compose+ # ps` and `make _wait` now see the difference.+ healthcheck:+ test:+ - CMD-SHELL+ - "python -c \"import urllib.request,sys; r=urllib.request.urlopen('http://127.0.0.1:8006/readyz',timeout=2); sys.exit(0 if r.status==200 else 1)\" || exit 1"+ interval: 10s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 20+ start_period: 90s+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ realtime:+ build:+ context: ./services/realtime+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-realtime:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-realtime+ depends_on:+ redis:+ condition: service_healthy+ kafka:+ condition: service_healthy+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8086:4000"+ environment:+ KAFKA_BOOTSTRAP_SERVERS: kafka:29092+ REDIS_URL: redis://:${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}@redis:6379+ REDIS_PASSWORD: ${REDIS_PASSWORD:-redis_dev_secret}+ PORT: 4000+ # Both are generated by `make up`. Neither was passed to this container+ # before, which is what made the ticket verifier fall back to a constant+ # published in this repository and the /internal/* guard treat every+ # caller as authorized.+ AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET: ${AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET:-}+ REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${REALTIME_INTERNAL_TOKEN:-}+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ # ChatOps adapter. Holds no state — forwards `/aisoc …` slash commands and+ # approval-card button clicks to services/api and services/actions. Runs+ # under the `chatops` profile so a default `docker compose up` doesn't fail+ # when the operator has not yet provisioned a Slack app or service tokens.+ slack-bot:+ build:+ context: ./services/slack-bot+ dockerfile: Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-slack-bot:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-slack-bot+ depends_on:+ - api+ - actions+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:8009:8089"+ profiles:+ - chatops+ environment:+ SLACK_BOT_TOKEN: ${SLACK_BOT_TOKEN:-}+ SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET: ${SLACK_SIGNING_SECRET:-}+ AISOC_API_BASE_URL: http://api:8000+ AISOC_ACTIONS_BASE_URL: http://actions:8085+ AISOC_API_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SLACK_API_TOKEN:-}+ AISOC_ACTIONS_SERVICE_TOKEN: ${AISOC_SLACK_ACTIONS_TOKEN:-}+ AISOC_DEFAULT_TENANT_ID: ${AISOC_DEFAULT_TENANT_ID:-00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}+ AISOC_WEB_BASE_URL: ${AISOC_WEB_BASE_URL:-http://localhost:3000}+ AISOC_SLACK_BOT_PORT: 8089+ AISOC_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: 10+ # Proactive approval cards. Empty channel disables posting, which is+ # the right default: a bot that posts into a channel nobody chose is+ # worse than one that posts nowhere.+ SLACK_APPROVALS_CHANNEL: ${SLACK_APPROVALS_CHANNEL:-}+ # Shared with the agents service, which calls /internal/approval-card.+ AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN: ${AISOC_INTERNAL_TOKEN:-}+ AISOC_DEV_MODE: ${AISOC_DEV_MODE:-0}+ # What this deployment published, so the service can refuse the+ # anonymous auth shim on an address someone else can reach. It+ # binds 0.0.0.0 inside the container and cannot tell otherwise.+ AISOC_PUBLISHED_BIND_ADDRS: ${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}},${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ web:+ build:+ context: .+ dockerfile: apps/web/Dockerfile+ image: ghcr.io/beenuar/aisoc-web:${AISOC_VERSION:-latest}+ pull_policy: ${AISOC_PULL_POLICY:-missing}+ container_name: aisoc-web+ depends_on:+ - api+ - realtime+ ports:+ # The console has its own bind address because it is the only port a+ # browser needs. Everything it talks to — the API, the agents service,+ # the realtime gateway — is reached through this server's same-origin+ # proxy on the internal network, so exposing AiSOC to a single host's+ # LAN means publishing one port, not fourteen.+ #+ # AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR=0.0.0.0 # reachable at http://<host>:3000+ #+ # Falls back to AISOC_BIND_ADDR and then to loopback, so the default+ # install is still reachable only from the machine it runs on. Put it+ # behind a reverse proxy with TLS before anything hostile can route to+ # it; see apps/docs/docs/deployment/single-host.md.+ - "${AISOC_CONSOLE_BIND_ADDR:-${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}}:3000:3000"+ environment:+ # Where this server proxies to. These are read at container start by+ # apps/web/docker-entrypoint.sh, which re-points the compiled rewrite+ # table at them — so unlike the NEXT_PUBLIC_* pair that used to sit+ # here, they take effect on a pulled image.+ API_URL: ${AISOC_API_URL:-http://api:8000}+ AGENTS_URL: ${AISOC_AGENTS_URL:-http://agents:8084}+ REALTIME_URL: ${AISOC_REALTIME_URL:-http://realtime:4000}+ # NOTE: do not add NEXT_PUBLIC_* here. Next inlines those into the+ # JavaScript bundle at `next build` time, so on the pulled image this+ # service runs they are read by nothing. NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL and+ # NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL were set here and did exactly nothing; an operator+ # pointing the console at their own host edited them, saw no change,+ # and had no way to tell the setting was inert. The browser needs no+ # absolute URL at all — the bundle calls same-origin paths and this+ # server proxies them onward.+ AISOC_DEMO_MODE: ${AISOC_DEMO_MODE:-false}+ NODE_ENV: production+ networks:+ - aisoc+ restart: unless-stopped++ # ─── Observability ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────++ prometheus:+ image: prom/prometheus:v2.48.0+ container_name: aisoc-prometheus+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9091:9090"+ volumes:+ - ./infra/docker/prometheus.yml:/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml:ro+ # Phase 2.4 — alert rules mounted as a directory so adding a+ # new rule file under `infra/docker/alerts/` is picked up on+ # next `docker compose restart prometheus` (or a SIGHUP).+ - ./infra/docker/alerts:/etc/prometheus/alerts:ro+ # Phase 2.4 — Prometheus needs to reach the Alertmanager service+ # before it can forward alerts. The `depends_on` keeps `docker+ # compose up monitoring` healthy on cold boot — without it,+ # Prometheus logs "level=warn ... alertmanager_url=... err=lookup"+ # for the first ~30s of every restart.+ depends_on:+ - alertmanager+ networks:+ - aisoc+ profiles:+ - monitoring++ # Phase 2.4 — in-cluster Alertmanager. Receives firing alerts+ # from Prometheus, groups + deduplicates them per+ # `infra/docker/alertmanager.yml`, and forwards them to the+ # configured receivers. The dev stack ships with a no-op webhook+ # receiver that points at the API's `/internal/alerts/sink`+ # endpoint (which logs the payload); production operators replace+ # the receiver block with PagerDuty / Slack / Opsgenie. The+ # `monitoring` profile keeps it out of `docker compose up`'s+ # default surface so a stock `aisoc serve` doesn't fail when the+ # operator hasn't provisioned downstream alerting.+ alertmanager:+ image: prom/alertmanager:v0.27.0+ container_name: aisoc-alertmanager+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:9094:9093"+ volumes:+ - ./infra/docker/alertmanager.yml:/etc/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml:ro+ command:+ - '--config.file=/etc/alertmanager/alertmanager.yml'+ - '--storage.path=/alertmanager'+ # External URL is what Alertmanager uses to render deep-links+ # in notification templates (e.g. "Silence in Alertmanager").+ # Port 9094 here matches the host-side mapping so the link+ # works from a browser on the operator's laptop.+ - '--web.external-url=http://localhost:9094'+ # NOTE: The Alertmanager binary does NOT substitute shell-style+ # env vars in `alertmanager.yml`. To change receivers per+ # environment, mount a different config file (production+ # deployments do this through Helm values templating).+ networks:+ - aisoc+ profiles:+ - monitoring++ # ── Tracing ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+ # The services default OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT to+ # http://otel-collector:4317 and no collector shipped in any compose file,+ # so out of the box every span went into a connection error. That is worse+ # than having no tracing at all: the code looks instrumented, the logs fill+ # with export failures, and nobody can tell whether a missing trace means a+ # missing span or a missing collector.+ #+ # Scope, stated because the docs previously overstated it: api, agents,+ # ueba and honeytokens are instrumented. ingest (Go) and realtime+ # (TypeScript) are not, and they are the two ends of the Kafka spine.+ otel-collector:+ image: otel/opentelemetry-collector-contrib:0.109.0+ container_name: aisoc-otel-collector+ command: ["--config=/etc/otel/collector.yaml"]+ depends_on:+ - tempo+ volumes:+ - ./infra/docker/otel/collector.yaml:/etc/otel/collector.yaml:ro+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:4317:4317"+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:4318:4318"+ healthcheck:+ test: ["CMD", "/otelcol-contrib", "--version"]+ interval: 30s+ timeout: 5s+ retries: 3+ networks:+ - aisoc+ profiles:+ - monitoring++ tempo:+ image: grafana/tempo:2.6.0+ container_name: aisoc-tempo+ command: ["-config.file=/etc/tempo/tempo.yaml"]+ user: "0:0"+ volumes:+ - ./infra/docker/otel/tempo.yaml:/etc/tempo/tempo.yaml:ro+ - tempo_data:/var/tempo+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:3200:3200"+ networks:+ - aisoc+ profiles:+ - monitoring++ grafana:+ image: grafana/grafana:10.2.0+ container_name: aisoc-grafana+ depends_on:+ - prometheus+ - tempo+ ports:+ - "${AISOC_BIND_ADDR:-127.0.0.1}:3001:3000"+ # Default admin password is intentionally weak for the dev compose stack;+ # the 127.0.0.1 binding above keeps the dashboard off the LAN. Override+ # GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD in production deployments (helm/terraform).+ environment:+ GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-admin}+ volumes:+ - ./infra/docker/grafana:/etc/grafana/provisioning:ro+ networks:+ - aisoc+ profiles:+ - monitoringdiff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.pyindex acc24c6f7..65cd67b33 100644--- a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query, Response, statusfrom fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, PlainTextResponsefrom pydantic import BaseModel, Fieldfrom sqlalchemy import text+from sqlalchemy import selectfrom app.api.v1.deps import AuthUser, DBSession, require_permissionfrom app.core.logging import safe_log_value@@ -72,6 +73,16 @@ router = APIRouter(prefix="/cases", tags=["cases"])# to the agents service so the front end has a single, stable API origin._AGENTS_URL = (os.getenv("AGENTS_SERVICE_URL") or os.getenv("AGENTS_API_URL") or "http://agents:8084").rstrip("/")+# The agents service guards its routes with require_console_or_service_auth:+# it accepts a console JWT or the shared service token paired with an explicit+# tenant header, and fails closed (401 "missing bearer credential") otherwise.+# This proxy forwards the user's *claims* but must present a credential of its+# own: the agents service does not share the API's user database. Resolve the+# same per-service token the agents service verifies (specific first, then+# shared), matching tenant_scope.resolve_service_token's precedence.+_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN = (os.getenv("AISOC_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN") or os.getenv("AISOC_SERVICE_TOKEN") or "").strip()++# Tight allowlist for proxied request paths. We only ever proxy to a fixed# upstream (`_AGENTS_URL`) on a known set of investigation routes, so the# path must be a pure relative path — no scheme, no host, no control bytes,@@ -94,7 +105,9 @@ def _validate_agents_path(path: str) -> str:# Pydantic schemas# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────-CaseStatus = Literal["new", "triaged", "investigating", "contained", "resolved", "closed"]+CaseStatus = Literal["new", "triaged", "investigating", "contained", "resolved", "closed",+ # legacy/console aliases, normalized to the ladder above in update_case+ "open", "in_progress", "pending", "pending_closure", "cancelled"]CaseSeverity = Literal["info", "low", "medium", "high", "critical"]# Valid forward-only state transitions@@ -104,6 +117,29 @@ CaseSeverity = Literal["info", "low", "medium", "high", "critical"]# status even is._TRANSITIONS: dict[str, set[str]] = case_status.TRANSITIONS+# The console historically spoke a second vocabulary (open/in_progress/pending/+# cancelled — see packages/types CaseStatus), so every status the UI can send+# is normalized onto the canonical ladder *before* the transition gate above+# runs. Aliases never bypass validation; they only translate the vocabulary.+_STATUS_ALIASES: dict[str, str] = {+ "open": "new",+ "in_progress": "investigating",+ "pending": "contained",+ "pending_closure": "contained",+ "cancelled": "closed",+}+++def _normalize_status(status: str) -> str:+ return _STATUS_ALIASES.get(status, status)+++def _status_transition_ok(current: str, target: str) -> bool:+ """Upstream's canonical gate: every move must be a declared edge in+ `case_status.TRANSITIONS`. Backwards moves and undeclared skips are+ rejected; reopening goes through the explicit reopen action."""+ return target in _TRANSITIONS.get(current, set())+class CreateCaseRequest(BaseModel):title: str = Field(..., min_length=3)@@ -677,12 +713,13 @@ async def update_case(if not existing:raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")+ if body.status is not None:+ body.status = _normalize_status(body.status)if body.status and body.status != existing.status:- allowed = _TRANSITIONS.get(existing.status, set())- if body.status not in allowed:+ if not _status_transition_ok(existing.status, body.status):raise HTTPException(status_code=422,- detail=f"Invalid status transition: {existing.status} → {body.status}. Allowed: {sorted(allowed) or 'none'}",+ detail=f"Invalid status transition: {existing.status} → {body.status}. Allowed: {sorted(_TRANSITIONS.get(existing.status, set())) or 'none'}; reopening requires the reopen action.",)now = datetime.now(UTC)@@ -1340,9 +1377,12 @@ async def _agents_proxy(method: str, path: str, **kwargs: Any) -> httpx.Responsesafe_path = _validate_agents_path(path)url = f"{_AGENTS_URL}{safe_path}"timeout = kwargs.pop("timeout", 30.0)+ headers = dict(kwargs.pop("headers", None) or {})+ if _AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN:+ headers.setdefault("Authorization", f"Bearer {_AGENTS_SERVICE_TOKEN}")try:async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=timeout) as client:- return await client.request(method, url, **kwargs)+ return await client.request(method, url, headers=headers, **kwargs)except httpx.HTTPError as exc:logger.exception("agents_proxy.request_failed",@@ -1489,16 +1529,13 @@ async def case_investigate(# to the real tenant instead of falling back to the "default" placeholder,# which the demo seed no longer maps to any tenant (issue #601). The ledger# is scoped by tenant_id, so without this the whole run is never persisted.+ # Service-token path requires the acting tenant on the header, not just+ # in the body: tenant_scope refuses a service token with no tenant.resp = await _agents_proxy("POST",f"/api/v1/cases/{cid}/investigate",- json={- "alert_summary": summary,- "tenant_id": str(user.tenant_id),- # Declared by `InvestigationRequest` on the agents side since it- # was written, and never sent by anything until now.- "raw_alert": raw_alert,- },+ json={"alert_summary": body.alert_summary or "", "tenant_id": str(user.tenant_id)},+ headers={"X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID": str(user.tenant_id)},)if resp.status_code >= 400:raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)@@ -1518,15 +1555,39 @@ async def list_case_investigations("""cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)try:- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/cases/{cid}/investigations")- if resp.status_code == 404:- return {"runs": []}- if resp.status_code >= 400:- return {"runs": []}- return resp.json()+ resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/cases/{cid}/investigations", headers={"X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID": str(user.tenant_id)})+ if resp.status_code < 400:+ return resp.json()except HTTPException:- # Agents service unavailable — render a soft-empty list instead of 503.- return {"runs": []}+ pass+ # Agents service has no list route (or is unreachable) — fall back to the+ # local ledger, which every run persists to anyway.+ from app.models.investigation import InvestigationRun+ rows = (+ await db.execute(+ select(InvestigationRun)+ .where(InvestigationRun.tenant_id == user.tenant_id)+ .where(InvestigationRun.case_id.in_([str(cid), str(case_id)]))+ .order_by(InvestigationRun.created_at.desc())+ .limit(20)+ )+ ).scalars().all()+ return {+ "runs": [+ {+ "run_id": str(r.id),+ "case_id": r.case_id,+ "status": r.status,+ "model": r.model_used,+ "iterations": r.iterations,+ "total_tokens": r.total_tokens,+ "started_at": r.started_at.isoformat() if r.started_at else None,+ "completed_at": r.completed_at.isoformat() if r.completed_at else None,+ "error": r.error,+ }+ for r in rows+ ]+ }@router.get("/{case_id}/investigations/{run_id}", summary="Get investigation run")@@ -1554,7 +1615,7 @@ async def case_investigation_run(# URL-encode the user-supplied run_id so it cannot inject `/`, `?`, `#`,# CR/LF, or other URL syntax into the proxied path.safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}")+ resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}", headers={"X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID": str(user.tenant_id)})if resp.status_code >= 400:raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)run = resp.json()@@ -1593,7 +1654,7 @@ async def case_investigation_report_md(cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")- meta = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}")+ meta = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}", headers={"X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID": str(user.tenant_id)})if meta.status_code >= 400:raise HTTPException(status_code=meta.status_code, detail=meta.text)run_case_id = meta.json().get("case_id")@@ -1603,7 +1664,7 @@ async def case_investigation_report_md(detail="Investigation run not found for this case",)- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.md")+ resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.md", headers={"X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID": str(user.tenant_id)})if resp.status_code >= 400:raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)return PlainTextResponse(content=resp.text, media_type="text/markdown; charset=utf-8")@@ -1756,7 +1817,7 @@ async def case_investigation_pdf(user: AuthUser,) -> Response:safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")- resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.pdf")+ resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.pdf", headers={"X-AiSOC-Tenant-ID": str(user.tenant_id)})if resp.status_code >= 400:raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)safe_case_id = _safe_filename_segment(case_id)diff --git a/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py.bak.1790945982 b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py.bak.1790945982new file mode 100644index 000000000..8e9d21727--- /dev/null+++ b/services/api/app/api/v1/endpoints/cases.py.bak.1790945982@@ -0,0 +1,1478 @@+"""First-class case management (tier2-cases).++Implements the full case lifecycle: new → triaged → investigating → contained →+resolved → closed. Each case aggregates multiple alerts, maintains an observable+graph, evidence chain, and MITRE ATT&CK coverage map.++Tenant isolation+----------------+Every query in this module is scoped by ``tenant_id = user.tenant_id``. The+``aisoc_cases`` table has carried a ``tenant_id`` column since migration 012+but the API historically did not filter by it, allowing any authenticated+caller to read or mutate another tenant's cases just by guessing a UUID (or+by guessing the short ``INC-001`` form). Companion tables+(``aisoc_case_comments``, ``aisoc_case_tasks``) gained a ``tenant_id``+column in migration 044 and are backfilled from their parent case so the+same RLS predicate applies uniformly.++The ``_resolve_case_id`` helper is also tenant-scoped — looking up+``INC-001`` for tenant A must never return tenant B's INC-001.++Endpoints+---------+* ``GET /cases`` List cases (filterable by status/severity/assignee).+* ``POST /cases`` Create a new case.+* ``GET /cases/{id}`` Retrieve a case.+* ``PATCH /cases/{id}`` Update case fields (status, severity, assignee, …).+* ``POST /cases/{id}/alerts`` Link alerts to a case.+* ``POST /cases/{id}/observables`` Add / update observable graph nodes/edges.+* ``POST /cases/{id}/comments`` Add a comment / timeline entry.+* ``GET /cases/{id}/comments`` List comments for a case.+* ``GET /cases/{id}/evidence`` Export the evidence chain as a structured report.+"""++from __future__ import annotations++import logging+import os+import re+import uuid+from datetime import UTC, datetime+from typing import Annotated, Any, Literal+from urllib.parse import quote++import httpx+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query, Response, status+from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, PlainTextResponse+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field+from sqlalchemy import text++from app.api.v1.deps import AuthUser, DBSession, require_permission+from app.core.logging import safe_log_value+from app.services.case_fanout import (+ FanoutResult,+ fanout_create_case,+ fanout_status_change,+)+from app.services.case_postmortem import build_case_postmortem+from app.services.case_postmortem_html import render_case_postmortem_html+from app.services.case_summary import build_case_summary+from app.services.case_summary_html import render_case_summary_html++logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)++router = APIRouter(prefix="/cases", tags=["cases"])++# The agents service owns the actual investigation orchestrator (Pillar-1).+# We keep the route surface on `/cases/{id}/investigate` and+# `/cases/{id}/investigations/{run_id}` for the web console and proxy through+# to the agents service so the front end has a single, stable API origin.+_AGENTS_URL = (os.getenv("AGENTS_SERVICE_URL") or os.getenv("AGENTS_API_URL") or "http://agents:8084").rstrip("/")++# Tight allowlist for proxied request paths. We only ever proxy to a fixed+# upstream (`_AGENTS_URL`) on a known set of investigation routes, so the+# path must be a pure relative path — no scheme, no host, no control bytes,+# no traversal sequences. This neutralises partial-SSRF (an attacker cannot+# redirect the request to a different host) and log-injection (the path+# can never contain CR/LF or other control characters).+_SAFE_PROXY_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"^/[A-Za-z0-9_\-./%]*$")+++def _validate_agents_path(path: str) -> str:+ """Reject any proxied path that isn't a tightly constrained relative path."""+ if (+ not isinstance(path, str) or not _SAFE_PROXY_PATH_RE.match(path) or ".." in path or path.startswith("//") # protocol-relative URL+ ):+ raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="invalid_request_path")+ return path+++# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Pydantic schemas+# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────++CaseStatus = Literal["new", "triaged", "investigating", "contained", "resolved", "closed"]+CaseSeverity = Literal["info", "low", "medium", "high", "critical"]++# Valid forward-only state transitions+_TRANSITIONS: dict[str, set[str]] = {+ "new": {"triaged"},+ "triaged": {"investigating"},+ "investigating": {"contained", "resolved"},+ "contained": {"resolved"},+ "resolved": {"closed"},+ "closed": set(),+}+++class CreateCaseRequest(BaseModel):+ title: str = Field(..., min_length=3)+ description: str | None = None+ severity: CaseSeverity = "medium"+ assignee: str | None = None+ alert_ids: list[uuid.UUID] = Field(default_factory=list)+ mitre_techniques: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)+ compliance_frameworks: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)+ tags: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)+ sla_due_at: datetime | None = None+ # Workstream 8 — bidirectional ITSM. When the operator selects one or+ # more connector instances at create time, the API fans the new case+ # out to those external systems and persists the linkage in+ # ``case_external_refs``. Connector instances must be tenant-owned,+ # enabled, and declare ``Capability.PUSH_CASE`` (e.g. Jira,+ # ServiceNow). Empty list = case stays AiSOC-only.+ push_to_connector_ids: list[uuid.UUID] = Field(default_factory=list)+++class UpdateCaseRequest(BaseModel):+ title: str | None = None+ description: str | None = None+ severity: CaseSeverity | None = None+ status: CaseStatus | None = None+ assignee: str | None = None+ mitre_techniques: list[str] | None = None+ compliance_frameworks: list[str] | None = None+ tags: dict[str, str] | None = None+ sla_due_at: datetime | None = None+++class AddAlertsRequest(BaseModel):+ alert_ids: list[uuid.UUID]+++class ObservableNode(BaseModel):+ id: str+ kind: Literal["ip", "user", "host", "domain", "hash", "file", "process", "alert"]+ value: str+ tags: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)+++class ObservableEdge(BaseModel):+ source: str+ target: str+ relation: str+++class UpdateObservablesRequest(BaseModel):+ nodes: list[ObservableNode] = Field(default_factory=list)+ edges: list[ObservableEdge] = Field(default_factory=list)+++class AddCommentRequest(BaseModel):+ body: str = Field(..., min_length=1)+ is_system: bool = False+++class CaseResponse(BaseModel):+ id: uuid.UUID+ case_number: str | None = None+ title: str+ description: str | None+ severity: str+ status: str+ assignee: str | None+ mitre_techniques: list[str]+ alert_ids: list[uuid.UUID]+ observable_graph: dict[str, Any]+ evidence_chain: list[dict[str, Any]]+ compliance_frameworks: list[str]+ opened_at: datetime+ triaged_at: datetime | None+ resolved_at: datetime | None+ closed_at: datetime | None+ created_at: datetime+ updated_at: datetime+ created_by: str | None+ tags: dict[str, Any]+ sla_due_at: datetime | None+ # Workstream 8 — populated only by ``POST /cases`` (create-time+ # fan-out) and ``PATCH /cases/{id}`` when ``status`` is changed.+ # The list is per-connector-instance and includes failures so the+ # UI can show "Jira ✓ · ServiceNow ✗ (timeout)" beside the case+ # without a follow-up GET. ``None`` (default) means "no fan-out+ # was attempted on this call" and is distinct from ``[]`` ("fan-out+ # was attempted but no connectors were selected").+ fanout_results: list[FanoutResult] | None = None+++class CommentResponse(BaseModel):+ id: uuid.UUID+ case_id: uuid.UUID+ author: str | None+ body: str+ is_system: bool+ created_at: datetime+++class EvidenceReport(BaseModel):+ case_id: uuid.UUID+ title: str+ severity: str+ status: str+ alert_count: int+ mitre_techniques: list[str]+ compliance_frameworks: list[str]+ evidence_chain: list[dict[str, Any]]+ generated_at: datetime+++# Timeline / tasks+TaskStatus = Literal["todo", "in_progress", "done"]+++class TimelineEvent(BaseModel):+ id: str+ type: str # 'created' | 'status_change' | 'comment' | 'alert_linked' | 'task'+ timestamp: datetime+ title: str+ description: str | None = None+ actor: str | None = None+++class TimelineResponse(BaseModel):+ events: list[TimelineEvent]+++class CreateTaskRequest(BaseModel):+ title: str = Field(..., min_length=1)+ status: TaskStatus = "todo"+ assignee: str | None = None+ due_at: datetime | None = Field(None, alias="dueAt")++ model_config = {"populate_by_name": True}+++class UpdateTaskRequest(BaseModel):+ title: str | None = None+ status: TaskStatus | None = None+ assignee: str | None = None+ due_at: datetime | None = Field(None, alias="dueAt")++ model_config = {"populate_by_name": True}+++class TaskResponse(BaseModel):+ id: str+ title: str+ status: TaskStatus+ assignee: str | None = None+ due_at: datetime | None = Field(None, alias="dueAt")+ created_at: datetime = Field(..., alias="createdAt")++ model_config = {"populate_by_name": True}+++def _row_to_task(row: Any) -> TaskResponse:+ return TaskResponse(+ id=str(row.id),+ title=row.title,+ status=row.status,+ assignee=row.assignee,+ dueAt=row.due_at,+ createdAt=row.created_at,+ )+++# Investigation proxy schemas (forwarded to the agents service).+class InvestigateRequest(BaseModel):+ alert_summary: str | None = ""+++# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Helpers+# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+++def _coerce_mitre(values: Any) -> list[str]:+ """Normalize mitre_techniques to a list of technique IDs.++ Accepts list[str] or list[dict] like ``{"id": "T1041", "name": "..."}``.+ Older seed fixtures stored objects; newer ones store flat IDs.+ """+ if not values:+ return []+ out: list[str] = []+ for item in values:+ if isinstance(item, str):+ out.append(item)+ elif isinstance(item, dict):+ tid = item.get("id") or item.get("technique_id") or item.get("name")+ if tid:+ out.append(str(tid))+ return out+++def _coerce_tags(value: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:+ """aisoc_cases.tags is JSONB which may be an object or array."""+ if isinstance(value, dict):+ return value+ if isinstance(value, list):+ return {"labels": [str(v) for v in value]}+ return {}+++def _row_to_case(row: Any) -> CaseResponse:+ return CaseResponse(+ id=row.id,+ case_number=getattr(row, "case_number", None),+ title=row.title,+ description=row.description,+ severity=row.severity,+ status=row.status,+ assignee=row.assignee,+ mitre_techniques=_coerce_mitre(row.mitre_techniques),+ alert_ids=list(row.alert_ids or []),+ observable_graph=dict(row.observable_graph or {}),+ evidence_chain=list(row.evidence_chain or []),+ compliance_frameworks=list(row.compliance_frameworks or []),+ opened_at=row.opened_at,+ triaged_at=row.triaged_at,+ resolved_at=row.resolved_at,+ closed_at=row.closed_at,+ created_at=row.created_at,+ updated_at=row.updated_at,+ created_by=row.created_by,+ tags=_coerce_tags(row.tags),+ sla_due_at=row.sla_due_at,+ )+++async def _resolve_case_id(case_id: str, db: Any, tenant_id: uuid.UUID) -> uuid.UUID:+ """Resolve a case identifier (UUID **or** human-readable case_number) to a UUID+ scoped to the caller's tenant.++ The web console and demo deeplinks use short identifiers like ``INC-001``,+ while the database primary key is a UUID. Accepting both forms here keeps+ the API ergonomic without forcing the front end to do a separate lookup.++ Tenant scoping is enforced in both branches:++ * For the UUID branch we return the parsed UUID without touching the DB;+ callers must still apply ``WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id`` in their own+ query, which they all do. (We don't probe existence here because every+ caller does its own SELECT and would issue a redundant round-trip.)+ * For the ``case_number`` branch we look up the row with+ ``WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id AND case_number = :case_number`` so an+ attacker can't enumerate another tenant's INC-NNN identifiers.++ Raises ``404`` if the identifier doesn't match either form within the+ caller's tenant.+ """+ case_id = (case_id or "").strip()+ if not case_id:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")++ # Try UUID first — that's the canonical form. Tenant scoping is enforced+ # by the per-endpoint queries that consume the returned UUID, so we+ # don't need a DB round-trip just to validate the format.+ try:+ return uuid.UUID(case_id)+ except (ValueError, AttributeError):+ pass++ # Fall back to case_number lookup. Use a parameterized query — never+ # interpolate the raw string into SQL — and scope by tenant so the+ # short-id form can't be used as a cross-tenant oracle.+ row = (+ await db.execute(+ text(+ "SELECT id FROM aisoc_cases WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id AND case_number = :case_number ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1"+ ).bindparams(tenant_id=tenant_id, case_number=case_id)+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not row:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")+ return row.id+++# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Endpoints+# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────++[email protected]("", response_model=list[CaseResponse], summary="List cases")+async def list_cases(+ db: DBSession,+ user: AuthUser,+ status_filter: str | None = Query(None, alias="status"),+ severity: str | None = Query(None),+ assignee: str | None = Query(None),+ limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=500),+ offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),+) -> list[CaseResponse]:+ # Tenant scoping is non-optional. The aisoc_cases table has carried a+ # tenant_id column since migration 012; until P2-W1 the API simply+ # ignored it, exposing every tenant's caseload to every authenticated+ # caller. Anchor the WHERE clause on tenant_id so the filter is always+ # present even when the operator passes no other filters.+ where_clauses = ["tenant_id = :tenant_id"]+ params: dict[str, Any] = {+ "limit": limit,+ "offset": offset,+ "tenant_id": user.tenant_id,+ }+ if status_filter:+ where_clauses.append("status = :status")+ params["status"] = status_filter+ if severity:+ where_clauses.append("severity = :severity")+ params["severity"] = severity+ if assignee:+ where_clauses.append("assignee = :assignee")+ params["assignee"] = assignee++ q = f"""+ SELECT * FROM aisoc_cases+ WHERE {" AND ".join(where_clauses)}+ ORDER BY created_at DESC+ LIMIT :limit OFFSET :offset+ """+ try:+ rows = await db.execute(text(q).bindparams(**params))+ return [_row_to_case(r) for r in rows.fetchall()]+ except Exception as exc:+ logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")+ raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc++[email protected]("", response_model=CaseResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED, summary="Create case")+async def create_case(+ body: CreateCaseRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]+) -> CaseResponse:+ import json as _json++ case_id = uuid.uuid4()+ now = datetime.now(UTC)+ # Note: PostgreSQL ``::type`` casts inside text() confuse SQLAlchemy's+ # bind-parameter parser; use ``CAST(:param AS TYPE)`` so the bind survives+ # the round-trip (see also Batch 2 / hunts.py for the same gotcha).+ q = text("""+ INSERT INTO aisoc_cases (+ id, tenant_id, title, description, severity, status, assignee,+ mitre_techniques, alert_ids, compliance_frameworks, tags,+ sla_due_at, opened_at, created_at, updated_at, created_by+ ) VALUES (+ :id, :tenant_id, :title, :description, :severity, 'new', :assignee,+ CAST(:mitre AS JSONB), CAST(:alert_ids AS UUID[]),+ CAST(:frameworks AS TEXT[]), CAST(:tags AS JSONB),+ :sla, :now, :now, :now, :user+ ) RETURNING *+ """).bindparams(+ id=case_id,+ tenant_id=user.tenant_id,+ title=body.title,+ description=body.description,+ severity=body.severity,+ assignee=body.assignee,+ mitre=_json.dumps(body.mitre_techniques),+ alert_ids=list(map(str, body.alert_ids)) or [],+ frameworks=body.compliance_frameworks or [],+ tags=_json.dumps(body.tags),+ sla=body.sla_due_at,+ now=now,+ user=getattr(user, "email", None) or "system",+ )+ try:+ row = (await db.execute(q)).fetchone()+ if row is None:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error: INSERT returned no row")+ await db.commit()+ except Exception as exc:+ await db.rollback()+ logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")+ raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc++ response = _row_to_case(row)++ # Workstream 8 — fan out to operator-selected ITSM connectors. The+ # case is already persisted (commit above) so a flaky Jira can't+ # block the create. ``fanout_create_case`` swallows per-backend+ # errors into the FanoutResult.status field; we only need to+ # commit the ``case_external_refs`` writes it staged.+ if body.push_to_connector_ids:+ try:+ results = await fanout_create_case(+ db,+ case_row=row,+ tenant_id=user.tenant_id,+ connector_ids=body.push_to_connector_ids,+ pushed_by=getattr(user, "email", None),+ )+ await db.commit()+ response.fanout_results = results+ except Exception:+ # Persistence of external refs failed but the AiSOC case+ # itself is fine; surface the partial result and move on.+ logger.exception("cases.create.fanout_persistence_failed case=%s", row.id)+ await db.rollback()+ response.fanout_results = []++ return response++[email protected]("/{case_id}", response_model=CaseResponse, summary="Get case")+async def get_case(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> CaseResponse:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ row = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT * FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not row:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")+ return _row_to_case(row)++[email protected]("/{case_id}", response_model=CaseResponse, summary="Update case")+async def update_case(+ case_id: str, body: UpdateCaseRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]+) -> CaseResponse:+ import json as _json++ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ existing = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT status FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not existing:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")++ if body.status and body.status != existing.status:+ allowed = _TRANSITIONS.get(existing.status, set())+ if body.status not in allowed:+ raise HTTPException(+ status_code=422,+ detail=f"Invalid status transition: {existing.status} → {body.status}. Allowed: {sorted(allowed) or 'none'}",+ )++ now = datetime.now(UTC)+ sets = ["updated_at = :now"]+ params: dict[str, Any] = {+ "id": cid,+ "now": now,+ "tenant_id": user.tenant_id,+ }++ if body.title is not None:+ sets.append("title = :title")+ params["title"] = body.title+ if body.description is not None:+ sets.append("description = :description")+ params["description"] = body.description+ if body.severity is not None:+ sets.append("severity = :severity")+ params["severity"] = body.severity+ if body.assignee is not None:+ sets.append("assignee = :assignee")+ params["assignee"] = body.assignee+ if body.sla_due_at is not None:+ sets.append("sla_due_at = :sla")+ params["sla"] = body.sla_due_at+ if body.mitre_techniques is not None:+ sets.append("mitre_techniques = CAST(:mitre AS JSONB)")+ params["mitre"] = _json.dumps(body.mitre_techniques)+ if body.compliance_frameworks is not None:+ sets.append("compliance_frameworks = CAST(:frameworks AS TEXT[])")+ params["frameworks"] = body.compliance_frameworks+ if body.tags is not None:+ sets.append("tags = CAST(:tags AS JSONB)")+ params["tags"] = _json.dumps(body.tags)++ if body.status:+ sets.append("status = :status")+ params["status"] = body.status+ ts_col = {"triaged": "triaged_at", "resolved": "resolved_at", "closed": "closed_at"}.get(body.status)+ if ts_col:+ sets.append(f"{ts_col} = :now")++ q = text(f"UPDATE aisoc_cases SET {', '.join(sets)} WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id RETURNING *").bindparams(**params)+ try:+ row = (await db.execute(q)).fetchone()+ if row is None:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")+ await db.commit()+ except Exception as exc:+ await db.rollback()+ logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")+ raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc++ response = _row_to_case(row)++ # Workstream 8 — if the operator changed status, project the+ # transition onto every connector this case is already linked to.+ # ``fanout_status_change`` no-ops when the case has no+ # ``case_external_refs`` rows yet, so the call is cheap for+ # AiSOC-only cases.+ if body.status and body.status != existing.status:+ try:+ results = await fanout_status_change(+ db,+ case_row=row,+ tenant_id=user.tenant_id,+ old_status=existing.status,+ new_status=body.status,+ pushed_by=getattr(user, "email", None),+ )+ if results:+ await db.commit()+ response.fanout_results = results+ except Exception:+ logger.exception("cases.update.fanout_persistence_failed case=%s", row.id)+ await db.rollback()+ response.fanout_results = []++ # WS-D2 — when a case enters its terminal lifecycle stages, drop a+ # system note pointing to the auto-summary artifact. The summary+ # itself is generated on-demand by GET /cases/{id}/summary, so this+ # is a cheap, idempotent breadcrumb rather than a heavy precompute.+ if body.status in {"resolved", "closed"}:+ try:+ await _emit_summary_breadcrumb(+ db,+ case_id=row.id,+ tenant_id=user.tenant_id,+ status=body.status,+ )+ except Exception: # pragma: no cover — defensive: never block status change.+ logger.exception("cases.update.summary_breadcrumb_failed case=%s", row.id)+ await db.rollback()++ return response++[email protected]("/{case_id}/alerts", response_model=CaseResponse, summary="Link alerts to a case")+async def add_alerts(+ case_id: str, body: AddAlertsRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]+) -> CaseResponse:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ ids_str = [str(a) for a in body.alert_ids]+ q = text("""+ UPDATE aisoc_cases+ SET alert_ids = array(SELECT DISTINCT unnest(alert_ids || CAST(:new_ids AS UUID[]))),+ updated_at = now()+ WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id+ RETURNING *+ """).bindparams(id=cid, new_ids=ids_str, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ try:+ row = (await db.execute(q)).fetchone()+ if not row:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")+ await db.commit()+ return _row_to_case(row)+ except HTTPException:+ raise+ except Exception as exc:+ await db.rollback()+ logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")+ raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc++[email protected]("/{case_id}/observables", response_model=CaseResponse, summary="Update observable graph")+async def update_observables(+ case_id: str, body: UpdateObservablesRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]+) -> CaseResponse:+ import json as _json++ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ existing = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT observable_graph FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(+ id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id+ )+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not existing:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")++ graph: dict[str, Any] = dict(existing.observable_graph or {})+ nodes = graph.get("nodes", [])+ edges = graph.get("edges", [])++ existing_ids = {n["id"] for n in nodes}+ for n in body.nodes:+ if n.id not in existing_ids:+ nodes.append(n.model_dump())+ else:+ nodes = [n.model_dump() if x["id"] == n.id else x for x in nodes]++ edge_keys = {(e["source"], e["target"]) for e in edges}+ for e in body.edges:+ if (e.source, e.target) not in edge_keys:+ edges.append(e.model_dump())++ graph = {"nodes": nodes, "edges": edges}+ q = text(+ "UPDATE aisoc_cases SET observable_graph = CAST(:g AS JSONB), updated_at = now() "+ "WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id RETURNING *"+ ).bindparams(id=cid, g=_json.dumps(graph), tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ try:+ row = (await db.execute(q)).fetchone()+ await db.commit()+ return _row_to_case(row)+ except Exception as exc:+ await db.rollback()+ logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")+ raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc++[email protected]("/{case_id}/comments", response_model=CommentResponse, status_code=201, summary="Add comment")+async def add_comment(+ case_id: str, body: AddCommentRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]+) -> CommentResponse:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ exists = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT 1 FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not exists:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")++ comment_id = uuid.uuid4()+ now = datetime.now(UTC)+ # Stamp the row with tenant_id so the comment table is independently+ # tenant-scoped — see migration 044.+ q = text("""+ INSERT INTO aisoc_case_comments+ (id, case_id, tenant_id, author, body, is_system, created_at)+ VALUES+ (:id, :case_id, :tenant_id, :author, :body, :sys, :now)+ RETURNING *+ """).bindparams(+ id=comment_id,+ case_id=cid,+ tenant_id=user.tenant_id,+ author=getattr(user, "email", None) or "system",+ body=body.body,+ sys=body.is_system,+ now=now,+ )+ try:+ row = (await db.execute(q)).fetchone()+ if row is None:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error: INSERT returned no row")+ await db.commit()+ return CommentResponse(+ id=row.id,+ case_id=row.case_id,+ author=row.author,+ body=row.body,+ is_system=row.is_system,+ created_at=row.created_at,+ )+ except Exception as exc:+ await db.rollback()+ logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")+ raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc++[email protected]("/{case_id}/comments", response_model=list[CommentResponse], summary="List case comments")+async def list_comments(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> list[CommentResponse]:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ rows = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT * FROM aisoc_case_comments WHERE case_id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id ORDER BY created_at").bindparams(+ id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id+ )+ )+ ).fetchall()+ return [+ CommentResponse(id=r.id, case_id=r.case_id, author=r.author, body=r.body, is_system=r.is_system, created_at=r.created_at)+ for r in rows+ ]+++# Alias `/notes` → `/comments` so the web console (which calls `/notes` for the+# "Add Note" affordance) hits the same backing store. Keeping both routes+# avoids a behavior change for any existing integration that already speaks+# `/comments`.[email protected]("/{case_id}/notes", response_model=list[CommentResponse], summary="List case notes (alias of /comments)")+async def list_notes(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> list[CommentResponse]:+ return await list_comments(case_id, db, user)++[email protected]("/{case_id}/notes", response_model=CommentResponse, status_code=201, summary="Add case note (alias of /comments)")+async def add_note(+ case_id: str, body: AddCommentRequest, db: DBSession, user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))]+) -> CommentResponse:+ return await add_comment(case_id, body, db, user)++[email protected]("/{case_id}/evidence", response_model=EvidenceReport, summary="Export evidence chain report")+async def evidence_report(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> EvidenceReport:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ row = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT * FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not row:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")+ return EvidenceReport(+ case_id=row.id,+ title=row.title,+ severity=row.severity,+ status=row.status,+ alert_count=len(row.alert_ids or []),+ mitre_techniques=_coerce_mitre(row.mitre_techniques),+ compliance_frameworks=list(row.compliance_frameworks or []),+ evidence_chain=list(row.evidence_chain or []),+ generated_at=datetime.now(UTC),+ )+++# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Timeline+#+# A flattened activity stream that the case workspace renders on the right.+# We synthesize the timeline from the case's own state transitions, linked+# alerts, comments, and tasks so the front end gets one unified view without+# orchestrating four separate calls.+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────++[email protected]("/{case_id}/timeline", response_model=TimelineResponse, summary="Case activity timeline")+async def case_timeline(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> TimelineResponse:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ case_row = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT * FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not case_row:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")++ events: list[TimelineEvent] = []++ # Case creation event+ events.append(+ TimelineEvent(+ id=f"case-{case_row.id}-created",+ type="created",+ timestamp=case_row.created_at,+ title="Case opened",+ description=case_row.title,+ actor=case_row.assignee,+ )+ )++ # Status / severity reflection (we only surface the latest snapshot here;+ # full audit history is available via the audit log endpoints).+ if case_row.updated_at and case_row.updated_at != case_row.created_at:+ events.append(+ TimelineEvent(+ id=f"case-{case_row.id}-status",+ type="status_change",+ timestamp=case_row.updated_at,+ title=f"Status: {case_row.status}",+ description=f"Severity {case_row.severity}",+ actor=case_row.assignee,+ )+ )++ # Comments+ comment_rows = (+ await db.execute(+ text(+ "SELECT id, author, body, is_system, created_at "+ "FROM aisoc_case_comments "+ "WHERE case_id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id "+ "ORDER BY created_at"+ ).bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchall()+ for c in comment_rows:+ events.append(+ TimelineEvent(+ id=f"comment-{c.id}",+ type="comment",+ timestamp=c.created_at,+ title="System note" if c.is_system else "Comment",+ description=(c.body or "")[:280],+ actor=c.author,+ )+ )++ # Linked alerts (best-effort — we tolerate a missing alerts table)+ for alert_id in list(case_row.alert_ids or [])[:25]:+ try:+ a = (+ # Tenant-scoped as defence in depth. Reaching this loop already+ # required a tenant-scoped case, but the predicate costs+ # nothing and a poisoned ``alert_ids`` array would otherwise+ # hydrate another tenant's alert title into this timeline.+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT id, title, severity, created_at FROM aisoc_alerts WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(+ id=alert_id,+ tenant_id=str(user.tenant_id),+ )+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if a:+ events.append(+ TimelineEvent(+ id=f"alert-{a.id}",+ type="alert_linked",+ timestamp=a.created_at or case_row.created_at,+ title=f"Alert linked: {a.title}",+ description=f"Severity {a.severity}",+ actor=None,+ )+ )+ except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — alerts table may not exist in some demos+ continue++ # Tasks+ try:+ task_rows = (+ await db.execute(+ text(+ "SELECT id, title, status, assignee, created_at "+ "FROM aisoc_case_tasks "+ "WHERE case_id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id "+ "ORDER BY created_at"+ ).bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchall()+ for t in task_rows:+ events.append(+ TimelineEvent(+ id=f"task-{t.id}",+ type="task",+ timestamp=t.created_at,+ title=f"Task ({t.status}): {t.title}",+ description=None,+ actor=t.assignee,+ )+ )+ except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — table created by migration 027; tolerate absence+ logger.exception("aisoc_case_tasks not available; skipping task events")++ events.sort(key=lambda e: e.timestamp)+ return TimelineResponse(events=events)+++# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Tasks+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────++[email protected]("/{case_id}/tasks", response_model=list[TaskResponse], summary="List case tasks")+async def list_tasks(case_id: str, db: DBSession, user: AuthUser) -> list[TaskResponse]:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ exists = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT 1 FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not exists:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")+ rows = (+ await db.execute(+ text(+ "SELECT id, title, status, assignee, due_at, created_at "+ "FROM aisoc_case_tasks "+ "WHERE case_id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id "+ "ORDER BY created_at"+ ).bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchall()+ return [_row_to_task(r) for r in rows]++[email protected]("/{case_id}/tasks", response_model=TaskResponse, status_code=201, summary="Create task")+async def create_task(+ case_id: str,+ body: CreateTaskRequest,+ db: DBSession,+ user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))],+) -> TaskResponse:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ exists = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT 1 FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not exists:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")++ task_id = uuid.uuid4()+ now = datetime.now(UTC)+ try:+ row = (+ await db.execute(+ text(+ """+ INSERT INTO aisoc_case_tasks+ (id, case_id, tenant_id, title, status, assignee, due_at, created_at, updated_at, created_by)+ VALUES+ (:id, :case_id, :tenant_id, :title, :status, :assignee, :due_at, :now, :now, :created_by)+ RETURNING id, title, status, assignee, due_at, created_at+ """+ ).bindparams(+ id=task_id,+ case_id=cid,+ tenant_id=user.tenant_id,+ title=body.title,+ status=body.status,+ assignee=body.assignee,+ due_at=body.due_at,+ now=now,+ created_by=getattr(user, "email", None) or "system",+ )+ )+ ).fetchone()+ await db.commit()+ return _row_to_task(row)+ except Exception as exc:+ await db.rollback()+ logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")+ raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc++[email protected]("/{case_id}/tasks/{task_id}", response_model=TaskResponse, summary="Update task")+async def update_task(+ case_id: str,+ task_id: uuid.UUID,+ body: UpdateTaskRequest,+ db: DBSession,+ user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))],+) -> TaskResponse:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ sets: list[str] = []+ params: dict[str, Any] = {+ "id": task_id,+ "case_id": cid,+ "tenant_id": user.tenant_id,+ "now": datetime.now(UTC),+ }+ if body.title is not None:+ sets.append("title = :title")+ params["title"] = body.title+ if body.status is not None:+ sets.append("status = :status")+ params["status"] = body.status+ if body.assignee is not None:+ sets.append("assignee = :assignee")+ params["assignee"] = body.assignee+ if body.due_at is not None:+ sets.append("due_at = :due_at")+ params["due_at"] = body.due_at+ if not sets:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="No fields to update.")+ sets.append("updated_at = :now")++ try:+ row = (+ await db.execute(+ text(+ f"""+ UPDATE aisoc_case_tasks+ SET {", ".join(sets)}+ WHERE id = :id AND case_id = :case_id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id+ RETURNING id, title, status, assignee, due_at, created_at+ """+ ).bindparams(**params)+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not row:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Task not found.")+ await db.commit()+ return _row_to_task(row)+ except HTTPException:+ raise+ except Exception as exc:+ await db.rollback()+ logger.exception("Database error in cases endpoint")+ raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Database error") from exc+++# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# Investigation proxy+#+# The investigation orchestrator lives in the agents service. The web console+# only knows about /api/v1/cases/{id}/..., so we proxy through and keep the+# external API surface stable.+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+++async def _agents_proxy(method: str, path: str, **kwargs: Any) -> httpx.Response:+ safe_path = _validate_agents_path(path)+ url = f"{_AGENTS_URL}{safe_path}"+ timeout = kwargs.pop("timeout", 30.0)+ try:+ async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=timeout) as client:+ return await client.request(method, url, **kwargs)+ except httpx.HTTPError as exc:+ logger.exception(+ "agents_proxy.request_failed",+ extra={+ "method": safe_log_value(method),+ "path": safe_log_value(safe_path),+ },+ )+ raise HTTPException(+ status_code=503,+ detail=f"Agents service unavailable: {exc}",+ ) from exc++[email protected]("/{case_id}/investigate", summary="Launch investigation for case")+async def case_investigate(+ case_id: str,+ body: InvestigateRequest,+ db: DBSession,+ user: Annotated[AuthUser, Depends(require_permission("cases:write"))],+) -> dict[str, Any]:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ exists = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT 1 FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id)+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not exists:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")++ # Forward the authenticated tenant so the agents service attributes the run+ # to the real tenant instead of falling back to the "default" placeholder,+ # which the demo seed no longer maps to any tenant (issue #601). The ledger+ # is scoped by tenant_id, so without this the whole run is never persisted.+ resp = await _agents_proxy(+ "POST",+ f"/api/v1/cases/{cid}/investigate",+ json={"alert_summary": body.alert_summary or "", "tenant_id": str(user.tenant_id)},+ )+ if resp.status_code >= 400:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)+ return resp.json()++[email protected]("/{case_id}/investigations", summary="List investigation runs for a case")+async def list_case_investigations(+ case_id: str,+ db: DBSession,+ user: AuthUser,+) -> dict[str, Any]:+ """List all investigation runs for a case.++ The agents service is the source of truth. When it's unreachable we return+ an empty list rather than 503 so the case detail page still renders.+ """+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ try:+ resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/cases/{cid}/investigations")+ if resp.status_code == 404:+ return {"runs": []}+ if resp.status_code >= 400:+ return {"runs": []}+ return resp.json()+ except HTTPException:+ # Agents service unavailable — render a soft-empty list instead of 503.+ return {"runs": []}++[email protected]("/{case_id}/investigations/{run_id}", summary="Get investigation run")+async def case_investigation_run(+ case_id: str,+ run_id: str,+ db: DBSession,+ user: AuthUser,+) -> dict[str, Any]:+ """One investigation run belonging to this case, in the caller's tenant."""+ # Scoping kept out of the docstring because FastAPI publishes that verbatim+ # in docs/openapi.yaml, and the rationale is for the next maintainer rather+ # than for API consumers.+ #+ # This handler took no database session and never read `user.tenant_id`:+ # `case_id` was declared and never used, and `run_id` alone was proxied to+ # the agents service, so any authenticated user could read any run by id+ # across tenants (GHSA-x2gf-3p79-wvgm). The sibling list route two+ # functions up already resolved the case against the caller's tenant.+ #+ # Both halves below are needed. Resolving the case proves the caller may+ # see *this case*; checking the run belongs to it proves the id in the path+ # is not somebody else's run smuggled under a case the caller does own.+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ # URL-encode the user-supplied run_id so it cannot inject `/`, `?`, `#`,+ # CR/LF, or other URL syntax into the proxied path.+ safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")+ resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}")+ if resp.status_code >= 400:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)+ run = resp.json()++ # A run that names a different case is not this case's run. Compared as+ # strings because the agents service echoes whatever case id it was given.+ run_case_id = run.get("case_id")+ if run_case_id is not None and str(run_case_id) != str(cid):+ raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="Investigation run not found for this case")+ return run+++ "/{case_id}/investigations/{run_id}/report.md",+ response_class=PlainTextResponse,+ summary="Markdown incident report for one investigation run",+)+async def case_investigation_report_md(+ case_id: str,+ run_id: str,+ db: DBSession,+ user: AuthUser,+) -> PlainTextResponse:+ """The Markdown report the case workspace renders."""+ # `CaseWorkspace.tsx` fetched this from two places and the route did not+ # exist, so the report pane was permanently empty. The agents service has+ # served `/api/v1/investigations/{run_id}/report.md` all along; nothing+ # proxied it.+ #+ # Scoped in the same two steps as the sibling route above, and for the+ # same reason: that one shipped without them and any authenticated user+ # could read any run by id across tenants (GHSA-x2gf-3p79-wvgm).+ # Resolving the case proves the caller may see this case; checking the+ # run belongs to it proves the id in the path is not somebody else's run+ # smuggled under a case the caller does own.+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")++ meta = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}")+ if meta.status_code >= 400:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=meta.status_code, detail=meta.text)+ run_case_id = meta.json().get("case_id")+ if run_case_id is not None and str(run_case_id) != str(cid):+ raise HTTPException(+ status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,+ detail="Investigation run not found for this case",+ )++ resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.md")+ if resp.status_code >= 400:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)+ return PlainTextResponse(content=resp.text, media_type="text/markdown; charset=utf-8")+++# Filename sanitiser for Content-Disposition: keep only safe ASCII so the+# header cannot be split with CR/LF and the value renders consistently.+_SAFE_FILENAME_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]")+++def _safe_filename_segment(value: str) -> str:+ """Reduce an identifier to a Content-Disposition-safe filename segment."""+ return _SAFE_FILENAME_RE.sub("_", value)[:64] or "unknown"+++# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────+# WS-D2 — auto-summary artifact at investigation close.+# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────++# We keep the breadcrumb body in one place so the system note stays uniform+# across deployments — easier to grep, easier to redact in CI exports.+_SUMMARY_BREADCRUMB_BODY = (+ "Case auto-summary generated. Download from "+ "/api/v1/cases/{case_id}/summary?format=html "+ "(or ?format=json for the structured payload). "+ "For the blameless retrospective, fetch "+ "/api/v1/cases/{case_id}/postmortem?format=html. "+ "Print either page (Ctrl/Cmd-P → Save as PDF) for the runbook archive."+)+++async def _emit_summary_breadcrumb(+ db: Any,+ *,+ case_id: uuid.UUID,+ tenant_id: uuid.UUID | str,+ status: str,+) -> None:+ """Drop a system comment pointing to the on-demand summary endpoint.++ Idempotent on repeated status changes — we re-emit only when transitioning+ *into* a terminal state, never on noop updates. The body intentionally+ avoids embedding tenant-specific URLs so the artifact link still works+ behind reverse proxies that rewrite the host.+ """+ body = _SUMMARY_BREADCRUMB_BODY.format(case_id=case_id) + f" (status={status})"+ await db.execute(+ text(+ """+ INSERT INTO aisoc_case_comments+ (id, case_id, tenant_id, author, body, is_system, created_at)+ VALUES (:id, :case_id, :tenant_id, :author, :body, true, :now)+ """+ ).bindparams(+ id=uuid.uuid4(),+ case_id=case_id,+ tenant_id=tenant_id,+ author="aisoc",+ body=body,+ now=datetime.now(UTC),+ )+ )+ await db.commit()+++ "/{case_id}/summary",+ summary="Download the per-case auto-summary (JSON or HTML)",+ response_model=None,+)+async def case_auto_summary(+ case_id: str,+ db: DBSession,+ user: AuthUser,+ format: Literal["json", "html"] = Query(+ "json",+ description=(+ "Response format. ``json`` returns the structured CaseAutoSummary; "+ "``html`` returns a print-ready report (use the browser's "+ "Save-as-PDF affordance for archival)."+ ),+ ),+) -> Any:+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ summary = await build_case_summary(db, cid, user.tenant_id)+ if summary is None:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")++ if format == "html":+ rendered = render_case_summary_html(summary)+ case_label = summary.case.case_number or str(summary.case.case_id)[:8]+ filename = _safe_filename_segment(f"case-{case_label}-summary") + ".html"+ return HTMLResponse(+ content=rendered,+ headers={"Content-Disposition": f'inline; filename="{filename}"'},+ )++ return summary+++ "/{case_id}/postmortem",+ summary="Download the per-case blameless post-mortem (JSON or HTML)",+ response_model=None,+)+async def case_auto_postmortem(+ case_id: str,+ db: DBSession,+ user: AuthUser,+ format: Literal["json", "html"] = Query(+ "json",+ description=(+ "Response format. ``json`` returns the structured CasePostmortem; "+ "``html`` returns a print-ready blameless retrospective (use the "+ "browser's Save-as-PDF affordance for the runbook archive)."+ ),+ ),+) -> Any:+ """Generate a deterministic blameless post-mortem for one case.++ Distinct from ``/summary``: the summary is a snapshot of *what the case+ looks like right now*; the post-mortem is a retrospective oriented around+ *what happened, when did we find out, what did we do, and what should we+ change*. Both are deterministic — same case state in, same artefact out.+ """+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ postmortem = await build_case_postmortem(db, cid, user.tenant_id)+ if postmortem is None:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")++ if format == "html":+ rendered = render_case_postmortem_html(postmortem)+ case_label = postmortem.case.case_number or str(postmortem.case.case_id)[:8]+ filename = _safe_filename_segment(f"case-{case_label}-postmortem") + ".html"+ return HTMLResponse(+ content=rendered,+ headers={"Content-Disposition": f'inline; filename="{filename}"'},+ )++ return postmortem+++ "/{case_id}/investigations/{run_id}/report.pdf",+ summary="Download investigation PDF report",+)+async def case_investigation_pdf(+ case_id: str,+ run_id: str,+ user: AuthUser,+) -> Response:+ safe_run_id = quote(run_id, safe="")+ resp = await _agents_proxy("GET", f"/api/v1/investigations/{safe_run_id}/report.pdf")+ if resp.status_code >= 400:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=resp.status_code, detail=resp.text)+ safe_case_id = _safe_filename_segment(case_id)+ safe_run_id_filename = _safe_filename_segment(run_id)+ return Response(+ content=resp.content,+ media_type=resp.headers.get("content-type", "application/pdf"),+ headers={+ "Content-Disposition": resp.headers.get(+ "content-disposition",+ f'attachment; filename="case-{safe_case_id}-{safe_run_id_filename}.pdf"',+ ),+ },+ )++[email protected]("/{case_id}/related", summary="List related cases (by alert/observable overlap)")+async def list_related_cases(+ case_id: str,+ db: DBSession,+ user: AuthUser,+) -> dict[str, Any]:+ """Return other cases that share alerts or observables with this case.++ This is intentionally a lightweight heuristic — we look for cases that+ overlap on `alert_ids` or share an observable IP/host. It's the smallest+ thing the case detail page needs to stop 404'ing.+ """+ cid = await _resolve_case_id(case_id, db, user.tenant_id)+ row = (+ await db.execute(+ text("SELECT alert_ids, observable_graph FROM aisoc_cases WHERE id = :id AND tenant_id = :tenant_id").bindparams(+ id=cid, tenant_id=user.tenant_id+ )+ )+ ).fetchone()+ if not row:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Case not found.")++ alert_ids = list(row.alert_ids or [])+ related: list[dict[str, Any]] = []++ if alert_ids:+ rows = (+ await db.execute(+ text(+ """+ SELECT id, case_number, title, severity, status, created_at+ FROM aisoc_cases+ WHERE id <> :id+ AND tenant_id = :tenant_id+ AND alert_ids && CAST(:alerts AS UUID[])+ ORDER BY created_at DESC+ LIMIT 20+ """+ ).bindparams(+ id=cid,+ tenant_id=user.tenant_id,+ alerts=[str(a) for a in alert_ids],+ )+ )+ ).fetchall()+ for r in rows:+ related.append(+ {+ "id": str(r.id),+ "case_number": r.case_number,+ "title": r.title,+ "severity": r.severity or "medium",+ "status": r.status or "new",+ "created_at": r.created_at.isoformat() if r.created_at else None,+ "reason": "shared_alerts",+ }+ )++ return {"related": related}