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fix(web): run same-site check on the cookie-auth fallback regardless of Authorization header
Richie McIlroy59c0f5a3aaa9
diff --git a/apps/web/__tests__/unit/cookie-write-site.test.ts b/apps/web/__tests__/unit/cookie-write-site.test.tsindex dc8457e91..564ff3db0 100644--- a/apps/web/__tests__/unit/cookie-write-site.test.ts+++ b/apps/web/__tests__/unit/cookie-write-site.test.ts@@ -170,12 +170,17 @@ describe("isCrossSiteCookieWrite", () => {).toBe(false);});- it("leaves requests with an Authorization header alone", () => {+ it("still flags a cross-site write that carries an Authorization header", () => {expect(isCrossSiteCookieWrite(request("POST", { ...crossSite, authorization: `Bearer ${API_KEY}` }),),- ).toBe(false);+ ).toBe(true);+ expect(+ isCrossSiteCookieWrite(+ request("POST", { ...crossSite, authorization: "Bearer bogus" }),+ ),+ ).toBe(true);});it.each(["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"])("leaves %s alone", (method) => {@@ -203,12 +208,30 @@ describe("Hono cookie fallback", () => {expect(mocks.getSessionUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();});+ it("does not authenticate a cross-site cookie write carrying a bogus bearer", async () => {+ const response = await send("/required", "POST", {+ ...crossSite,+ authorization: "Bearer bogus",+ });+ expect(response.status).toBe(401);+ expect(mocks.getSessionUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });+it("keeps optional endpoints working anonymously for cross-site writes", async () => {const response = await send("/optional", "POST", crossSite);expect(response.status).toBe(200);expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ user: null });});+ it("keeps optional endpoints anonymous for a cross-site write with a bogus bearer", async () => {+ const response = await send("/optional", "POST", {+ ...crossSite,+ authorization: "Bearer bogus",+ });+ expect(response.status).toBe(200);+ expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ user: null });+ });+it.each([["same-origin", sameOrigin],["same-site", sameSite],@@ -285,8 +308,14 @@ describe("Effect getCurrentUser", () => {),);- it("returns no user for a cross-site cookie write", async () => {- expect(await run(request("POST", crossSite))).toEqual(Option.none());+ it.each([+ ["plain cross-site write", request("POST", crossSite)],+ [+ "cross-site write carrying a bogus bearer",+ request("POST", { ...crossSite, authorization: "Bearer other" }),+ ],+ ])("returns no user for a %s", async (_label, web) => {+ expect(await run(web)).toEqual(Option.none());expect(mocks.getServerSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();});@@ -294,10 +323,6 @@ describe("Effect getCurrentUser", () => {["same-origin write", request("POST", sameOrigin)],["same-site write", request("POST", sameSite)],["cross-site GET", request("GET", crossSite)],- [- "cross-site write with an Authorization header",- request("POST", { ...crossSite, authorization: "Bearer other" }),- ],["call outside a request", undefined],])("returns the cookie user for a %s", async (_label, web) => {expect(await run(web)).toEqual(Option.some("cookie-user"));@@ -361,6 +386,14 @@ describe("HttpApi auth middleware", () => {expect(response.status).toBe(401);});+ it("does not authenticate a cross-site cookie write carrying a bogus bearer", async () => {+ const response = await send("POST", {+ ...crossSite,+ authorization: "Bearer bogus",+ });+ expect(response.status).toBe(401);+ });+it.each([["same-origin", sameOrigin],["same-site", sameSite],diff --git a/packages/database/auth/request-site.ts b/packages/database/auth/request-site.tsindex 40e17f46a..c9e82a039 100644--- a/packages/database/auth/request-site.ts+++ b/packages/database/auth/request-site.ts@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ const READ_ONLY_METHODS = new Set(["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"]);export type SiteCheckedRequest = {method: string;url: string;- headers: Pick<Headers, "get" | "has">;+ headers: Pick<Headers, "get">;};const parseUrl = (value: string | null | undefined) => {@@ -34,9 +34,12 @@ const isOwnOrigin = (origin: URL, request: SiteCheckedRequest) => {return parseUrl(webUrl)?.origin === origin.origin;};+// Callers must only consult this on the cookie-auth path: a successfully+// authenticated bearer token returns before the check is reached. The presence+// of an Authorization header is not proof of bearer auth, so it is ignored+// here — an invalid bearer that falls back to the cookie still gets checked.export const isCrossSiteCookieWrite = (request: SiteCheckedRequest) => {if (READ_ONLY_METHODS.has(request.method.toUpperCase())) return false;- if (request.headers.has("authorization")) return false;// Sec-Fetch-Site is set by the browser and cannot be forged by page script,// so it decides when present. Origin is the fallback for clients that