A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.
name: validate description: Validate a finding — runs 7-Question Gate + 4-gate checklist. Kills weak findings before report writing. Prevents N/A submissions that hurt validity ratio. Usage: /validate
/validate
Run full validation on the current finding before writing a report.
What This Does
- Runs 7-Question Gate (one wrong answer = kill it)
- Checks against the always-rejected list
- Runs 4 pre-submission gates
- Outputs: PASS (write the report) or KILL (move on)
Usage
/validate
Describe the finding when prompted. Include:
- The endpoint
- The bug class
- What the PoC shows
- The target program
The 7-Question Gate
Answer each. ONE wrong answer = STOP.
Q1: Can I demonstrate this step-by-step RIGHT NOW?
Write this out:
1. Setup: I need [own account / another user's ID / no account]
2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body]
3. Result: Response shows [exact data / action completed]
4. Impact: Real consequence is [account takeover / PII exposed / money stolen]
5. Cost: Time: [X min], Capital: [$0 / $X]
If step 2 is "I need to look at the code more" → KILL IT.
Q2: Is the impact accepted by this program?
Check program scope page. Is your bug class listed? Is it excluded?
Q3: Is the vulnerable asset in scope?
Exact domain in scope? Not staging/dev? Not a third-party service?
Q4: Does it need admin or privileged access that an attacker can't get?
"Admin can do X" → KILL IT. "Regular user can do X that only admin should" → valid.
Q5: Is this known or documented behavior?
Search disclosed reports + changelog + API docs.
Q6: Can you prove impact beyond "technically possible"?
- XSS → actual cookie value in exfil request, not just alert()
- SSRF → response body from internal service, not just DNS callback
- IDOR → actual other-user's private data in response, not just 200 status
Q7: Is this on the never-submit list?
Missing headers, GraphQL introspection alone, clickjacking without PoC,
self-XSS, open redirect alone, SSRF DNS-only, logout CSRF, banner disclosure,
rate limit on non-critical forms, missing cookie flags alone...
If yes → KILL IT unless you have a chain.
Check: Conditionally Valid?
If it's on the never-submit list, can you chain it?
| You Have | Chain Available? |
|---|---|
| Open redirect | + OAuth code theft → ATO? |
| SSRF DNS-only | + internal service data? |
| Clickjacking | + sensitive action + PoC? |
| CORS wildcard | + credentialed data exfil? |
| Prompt injection | + IDOR → other user's data? |
If no chain → KILL IT. If chain confirmed → report both together.
4 Gates — All Must Pass
Gate 0 (30 sec):
[ ] Confirmed with real HTTP requests (not just code reading)
[ ] In scope (checked program page)
[ ] Reproducible from scratch
[ ] Evidence captured
Gate 1 — Impact (2 min):
[ ] Can answer "What does attacker walk away with?"
[ ] More than "sees non-sensitive data"
[ ] Real victim exists
[ ] No unlikely preconditions
Gate 2 — Dedup (5 min):
[ ] Searched HackerOne Hacktivity for endpoint + bug class
[ ] Searched GitHub issues
[ ] Read 5 most recent disclosed reports
[ ] Not in changelog as known issue
Gate 3 — Report quality (10 min):
[ ] Title formula: [Class] in [Endpoint] allows [actor] to [impact]
[ ] Steps have exact HTTP request
[ ] Evidence shows actual impact
[ ] CVSS calculated
[ ] Fix: 1-2 concrete sentences
Output
PASS: "All 7 questions pass. All 4 gates pass. Proceed to /report."
KILL: "Q[N] fails because [reason]. Kill this finding. Reason: [explanation]. Move on."
DOWNGRADE: "Q6 only shows technical possibility. Downgrade from High to Medium. Requires showing actual data exfil in PoC."