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A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.

feat(grounding): add sources/report_count validator (warn) + backfill 30 skills (#68)

Sachin Sharma9a1863c682d3
diff --git a/scripts/lint_skills.py b/scripts/lint_skills.py
index 047e2b8..cad1402 100644
--- a/scripts/lint_skills.py
+++ b/scripts/lint_skills.py
@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9-]+$")
MAX_DESC = 1024
MAX_BODY_LINES = 500
+# Grounding enforcement. Every skill must declare `sources:`; hunt-* skills (built
+# from disclosed reports) must also declare an integer `report_count:` (0 is fine
+# when `sources:` justifies it — e.g. a pattern library or research-derived skill).
+# Phase 4a ships this as WARNINGS while the backfill lands; 4b flips it to errors.
+GROUNDING_STRICT = False
+
# --- real-secret patterns (kept tight to avoid flagging documented regexes) ---
SECRET_PATTERNS = [
("AWS access key", re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b")),
@@ -175,6 +181,17 @@ def lint_skill(skill_dir, denylist):
if body_lines > MAX_BODY_LINES:
warnings.append(f"{name}: body {body_lines} lines > {MAX_BODY_LINES} guideline (use references/ subfolder)")
+ # grounding: every skill declares `sources:`; hunt-* also declares report_count.
+ grounding = errors if GROUNDING_STRICT else warnings
+ if not fm.get("sources", "").strip():
+ grounding.append(f"{name}: missing `sources:` — declare grounding provenance in frontmatter")
+ if name.startswith("hunt-"):
+ rc = fm.get("report_count")
+ if rc is None:
+ grounding.append(f"{name}: hunt-* skill missing `report_count:` (use 0 if not a counted-report corpus)")
+ elif not re.fullmatch(r"\d+", rc.strip()):
+ grounding.append(f"{name}: `report_count: {rc}` must be a non-negative integer")
+
# client-identifier denylist
if denylist:
hit = set()
diff --git a/skills/bb-local-toolkit/SKILL.md b/skills/bb-local-toolkit/SKILL.md
index 6af3687..09e7d3b 100644
--- a/skills/bb-local-toolkit/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/bb-local-toolkit/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: bb-local-toolkit
description: Local-tooling companion to the bug-bounty orchestrator — carries the SAME complete bug-bounty workflow, but reach for THIS variant when you also need to resolve where tools, wordlists, and clones are installed on the local machine (jhaddix, SecLists, trufflehog, ffuf, dalfox, ghauri); for pure orchestration/routing use the bug-bounty skill. Workflow it covers — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use when you need the local install path of a tool / wordlist / clone for a hunt, or as the full-workflow variant when operating from this local toolkit; for general routing use the bug-bounty skill. 中文触发词:漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
+sources: community, operator_experience
---
# Bug Bounty Master Workflow
diff --git a/skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md b/skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md
index 004df9f..9006bb3 100644
--- a/skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: bb-methodology
description: Use at the START of any bug bounty hunting session, when switching targets, or when feeling lost about what to do next. Master orchestrator that combines the 5-phase non-linear hunting workflow with the critical thinking framework (developer psychology, anomaly detection, What-If experiments). Routes to all other skills based on current hunting phase. Also use when asking "what should I do next" or "where am I in the process."
+sources: community, public_research
---
# Bug Bounty Methodology: Workflow + Mindset
diff --git a/skills/bug-bounty/SKILL.md b/skills/bug-bounty/SKILL.md
index 80239dd..af71fd2 100644
--- a/skills/bug-bounty/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/bug-bounty/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: bug-bounty
description: Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload, business logic, GraphQL, HTTP smuggling, cache poisoning, OAuth, timing side-channels, OIDC, SSTI, subdomain takeover, cloud misconfig, ATO chains, agentic AI), LLM/AI security testing (chatbot IDOR, prompt injection, indirect injection, ASCII smuggling, exfil channels, RCE via code tools, system prompt extraction, ASI01-ASI10), A-to-B bug chaining (IDOR→auth bypass, SSRF→cloud metadata, XSS→ATO, open redirect→OAuth theft, S3→bundle→secret→OAuth), bypass tables (SSRF IP bypass, open redirect bypass, file upload bypass), language-specific grep (JS prototype pollution, Python pickle, PHP type juggling, Go template.HTML, Ruby YAML.load, Rust unwrap), and reporting (7-Question Gate, 4 validation gates, human-tone writing, templates by vuln class, CVSS 3.1, PoC generation, always-rejected list, conditional chain table, submission checklist). Use for ANY bug bounty task — starting a new target, doing recon, hunting specific vulns, auditing source code, testing AI features, validating findings, or writing reports. 中文触发词:漏洞赏金、安全测试、渗透测试、漏洞挖掘、信息收集、子域名枚举、XSS测试、SQL注入、SSRF、安全审计、漏洞报告
+sources: community, public_research
---
# Bug Bounty Master Workflow
diff --git a/skills/bugcrowd-reporting/SKILL.md b/skills/bugcrowd-reporting/SKILL.md
index 961dca8..daa93e1 100644
--- a/skills/bugcrowd-reporting/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/bugcrowd-reporting/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: bugcrowd-reporting
description: "Bugcrowd-specific reporting tactics complementing report-writing: VRT category search-and-fallback strategy when no exact match exists, manual severity override when VRT defaults underrate impact, severity-request paragraph as first body section, OOS-clause rebuttal templates (rate limiting on auth-flow endpoints, debug-info framing, user-enumeration with sensitive PII, theoretical-issue counter), chained-finding cross-reference patterns, target selection for QA-vs-prod programs, researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja email alias, account state restoration, friendly-tester posture). Use when filing a Bugcrowd submission, when VRT default seems wrong, when triager closes as OOS or downgrades severity, when chaining linked submissions, or when scope distinguishes production from QA. Pairs with report-writing and triage-validation."
+sources: bugcrowd, community
---
# BUGCROWD REPORTING — Program-Specific Tactics
diff --git a/skills/evidence-hygiene/SKILL.md b/skills/evidence-hygiene/SKILL.md
index 5ec1528..159952c 100644
--- a/skills/evidence-hygiene/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/evidence-hygiene/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: evidence-hygiene
description: "Evidence-capture and PoC-redaction discipline for bug-bounty submissions: cookie redaction protocol (which fields to mask, Preview annotation / Burp panel hiding / DevTools workflow), PII black-bar discipline (what to mask in other-user data — names, emails, phones, faces — vs what is safe to leave — usernames, trace IDs, request bodies), HAR file sanitization (jq filters for Cookie/Set-Cookie/Authorization headers), Burp Repeater/Intruder screenshot hygiene (hide request body, show only Results table for rate-limit attacks), Chrome DevTools Console PoC patterns (credentials include so cookies are not echoed, labeled console.log), screenshot capture order, filename conventions, post-submission rotation hygiene. Use BEFORE any PoC screenshot, BEFORE attaching a HAR, or whenever preparing evidence with session cookies or other-user PII. Pairs with bugcrowd-reporting and report-writing."
+sources: community, operator_experience
---
# EVIDENCE HYGIENE — PoC Capture & Redaction Discipline
diff --git a/skills/hunt-api-misconfig/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-api-misconfig/SKILL.md
index d295242..ca6d677 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-api-misconfig/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-api-misconfig/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-api-misconfig
description: "Hunt API security misconfiguration — mass assignment, prototype pollution, HTTP verb tampering. Mass assignment: send {is_admin:true, role:admin, verified:true} on profile/account/reset endpoints — server blindly applies. JWT signature/crypto forging (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku) is owned by hunt-jwt-crypto; this skill covers only non-crypto JWT handling. Prototype pollution: __proto__ injection in JSON merge / Object.assign / lodash _.merge → polluted prototype reaches sink (RCE in Node, XSS in browser). HTTP verb: GET-bypass-CSRF, X-HTTP-Method-Override, TRACE enabled. Detection: API responses with extra fields, JWTs in headers (decode at jwt.io). CORS misconfiguration (reflect-any-origin, null origin, subdomain-regex bypass, postMessage) is owned by hunt-cors. Use when hunting API misconfigs, mass-assignment, prototype pollution (JWT crypto → hunt-jwt-crypto)."
+sources: hackerone_public, owasp_api_top10_2023, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## 12. API SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION
diff --git a/skills/hunt-ato/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-ato/SKILL.md
index ec6829f..6c1ec0e 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-ato/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-ato/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-ato
description: "Hunt account takeover taxonomy — 9 distinct paths to ATO, plus chains. Paths: (1) password reset flaws (host-header injection redirects token, predictable/numeric token, Referer leak, no-expiry/reuse), (2) email change without re-auth, (3) OAuth account-link CSRF, (4) MFA bypass (per hunt-mfa-bypass), (5) session fixation, (6) JWT manipulation (forge token to another identity; crypto details → hunt-jwt-crypto), (7) password change without step-up (chain with login timing/length oracle), (8) social-recovery / security-question brute-force, (9) SSO subdomain takeover at OAuth redirect_uri. Chains: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = persistent ATO; lax redirect_uri = auth-code theft; dangling-CNAME takeover at redirect_uri = ATO. Validate: demonstrate real takeover of test account B from attacker A's session; OOB/Collaborator confirm blind token-leak steps. Use when hunting ATO chains, testing password reset / email change / MFA / OAuth / session / JWT, or chaining primitives toward Critical."
+sources: hackerone_public, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## 13. ATO — ACCOUNT TAKEOVER TAXONOMY
diff --git a/skills/hunt-captcha-bypass/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-captcha-bypass/SKILL.md
index 0da7407..2c4ca16 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-captcha-bypass/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-captcha-bypass/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-captcha-bypass
description: "Hunt CAPTCHA Bypass — 6 distinct patterns: (1) CAPTCHA field simply omitted from the request (server-side validation absent), (2) CAPTCHA token replayed from a solved challenge (no single-use enforcement), (3) CAPTCHA response accepted on a different endpoint than it was solved on (no binding to action/session), (4) static or predictable CAPTCHA values accepted (e.g. '0', 'null', empty string), (5) audio/accessibility CAPTCHA trivially solvable programmatically, (6) CAPTCHA only enforced after N failures (first N requests bypass it). Detection: intercept a successful form submission, remove the CAPTCHA field entirely, replay — if it still succeeds, server-side validation is absent. Medium severity standalone; High when it removes the only rate-limit gate protecting a login, registration, or payment endpoint."
+sources: public_research, operator_experience
+report_count: 0
---
## Autonomous Testing Priority
diff --git a/skills/hunt-clickjacking/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-clickjacking/SKILL.md
index 72360eb..b55114e 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-clickjacking/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-clickjacking/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-clickjacking
description: "Hunt Clickjacking — missing X-Frame-Options / CSP frame-ancestors lets an attacker embed the target page in an invisible iframe and trick victims into clicking buttons they cannot see (UI redressing). Targets: login flows, money transfers, account settings, OAuth confirmation pages. Confirm by fetching the page, then PROVE it frames in a real browser and a sensitive state-changing action survives the cross-site context (SameSite cookies / framebusting JS can defeat it) — header-absence alone is not a finding."
+sources: hackerone_public, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## What is Clickjacking
diff --git a/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.md
index 7bcae34..79e3ce3 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-cloud-misconfig
description: "Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessible via SSRF. GCP: public GCS buckets, exposed Cloud Run services, leaked service account JSON. Azure: public blob containers, exposed Function App. (Kubernetes/Docker exposure is owned by hunt-k8s; CI/CD pipeline attacks by hunt-cicd; post-credential IAM escalation by cloud-iam-deep.) Detection: targeted dorking, certificate transparency, JS bundle secret extraction, port scan for known service ports. Validate: actual data read / write / RCE. Use when hunting cloud-native storage and compute misconfig (S3/GCS/Blob, IMDS-via-SSRF, serverless, public managed services)."
+sources: hackerone_public, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## 16. CLOUD / INFRA MISCONFIGS
diff --git a/skills/hunt-cors/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-cors/SKILL.md
index a5caaed..07e3975 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-cors/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-cors/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: hunt-cors
description: "Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDENTIALED cross-origin read of sensitive data and you have proven it in a browser. Use when testing API endpoints, SPAs, or any app emitting Access-Control-* headers."
+report_count: 19
sources: hackerone_public
---
diff --git a/skills/hunt-dispatch/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-dispatch/SKILL.md
index 7f591fb..af35450 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-dispatch/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-dispatch/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-dispatch
description: Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and print the taxonomy. Not for direct user invocation.
+sources: community
+report_count: 0
---
# hunt-dispatch
diff --git a/skills/hunt-exceptional-conditions/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-exceptional-conditions/SKILL.md
index 047650a..bc9ca4f 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-exceptional-conditions/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-exceptional-conditions/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: hunt-exceptional-conditions
description: "Hunt mishandling of exceptional conditions — feed an endpoint malformed/unexpected input (wrong type, broken JSON, oversized field, null byte) and make it fail OPEN or leak internals: a verbose stack-trace / framework error page that discloses ORM internals, server file paths, library versions, or a language traceback. Use on any input-accepting endpoint (JSON APIs, forms, query params). Medium-High when the leak exposes internal structure that arms a deeper attack."
+report_count: 0
sources: hackerone_public
---
diff --git a/skills/hunt-file-upload/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-file-upload/SKILL.md
index 4eacf83..a4d5960 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-file-upload/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-file-upload/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-file-upload
description: "Hunt file upload bugs — RCE via webshell, XSS via SVG/HTML, SSRF via XXE in DOCX, path traversal via filename. Bypass tables (10 techniques): double extension (shell.php.jpg if server checks last ext only), magic bytes spoofing (PNG header on PHP), null byte (shell.php\0.jpg), case (PHP, .Php, .pHP), .htaccess upload to enable execution, SVG with <script>, HTML/SVG XSS, DOCX with embedded XXE, ZIP slip (../../../etc/passwd in archive), polyglot files. Detection: any /upload, /avatar, /profile-picture, /attachment, /import endpoint. Test: upload PHP/JSP/ASPX shells, request via direct URL, check response. Validate: actual code execution (whoami output) for RCE; reflected XSS in profile-photo URL. Use when testing file upload features, avatar/attachment endpoints, import/export functions, XML/DOCX/ZIP processors. Real paid examples."
+sources: hackerone_public, cve_database, owasp, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## 9. FILE UPLOAD
diff --git a/skills/hunt-forgot-password/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-forgot-password/SKILL.md
index a07c422..a4dd15a 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-forgot-password/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-forgot-password/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-forgot-password
description: "Hunt Forgot Password / Account Recovery Authentication Flaws — 5 distinct patterns: (1) username enumeration via different responses for valid vs invalid email, (2) reset token exposed directly in the API response body, (3) reset token not invalidated after use (replay), (4) password reset link works from a different IP/browser (no binding), (5) no rate limit on the reset request endpoint. These are the standalone recovery-flow broken-auth primitives — distinct from reset-email host-header poisoning (hunt-host-header) and the full ATO chain (hunt-ato owns password-reset as an ATO path; prove the primitive here, chain it there). Detection: trace the full forgot-password flow from request to token to use; check response diffs between valid/invalid emails; test token replay after consumption. Medium to High (enumeration=Medium, token-reuse=High, account-takeover=Critical when chained to known-email)."
+sources: hackerone_public, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## Autonomous Testing Priority
diff --git a/skills/hunt-html-injection/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-html-injection/SKILL.md
index 472db24..8112650 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-html-injection/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-html-injection/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-html-injection
description: "Hunt HTML Injection — user-supplied input is rendered as raw HTML in the response without sanitisation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags (but not necessarily JavaScript). Lower severity than XSS but enables phishing, UI manipulation, and credential harvesting via injected forms. Use when testing text-display surfaces (search results, profile fields, comments, error messages, feedback forms). For markup that executes JavaScript, escalate to hunt-xss."
+sources: hackerone_public, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## What is HTML Injection
diff --git a/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.md
index bf0bb24..6634223 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-http-smuggling
description: "Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by sending TE: chunked but with body that fits CL count. TE.CL: opposite. H2.CL: HTTP/2 downgrade, smuggle CL into HTTP/1.1 back-end. Detection tools: Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension, smuggler.py, h2csmuggler. Confirm: time-delay technique (smuggled GET with 30s timeout) — if front-end returns slow on next victim request, smuggling works. Validate: cache poisoning chain (smuggle request that gets cached for victim), credential theft (smuggle X-Forwarded-For override that captures next user's cookies), bypass auth (smuggled internal-path request). Real paid examples from major CDN deployments. Use when hunting H1 paid programs running CDN+origin stacks, when targeting load balancer / WAF bypass."
+sources: hackerone_public, cve_database, portswigger_research, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## 17. HTTP REQUEST SMUGGLING
diff --git a/skills/hunt-jwt-crypto/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-jwt-crypto/SKILL.md
index 837ca7e..3642740 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-jwt-crypto/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-jwt-crypto/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: hunt-jwt-crypto
description: "Hunt JWT cryptographic failures — alg:none signature-stripping and RS256→HS256 key-confusion that let an attacker forge a token for any identity (e.g. an admin) without knowing a secret. Use when the app authenticates with a JSON Web Token (an `eyJ...` Bearer token in the Authorization header, a cookie, or a login response). This skill OWNS JWT signature/crypto forgery (alg:none, key confusion, kid/jku header injection); hunt-ato covers JWT as one ATO path, hunt-auth-bypass covers SSO/SAML token trust, hunt-api-misconfig covers non-crypto JWT handling. Critical when a forged token grants access to another user's data or an admin-only endpoint."
+report_count: 0
sources: hackerone_public
---
diff --git a/skills/hunt-mfa-bypass/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-mfa-bypass/SKILL.md
index 729b927..b35ba95 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-mfa-bypass/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-mfa-bypass/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-mfa-bypass
description: "Hunt MFA / 2FA bypass — 7 distinct patterns. (1) MFA not enforced on sensitive endpoints (password change, email change accept without MFA challenge), (2) MFA-step skip via direct navigation to post-login URL, (3) MFA-token replay (same code accepted twice), (4) brute-force the 6-digit OTP without rate limit (10^6 attempts at server speed), (5) race condition on OTP validation, (6) recovery-code dump via /api/me, (7) backup factor downgrade (SMS factor with no rate limit). Plus the chain: cookie theft + password oracle + no step-up = ATO without MFA challenge. Detection: trace auth flow in Burp, find every state transition, check if MFA is middleware-gated vs per-endpoint, check OTP entropy and rate limit on OTP-validate. Validate: attacker session reaching post-MFA state. Use when hunting auth bypass, MFA flows, chaining primitives toward ATO."
+sources: hackerone_public, cve_database, nist_800_63b, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## Autonomous Testing Priority
diff --git a/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md
index 02e3ee6..40bc3e0 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-saml
description: "Hunt SAML / SSO attacks. Patterns: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — modify Assertion while keeping Signature valid by relocating signed element, comment injection in NameID ([email protected]<!--evil-->@attacker.com → some parsers see [email protected]), signature stripping (remove Signature element entirely, server should reject but doesn't), key confusion (signed by attacker's IdP, accepted by SP), audience-restriction not validated, replay attack (same Assertion accepted twice within validity window). Tools: SAML Raider Burp extension, samlmagic, manual XML manipulation. Detection: any /saml endpoint, /Shibboleth.sso, /sso/saml/, Microsoft ADFS endpoints. Validate: account takeover via altered NameID, admin role injection via altered AttributeStatement. Use when hunting SSO flows, when SAML AssertionConsumerService is reachable, when chaining IdP-trust to SP-impersonation."
+sources: cve_database, oasis_saml_spec, academic_research, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## 20. SAML / SSO ATTACKS
diff --git a/skills/hunt-ssti/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-ssti/SKILL.md
index 6d10a66..d4ac509 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-ssti/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-ssti/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
---
name: hunt-ssti
description: "Hunt server-side template injection (SSTI) across Jinja2 (Flask/Django), Twig (Symfony), Freemarker (Java), ERB (Rails), Spring, Velocity, Mako, Thymeleaf, Smarty. Detection probes use double-curly and dollar-curly math expressions evaluated server-side. Once an engine is fingerprinted, escalate to RCE via the engine-specific class-walker, callback-registrar, or Execute-utility patterns documented in disclosed reports. Detection patterns: error messages reveal engine, blank or numeric eval reveals expression mode. Targets: email templates, PDF/report generators, CMS preview features, error pages with user input. Use when hunting RCE via template rendering, when content shows engine fingerprints, when finding endpoints that compose strings with user input before render."
+sources: hackerone_public, cve_database, public_research
+report_count: 0
---
## Autonomous Testing Priority
diff --git a/skills/hunt-tls-network/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-tls-network/SKILL.md
index 1e92d69..e9fe699 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-tls-network/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-tls-network/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: hunt-tls-network
description: "Hunt TLS/SSL and DNS misconfigurations — missing HSTS (downgrade attack), weak cipher suites, expired/invalid certificates, mTLS bypass, missing SPF/DKIM/DMARC (email spoofing), DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR), dangling CNAME subdomain takeover, CAA records. Most of these are Info/Low on their own — this skill is opinionated about which findings actually pay (spoofable DMARC with delivered-to-inbox proof, AXFR returning internal hosts, dangling-CNAME takeover) versus which get rejected as best-practice noise (missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM position). Use during recon to find infrastructure weaknesses, and to TRIAGE them honestly before reporting."
+report_count: 0
sources: portswigger_research, ssl_labs_research, hstspreload_org
---
diff --git a/skills/meme-coin-audit/SKILL.md b/skills/meme-coin-audit/SKILL.md
index 014e823..152c022 100644
--- a/skills/meme-coin-audit/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/meme-coin-audit/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: meme-coin-audit
description: Meme coin and token security audit — rug pull detection (honeypot, hidden mint, fee manipulation, LP lock bypass), Solana SPL token analysis (freeze authority, mint authority, metadata mutability), Token-2022 extension risks (transfer hooks, permanent delegate), DEX liquidity pool attacks (sandwich amplification, LP drain, bonding curve exploits), pump.fun/Raydium/Jupiter integration risks, and real exploit examples from 2024-2025. Use for any token audit, rug pull assessment, meme coin security review, or pre-investment due diligence.
+sources: public_research
---
# MEME COIN & TOKEN SECURITY AUDIT
diff --git a/skills/offensive-osint/SKILL.md b/skills/offensive-osint/SKILL.md
index 7ce6754..fa80010 100644
--- a/skills/offensive-osint/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/offensive-osint/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: offensive-osint
description: "Operational arsenal for authorized external red-team and bug-bounty recon. Concrete probes, wordlists, regexes, dorks, curl one-liners for: subdomain enum, GraphQL/Swagger/REST discovery, identity fabric (Entra/Okta/ADFS/Google/SAML/M365 deep — Teams/SharePoint/OneDrive), cloud bucket enum (S3/GCS/Azure), CDN/WAF bypass, origin discovery, vendor fingerprinting (Citrix/F5/Pulse/Fortinet/PaloAlto/Cisco/VMware), CI/CD exposure, 48-pattern secret-scan catalog (AWS/GCP/GitHub/Stripe/Slack/Anthropic/OpenAI/Atlassian/DataDog/npm/PyPI), Postman workspaces, breach correlation (HudsonRock/HIBP/DeHashed/IntelX), TLS/JA3 audit, certificate transparency, JS endpoint extraction, package registry leaks, mobile/APK recon, sat imagery, sector-specific recon (healthcare DICOM, finance SWIFT, ICS/SCADA Modbus/BACnet). Detail content in 15 modular reference files, loaded on demand. Use for any authorized recon: scoping, asset discovery, attack-path mapping, secret triage, severity scoring."
+sources: hackerone_public, community, public_research
version: 3.0.0
triggers:
- external recon
diff --git a/skills/osint-methodology/SKILL.md b/skills/osint-methodology/SKILL.md
index 17ecff5..8c38c73 100644
--- a/skills/osint-methodology/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/osint-methodology/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: osint-methodology
description: "Comprehensive OSINT methodology for external red-team operations and authorized attack-surface assessments. Covers the 5-stage recon pipeline (seed discovery, asset expansion, enrichment, exposure analysis, reporting), asset-graph discipline with 29 asset types, severity rubric (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW/INFO), confidence upgrade workflows, time budgeting, asset-level triage rules, scale-based tactics, identity-fabric mapping (Entra/Okta/ADFS/Google/SAML/M365 Teams+SharePoint+OAuth), API and auth-map methodology, JavaScript deep analysis, mobile attack surface, cloud attack surface, breach×identity correlation, detectability tagging, detection-aware probing (back-off, persona rotation), read-only validator discipline, WAF/CDN bypass + origin discovery, vulnerability prioritization (CVE/EPSS/KEV), phishing infrastructure planning + pretext development, bug bounty submission templates, client deliverable templates with risk translation, threat-actor investigation (incl. RU/CN pivots), cryptocurrency tracing, image/video forensics, chronolocation. Use when planning or executing reconnaissance against authorized targets, mapping an organization's external attack surface, investigating a person/entity, tracing crypto flows, geolocating media, or performing attribution work."
+sources: community, public_research
version: 2.3
triggers:
- external recon
diff --git a/skills/report-writing/SKILL.md b/skills/report-writing/SKILL.md
index 74d3458..56f6785 100644
--- a/skills/report-writing/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/report-writing/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: report-writing
description: Bug bounty report writing for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi — report templates, human tone guidelines, impact-first writing, CVSS 3.1 scoring, title formula, impact statement formula, severity decision guide, downgrade counters, pre-submit checklist. Validation gates and the submittability/always-rejected decision are owned by triage-validation; this skill owns the written report itself (templates, tone, formulas). Use after validating a finding and before submitting. Never use "could potentially" — prove it or don't report.
+sources: community, operator_experience
---
# REPORT WRITING
diff --git a/skills/security-arsenal/SKILL.md b/skills/security-arsenal/SKILL.md
index 7274007..805e05e 100644
--- a/skills/security-arsenal/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/security-arsenal/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: security-arsenal
description: Security payloads, bypass tables, wordlists, gf pattern names, always-rejected bug list, and conditionally-valid-with-chain table. Use when you need specific payloads for XSS/SSRF/SQLi/XXE/NoSQLi/command injection/SSTI/IDOR/path-traversal/HTTP smuggling/WebSocket/MFA bypass, or bypass techniques. Submittability and the always-rejected / what-NOT-to-submit decision are owned by triage-validation.
+sources: community, public_research
---
# SECURITY ARSENAL
diff --git a/skills/triage-validation/SKILL.md b/skills/triage-validation/SKILL.md
index 8a6c780..3ef9287 100644
--- a/skills/triage-validation/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/triage-validation/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: triage-validation
description: Finding validation before writing any report — 7-Question Gate (all 7 questions), 4 pre-submission gates, always-rejected list, conditionally valid with chain table, CVSS 3.1 quick reference, severity decision guide, report title formula, 60-second pre-submit checklist. Use BEFORE writing any report. One wrong answer = kill the finding and move on. Saves N/A ratio.
+sources: community, operator_experience
---
# TRIAGE & VALIDATION
diff --git a/skills/web2-recon/SKILL.md b/skills/web2-recon/SKILL.md
index 27b742f..6f347a7 100644
--- a/skills/web2-recon/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/web2-recon/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: web2-recon
description: Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis (LinkFinder, SecretFinder), continuous monitoring (new subdomain alerts, JS change detection, GitHub commit watch). Use when starting recon on any web2 target or when asked about asset discovery, subdomain enum, or attack surface mapping.
+sources: community, public_research
---
# WEB2 RECON PIPELINE
diff --git a/skills/web3-audit/SKILL.md b/skills/web3-audit/SKILL.md
index 8eb6e6a..aafc5f9 100644
--- a/skills/web3-audit/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/web3-audit/SKILL.md
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
---
name: web3-audit
description: Smart contract security audit — 10 DeFi bug classes (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy), pre-dive kill signals (TVL < $500K etc), Foundry PoC template, grep patterns for each class, and real Immunefi paid examples. Use for any Solidity/Rust contract audit or when deciding whether a DeFi target is worth hunting.
+sources: public_research, community
---
# WEB3 SMART CONTRACT AUDIT