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A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.

skills: salvage unique content from deprecated installed stubs

Sachin Sharma9bc9691a3f69
diff --git a/skills/hunt-auth-bypass/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-auth-bypass/SKILL.md
index 66bfd83..0b30fc2 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-auth-bypass/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-auth-bypass/SKILL.md
@@ -407,6 +407,36 @@ Cross-references for the chain:
---
+## Function-Level Access Control (Broken Authorization)
+
+Authentication bypass gets you *in*; **function-level access control** failures let an already-authenticated low-privilege user reach privileged *functions* the UI never offered them. This is the authorization sibling of `hunt-idor` (object-level access) — test both whenever you hold any authenticated session.
+
+**The sibling-function rule:** if 9 endpoints under a path enforce auth/role middleware, the 10th that doesn't is your bug. Admin route families are the highest-yield place to look:
+
+```
+/api/admin/users → has auth middleware
+/api/admin/export → often MISSING it
+/api/admin/delete → often MISSING it
+/api/admin/reset → often MISSING it
+```
+
+**Anti-patterns to grep for:**
+```javascript
+// Missing middleware on a sibling route
+router.get('/admin/users', authenticate, authorize('admin'), getUsers);
+router.get('/admin/export', getExport); // No middleware!
+
+// Client-side role check only — server never re-checks
+if (user.role === 'admin') showAdminButton(); // frontend gate
+app.post('/api/admin/delete', deleteUser); // no server-side check
+```
+
+**How to hunt:** enumerate every privileged endpoint (admin/export/delete/reset/impersonate, GraphQL admin queries), then replay each from a *regular* authenticated session — and again with no session. A 200 (or a differential vs the 403 its siblings return) is broken function-level access control.
+
+**Real paid example — HackerOne TrustHub:** `POST /graphql` with the `TrustHubQuery` operation had no authorization check — a regular user could read all vendors' data (CVSS 8.7, High). The object-level variant (e.g. a WebSocket `get_history` accepting an arbitrary UUID with no ownership check) belongs to `hunt-idor`.
+
+---
+
## Related Skills & Chains
- **`hunt-idor`** — Auth bypass without object-level access is half a finding; pair them. Chain primitive: legacy `/v1/users/{id}` route missing both auth middleware AND ownership check = unauthenticated cross-tenant data read via direct ID substitution → full PII dump from "I am nobody" starting position.
diff --git a/skills/hunt-subdomain/SKILL.md b/skills/hunt-subdomain/SKILL.md
index a010151..1630f4a 100644
--- a/skills/hunt-subdomain/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/hunt-subdomain/SKILL.md
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ Subdomain takeover is high-value because it allows an attacker to serve content
- `"Do you want to register"` (any domain parking page)
- HTTP 404 with provider-specific error templates
- Fastly: `"Fastly error: unknown domain"`
+- `"404 Web Site not found"` (Azure App Service)
**Tech stack signals:**
- Response headers: `X-Served-By: cache-*` (Fastly), `X-GitHub-Request-Id`, `Server: Netlify`