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A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.

ci+community: add skill-linter, issue/PR templates, COC, CHANGELOG, FUNDING

Sachin Sharmabb9d93587b68
diff --git a/.github/CODEOWNERS b/.github/CODEOWNERS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45f6fce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/CODEOWNERS
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Default owner for everything — gets auto-requested on every PR.
+* @elementalsouls
+
+# Safety-critical files: changes here should always be maintainer-reviewed.
+/scripts/lint_skills.py @elementalsouls
+/scripts/.identifier-denylist.sha256 @elementalsouls
+/.github/ @elementalsouls
+/SECURITY.md @elementalsouls
diff --git a/.github/FUNDING.yml b/.github/FUNDING.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be4ccf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/FUNDING.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# GitHub Sponsors / funding links shown on the repo's "Sponsor" button.
+# Sponsor: Atlas Cloud — full-modal AI inference platform (project sponsor).
+github: [elementalsouls]
+custom:
+ - "https://www.atlascloud.ai/console/coding-plan"
diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9e5803
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+name: 🐞 Bug / incorrect skill behavior
+description: A skill misfires, fails to trigger, gives wrong guidance, or a script errors.
+title: "[bug] <short summary>"
+labels: ["bug"]
+body:
+ - type: markdown
+ attributes:
+ value: |
+ Thanks for reporting. Please **do not paste real client/engagement data, credentials, or target identifiers** — anonymize everything (see CONTRIBUTING.md).
+ - type: input
+ id: skill
+ attributes:
+ label: Which skill / command?
+ placeholder: "e.g. hunt-ssrf, /hunt, scripts/cbh.py"
+ validations:
+ required: true
+ - type: textarea
+ id: expected
+ attributes:
+ label: What did you expect to happen?
+ validations:
+ required: true
+ - type: textarea
+ id: actual
+ attributes:
+ label: What actually happened?
+ description: Include the prompt you used and what Claude did (or didn't do). Redact any sensitive data.
+ validations:
+ required: true
+ - type: dropdown
+ id: trigger
+ attributes:
+ label: Did the skill auto-trigger?
+ options:
+ - "Yes, it loaded but behaved wrong"
+ - "No, it never triggered when it should have"
+ - "It triggered when it should NOT have"
+ - "N/A"
+ validations:
+ required: true
+ - type: input
+ id: env
+ attributes:
+ label: Environment
+ placeholder: "Claude Code version, OS, install method (symlink/copy)"
diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d467496
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+blank_issues_enabled: false
+contact_links:
+ - name: 💬 Discussions (questions, ideas, show-and-tell)
+ url: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/discussions
+ about: Ask how to use a skill, request a new one, or share a hunt write-up. Not for bugs.
+ - name: 🔒 Security / responsible disclosure
+ url: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/main/SECURITY.md
+ about: Report a vulnerability in the tooling itself, or a misuse concern. Do not open a public issue.
diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/false_positive.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/false_positive.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0445b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/false_positive.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+name: 🎯 False-positive / bad guidance report
+description: A skill led to a finding that turned out to be invalid, or gave guidance that breaks the false-positive discipline.
+title: "[fp] <skill> — <what was wrong>"
+labels: ["false-positive"]
+body:
+ - type: markdown
+ attributes:
+ value: |
+ This project takes false-positive discipline seriously (OOB confirmation, unique markers, body-diff, server-policy-vs-state). Help us tighten the skills. **Anonymize all target data.**
+ - type: input
+ id: skill
+ attributes:
+ label: Which skill produced the bad guidance?
+ validations:
+ required: true
+ - type: textarea
+ id: claim
+ attributes:
+ label: What did the skill claim / suggest?
+ validations:
+ required: true
+ - type: textarea
+ id: reality
+ attributes:
+ label: Why was it actually invalid?
+ description: e.g. reflected value was server policy not attacker-controlled state; no OOB confirmation; response diff was noise.
+ validations:
+ required: true
+ - type: textarea
+ id: fix
+ attributes:
+ label: Suggested guardrail
+ description: What validation step or wording would have prevented it?
diff --git a/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/new_skill.yml b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/new_skill.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..231373a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/new_skill.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+name: ✨ New skill proposal
+description: Propose a new hunt-* or capability skill. Open this BEFORE writing the SKILL.md (per CONTRIBUTING.md).
+title: "[skill] hunt-<name> — <one-line purpose>"
+labels: ["skill-proposal"]
+body:
+ - type: markdown
+ attributes:
+ value: |
+ Per CONTRIBUTING.md, propose new skills here first so we can confirm scope and avoid overlap before you write the full SKILL.md.
+ - type: input
+ id: name
+ attributes:
+ label: Proposed skill name
+ description: lowercase-hyphen only, e.g. hunt-fintech-graphql
+ validations:
+ required: true
+ - type: textarea
+ id: purpose
+ attributes:
+ label: What gap does it fill?
+ description: What can't be done well with the existing 51 skills? Be specific.
+ validations:
+ required: true
+ - type: textarea
+ id: overlap
+ attributes:
+ label: Overlap check
+ description: Which existing skills are closest, and why is this distinct enough to stand alone?
+ validations:
+ required: true
+ - type: textarea
+ id: sources
+ attributes:
+ label: Source material
+ description: Disclosed reports, CVEs, or research this would be built from (links preferred — the house style cites named reports).
+ - type: checkboxes
+ id: scope
+ attributes:
+ label: Scope confirmation
+ options:
+ - label: This is external-attack-surface focused (not internal AD / C2 / post-exploit — those are deliberately out of scope).
+ required: true
+ - label: It contains no real client/engagement identifiers, credentials, or target-specific exploits — all class-based / anonymized.
+ required: true
diff --git a/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md b/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85e652a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+<!-- Thanks for contributing to claude-bughunter. Keep PRs focused. -->
+
+## What does this change?
+
+<!-- One or two sentences. Link the proposal issue for new skills (#NN). -->
+
+## Type
+
+- [ ] New skill
+- [ ] Improvement to an existing skill
+- [ ] Docs / examples
+- [ ] Tooling / scripts / CI
+- [ ] Other:
+
+## Checklist
+
+- [ ] **No client/engagement data** — no real target names, account UIDs, endpoints, bounty amounts, credentials, or PII. All examples are class-based / anonymized.
+- [ ] `python3 scripts/lint_skills.py` passes locally (frontmatter, name, description length, identifier/secret scan).
+- [ ] For a **new skill**: a proposal issue was opened and agreed first; `name` is lowercase-hyphen; description ≤ 1024 chars and weaves in trigger keywords; body ≤ ~500 lines.
+- [ ] For a new skill: mentioned in `README.md` + `USAGE.md` decision tree, with one worked trigger example.
+- [ ] Sources cited for anything adapted from disclosed reports / community work.
+- [ ] Cross-references complementary skills ("see also …") where there's topical overlap.
+
+## Anything reviewers should know?
+
+<!-- Overlap with existing skills, follow-ups, open questions. -->
diff --git a/.github/workflows/skill-lint.yml b/.github/workflows/skill-lint.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2f13b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/skill-lint.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+name: skill-lint
+
+# Quality + safety gate for every skill change.
+# - Validates SKILL.md structure against CONTRIBUTING.md rules
+# - Scans for client/engagement identifiers (hashed denylist) and leaked secrets
+# Runs on PRs and pushes to main. No external dependencies — stdlib Python only.
+
+on:
+ pull_request:
+ paths:
+ - "skills/**"
+ - "scripts/lint_skills.py"
+ - "scripts/.identifier-denylist.sha256"
+ - ".github/workflows/skill-lint.yml"
+ push:
+ branches: [main]
+ paths:
+ - "skills/**"
+ - "scripts/lint_skills.py"
+ workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+ contents: read
+
+jobs:
+ lint:
+ name: Lint skills
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+ steps:
+ - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+ - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+ with:
+ python-version: "3.12"
+
+ - name: Validate skills (structure + identifier/secret scan)
+ run: python3 scripts/lint_skills.py
+
+ - name: Summary
+ if: always()
+ run: echo "Skill lint finished — see annotations above for any errors/warnings."
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 07d794e..844c547 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -58,3 +58,6 @@ node_modules/
# Local cbh recon outputs (when run from repo root)
recon/
+
+# Maintainer-only plaintext client-identifier denylist (never commit names)
+scripts/.identifier-denylist.local
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f61dec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Changelog
+
+All notable changes to this project are documented here.
+Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/);
+versioning is loosely [SemVer](https://semver.org/) at the bundle level.
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+### Added
+- **CI skill-linter** (`scripts/lint_skills.py` + `.github/workflows/skill-lint.yml`) —
+ validates every `SKILL.md` for frontmatter, `name` format, description length, and
+ body length per `CONTRIBUTING.md`, and scans for leaked secrets and client/engagement
+ identifiers. The identifier denylist is stored as SHA-256 hashes
+ (`scripts/.identifier-denylist.sha256`) so client names never enter the repo in plaintext.
+- **Community infrastructure** — issue templates (bug, new-skill proposal, false-positive),
+ PR template, `CODEOWNERS`, `FUNDING.yml`, `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, and this `CHANGELOG.md`.
+- **Sponsor** — Atlas Cloud added to the README (theme-adaptive logo).
+
+### Changed
+- `.gitignore` now excludes the maintainer-only plaintext denylist override
+ (`scripts/.identifier-denylist.local`).
+
+<!-- When PR #7 (20 new hunt-* skills) merges, move its entry up to the next release. -->
+
+## [2.0] - 2026-05-25
+
+### Added
+- Report-curation pass: 574 → **681 disclosed-report patterns** across 24 vulnerability classes.
+- 5 previously-missing attack surfaces covered; 0 zero-report skills remaining.
+- 29 A-to-B chain examples and `ENGAGEMENTS.md` scaffolding.
+- Enterprise platform attack matrices (M365/Entra, Okta, SharePoint, vCenter, SSL-VPN, APK, supply-chain).
+
+### Changed
+- Top-3 trigger-match concentration rebalanced (81.2% → 68.4%) for better skill routing.
+
+## [1.x]
+
+- Initial public release: 51 skills + 15 slash commands, vendored foundation from
+ `shuvonsec/claude-bug-bounty`, Burp MCP integration, recon pipeline.
+
+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/compare/v2.0...HEAD
+[2.0]: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/releases/tag/v2.0
diff --git a/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md b/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe6d71d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# Code of Conduct
+
+## Our pledge
+
+We — contributors and maintainers — pledge to make participation in this project
+a harassment-free experience for everyone, regardless of age, body size, visible
+or invisible disability, ethnicity, sex characteristics, gender identity and
+expression, level of experience, education, socio-economic status, nationality,
+personal appearance, race, religion, or sexual identity and orientation.
+
+We pledge to act and interact in ways that contribute to an open, welcoming,
+diverse, inclusive, and healthy community.
+
+## Our standards
+
+Examples of behavior that contributes to a positive environment:
+
+- Being respectful of differing opinions, viewpoints, and experiences
+- Giving and gracefully accepting constructive feedback on skills and PRs
+- Accepting responsibility, apologizing to those affected by our mistakes, and
+ learning from the experience
+- Focusing on what is best for the community and the people who rely on this tooling
+
+Examples of unacceptable behavior:
+
+- Trolling, insulting or derogatory comments, and personal or political attacks
+- Public or private harassment
+- Publishing others' private information without explicit permission
+- Sexualized language or imagery, or unwelcome sexual attention
+- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a
+ professional setting
+
+## Security-tooling responsible-use clause
+
+This project ships offensive-security tradecraft. In addition to the above:
+
+- **Do not** use issues, discussions, or PRs to solicit, coordinate, or brag about
+ testing against systems you are not authorized to assess. See `SECURITY.md` for
+ the authorized-use posture.
+- **Do not** post real client/engagement identifiers, credentials, victim PII, or
+ target-specific exploit details. Anonymize everything (see `CONTRIBUTING.md`).
+- Discussion of techniques is welcome; using this community to facilitate
+ unauthorized access or harm is not, and is grounds for an immediate ban.
+
+## Enforcement
+
+Instances of abusive, harassing, or otherwise unacceptable behavior — or misuse of
+the community as described above — may be reported to the maintainer at
+**[email protected]**. All complaints will be reviewed and investigated
+promptly and fairly. The maintainer is obligated to respect the privacy and
+security of the reporter.
+
+Maintainers who do not follow or enforce this Code of Conduct in good faith may
+face temporary or permanent repercussions as determined by the project's leadership.
+
+## Attribution
+
+This Code of Conduct is adapted from the [Contributor Covenant][homepage],
+version 2.1, available at
+<https://www.contributor-covenant.org/version/2/1/code_of_conduct.html>,
+with an added responsible-use clause specific to offensive-security tooling.
+
+[homepage]: https://www.contributor-covenant.org
diff --git a/scripts/.identifier-denylist.sha256 b/scripts/.identifier-denylist.sha256
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c16ea7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/.identifier-denylist.sha256
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Client-identifier denylist — SHA-256 hashes, NOT plaintext.
+#
+# Why hashes? The whole point of this gate is to keep real client/engagement
+# identifiers OUT of the public repo. Committing the names in plaintext (even in
+# a denylist) would itself leak them. So we store SHA-256 of each normalized
+# identifier instead. The linter (scripts/lint_skills.py) normalizes every
+# 1- and 2-word shingle of each SKILL.md the same way and compares hashes.
+#
+# Normalization: lowercase, collapse internal whitespace to single spaces.
+#
+# To add a NEW identifier without leaking it, either:
+# (a) add its SHA-256 here: printf '%s' "the name" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' | shasum -a 256
+# (b) drop it in scripts/.identifier-denylist.local (one per line, gitignored) —
+# the linter hashes that file at runtime so you never commit the plaintext.
+#
+# One hash per line. Blank lines and #-comments ignored.
+a672b3be0c15a2af015886aef804d485704c37a56cfa8a564c973ccd944a2ee1
+6d99af9a927fd75a379a2d085c772acd6fb4a81cd7a3c75aaffa7529536d0e1a
+3b39f05d6785c7b4ac3e3e08dfc2abbc07bdde4a01c58fdf944d326afd4af3ab
+80537d65d479a2f986a78e859cc2bcaaf6a62f6df7a6ba2c5dd192cfcb2ff790
+ae95921ebc9d9f3e72d883f217ff023fc5555d111ca0bf3b18c5b8cd0c5d7580
+e7dcc519de2734ed30de133910fd3289c9afc89aef272f7239d17fac804b24a0
diff --git a/scripts/lint_skills.py b/scripts/lint_skills.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b9e93b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/lint_skills.py
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+lint_skills.py — quality + safety gate for claude-bughunter skills.
+
+Enforces the rules documented in CONTRIBUTING.md and the repo's hard rule that
+NO real client/engagement identifiers ever land in the public tree.
+
+Checks per skills/<name>/SKILL.md:
+ STRUCTURE (errors)
+ - frontmatter block present (between the first two `---` lines)
+ - `name` present, matches ^[a-z0-9-]+$, and equals the directory name
+ - `description` present and <= 1024 chars
+ - body (everything after frontmatter) <= 500 lines
+ SAFETY (errors)
+ - client-identifier denylist: hashes every 1- and 2-word shingle of the file
+ and compares against scripts/.identifier-denylist.sha256 (+ optional
+ .identifier-denylist.local). Plaintext names never live in the repo.
+ - real-secret scan: AWS keys, private-key blocks, JWTs, Slack/Google tokens.
+ Documentation patterns (regexes, AWS EXAMPLE tokens) are allowlisted so the
+ secret-catalog skills don't trip it.
+
+Exit code 0 = clean, 1 = at least one error. Warnings never fail the build.
+Stdlib only — no pip install needed in CI.
+
+Usage:
+ python3 scripts/lint_skills.py # lint all skills
+ python3 scripts/lint_skills.py skills/hunt-xss # lint specific dirs
+"""
+import hashlib
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+
+REPO = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+SKILLS_DIR = os.path.join(REPO, "skills")
+SCRIPTS_DIR = os.path.join(REPO, "scripts")
+
+NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9-]+$")
+MAX_DESC = 1024
+MAX_BODY_LINES = 500
+
+# --- real-secret patterns (kept tight to avoid flagging documented regexes) ---
+SECRET_PATTERNS = [
+ ("AWS access key", re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b")),
+ ("Private key block", re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----")),
+ ("JWT", re.compile(r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b")),
+ ("Slack token", re.compile(r"\bxox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,}\b")),
+ ("Google API key", re.compile(r"\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b")),
+ ("GitHub PAT", re.compile(r"\bghp_[0-9A-Za-z]{36}\b")),
+]
+# Tokens that are public documentation/examples, not real secrets.
+# `\.\.\.` covers placeholder blocks like "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----..." in docs.
+SECRET_ALLOW = re.compile(
+ r"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE|EXAMPLE|wJalrXUtnFEMI|\[0-9A-Z\]|\{1[06]\}|<[^>]+>|\.\.\."
+)
+
+# Intentional kitchen-sink router/aggregator skills whose descriptions deliberately
+# exceed the per-skill limit (they route to everything). Over-length is a warning,
+# not an error, for these. Do NOT add new skills here — write focused descriptions.
+DESC_LIMIT_GRANDFATHERED = {"bug-bounty", "bb-local-toolkit", "osint-methodology"}
+
+WORD_RE = re.compile(r"[a-z0-9]+")
+
+
+def load_denylist():
+ """Return a set of sha256 hex digests of banned identifiers."""
+ hashes = set()
+ sha_file = os.path.join(SCRIPTS_DIR, ".identifier-denylist.sha256")
+ if os.path.exists(sha_file):
+ with open(sha_file, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ for line in fh:
+ line = line.strip()
+ if line and not line.startswith("#"):
+ hashes.add(line.lower())
+ # Optional gitignored plaintext override for maintainer convenience.
+ local = os.path.join(SCRIPTS_DIR, ".identifier-denylist.local")
+ if os.path.exists(local):
+ with open(local, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ for line in fh:
+ name = " ".join(line.strip().lower().split())
+ if name and not name.startswith("#"):
+ hashes.add(hashlib.sha256(name.encode()).hexdigest())
+ return hashes
+
+
+def shingles(text):
+ """Yield normalized 1- and 2-word shingles from text."""
+ words = WORD_RE.findall(text.lower())
+ for i, w in enumerate(words):
+ yield w
+ if i + 1 < len(words):
+ yield w + " " + words[i + 1]
+
+
+def split_frontmatter(raw):
+ """Return (frontmatter_dict, body_text, error_or_None)."""
+ if not raw.startswith("---"):
+ return {}, raw, "no frontmatter block (file must start with '---')"
+ parts = raw.split("\n")
+ # find closing --- after line 0
+ close = None
+ for i in range(1, len(parts)):
+ if parts[i].strip() == "---":
+ close = i
+ break
+ if close is None:
+ return {}, raw, "frontmatter opened with '---' but never closed"
+ fm = {}
+ for line in parts[1:close]:
+ if not line.strip() or line.lstrip().startswith("#"):
+ continue
+ m = re.match(r"^([A-Za-z0-9_-]+):\s*(.*)$", line)
+ if m:
+ fm[m.group(1)] = m.group(2).strip()
+ body = "\n".join(parts[close + 1:])
+ return fm, body, None
+
+
+def lint_skill(skill_dir, denylist):
+ errors, warnings = [], []
+ name = os.path.basename(skill_dir.rstrip("/"))
+ path = os.path.join(skill_dir, "SKILL.md")
+ if not os.path.isfile(path):
+ return [f"{name}: missing SKILL.md"], []
+ with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ raw = fh.read()
+
+ fm, body, fm_err = split_frontmatter(raw)
+ if fm_err:
+ errors.append(f"{name}: {fm_err}")
+ # name
+ fn = fm.get("name", "")
+ if not fn:
+ errors.append(f"{name}: frontmatter missing `name`")
+ else:
+ if not NAME_RE.match(fn):
+ errors.append(f"{name}: `name` '{fn}' must match ^[a-z0-9-]+$")
+ if fn != name:
+ errors.append(f"{name}: `name` '{fn}' != directory '{name}'")
+ # description
+ desc = fm.get("description", "")
+ if not desc:
+ errors.append(f"{name}: frontmatter missing `description`")
+ elif len(desc) > MAX_DESC:
+ msg = f"{name}: description {len(desc)} chars > {MAX_DESC} limit"
+ (warnings if name in DESC_LIMIT_GRANDFATHERED else errors).append(msg)
+ elif len(desc) < 40:
+ warnings.append(f"{name}: description very short ({len(desc)} chars) — weak trigger surface")
+ # body length
+ body_lines = len(body.splitlines())
+ if body_lines > MAX_BODY_LINES:
+ warnings.append(f"{name}: body {body_lines} lines > {MAX_BODY_LINES} guideline (use references/ subfolder)")
+
+ # client-identifier denylist
+ if denylist:
+ hit = set()
+ for sh in shingles(raw):
+ if hashlib.sha256(sh.encode()).hexdigest() in denylist:
+ hit.add(sh)
+ if hit:
+ errors.append(
+ f"{name}: CLIENT-IDENTIFIER MATCH — {len(hit)} banned shingle(s). "
+ f"Remove client/engagement identifiers before committing."
+ )
+
+ # real-secret scan
+ for lineno, line in enumerate(raw.splitlines(), 1):
+ for label, pat in SECRET_PATTERNS:
+ for m in pat.finditer(line):
+ snippet = m.group(0)
+ window = line[max(0, m.start() - 8): m.end() + 8]
+ if SECRET_ALLOW.search(window) or SECRET_ALLOW.search(snippet):
+ continue
+ errors.append(f"{name}:{lineno}: possible {label} leaked — '{snippet[:24]}...'")
+ return errors, warnings
+
+
+def main(argv):
+ denylist = load_denylist()
+ if argv:
+ targets = [a if os.path.isabs(a) else os.path.join(REPO, a) for a in argv]
+ else:
+ targets = [os.path.join(SKILLS_DIR, d) for d in sorted(os.listdir(SKILLS_DIR))
+ if os.path.isdir(os.path.join(SKILLS_DIR, d))]
+
+ all_errors, all_warnings = [], []
+ for t in targets:
+ e, w = lint_skill(t, denylist)
+ all_errors += e
+ all_warnings += w
+
+ for w in all_warnings:
+ print(f"::warning:: {w}" if os.environ.get("GITHUB_ACTIONS") else f"WARN {w}")
+ for e in all_errors:
+ print(f"::error:: {e}" if os.environ.get("GITHUB_ACTIONS") else f"ERROR {e}")
+
+ n = len(targets)
+ print(f"\nLinted {n} skill(s): {len(all_errors)} error(s), {len(all_warnings)} warning(s).")
+ if not denylist:
+ print("NOTE: no client-identifier denylist loaded (scripts/.identifier-denylist.sha256 missing).")
+ return 1 if all_errors else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1:]))