A Claude Code skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work - 82 skills, 15 slash commands, 681 disclosed-report patterns curated across 24 core vulnerability classes, plus enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices.
Python ai-securityanthropicapplication-securitybug-bountybugbountybugcrowdclaudeclaude-codeclaude-skillsethical-hackinghackeroneoffensive-securitypentestingred-teamsecurity-toolsweb-security
Phase 4: skill hardening + comprehensive public-repo redaction
Sachin Sharmafb9f11b99daf
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignoreindex 0decb3c..dcd5545 100644--- a/.gitignore+++ b/.gitignore@@ -51,3 +51,6 @@ node_modules/# Test artifacts.pytest_cache/*.log++# Local cbh recon outputs (when run from repo root)+recon/diff --git a/README.md b/README.mdindex 9faaca7..ff0c2e6 100644--- a/README.md+++ b/README.md@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Four layers stack:All triggered automatically by topic — describe what you're testing in plain English and the relevant skill loads. No invocation by name.-> **51 skills · 15 commands · 574+ disclosed reports curated · 6-phase workflow · validated through both a Bugcrowd financial-target engagement and a paid external red-team engagement (redacted-client, May 2026).**+> **51 skills · 15 commands · 574+ disclosed reports curated · 6-phase workflow · validated through both a Bugcrowd financial-target engagement and a paid external red-team engagement against a large Indian manufacturing conglomerate (May 2026).**---@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ Drop the contents of `skills/` into `~/.claude/skills/` and Claude auto-triggers| Capability | Source | Skill ||---|---|---|-| **M365 / Entra ID — AADSTS codes, user enum, Smart Lockout math, CA bypass, ROPC, SAML SSO browser flow** | redacted-client red-team May 2026 | `m365-entra-attack` |+| **M365 / Entra ID — AADSTS codes, user enum, Smart Lockout math, CA bypass, ROPC, SAML SSO browser flow** | engagement_2026_05 (external red-team) | `m365-entra-attack` || **Okta-as-IdP — tenant discovery, user enum vectors, factor enumeration, push-fatigue, FastPass abuse, OIDC redirect_uri tampering** | original | `okta-attack` || **Cloud IAM priv-esc — AWS (24+), Azure (8+), GCP (6+) patterns · STS chaining · IMDS · K8s SA tokens · confused-deputy** | original | `cloud-iam-deep` |@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ Drop the contents of `skills/` into `~/.claude/skills/` and Claude auto-triggers| Capability | Source | Skill ||---|---|---|| **VMware vSphere / vCenter / Workspace ONE / Aria CVE chain (CVE-2021-21972 → CVE-2024-37085)** | original | `vmware-vcenter-attack` |-| **Enterprise SSL VPN — Cisco ASA/AnyConnect · Fortinet · Citrix NetScaler · Palo Alto · Pulse/Ivanti · SonicWall · F5** | redacted-client red-team May 2026 | `enterprise-vpn-attack` |+| **Enterprise SSL VPN — Cisco ASA/AnyConnect · Fortinet · Citrix NetScaler · Palo Alto · Pulse/Ivanti · SonicWall · F5** | engagement_2026_05 (external red-team) | `enterprise-vpn-attack` || **SharePoint on-prem (2013-SE) — ToolShell precondition chain (CVE-2025-53770), SOAP auth bypass, anon FormDigest, SafeControl enum** | engagement_2026_05 | `hunt-sharepoint` || **NTLM/Negotiate anonymous Type-2 disclosure — AV_PAIRS leakage, internal DNS forest, default WIN-XXX hostnames** | engagement_2026_05 | `hunt-ntlm-info` |@@ -194,9 +194,9 @@ Drop the contents of `skills/` into `~/.claude/skills/` and Claude auto-triggers| Capability | Source | Skill ||---|---|---|-| **Red-team operator discipline — mindset corrections separating offensive from defensive WAPT** | redacted-client red-team May 2026 | `redteam-mindset` |-| **Mid-engagement IR detection — SOC patches mid-test, external attacker activity, baseline-shift detection** | redacted-client red-team May 2026 | `mid-engagement-ir-detection` |-| **Android APK red-team pipeline — Play Store + apkpure acquisition, jadx decompile, secret/JWT/Firebase grep, Frida templates** | redacted-client red-team May 2026 | `apk-redteam-pipeline` |+| **Red-team operator discipline — mindset corrections separating offensive from defensive WAPT** | engagement_2026_05 (external red-team) | `redteam-mindset` |+| **Mid-engagement IR detection — SOC patches mid-test, external attacker activity, baseline-shift detection** | engagement_2026_05 (external red-team) | `mid-engagement-ir-detection` |+| **Android APK red-team pipeline — Play Store + apkpure acquisition, jadx decompile, secret/JWT/Firebase grep, Frida templates** | engagement_2026_05 (external red-team) | `apk-redteam-pipeline` || **Supply-chain recon — dep-confusion, GH Actions injection, SBOM mining, container registry exposure, internal-package leakage** | original | `supply-chain-attack-recon` |### Recon & OSINT@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ This bundle was built and validated through two paid engagements that exposed di3. **No engagement coordination** — findings, evidence, and submission IDs scattered across folders4. **No evidence hygiene** — screenshots leaked cookies and victim PII-**External red-team — a large enterprise (redacted-client, May 2026)** — exposed five additional gaps that bug-bounty defaults made worse:+**External red-team — large Indian manufacturing conglomerate (May 2026)** — exposed five additional gaps that bug-bounty defaults made worse:1. **Conservative defaults retracted real findings** — WAPT mindset stopped tests early on defended targets where red-team continuation would have surfaced bypass chains → `redteam-mindset`2. **No mid-engagement situational awareness** — client SOC patched confirmed SQLi within 30 min; external attacker locked 14 accounts during a live test session — both invisible without explicit detection methodology → `mid-engagement-ir-detection`diff --git a/USAGE.md b/USAGE.mdindex 9bf315e..7a09b6a 100644--- a/USAGE.md+++ b/USAGE.md@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@A practical guide to using the 51-skill Claude-BugHunter bundle for bug hunting (bounty programs, authorized pentesting, CTFs, vuln research) **and external red-team engagements** against enterprise targets. This document covers what's in the bundle, how it composes, and how to use it on a real engagement from intake through paid bounty (or final client deliverable).-> Built and validated through two paid engagements: a Bugcrowd engagement on a major financial target (exposed four bug-bounty capability gaps), and an external red-team engagement against an a large enterprise (redacted-client, May 2026 — exposed five additional gaps around platform attack chains, mid-engagement IR detection, and client-facing reporting). The final stack documented here addresses both modes.+> Built and validated through two paid engagements: a Bugcrowd engagement on a major financial target (exposed four bug-bounty capability gaps), and an external red-team engagement against a large Indian manufacturing conglomerate (May 2026 — exposed five additional gaps around platform attack chains, mid-engagement IR detection, and client-facing reporting). The final stack documented here addresses both modes.---diff --git a/assets/banner.svg b/assets/banner.svgindex 36757ab..f2ecd70 100644--- a/assets/banner.svg+++ b/assets/banner.svg@@ -1,340 +1,507 @@-<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 1920 720" width="1920" height="720" role="img" aria-label="claude-bughunter — a Claude skill for offensive security tradecraft">+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 1920 1080" width="1920" height="1080" role="img" aria-label="claude-bughunter — bug bounty arsenal for Claude Code"><defs>- <!-- Background: deep warm + soft radial glow on the hero -->- <radialGradient id="bg" cx="32%" cy="50%" r="78%">- <stop offset="0%" stop-color="#23201C"/>- <stop offset="55%" stop-color="#14120F"/>- <stop offset="100%" stop-color="#080705"/>- </radialGradient>-- <radialGradient id="coralHalo" cx="50%" cy="50%" r="50%">- <stop offset="0%" stop-color="#FFB591" stop-opacity="0.55"/>- <stop offset="30%" stop-color="#DA7756" 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fill="url(#grid)"/>++ <!-- Soft glow behind the logo -->+ <ellipse cx="140" cy="185" rx="200" ry="120" fill="url(#logoGlow)" opacity="0.4"/>++ <!-- ============================ CORNER BRACKETS w/ plus marks ============================ -->+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="2" fill="none">+ <!-- TL -->+ <path d="M 40 30 L 20 30 L 20 50"/>+ <path d="M 12 18 L 28 18 M 20 10 L 20 26"/>+ <!-- TR -->+ <path d="M 1880 30 L 1900 30 L 1900 50"/>+ <path d="M 1892 18 L 1908 18 M 1900 10 L 1900 26"/>+ <!-- BL -->+ <path d="M 40 1050 L 20 1050 L 20 1030"/>+ <path d="M 12 1062 L 28 1062 M 20 1054 L 20 1070"/>+ <!-- BR -->+ <path d="M 1880 1050 L 1900 1050 L 1900 1030"/>+ <path d="M 1892 1062 L 1908 1062 M 1900 1054 L 1900 1070"/></g>- <!-- ============================================================ -->- <!-- TOP MICROTEXT -->- <!-- ============================================================ -->- <g font-family="ui-monospace, 'SF Mono', Menlo, Consolas, monospace" font-size="11" letter-spacing="3.5">- <text x="58" y="58" fill="#807565">▸ CLAUDE SKILL · v1.0 · MIT</text>- <text x="370" y="58" fill="#807565">·</text>- <text x="390" y="58" fill="#C5BEB0">HUNT-MODE ACTIVE</text>- <text x="1862" y="58" text-anchor="end" fill="#807565">github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter</text>+ <!-- ============================ HEADER MICROTEXT ============================ -->+ <g font-family="ui-monospace, 'SF Mono', Menlo, Consolas, monospace" font-size="13" fill="#5A5A6A" letter-spacing="2">+ <text x="60" y="58">▸ N 00°00'00" · SECTOR-A</text>+ <text x="760" y="58">· BUILD:STABLE · SHA:b48c833 · NO TELEMETRY ·</text>+ <text x="1860" y="58" text-anchor="end">SYS://HUNT.LIVE · 0xC0DE</text></g>- <!-- ============================================================ -->- <!-- HUNT SCENE — left of center -->- <!-- Sunburst @ (500, 380), bug targets arrayed around it. -->- <!-- ============================================================ -->- <g transform="translate(500, 380)">- <!-- Big diffuse halo -->- <circle r="350" fill="url(#coralHalo)"/>-- <!-- Outer scanning rings -->- <g fill="none" stroke="#DA7756">- <circle r="290" stroke-width="0.6" opacity="0.35" stroke-dasharray="1 9"/>- <circle r="262" stroke-width="0.4" opacity="0.25" stroke-dasharray="2 5"/>- <circle r="240" stroke-width="0.3" opacity="0.18"/>+ <!-- ============================ TITLE BLOCK ============================ -->+ <!-- Sunburst mark -->+ <use href="#sunburst" x="80" y="125" width="120" height="120"/>++ <!-- Wordmark — single text, tspan flow so the slash is clean -->+ <text y="220" font-size="108" font-weight="900"+ font-family="ui-sans-serif, -apple-system, 'Segoe UI', Inter, sans-serif"+ letter-spacing="-4">+ <tspan x="240" fill="#FFFFFF">claude</tspan><tspan dx="20" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="300">/</tspan><tspan dx="20" fill="#FF2D4F" filter="url(#redGlow)">bughunter</tspan>+ </text>++ <!-- Underline under "bughunter" -->+ <line x1="595" y1="238" x2="1180" y2="238" stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="3"/>++ <!-- Subtitle -->+ <g font-family="ui-sans-serif, -apple-system, 'Segoe UI', Inter, sans-serif"+ font-size="16" letter-spacing="5" fill="#8A8A9A">+ <circle cx="252" cy="278" r="4.5" fill="#FF2D4F"/>+ <text x="268" y="284" font-weight="600" fill="#FF2D4F">BUG BOUNTY ARSENAL</text>+ <text x="610" y="284">·</text>+ <text x="630" y="284">DISCLOSED-REPORT TRADECRAFT</text>+ <text x="1130" y="284">·</text>+ <text x="1150" y="284">RED-TEAM PIPELINE</text>+ </g>++ <!-- ============================ TOP-RIGHT INFO BLOCK ============================ -->+ <g transform="translate(1430, 138)">+ <!-- OPERATIONAL box -->+ <rect x="0" y="0" width="390" height="48" fill="none" stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.6"/>+ <circle cx="22" cy="24" r="6" fill="#FF2D4F"/>+ <text x="42" y="30" font-family="ui-sans-serif, -apple-system, 'Segoe UI', sans-serif"+ font-size="18" letter-spacing="5" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="700">OPERATIONAL</text>++ <g font-family="ui-monospace, 'SF Mono', monospace" font-size="14" letter-spacing="2.5">+ <text x="0" y="80" fill="#5A5A6A">VERSION</text>+ <text x="390" y="80" text-anchor="end" fill="#FFFFFF">v1.0 · MIT</text>++ <text x="0" y="106" fill="#5A5A6A">AUTHOR</text>+ <text x="390" y="106" text-anchor="end" fill="#FFFFFF">@elementalsouls</text>+ </g>+ <g font-family="ui-monospace, 'SF Mono', monospace" font-size="12" letter-spacing="1.5">+ <text x="0" y="132" fill="#5A5A6A">REPO</text>+ <text x="390" y="132" text-anchor="end" fill="#FFFFFF">github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter</text></g>+ </g>- <!-- Outer cardinal scan ticks -->- <g stroke="#DA7756" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" opacity="0.7">- <line x1="0" y1="-298" x2="0" y2="-282"/>- <line x1="0" y1="282" x2="0" y2="298"/>- <line x1="-298" y1="0" x2="-282" y2="0"/>- <line x1="282" y1="0" x2="298" y2="0"/>+ <!-- ============================ SECTION HEADER ============================ -->+ <g transform="translate(60, 380)">+ <line x1="0" y1="-12" x2="0" y2="14" stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="3"/>+ <text x="14" y="6" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="16"+ letter-spacing="5" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="700">HUNT ARSENAL</text>++ <g font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="14" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">+ <text x="260" y="6">// 51 SKILLS</text>+ <text x="420" y="6">// 24 VULN CLASSES</text>+ <text x="640" y="6">// 15 COMMANDS</text>+ <text x="820" y="6">// 6 PHASES</text></g>- <!-- ===== BEAMS from sunburst to each bug target ===== -->- <!-- Targets array (8 hunts) -->- <g stroke="#DA7756" stroke-width="1" stroke-linecap="round" opacity="0.55" stroke-dasharray="2 5">- <!-- N --> <line x1="0" y1="0" x2="0" y2="-225"/>- <!-- NE --> <line x1="0" y1="0" x2="195" y2="-150"/>- <!-- E-up --> <line x1="0" y1="0" x2="305" y2="-55"/>- <!-- E-dn --> <line x1="0" y1="0" x2="305" y2="55"/>- <!-- SE --> <line x1="0" y1="0" x2="195" y2="150"/>- <!-- S --> <line x1="0" y1="0" x2="0" y2="225"/>- <!-- SW --> <line x1="0" y1="0" x2="-195" y2="150"/>- <!-- W --> <line x1="0" y1="0" x2="-305" y2="0"/>- <!-- NW --> <line x1="0" y1="0" x2="-195" y2="-150"/>+ <text x="1800" y="6" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" font-size="14"+ letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A">0X01 · TRIAGE · VALIDATE · CHAIN · REPORT</text>+ </g>++ <!-- thin divider below section header -->+ <line x1="60" y1="404" x2="1860" y2="404" stroke="#1A1A26" stroke-width="1"/>++ <!-- ============================ 4 CAPABILITY COLUMNS ============================ -->+ <!-- Column dimensions: each 430 wide, gap 30. Start x=60. -->++ <!-- ============ COLUMN [01] WEB APP ============ -->+ <g transform="translate(60, 430)">+ <text x="0" y="0" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="15"+ letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A" font-weight="600">[01] WEB APP</text>++ <!-- Card 1 -->+ <g transform="translate(0, 30)">+ <!-- 4 corner brackets -->+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">XSS · IDOR · SQLi</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">HW-01</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">174 · 26 · 8 reports · stored, reflected, DOM</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">hunt-xss · hunt-idor · hunt-sqli</text></g>- <!-- ===== THE SUNBURST ===== -->- <use href="#claudeSun" x="-180" y="-180" width="360" height="360" filter="url(#softGlow)"/>+ <!-- Card 2 -->+ <g transform="translate(0, 150)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">CSRF · file-upload · SSTI</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">HW-02</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">10 reports · 10 upload-bypass · 5 template engines</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">hunt-csrf · hunt-file-upload · hunt-ssti</text>+ </g>- <!-- ===== BUG TARGETS w/ vuln labels ===== -->- <!-- N: XSS -->- <g transform="translate(0, -245)">- <use href="#bugTarget" x="-26" y="-26" width="52" height="52"/>- <text x="0" y="-38" text-anchor="middle" font-size="11" letter-spacing="2.5"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#FFE4D1" font-weight="700">XSS</text>+ <!-- Card 3 -->+ <g transform="translate(0, 270)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">ASP.NET · BizLogic · XXE</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">HW-03</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">ViewState · machineKey · WCF · coupon · OOB</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">hunt-aspnet · hunt-business-logic · hunt-xxe</text></g>- <!-- NE: SQLi -->- <g transform="translate(215, -165)">- <use href="#bugTarget" x="-26" y="-26" width="52" height="52"/>- <text x="0" y="-38" text-anchor="middle" font-size="11" letter-spacing="2.5"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#FFE4D1" font-weight="700">SQLi</text>+ </g>++ <!-- ============ COLUMN [02] AUTH & IDENTITY ============ -->+ <g transform="translate(520, 430)">+ <text x="0" y="0" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="15"+ letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A" font-weight="600">[02] AUTH & IDENTITY</text>++ <g transform="translate(0, 30)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">OAuth · SAML · ATO</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">AU-01</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">10 reports · 8 XSW patterns · 9 ATO paths</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">hunt-oauth · hunt-saml · hunt-ato</text></g>- <!-- E-up: RCE -->- <g transform="translate(335, -60)">- <use href="#bugTarget" x="-26" y="-26" width="52" height="52"/>- <text x="40" y="4" font-size="11" letter-spacing="2.5"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#FFE4D1" font-weight="700">RCE</text>++ <g transform="translate(0, 150)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">M365 · Entra · Okta</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">AU-02</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">AADSTS · CA-bypass · ROPC · push-fatigue · FastPass</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">m365-entra-attack · okta-attack</text></g>- <!-- E-dn: SSRF -->- <g transform="translate(335, 60)">- <use href="#bugTarget" x="-26" y="-26" width="52" height="52"/>- <text x="40" y="4" font-size="11" letter-spacing="2.5"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#FFE4D1" font-weight="700">SSRF</text>++ <g transform="translate(0, 270)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">MFA · auth-bypass · LLM</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">AU-03</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">7 patterns · OTP brute · ASI 01–10 · prompt-inj</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">hunt-mfa-bypass · hunt-auth-bypass · hunt-llm-ai</text></g>- <!-- SE: OAuth -->- <g transform="translate(215, 165)">- <use href="#bugTarget" x="-26" y="-26" width="52" height="52"/>- <text x="0" y="46" text-anchor="middle" font-size="11" letter-spacing="2.5"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#FFE4D1" font-weight="700">OAuth</text>+ </g>++ <!-- ============ COLUMN [03] API & INFRA ============ -->+ <g transform="translate(980, 430)">+ <text x="0" y="0" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="15"+ letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A" font-weight="600">[03] API & INFRA</text>++ <g transform="translate(0, 30)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">SSRF · RCE · GraphQL</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">AP-01</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">9 · 67 · 3 reports · 11 IP-bypass · introspection</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">hunt-ssrf · hunt-rce · hunt-graphql</text></g>- <!-- S: IDOR -->- <g transform="translate(0, 245)">- <use href="#bugTarget" x="-26" y="-26" width="52" height="52"/>- <text x="0" y="46" text-anchor="middle" font-size="11" letter-spacing="2.5"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#FFE4D1" font-weight="700">IDOR</text>++ <g transform="translate(0, 150)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">Cloud IAM · Subdomain TO</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">AP-02</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">24 AWS · 8 Azure · 6 GCP · 27 takeover fingerprints</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">cloud-iam-deep · hunt-subdomain</text></g>- <!-- SW: SSTI -->- <g transform="translate(-215, 165)">- <use href="#bugTarget" x="-26" y="-26" width="52" height="52"/>- <text x="0" y="46" text-anchor="middle" font-size="11" letter-spacing="2.5"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#FFE4D1" font-weight="700">SSTI</text>++ <g transform="translate(0, 270)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">VMware · VPN · SharePoint</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">AP-03</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">vCenter · 7 SSL-VPN vendors · ToolShell · NTLM Type-2</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">vmware-vcenter · enterprise-vpn · hunt-sharepoint</text></g>- <!-- W: Cloud -->- <g transform="translate(-335, 0)">- <use href="#bugTarget" x="-26" y="-26" width="52" height="52"/>- <text x="-40" y="4" text-anchor="end" font-size="11" letter-spacing="2.5"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#FFE4D1" font-weight="700">Cloud</text>+ </g>++ <!-- ============ COLUMN [04] ADVANCED & RED-TEAM ============ -->+ <g transform="translate(1440, 430)">+ <text x="0" y="0" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="15"+ letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A" font-weight="600">[04] ADVANCED & RED-TEAM</text>++ <g transform="translate(0, 30)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">Smuggling · Cache · Race</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">AD-01</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">CL.TE · TE.CL · H2.CL · CDN poison · TOCTOU</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">hunt-http-smuggling · hunt-cache · hunt-race</text></g>- <!-- NW: MFA -->- <g transform="translate(-215, -165)">- <use href="#bugTarget" x="-26" y="-26" width="52" height="52"/>- <text x="0" y="-38" text-anchor="middle" font-size="11" letter-spacing="2.5"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#FFE4D1" font-weight="700">MFA</text>++ <g transform="translate(0, 150)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">APK · Supply-chain · IR</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">AD-02</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">jadx · Frida · dep-confusion · GH-Actions · baseline-shift</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">apk-redteam · supply-chain · mid-engagement-ir</text></g>- <!-- Distant "detected" markers (further out, no full reticles) -->- <use href="#bugDetected" x="-296" y="-180" width="22" height="22"/>- <use href="#bugDetected" x="290" y="-200" width="22" height="22"/>- <use href="#bugDetected" x="280" y="220" width="22" height="22"/>- <use href="#bugDetected" x="-310" y="200" width="22" height="22"/>-- <!-- Atmospheric particles -->- <g fill="#FFB591" opacity="0.65">- <circle cx="-260" cy="-90" r="1.2"/>- <circle cx="250" cy="-130" r="1"/>- <circle cx="-100" cy="-300" r="1.3"/>- <circle cx="120" cy="-280" r="0.9"/>- <circle cx="-220" cy="80" r="1.1"/>- <circle cx="180" cy="285" r="1"/>+ <g transform="translate(0, 270)">+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.5" fill="none">+ <path d="M 0 12 L 0 0 L 12 0"/>+ <path d="M 418 0 L 430 0 L 430 12"/>+ <path d="M 0 88 L 0 100 L 12 100"/>+ <path d="M 418 100 L 430 100 L 430 88"/>+ </g>+ <text x="18" y="38" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="22"+ font-weight="700" fill="#FFFFFF" letter-spacing="0.5">Web3 · DeFi · meme-coin</text>+ <text x="412" y="32" text-anchor="end" font-family="ui-monospace, monospace"+ font-size="12" letter-spacing="3" fill="#5A5A6A">AD-03</text>+ <text x="18" y="62" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="14"+ fill="#8A8A9A">10 DeFi classes · rug-pull · honeypot · LP-lock</text>+ <text x="18" y="82" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ fill="#5A5A6A">web3-audit · meme-coin-audit</text></g></g>- <!-- ============================================================ -->- <!-- TITLE BLOCK — right side -->- <!-- ============================================================ -->- <g transform="translate(960, 0)">- <!-- A CLAUDE SKILL chip -->- <g transform="translate(0, 222)">- <line x1="0" y1="0" x2="46" y2="0" stroke="#DA7756" stroke-width="3"/>- <circle cx="58" cy="0" r="3.6" fill="#DA7756"/>- <text x="74" y="5" font-size="12" letter-spacing="5"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#DA7756" font-weight="700">A CLAUDE SKILL</text>- <text x="280" y="5" font-size="11" letter-spacing="3"- font-family="ui-monospace, monospace" fill="#807565">· HUNT-MODE ACTIVE</text>+ <!-- ============================ KILL CHAIN ============================ -->+ <g transform="translate(60, 805)">+ <text x="0" y="14" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ letter-spacing="4" fill="#5A5A6A" font-weight="700">KILL</text>+ <text x="0" y="32" font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif" font-size="13"+ letter-spacing="4" fill="#5A5A6A" font-weight="700">CHAIN</text>++ <!-- 6 phase boxes -->+ <g font-family="ui-sans-serif, sans-serif">+ <!-- 01 SCOPE -->+ <g transform="translate(90, 0)">+ <rect x="0" y="0" width="270" height="46" fill="none" stroke="#2A2A3A" stroke-width="1.2"/>+ <text x="16" y="30" font-size="16" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">01</text>+ <text x="46" y="30" font-size="18" fill="#FFFFFF" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">SCOPE</text>+ <text x="254" y="30" text-anchor="end" font-size="13" fill="#5A5A6A" letter-spacing="2">intake</text>+ </g>+ <text x="372" y="30" fill="#FF2D4F" font-size="20" font-weight="700">▸</text>++ <!-- 02 RECON -->+ <g transform="translate(394, 0)">+ <rect x="0" y="0" width="270" height="46" fill="none" stroke="#2A2A3A" stroke-width="1.2"/>+ <text x="16" y="30" font-size="16" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">02</text>+ <text x="46" y="30" font-size="18" fill="#FFFFFF" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">RECON</text>+ <text x="254" y="30" text-anchor="end" font-size="13" fill="#5A5A6A" letter-spacing="2">passive</text>+ </g>+ <text x="676" y="30" fill="#FF2D4F" font-size="20" font-weight="700">▸</text>++ <!-- 03 HUNT — highlighted as active -->+ <g transform="translate(698, 0)">+ <rect x="0" y="0" width="270" height="46" fill="none" stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="2.2"/>+ <text x="16" y="30" font-size="16" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">03</text>+ <text x="46" y="30" font-size="18" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">HUNT</text>+ <text x="254" y="30" text-anchor="end" font-size="13" fill="#FF2D4F" letter-spacing="2" font-weight="700">active</text>+ </g>+ <text x="980" y="30" fill="#FF2D4F" font-size="20" font-weight="700">▸</text>++ <!-- 04 VALIDATE -->+ <g transform="translate(1002, 0)">+ <rect x="0" y="0" width="270" height="46" fill="none" stroke="#2A2A3A" stroke-width="1.2"/>+ <text x="16" y="30" font-size="16" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">04</text>+ <text x="46" y="30" font-size="18" fill="#FFFFFF" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">VALIDATE</text>+ <text x="254" y="30" text-anchor="end" font-size="13" fill="#5A5A6A" letter-spacing="2">triage</text>+ </g>+ <text x="1284" y="30" fill="#FF2D4F" font-size="20" font-weight="700">▸</text>++ <!-- 05 CAPTURE -->+ <g transform="translate(1306, 0)">+ <rect x="0" y="0" width="240" height="46" fill="none" stroke="#2A2A3A" stroke-width="1.2"/>+ <text x="16" y="30" font-size="16" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">05</text>+ <text x="46" y="30" font-size="18" fill="#FFFFFF" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">CAPTURE</text>+ <text x="224" y="30" text-anchor="end" font-size="13" fill="#5A5A6A" letter-spacing="2">PoC</text>+ </g>+ <text x="1558" y="30" fill="#FF2D4F" font-size="20" font-weight="700">▸</text>++ <!-- 06 REPORT -->+ <g transform="translate(1580, 0)">+ <rect x="0" y="0" width="240" height="46" fill="none" stroke="#2A2A3A" stroke-width="1.2"/>+ <text x="16" y="30" font-size="16" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">06</text>+ <text x="46" y="30" font-size="18" fill="#FFFFFF" font-weight="700" letter-spacing="2">REPORT</text>+ <text x="224" y="30" text-anchor="end" font-size="13" fill="#5A5A6A" letter-spacing="2">deliver</text>+ </g>+ </g>+ </g>++ <!-- ============================ BIG STATS ROW ============================ -->+ <g transform="translate(60, 900)">+ <!-- Thin red border around stats row w/ corner accents -->+ <g stroke="#FF2D4F" stroke-width="1.4" fill="none" opacity="0.8">+ <path d="M 0 16 L 0 0 L 16 0"/>+ <path d="M 1784 0 L 1800 0 L 1800 16"/>+ <path d="M 0 124 L 0 140 L 16 140"/>+ <path d="M 1784 140 L 1800 140 L 1800 124"/></g>- <!-- Massive wordmark, stacked for punch -->- <text y="340" font-size="108" font-weight="900"- font-family="ui-sans-serif, -apple-system, 'Segoe UI', Inter, sans-serif"- letter-spacing="-4" fill="#F5F4EE">claude</text>-- <text y="456" font-size="108" font-weight="900"- font-family="ui-sans-serif, -apple-system, 'Segoe UI', Inter, sans-serif"- letter-spacing="-4" fill="url(#titleGrad)" filter="url(#softGlow)">bughunter</text>-- <!-- Accent hairline under bughunter -->- <line x1="0" y1="474" x2="640" y2="474" stroke="#DA7756" stroke-width="2"/>-- <!-- Punchy tagline -->- <text x="0" y="518" font-size="22"- font-family="ui-sans-serif, -apple-system, 'Segoe UI', Inter, sans-serif"- fill="#C5BEB0" letter-spacing="0.2">- Senior bug-bounty researcher reflexes, on tap.- </text>-- <!-- Stat pills (widened, generous padding) -->- <g font-family="ui-monospace, 'SF Mono', Menlo, monospace" font-size="12" letter-spacing="2">- <g transform="translate(0, 568)">- <rect x="0" y="-18" width="130" height="28" rx="2" fill="none" stroke="#DA7756" stroke-width="1"/>- <text x="65" y="1" text-anchor="middle" fill="#F5F4EE" font-weight="700">40 SKILLS</text>+ <g font-family="ui-sans-serif, -apple-system, 'Segoe UI', Inter, sans-serif">+ <!-- 51 SKILLS -->+ <g transform="translate(80, 0)">+ <text x="0" y="78" font-size="78" font-weight="900" fill="#FF2D4F" letter-spacing="-2">51</text>+ <text x="0" y="115" font-size="14" letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A" font-weight="600">SKILLS</text></g>- <g transform="translate(142, 568)">- <rect x="0" y="-18" width="190" height="28" rx="2" fill="none" stroke="#DA7756" stroke-width="1"/>- <text x="95" y="1" text-anchor="middle" fill="#F5F4EE" font-weight="700">24 VULN CLASSES</text>+ <!-- 15 COMMANDS -->+ <g transform="translate(360, 0)">+ <text x="0" y="78" font-size="78" font-weight="900" fill="#FF2D4F" letter-spacing="-2">15</text>+ <text x="0" y="115" font-size="14" letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A" font-weight="600">COMMANDS</text></g>- <g transform="translate(344, 568)">- <rect x="0" y="-18" width="270" height="28" rx="2" fill="none" stroke="#DA7756" stroke-width="1"/>- <text x="135" y="1" text-anchor="middle" fill="#F5F4EE" font-weight="700">574+ DISCLOSED REPORTS</text>+ <!-- 24 VULN CLASSES -->+ <g transform="translate(640, 0)">+ <text x="0" y="78" font-size="78" font-weight="900" fill="#FF2D4F" letter-spacing="-2">24</text>+ <text x="0" y="115" font-size="14" letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A" font-weight="600">VULN CLASSES</text></g>- <g transform="translate(626, 568)">- <rect x="0" y="-18" width="210" height="28" rx="2" fill="none" stroke="#DA7756" stroke-width="1"/>- <text x="105" y="1" text-anchor="middle" fill="#F5F4EE" font-weight="700">6-PHASE WORKFLOW</text>+ <!-- 574+ REPORTS -->+ <g transform="translate(920, 0)">+ <text x="0" y="78" font-size="78" font-weight="900" fill="#FF2D4F" letter-spacing="-2">574+</text>+ <text x="0" y="115" font-size="14" letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A" font-weight="600">H1 REPORTS</text>+ </g>+ <!-- 10 DOMAINS -->+ <g transform="translate(1280, 0)">+ <text x="0" y="78" font-size="78" font-weight="900" fill="#FF2D4F" letter-spacing="-2">10</text>+ <text x="0" y="115" font-size="14" letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A" font-weight="600">DOMAINS</text>+ </g>+ <!-- 33K+ LINES -->+ <g transform="translate(1530, 0)">+ <text x="0" y="78" font-size="78" font-weight="900" fill="#FF2D4F" letter-spacing="-2">33K+</text>+ <text x="0" y="115" font-size="14" letter-spacing="4" fill="#8A8A9A" font-weight="600">LINES</text></g></g></g>- <!-- ============================================================ -->- <!-- BOTTOM STRIP -->- <!-- ============================================================ -->- <g font-family="ui-monospace, 'SF Mono', Menlo, monospace" font-size="11" letter-spacing="3">- <text x="58" y="678" fill="#807565">▸ INVOKE :</text>- <text x="146" y="678" fill="#F5F4EE">drop into ~/.claude/skills · auto-triggers on topic</text>- <text x="900" y="678" fill="#807565">·</text>- <text x="922" y="678" fill="#C5BEB0">recon · triage · validate · chain · capture · report</text>- <text x="1862" y="678" text-anchor="end" fill="#DA7756" letter-spacing="6" font-weight="700">SHIP IT</text>+ <!-- ============================ BOTTOM STRIP ============================ -->+ <g font-family="ui-monospace, 'SF Mono', Menlo, monospace" font-size="13" letter-spacing="3" transform="translate(0, 1062)">+ <text x="60" y="0" fill="#5A5A6A">▸ METHODOLOGY + ARSENAL</text>++ <g transform="translate(720, 0)">+ <text x="0" y="0" fill="#FF2D4F" font-weight="700">BUNDLED</text>+ <text x="116" y="0" fill="#5A5A6A">·</text>+ <text x="136" y="0" fill="#C5C5D5">PRODUCTION-READY</text>+ <text x="354" y="0" fill="#5A5A6A">·</text>+ <text x="374" y="0" fill="#C5C5D5">OFFENSIVE</text>+ <text x="500" y="0" fill="#5A5A6A">·</text>+ <text x="520" y="0" fill="#C5C5D5">DOCUMENTED</text>+ </g>++ <text x="1860" y="0" text-anchor="end" fill="#FF2D4F" letter-spacing="6" font-weight="700">SHIP IT ◀</text></g></svg>diff --git a/docs/credits.md b/docs/credits.mdindex f7c5611..2212e1e 100644--- a/docs/credits.md+++ b/docs/credits.md@@ -56,14 +56,14 @@ Plus 12 additional `hunt-*` skills curated by topic without an explicit report-c### Enterprise-platform attack skills (May 2026)-Built from two paid May-2026 red-team engagements (redacted-client — a large enterprise; on-prem SharePoint engagement — separate client) plus public CVE / advisory catalogues and IdP vendor documentation. Each skill is original work — vendor docs and public CVEs provided the technical primitives; the curation, current 2024-2026 chain assembly, and operator-discipline framing are the author's.+Built from two paid May-2026 red-team engagements (one against a large Indian manufacturing conglomerate; one on-prem SharePoint engagement — separate client) plus public CVE / advisory catalogues and IdP vendor documentation. Each skill is original work — vendor docs and public CVEs provided the technical primitives; the curation, current 2024-2026 chain assembly, and operator-discipline framing are the author's.-- **`m365-entra-attack`** — M365 / Entra ID full chain. AADSTS error reference, user enum vectors (with hardening status), Smart Lockout math, Conditional Access bypass options, ROPC + SAML SSO browser flow. 1,996 ROPC attempts during the redacted-client engagement, 247 pre-existing lockouts surfaced, 1 valid CA-blocked credential confirmed.+- **`m365-entra-attack`** — M365 / Entra ID full chain. AADSTS error reference, user enum vectors (with hardening status), Smart Lockout math, Conditional Access bypass options, ROPC + SAML SSO browser flow. ~2,000 ROPC attempts during the conglomerate engagement, ~250 pre-existing lockouts surfaced, 1 valid CA-blocked credential confirmed.- **`okta-attack`** — Okta-as-IdP attack chain for orgs where Okta sits alongside or instead of Entra. Distinct endpoints, distinct rate-limiting, distinct factor flows.- **`cloud-iam-deep`** — AWS / Azure / GCP IAM red-team post-credential model. 24+ AWS, 8+ Azure, 6+ GCP priv-esc patterns. Built for the "recon yielded a credential, what does it grant" workflow.- **`vmware-vcenter-attack`** — vSphere / vCenter / Workspace ONE / Aria external attack matrix. Internet-exposed only.- **`enterprise-vpn-attack`** — Cisco ASA, Fortinet, Citrix NetScaler, PAN GlobalProtect, Pulse/Ivanti, SonicWall, F5 — versioning, CVE matrix 2018-2026, AAA backend identification, default credentials, config-disclosure paths.-- **`apk-redteam-pipeline`** — End-to-end Android APK pipeline. 7 APKs processed manually during the redacted-client engagement, hardcoded JWT + 30 internal endpoints recovered.+- **`apk-redteam-pipeline`** — End-to-end Android APK pipeline. 7 APKs processed manually during the conglomerate engagement, hardcoded JWT + 30 internal endpoints recovered.- **`supply-chain-attack-recon`** — Recon and identification ONLY — actual package publishing / typosquat attacks require explicit written sign-off because they can affect entire npm/PyPI ecosystems.- **`hunt-sharepoint`** — SharePoint Server 2013–Subscription Edition on-prem farms. Anonymous endpoint enum, legacy SOAP login bypass, ToolShell precondition chain (CVE-2025-53770), SafeControl reflection enumeration, NTLM Type-2 disclosure, custom-zone Forms auth bridging. Built from a separate an authorized engagement against a SharePoint 2013 EoL farm.- **`hunt-aspnet`** — ASP.NET-specific surface. ViewState deserialization, machineKey recovery, dual-parser MAC-bypass anti-pattern, request-validator bypass. Same SharePoint engagement.@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Built from two paid May-2026 red-team engagements (redacted-client — a large e- **`redteam-mindset`** — Operator discipline corrections that separate offensive red-team work from defensive WAPT. Load at start of every red-team engagement; reload whenever feeling stuck on a defended target.- **`mid-engagement-ir-detection`** — Methodology for detecting client SOC patches, attacker activity, and security-state changes that occur DURING a red-team engagement. Built after observing a client patch a confirmed SQLi within 30 minutes of detection AND an external attacker lock 14 new accounts during a single test session.-- **`redteam-report-template`** — Client-facing deliverable format: Subject / Observations / Description / Impact / Recommendation / PoC. Built from the redacted-client deliverable (14 findings → 52KB MD + 2.2MB DOCX with 16 embedded screenshots).+- **`redteam-report-template`** — Client-facing deliverable format: Subject / Observations / Description / Impact / Recommendation / PoC. Built from a 14-finding deliverable (52KB MD + 2.2MB DOCX with 16 embedded screenshots).### Tooling and docs@@ -190,9 +190,9 @@ Exposed four bug-bounty capability gaps that the author's contributions directly3. Engagement coordination / scaffolding — addressed by the **`hunt`** shell command (original)4. Evidence hygiene / redaction — addressed by **`evidence-hygiene`** (original)-### Engagement 2 — redacted-client external red-team (May 2026)+### Engagement 2 — External red-team, large Indian manufacturing conglomerate (May 2026)-External red-team engagement against an a large enterprise. Exposed five additional gaps that bug-bounty defaults made worse:+Paid external red-team engagement against a large Indian manufacturing conglomerate. Exposed five additional gaps that bug-bounty defaults made worse:1. Conservative defaults retracted real findings → addressed by **`redteam-mindset`** (original)2. No mid-engagement situational awareness (client patched SQLi in 30 min; external attacker locked 14 accounts mid-test) → addressed by **`mid-engagement-ir-detection`** (original)@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ External red-team engagement against an a large enterprise. Exposed five additio4. No client-facing deliverable format → addressed by **`redteam-report-template`** (original)5. No post-credential escalation model → addressed by **`cloud-iam-deep`** (original)-Engagement-specific identifiers (target names, account UIDs, endpoint names, bounty amounts) have been replaced with abstract placeholders in the shipped versions of all engagement-derived skills. Engagement details are not redistributed for confidentiality. The redacted-client engagement (May 2026) is referenced by name in skill metadata only because the engagement was disclosed publicly by the author with client consent.+Engagement-specific identifiers (target names, domains, account UIDs, IPs, endpoint names, internal app names, employee names, tenant IDs, and any other client-identifying data) have been replaced with abstract placeholders in the shipped versions of all engagement-derived skills. Engagement details are not redistributed.---diff --git a/docs/disclosed-reports/hunt-ssrf.md b/docs/disclosed-reports/hunt-ssrf.mdindex 5f548af..f21b93b 100644--- a/docs/disclosed-reports/hunt-ssrf.md+++ b/docs/disclosed-reports/hunt-ssrf.md@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ SSRF earns its place at the top of the impact ladder because every modern applic### URL echo in error message- **Looks like:** Server returns 500 with body `"Could not fetch http://attacker.tld/x"`.- **Actually is:** String formatting in an error template. The server may never have made an outbound request — the URL is just being printed back to you in the error.-- **How to disprove:** Plant a Burp Collaborator subdomain in the URL and wait 30–120 seconds. Zero DNS or HTTP interactions = no fetch happened, even with the echo. This is the canonical FP-trap in SSRF hunting. Lesson reference: redacted-portal.ch SharePoint `/_layouts/15/download.aspx?SourceUrl=` echoed every URL into the error title; 38 Collaborator-tagged payloads across 12+ parameters yielded zero interactions. The "echo" was client-side formatting; the server resolved a SharePoint-internal SPFile path, not an outbound URL.+- **How to disprove:** Plant a Burp Collaborator subdomain in the URL and wait 30–120 seconds. Zero DNS or HTTP interactions = no fetch happened, even with the echo. This is the canonical FP-trap in SSRF hunting. Lesson reference (May-2026 SharePoint engagement): SharePoint `/_layouts/15/download.aspx?SourceUrl=` echoed every URL into the error title; 38 Collaborator-tagged payloads across 12+ parameters yielded zero interactions. The "echo" was client-side formatting; the server resolved a SharePoint-internal SPFile path, not an outbound URL.### 500 with stack trace mentioning your URL- **Looks like:** Stack trace in response shows `java.net.MalformedURLException: http://attacker.tld/x at ...`. Looks like the server tried to fetch and failed.diff --git a/docs/disclosed-reports/hunt-xss.md b/docs/disclosed-reports/hunt-xss.mdindex faeedfc..0c9baab 100644--- a/docs/disclosed-reports/hunt-xss.md+++ b/docs/disclosed-reports/hunt-xss.md@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ XSS pays when it combines privileged context (admin UI, billing flow, SSO callba### WAF rejection on `<` claimed as "filter bypass needed"- **Looks like:** ASP.NET request validator or a WAF returns 500 / 403 on a payload containing `<`. Operator wants to find a bypass.- **Actually is:** The framework is blocking *input*, not *output*. The data never reaches the application's output path. Finding an alternative-character bypass doesn't make this XSS; it just lets the request through to be safely encoded later.-- **How to disprove:** Find an input that *does* reach output unencoded (a header, a different parameter, a cookie). If every payload route gets encoded on output, it's a hardened app, not a bypassable one. Lesson reference: redacted-portal.ch — request validator blocks `<` before storage; encoding bypasses do not help.+- **How to disprove:** Find an input that *does* reach output unencoded (a header, a different parameter, a cookie). If every payload route gets encoded on output, it's a hardened app, not a bypassable one. Lesson reference (May-2026 SharePoint engagement): request validator blocks `<` before storage; encoding bypasses do not help.### Natural-language collision in response body- **Looks like:** You submitted `xsstest123` as the payload and observe `xsstest123` in the response body. Looks reflected.diff --git a/skills/apk-redteam-pipeline/SKILL.md b/skills/apk-redteam-pipeline/SKILL.mdindex a6298fb..efb23e4 100644--- a/skills/apk-redteam-pipeline/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/apk-redteam-pipeline/SKILL.md@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@---name: apk-redteam-pipeline-description: End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from the redacted-client engagement (May 2026) where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from `com.redacted-client.redacted-brand2`. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.-sources: redacted-client-redteam-2026+description: End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from a May-2026 external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.+sources: engagement-redactedreport_count: 1---@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ report_count: 1Trigger when:- Recon surfaces 1+ mobile apps under the target's developer name (Play Store dev page)-- A web app hosts `*.apk` files directly (we found `Recruitz.apk` on sclepro this way)-- APK package IDs leaked via stealer logs (we saw `com.redacted-client.redacted-client`, `com.redacted-client.redacted-brand2` in stealer dump format)+- A web app hosts `*.apk` files directly (e.g. `Recruitz.apk` found on a subdomain during one engagement)+- APK package IDs leaked via stealer logs (e.g. `com.<brand>.app`, `com.<brand>.<sub-brand>` patterns in stealer dump format)- Customer-facing app, dealer/partner portal, or employee mobile companion app is in scope- Bug bounty program lists Android in scope@@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ curl -sk -A "Mozilla/5.0" "https://play.google.com/store/apps/developer?id=<Brangrep -oE 'id=[a-zA-Z0-9._]+' /tmp/dev.html | sort -u```-Example output (redacted-client):+Example output (anonymized — 7 packages typical for a multi-brand conglomerate):```-com.events.redacted-brand2build-com.redacted.redacted-brand2-com.redacted.redacted-client-com.redacted-client.redacted-brand2-com.redacted-client.isaac-com.redacted-client.rockstrong-com.redacted-client.redacted-client+com.events.<brand>build+com.<corp>.<sub-brand-1>+com.<corp>.<sub-brand-2>+com.<corp>.<flagship>+com.<corp>.<product-line-1>+com.<corp>.<product-line-2>+com.<corp>.<sub-brand-3>```### Cross-reference with stealer logs-Stealer-log format includes package names like `*@com.redacted-client.redacted-client` — extract these from `creds_userpass.txt` if you have a leaked dump.+Stealer-log format includes package names like `*@com.<corp>.<app>` — extract these from `creds_userpass.txt` if you have a leaked dump.### Brand permutation guesses (a large enterprise patterns)```@@ -167,13 +167,13 @@ grep -oE 'client_secret["\s:=]+[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}' strings_<package>.txtgrep -oE '"password"\s*:\s*"[^"]+"|password\s*=\s*"[^"]+"' decompiled_<package>/sources/**/*.java 2>/dev/null```-### Real-world example finding (from redacted-client engagement)+### Real-world example finding (anonymized — from a an authorized engagement)```-# redacted-brand2 Pragati APK leaked:-https://api.redacted-client.com/JQc1Ep1Qpp/29gY3Nel6xugywaW4ygbhQdMyjB5kdsxOqyrlQxRilyQg99xkgUlL?token=REDACTED-JWT+# Customer-facing APK shipped a hardcoded URL of this shape:+https://api.<client>.example/<path-token>/<resource-token>?token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.<payload>.<sig>-# Decoded JWT payload: {"sid":2407,"iat":1542777587,"exp":1543641587}-# Expired since 2018-12-01 — but path tokens + 30 /v1/* endpoints still useful intel+# Decoded JWT payload: {"sid":<int>,"iat":<unix-ts>,"exp":<unix-ts>}+# Expired ~8 years earlier — but path tokens + 30 /v1/* endpoints still useful intel```---@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ done```### Real-world example-redacted-brand2 Cement Nirman Mitra APK contained `assets/api_redacted-brand_com.cer` — revealed the existence of `api.redacted-brand.com` (new asset not in our recon spreadsheet).+A customer-facing APK from a an authorized engagement contained `assets/api_<service>_<domain>_com.cer` — revealed the existence of an `api.<service>.<domain>.example` asset that had NOT surfaced in passive recon.---@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ mitmproxy --listen-port 8080- **Don't grep only for "password"** — most secrets have specific high-signal patterns (AKIA, AIza, eyJ, etc.). Generic word grep produces too much noise.- **Don't skip XAPK split APKs** — config.armeabi splits and config.<lang> splits sometimes contain different code paths.-- **Don't trust expired JWTs as "dead intel"** — the path structure, endpoint list, and signing algorithm are still useful. The redacted-brand2 Pragati example shows this.+- **Don't trust expired JWTs as "dead intel"** — the path structure, endpoint list, and signing algorithm are still useful. The 8-year-expired-JWT example above shows this.- **Don't reverse only the latest version** — older APK versions (via APKMirror version history) sometimes have secrets removed in newer versions but still active server-side.- **Don't ignore Firebase even if app looks "simple"** — Firebase rules misconfigurations (public read on Firestore) are extremely common.- **Don't run Frida on a production device** — use rooted emulator or test device only.@@ -385,13 +385,13 @@ download-apk() {----## Real-world finding template (from redacted-client)+## Real-world finding template (anonymized — an authorized engagement)-**Finding: Hardcoded JWT + 30+ Internal API Endpoints in redacted-brand2 Pragati APK**+**Finding: Hardcoded JWT + 30+ Internal API Endpoints in a customer-facing APK**- Subject: Hardcoded artifacts in legacy mobile build reveal internal API surface-- Observations: Decompilation of `com.redacted-client.redacted-brand2` revealed embedded JWT (expired 2018-12-01) and 30+ `/v1/*` endpoint paths against `api2.redacted-client.com` (internal-only externally)-- Description: APK ships with developer build artifacts. Path tokens (`JQc1Ep1Qpp/...`) are security-by-obscurity; API endpoint inventory is reconnaissance-grade.+- Observations: Decompilation of `com.<client>.<app>` revealed embedded JWT (expired ~8 years earlier) and 30+ `/v1/*` endpoint paths against `api2.<client>.example` (internal-only externally)+- Description: APK ships with developer build artifacts. Path tokens are security-by-obscurity; API endpoint inventory is reconnaissance-grade.- Impact: Post-VPN-foothold (via cred compromise), attacker has full API surface map without binary reverse. HS256 secret recovery (via SSRF/LFI) would yield arbitrary token forging.- Recommendation: rotate HS256 secret, migrate to RS256, remove hardcoded URLs from builds, audit all org APKs.- Evidence: extracted strings, decoded JWT, endpoint inventorydiff --git a/skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md b/skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.mdindex 95b080a..99b1ab1 100644--- a/skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/bb-methodology/SKILL.md@@ -401,6 +401,8 @@ Before pushing back with "I think we're done because X," do this:Most retracted findings come from four recurring process bugs. Each has a hard rule.+> **Important framing:** These discipline rules are about *correctness of findings* — not throttling of effort. They tell you which signals are real findings and which aren't. They do **not** tell you to send fewer probes. If you find yourself using these rules to justify stopping early, you're misreading them — load `redteam-mindset` (DO NOT STOP primary directive) and continue. Coverage discipline and finding-correctness discipline are orthogonal axes; you need both on full.+### Marker DisciplineWhen testing for reflection, cache poisoning, parameter pollution, or OOB SSRF, the marker string you inject MUST be unique and unmistakable.diff --git a/skills/enterprise-vpn-attack/SKILL.md b/skills/enterprise-vpn-attack/SKILL.mdindex ccb8149..cf29505 100644--- a/skills/enterprise-vpn-attack/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/enterprise-vpn-attack/SKILL.md@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@---name: enterprise-vpn-attack-description: External SSL VPN / remote-access appliance attack matrix — Cisco ASA/AnyConnect, Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS, Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, Pulse Secure / Ivanti Connect Secure, SonicWall, F5 Big-IP. Covers version fingerprinting, CVE matrix (2018-2026), AAA backend identification, default credentials, configuration-disclosure paths, pre-auth RCE/SSRF/path-traversal exploits where applicable. Built from redacted-client engagement (May 2026) Cisco ASA testing plus 2024-2026 enterprise VPN CVE landscape. Use whenever the target's perimeter exposes any SSL VPN appliance or remote-access gateway — these are the most common initial-access points in 2024-2026 actor TTPs.-sources: redacted-client-redteam-2026, public-advisories, cisa-kev+description: External SSL VPN / remote-access appliance attack matrix — Cisco ASA/AnyConnect, Fortinet FortiGate/FortiOS, Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, Pulse Secure / Ivanti Connect Secure, SonicWall, F5 Big-IP. Covers version fingerprinting, CVE matrix (2018-2026), AAA backend identification, default credentials, configuration-disclosure paths, pre-auth RCE/SSRF/path-traversal exploits where applicable. Built from engagement-redacted Cisco ASA testing plus 2024-2026 enterprise VPN CVE landscape. Use whenever the target's perimeter exposes any SSL VPN appliance or remote-access gateway — these are the most common initial-access points in 2024-2026 actor TTPs.+sources: engagement-redacted, public-advisories, cisa-kevreport_count: 1---## When to use this skillTrigger when recon surfaces:-- `*.redacted-client.com/+CSCOE+/logon.html` or similar `+CSCOE+` paths → Cisco ASA / AnyConnect+- `*.<client>.example/+CSCOE+/logon.html` or similar `+CSCOE+` paths → Cisco ASA / AnyConnect- `intranet.*` / `vpn.*` / `connect.*` / `webvpn.*` / `wc.*` / `remote.*` subdomains- Port 443 returning login pages with `Server: Apache` or banner like "AnyConnect", "FortiGate", "NetScaler", "GlobalProtect", "Pulse", "Ivanti"- TCP 8443 / 4443 / 10443 / 8888 (common VPN web-mgmt ports)diff --git a/skills/m365-entra-attack/SKILL.md b/skills/m365-entra-attack/SKILL.mdindex 7e4d9cf..5d9e130 100644--- a/skills/m365-entra-attack/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/m365-entra-attack/SKILL.md@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@---name: m365-entra-attack-description: Microsoft 365 / Entra ID red-team attack chain — current 2026 reality. AADSTS code reference, user enumeration vectors (with hardening status), Smart Lockout math, Conditional Access bypass options, ROPC + SAML SSO browser flow, Burp/Playwright templates. Built from a paid external red-team engagement against an a large enterprise (redacted-client, May 2026) where 1,996 ROPC attempts surfaced 247 pre-existing lockouts, 1 valid CA-blocked credential, and confirmed real-time external attacker activity. Use for any M365/Entra credential attack, password spray, user enumeration, CA-bypass exploration, or active-attacker-detection scenario.-sources: redacted-client-redteam-2026, microsoft-docs, AADInternals+description: Microsoft 365 / Entra ID red-team attack chain — current 2026 reality. AADSTS code reference, user enumeration vectors (with hardening status), Smart Lockout math, Conditional Access bypass options, ROPC + SAML SSO browser flow, Burp/Playwright templates. Built from a paid external red-team engagement against a large Indian manufacturing conglomerate (May 2026) where ~2,000 ROPC attempts surfaced ~250 pre-existing lockouts, 1 valid CA-blocked credential, and confirmed real-time external attacker activity. Use for any M365/Entra credential attack, password spray, user enumeration, CA-bypass exploration, or active-attacker-detection scenario.+sources: engagement-redacted, microsoft-docs, AADInternalsreport_count: 1---@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ DO NOT use for:```bash# For each owned domain-msftrecon -d redacted-client.com-msftrecon -d redacted-clientltd.com-msftrecon -d redacted-brand2school.com+msftrecon -d client.example+msftrecon -d clientltd.example+msftrecon -d sister-brand-school.example```Key fields in output:@@ -114,6 +114,20 @@ Host: <tenant>-my.sharepoint.com- Microsoft is hardening these endpoints over time — re-verify before relying on it- Some users may exist in Entra without OneDrive provisioning (license-dependent) — false negatives possible+**2026-05-17 re-verification (engagement-redacted revalidation):** The OneDrive enum primitive STILL WORKS as of 2026-05-17. Calibration: licensed users return HTTP 200 with ~57KB body; nonexistent users / shared-mailbox accounts return 404 with 0 bytes. The /personal/ root path (without /_layouts/15/onedrive.aspx) returns the same differential.++**Killer use case: license differential = account-class signal.** Cross-reference OneDrive 200/404 with ROPC AADSTS50034/50126:++| OneDrive | ROPC | Classification |+|---|---|---|+| 200 | AADSTS50076 (MFA req) or 50126 | **Licensed regular user** (real employee, MFA enforced) |+| 200 | AADSTS50034 | (shouldn't happen — inconsistency, investigate) |+| 404 | AADSTS50126 | **Shared mailbox / functional / service account** (no OneDrive license, has password) — historic MFA-exempt class, prime target for password guessing |+| 404 | AADSTS50034 | Doesn't exist in tenant |+| 404 | AADSTS50076 | Edge case (functional account WITH MFA enforced — rare) |++The OneDrive-404 + ROPC-50126 combination is **the signal for "functional account that might bypass MFA"** — admins frequently exempt these from CA policies because they're used by automation that can't satisfy MFA. Discovered usefulness on engagement-redacted revalidation: identified `noreply@`, `purchase@`, `accounts@`, `postmaster@`, `transport@` as functional-account candidates (typical for any conglomerate tenant).+**ROPC AADSTS50034 / AADSTS50126 differential:**- AADSTS50034 (user not exist) does NOT increment Smart Lockout counter- AADSTS50126 (wrong password) DOES increment@@ -173,7 +187,11 @@ def attempt(email, password):req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")try:r = urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=15)- return {"status": "VALID", "body": json.loads(r.read())}+ body = json.loads(r.read())+ # PARSE AS JSON — see CRITICAL TRAP below about substring matching+ if "access_token" in body: # ← JSON key check, NOT substring+ return {"status": "VALID", "body": body}+ return {"status": "STATUS_200_NO_TOKEN", "body": body}except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:msg = e.read().decode(errors="ignore")for code, status in [@@ -189,6 +207,26 @@ def attempt(email, password):return {"status": "OTHER", "msg": msg[:200]}```+### ⚠ CRITICAL TRAP — AADSTS50076 body contains literal `"access_token"` substring++When CA policy requires MFA and ROPC cannot satisfy it, Entra returns an error body that INCLUDES a `claims` field listing CA policy IDs as a step-up challenge:++```json+{+ "error": "invalid_grant",+ "error_description": "AADSTS50076: ...you must use multi-factor authentication...",+ "error_codes": [50076],+ "suberror": "basic_action",+ "claims": "{\"access_token\":{\"capolids\":{\"essential\":true,\"values\":[\"<policy-id-1>\",\"<policy-id-2>\"]}}}"+}+```++**The `"access_token"` substring appears inside the CA claims challenge JSON.** A loose substring check `if "access_token" in raw_body:` will false-positive every MFA-blocked attempt as a successful token issuance.++**Always parse JSON, then check `if "access_token" in parsed_dict:`** — never substring-match on OAuth error bodies. This was discovered in the 2026-05-17 engagement-redacted revalidation where a substring check produced 7 false-positive "CA bypasses" on Sway/Yammer/Bookings/Tunnel client_ids that were actually all enforcing MFA correctly.++The `claims.access_token.capolids` values are tenant-internal Conditional Access policy IDs — useful recon enrichment, but NOT a token. Document them in engagement notes as "CA policy IDs that fired" — they're a defender-side breadcrumb, not an attacker-side win.+**Pace:**- Per-IP: ≤30 req/sec is fine; Microsoft tolerates well- Per-user: hard cap from state file is the only thing that matters@@ -239,8 +277,8 @@ async def saml_validate(target_sp_url, username, password, screenshot_dir):return "MFA_REQUIRED" # cred valid, MFA wallelif "we couldn't sign you in" in low or "wrong" in low:return "INVALID"- elif "infrawatch" in low or "dashboard" in low:- return "FULL_SUCCESS" # session obtained+ elif "<post-auth-landing-marker>" in low or "dashboard" in low:+ return "FULL_SUCCESS" # session obtained (replace marker per target app)return "UNCLEAR"```@@ -263,12 +301,12 @@ This is the **highest-impact byproduct** of any M365 spray engagement. Always tr## Common password patterns to spray (Indian-conglomerate-specific)-- `<BrandName>@<Year>` — `redacted-client@2026`, `redacted-brand2@2026`, `Tata@2026`-- `<BrandName>@123` — `redacted-client@123` (very common)-- `<PlantCity>@<Year>` — `Hirakud@2026`, `Beawar@2026` (cement plant cities)+- `<BrandName>@<Year>` — `<Brand>@2026`, `Tata@2026`+- `<BrandName>@123` — `<Brand>@123` (very common)+- `<PlantCity>@<Year>` — `<City1>@2026`, `<City2>@2026` (production plant cities)- `<EmployeeID-as-password>` — common in legacy apps (PAN number, employee code, phone last4)- `Password@<year>`, `Welcome@<year>`, `Admin@<year>` — generic defaults-- `<BrandName>@<Y2-digits>` — `redacted-client@26`+- `<BrandName>@<Y2-digits>` — `<Brand>@26`**Engagement caveat:** when client provides leaked-cred dumps (stealer logs), use those FIRST. Each leaked cred is 1 cap-attempt against the strongest known guess for that user.@@ -278,24 +316,24 @@ This is the **highest-impact byproduct** of any M365 spray engagement. Always trEvery M365 attempt logs to JSONL:```json-{"ts":"2026-05-08T14:40:53","email":"[email protected]","pw_first4":"Shre","status":"VALID_CA_BLOCK","code":"AADSTS53003","attempts_used":1}+{"ts":"2026-05-08T14:40:53","email":"user1@<client>.example","pw_first4":"<r4>","status":"VALID_CA_BLOCK","code":"AADSTS53003","attempts_used":1}```**Per-user tracker** (atomic):```json-{"[email protected]": 1, "[email protected]": 1, ...}+{"user1@<client>.example": 1, "user2@<client>.example": 1, ...}```**IP rotation log** (per-day):```-2026-05-08 49.36.184.19 Reliance Jio Delhi Sachin (Lucideus) Round 2 spray+2026-05-08 <src-ip> <ISP-AS> <operator-handle> Round 2 spray```These three artifacts are deliverable evidence for the report. They survive into the next engagement as state.----## Real-world findings template (from redacted-client engagement)+## Real-world findings template (from engagement-redacted)For the report:diff --git a/skills/mid-engagement-ir-detection/SKILL.md b/skills/mid-engagement-ir-detection/SKILL.mdindex 7781a41..bdd75a0 100644--- a/skills/mid-engagement-ir-detection/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/mid-engagement-ir-detection/SKILL.md@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@---name: mid-engagement-ir-detection-description: Methodology for detecting client SOC patches, attacker activity, and security-state changes that occur DURING a red-team engagement — and converting those observations into deliverable findings. Built from a paid external red-team engagement (redacted-client, May 2026) where the client patched a confirmed SQLi within 30 minutes of detection AND an external attacker locked 14 NEW accounts during a single test session. Use when (a) running ANY active engagement against a monitored target, (b) a previously-confirmed finding stops reproducing, (c) baseline timing shifts unexpectedly, or (d) you notice response patterns changing during testing.-sources: redacted-client-redteam-2026+description: Methodology for detecting client SOC patches, attacker activity, and security-state changes that occur DURING a red-team engagement — and converting those observations into deliverable findings. Built from a paid external red-team engagement (engagement-redacted) where the client patched a confirmed SQLi within 30 minutes of detection AND an external attacker locked 14 NEW accounts during a single test session. Use when (a) running ANY active engagement against a monitored target, (b) a previously-confirmed finding stops reproducing, (c) baseline timing shifts unexpectedly, or (d) you notice response patterns changing during testing.+sources: engagement-redactedreport_count: 1---@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Anti-pattern: treating reproduction failure as evidence the original signal was# Capture pre-test fingerprint of the targetfingerprint = {"ts_pre": time.time(),- "ip_seen": "49.36.184.19",+ "ip_seen": "<operator-src-ip>","baseline_response_time_ms": <measure>,"baseline_response_size_bytes": <measure>,"response_headers": <capture set>,@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ Maintain three pieces of state:```json{"ts": "2026-05-08T13:00:00",- "source_ip": "49.36.184.19",+ "source_ip": "<operator-src-ip>","targets": {"https://target.example.com/login": {"baseline_response_time_ms": 584,@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ Every test logs:When a state change is detected, append:```jsonl-{"ts_observed":"2026-05-08T14:30:00","change_type":"baseline_time_shift","target":"https://eapps.../custdocument/scllogin.php","baseline_pre_ms":24412,"baseline_post_ms":90403,"interpretation":"likely WAF rule deployed","actions_taken":["tested WAF-evasion variants — no signal restoration","documented as IR-mitigation finding"]}+{"ts_observed":"2026-05-08T14:30:00","change_type":"baseline_time_shift","target":"https://<employee-app-host>/<app>/login.php","baseline_pre_ms":24412,"baseline_post_ms":90403,"interpretation":"likely WAF rule deployed","actions_taken":["tested WAF-evasion variants — no signal restoration","documented as IR-mitigation finding"]}```This third file is your finding evidence. Every entry is a candidate finding.diff --git a/skills/offensive-osint/SKILL.md b/skills/offensive-osint/SKILL.mdindex a22aaf4..77f199f 100644--- a/skills/offensive-osint/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/offensive-osint/SKILL.md@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ Drop these prompts into a fresh Claude session to verify the skill loads correct11. *"Curl one-liner to test for `/actuator/env`."* → §16.13.12. *"Show me the GraphQL field-suggestion enumeration trick when introspection is disabled."* → §22.9.13. *"Found a hard-coded JWT in JS. Walk me through full triage."* → §23.12 (JWT workflow).-14. *"Generate cloud bucket candidates for `redacted-client` with subdomains api/billing/hr."* → §16.8.+14. *"Generate cloud bucket candidates for `<Client Brand Ltd>` with subdomains api/billing/hr."* → §16.8.15. *"How do I find Microsoft 365 Teams federation status + SharePoint subdomains?"* → §22.8.16. *"Probe paths for Citrix Netscaler / F5 BIG-IP / Pulse Secure."* → §16.16.17. *"Find the origin behind Cloudflare on `target.example`."* → §16.15 + companion methodology §27.diff --git a/skills/offensive-osint/references/probes-and-wordlists.md b/skills/offensive-osint/references/probes-and-wordlists.mdindex f699017..7f1072d 100644--- a/skills/offensive-osint/references/probes-and-wordlists.md+++ b/skills/offensive-osint/references/probes-and-wordlists.md@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ old, legacy, archive, backup, beta, v1, v2, classic,cdn, static, assets, media, img, files, downloads, public,ns, ns1, ns2, dns, mx, mx1, mx2,zoom, teams, slack, lync, sip, voice, meet,-sclepro, tender, tenders, suppliers, vendor, vendors, procurement, purchase+eproc, tender, tenders, suppliers, vendor, vendors, procurement, purchase```**One-liner (PowerShell):**@@ -1258,9 +1258,9 @@ puredns resolve <(awk -v d="$D" '{print $1"."d}' assetnote-best-dns-wordlist.txt- For `vpn.*` / `gateway.*` / `gp.*` / `globalprotect.*` / `citrix.*` → flag for active vendor fingerprint (§16.16) under separate engagement scope.- For `api.*` / `app.*` → seed for §16.1–16.10 webapp probes.- For `staging.*` / `dev.*` / `uat.*` → seed for §16.5 always-on HTTP checks (often weaker auth + debug endpoints).-- For `intranet.*` / `eapps.*` / `sclepro.*` → public-intranet finding (often MEDIUM; per §40).+- For `intranet.*` / `eapps.*` / `eproc.*` / similar internal-app shortnames → public-intranet finding (often MEDIUM; per §40).-**Real-engagement validation:** in an internal smoke test, prefix-sweep found `vpn.`, `api.`, `intranet.`, `staging.`, `support.`, `eapps.`, `sclepro.`, `autodiscover.` — all of which crt.sh missed (or returned 502 for). Treat passive + active as **complementary, not alternatives**.+**Real-engagement validation:** in an internal smoke test, prefix-sweep found `vpn.`, `api.`, `intranet.`, `staging.`, `support.`, `eapps.`, `eproc.`, `autodiscover.` — all of which crt.sh missed (or returned 502 for). Treat passive + active as **complementary, not alternatives**.---diff --git a/skills/okta-attack/SKILL.md b/skills/okta-attack/SKILL.mdindex 9c051fc..7b2fa7f 100644--- a/skills/okta-attack/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/okta-attack/SKILL.md@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ DO NOT use for:### Direct guesses```bash# Tenant subdomains often match the brand-for tenant in redacted-client redacted-clientltd redacted-brand2cement uccrak <brand>; do+# Replace these with your target's actual tenant slug candidates:+for tenant in target-brand target-brand-ltd target-sister-brand target-brand-short target-other-variant; dofor region in okta okta-emea oktapreview; dohost="$tenant.$region.com"code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 8 "https://$host/")@@ -39,7 +40,8 @@ done### Cross-ref from DNS```bash# Look for CNAME records pointing to Okta-for domain in redacted-client.com redacted-clientltd.com; do+# Replace with your target's actual domains:+for domain in client.example client-ltd.example; dodig +short "sso.$domain" CNAMEdig +short "login.$domain" CNAMEdig +short "auth.$domain" CNAME@@ -175,7 +177,7 @@ Discipline:If a valid password is obtained and `push` factor is available, the classic attack: hammer the push factor until the user accepts out of fatigue.-⚠ **OUT OF SCOPE in most red-team engagements** (counts as social engineering / phishing — the user explicitly noted phishing OOS for redacted-client). Document the vector existence but do not execute without explicit sign-off.+⚠ **OUT OF SCOPE in most red-team engagements** (counts as social engineering / phishing — e.g. phishing was explicitly OOS for engagement-redacted). Document the vector existence but do not execute without explicit sign-off.### Detection-only check (does target allow it?)```bashdiff --git a/skills/redteam-mindset/SKILL.md b/skills/redteam-mindset/SKILL.mdindex f7bc41d..121d917 100644--- a/skills/redteam-mindset/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/redteam-mindset/SKILL.md@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@---name: redteam-mindset-description: Red-team operator discipline — the mindset corrections that separate offensive testing from defensive WAPT. Built from a paid external red-team engagement (redacted-client, May 2026) where conservative defaults caused multiple findings to be missed and one to be incorrectly retracted. Use at the START of any red-team engagement and again whenever feeling stuck or considering "stopping" on a defended target. The single most important skill to load when scope is "external red team" not "bug bounty / WAPT".-sources: redacted-client-redteam-2026+description: Red-team operator discipline — the mindset corrections that separate offensive testing from defensive WAPT. Built from a paid external red-team engagement (engagement-redacted) where conservative defaults caused multiple findings to be missed and one to be incorrectly retracted. Use at the START of any red-team engagement and again whenever feeling stuck or considering "stopping" on a defended target. The single most important skill to load when scope is "external red team" not "bug bounty / WAPT".+sources: engagement-redactedreport_count: 1---@@ -30,6 +30,60 @@ These produce DIFFERENT decisions at every blocker. Internalize the difference b---+## DO NOT STOP — primary directive (read this twice)++The 9 corrections below are nuance. THIS is the core. If you only retain one thing from this skill, retain this.++### Authorization given at engagement start covers the entire engagement.++Do not insert mid-engagement permission gates. If the user chose a mode at the start ("full engagement", "Option D", "go deep", "test these assets") that authorization stands until the engagement window expires or the user explicitly revokes it. **`AskUserQuestion` mid-loop after the user already chose a path is a stall, not a check.**++### Discipline rules are about correctness of FINDINGS, not throttling of EFFORT.++Read this twice. The bundle's discipline rules — OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen, Marker Discipline, Body-Diff, Pre-Severity Gate, Server-Policy-vs-State, Statistical Sampling — all answer one question: *"is this signal actually a finding?"*. **None of them answer the question *"should I send the next probe?"*** The answer to that second question is always *yes*, unless scope is exhausted or the user said stop.++### "Stop at PoC" means stop ESCALATING, not stop TESTING.++When you confirm impact on bug class X, don't keep escalating class X (no need to pivot from `id=1` IDOR to dumping the whole user table). But classes Y and Z have not been tested yet. Run Y. Then Z. Then the rest of the Pattern Library.++### Marker Discipline ≠ "one probe per surface."++Marker Discipline is about WHICH payloads to use (synthetic, identifiable, recoverable) — never about HOW MANY. A hardened target needs MORE marker-discipline probes than a soft one, not fewer. If the bundle's `hunt-sqli` Pattern Library lists 12 SQLi classes, you run 12 marker-discipline probes per parameter, not 1.++### Self-throttling anti-patterns — flag immediately if you catch yourself doing any of these++These all came out of a real engagement (engagement-redacted revalidation, 2026-05-17) where this skill *existed* and was *loaded* and the operator still self-throttled. The lesson is to make the failure modes explicit:++1. **Asking "want me to continue?" mid-run** after the user already chose Option D / full engagement / "go deep". The answer they gave at start IS the answer.+2. **Stopping at first-class-returning-401/403.** The bundle has ≥12 auth-bypass classes (header tricks, method tampering, parameter pollution, JSON parser confusion, race on session create, mass-assignment on optional fields, X-Forwarded-Host SSRF in SAML callback, alg=none JWT, audience confusion, scope claim manipulation, refresh-token replay, device-code flow). Run them all per surface.+3. **"Interesting constant token, not chased."** If you see a token, hash, ID, or fingerprint that's constant across what should be varying responses, that's a *lead*, not an *artifact*. `GET` it. Decode it. Pass it back. A `view.php?view=<constant-md5>` redirect is a session/auth/error-key signal, not noise.+4. **Reading robots.txt for cross-template signals and NOT READING the Disallow lines.** A 469-line robots.txt is a developer-curated map of every path they don't want public. Every Disallow line is a probe target.+5. **Treating soft-404 as "noted."** A 37 KB body inside a 404 status is leaking the home page or worse. Read it. Grep it. Diff it against the home page.+6. **"OpenAPI exposed → finding logged"** with only 4 of N endpoints probed. Every endpoint × every relevant test class. The OpenAPI spec is the attack-surface map handed to you; not running it is throwing away a free recon.+7. **"APK retest deferred — needs tooling."** `brew install jadx`, apkpure direct download, `apk-redteam-pipeline` already documents the flow. Five minutes of setup, not "another session."+8. **Volume framed as a problem.** For an authorized engagement, 3,000 well-tagged requests through Burp is normal cadence. Bug-bounty hunters at full pace exceed that per *hour*. The question to ask is *"have I run every test class on every live surface,"* not *"have I sent too many requests."*+9. **Inserting `AskUserQuestion` at any decision point inside an active engagement loop.** If the user picked a mode at start, that mode is in effect until revoked. Choosing operationally between e.g. SAML acs raw POST vs SAML acs replay is a *technical* decision the operator can make and document — it does not require user pre-approval.+10. **Skill-gap-as-stop-condition.** "No `hunt-zoho` skill exists, so I logged a v1.1 gap and moved on." NO. If a hunt-* skill doesn't exist for a discovered tech stack, do the same work *manually* using the vendor's public check matrix. Log the gap in v1.1 roadmap *and* run the checks now.++### Real-engagement cadence — what a complete sweep per live host actually looks like++Per live host, before declaring the host complete:++- Top-100 path probe (admin, api, login, /.git, /.env, server-status, swagger, openapi.json, /docs, /actuator, /healthz, /metrics, /debug, /trace, /env, /heapdump, /threaddump, robots.txt, sitemap.xml, /.well-known/*, common-CMS-paths per fingerprint)+- robots.txt content **read** — every Disallow becomes a probe target+- sitemap.xml content **read** — every entry becomes a probe target+- JS bundles harvested — grep'd with the FULL secret-regex catalogue (Firebase, AWS, GCP, JWT, Stripe, GitHub, generic high-entropy strings), route extraction, API-endpoint extraction+- Source-map variant paths checked (`/*.js.map`, `/static/js/*.js.map`, `/_next/static/*.js.map`, `/build/*.js.map`)+- For every form discovered: full SQLi marker-discipline sweep (12+ classes), auth-bypass class sweep (12+ classes), CSRF, parameter pollution, mass-assignment, race condition on state-changing submission+- For every API endpoint discovered (from JS, OpenAPI, swagger, network capture): HTTP method tampering, content-type tampering, JWT alg=none, alg=HS256-with-RS256-key, audience confusion, prototype pollution, race conditions on idempotency-violating ops+- For every SaaS tenant identified: vendor-specific check matrix from the vendor's known-vuln catalogue — even when no dedicated hunt-* skill exists yet+- Identity fabric: GetUserRealm, OpenID well-known, autodiscover-v2, federation behavior testing, sister-brand-TLD pivot for shared tenant, OneDrive-based user enum (no lockout risk)+- Mobile apps: pull every APK in the developer's catalogue, jadx decompile, secret + endpoint + cert-pin grep, exported-component enum++**If you've done less than this per host, you have not finished the host. The engagement is not done until every host is finished.**++---+## Mindset correction #1 — The blocker is data, not the stop sign**Anti-pattern (what I did wrong):**@@ -52,10 +106,10 @@ When a defense suddenly appears mid-engagement:## Mindset correction #2 — Sister-app pattern recognition**Anti-pattern:**-> "I confirmed SQLi on /medical/wmc/. Moving on to other tasks."+> "I confirmed SQLi on /app-a/. Moving on to other tasks."**The correct frame:**-> "Same backend, same code template likely → /custdocument/, /tenderSys/, /etax/, /vMS/, /transporterbidding/ are all probable. Test them with the SAME payload."+> "Same backend, same code template likely → /app-b/, /app-c/, /app-d/, /app-e/ (sibling apps on the same employee-portal host) are all probable. Test them with the SAME payload."When you confirm a vuln on app A:1. **Identify shared infrastructure** — same IP, same load balancer, same TLS cert, same response headers, same session cookie name, same login form HTML.@@ -64,7 +118,7 @@ When you confirm a vuln on app A:4. **Document the class of vulnerability** — "vulnerability is in shared form-handler template across N apps", not just one finding.5. **Recommend class-fix** — fix the shared template, not just one app.-The redacted-client engagement: WMC SQLi confirmed; custdocument, transporterbidding, etax, vMS sit on the same eapps host with similar form patterns — likely all share the same vulnerable template. Should have been a multi-app finding.+The engagement-redacted case: SQLi confirmed on one sub-app (`<app-A>`); four sibling sub-apps (`<app-B>`, `<app-C>`, `<app-D>`, `<app-E>`) sit on the same employee-app host with similar form patterns — likely all share the same vulnerable template. Should have been a multi-app finding.---@@ -201,7 +255,7 @@ A single signal can be coincidence (network jitter, server hiccup, cache). Two dReal-time, append-only, structured:```jsonl-{"ts":"2026-05-08T14:40:53","ip":"49.36.184.19","tool":"m365_validator","target":"login.microsoftonline.com","payload":"chetan.sharma:redacted-client***","resp_code":400,"resp_body_size":154,"resp_ms":1280,"aadsts":"AADSTS53003","verdict":"VALID_CA_BLOCK","notes":""}+{"ts":"2026-05-08T14:40:53","ip":"<src-ip>","tool":"m365_validator","target":"login.microsoftonline.com","payload":"user1@<client>.example:<pw-r4>***","resp_code":400,"resp_body_size":154,"resp_ms":1280,"aadsts":"AADSTS53003","verdict":"VALID_CA_BLOCK","notes":""}```Why:@@ -289,19 +343,25 @@ If you catch yourself thinking any of these, STOP and reconsider:## When to stop (the legitimate stop conditions)Only stop when:-- All in-scope assets have been actively probed (not just discovered) for top vuln classes+- All in-scope assets have been actively probed (not just discovered) for top vuln classes — see "Real-engagement cadence" checklist near top of this skill- Every confirmed vuln has been validated via 2+ techniques- Every confirmed vuln has been swept on its sister apps- Every blocker has been attempted via 2+ alternative vectors- Engagement window has expired AND deliverables are documented- Client has explicitly directed you to stop-NOT legitimate stop conditions:+NOT legitimate stop conditions (each of these has produced a real failure):- "I'm tired of this target"- "The first attempt didn't work"-- "Defenses are working"-- "I documented it"+- "Defenses are working" — defences working on class X says nothing about classes Y, Z+- "I documented it" — documenting a gap is not running the test- "We've already informed the client"+- "Volume is getting high" — for an authorized engagement, the only volume question is whether each request is well-tagged and audited+- "The discipline rules say be careful" — they say be correct, not be quiet+- "The skill for this tech stack doesn't exist yet" — apply the vendor's public check matrix manually; log v1.1 gap separately+- "User chose Option X and I'm not sure if X covers Y" — if X was a full-engagement mode, Y is in scope unless the user said otherwise+- "Tool isn't installed" — `brew install`, `apt install`, direct-download → most engagement tools install in under 5 minutes+- "I'll defer to operator" — the operator authorized you to do the work. Doing the work IS the deferral they want.---@@ -323,5 +383,5 @@ This skill is the operational discipline; those are the techniques.- **`hunt-dispatch`** — Once mindset is loaded, the `/hunt` command needs a mode answer (redteam vs wapt, blackbox vs greybox) before it routes to platform-specific skills. Engagement flow: red-team mindset triggered → confirm engagement mode (`bug-bounty` vs red-team vs pentest per project memory) → invoke `/hunt` → `hunt-dispatch` loads the right cluster (M365 / SharePoint / VPN / vCenter / APK).- **`mid-engagement-ir-detection`** — Red-team mindset says "behavior changes ARE findings"; this skill operationalizes that. Engagement flow: red-team engagement underway → baseline established at session start → response patterns shift mid-test → `mid-engagement-ir-detection` captures the SOC-patch state as a NEW finding (defensive-action observed = client capability metric). Don't dismiss it as "the bug got fixed."- **`redteam-report-template`** — Red-team deliverable is NOT a bug-bounty report; different audience, different tone, different cadence. Engagement flow: findings collected throughout engagement → at session close, package via `redteam-report-template` (Subject / Observations / Description / Impact / Recommendation / PoC) for client-facing DOCX, not `report-writing` which is for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti platforms.-- **`triage-validation`** — Red-team mindset includes "don't retract too fast" — the 4 retractions from redacted-portal.ch were mindset failures, not validation failures. Engagement flow: every finding through `triage-validation` 7-Question Gate, but with the red-team adjustment that "exploitable only with chain" is still a finding, not a no-finding.+- **`triage-validation`** — Red-team mindset includes "don't retract too fast" — the 4 retractions from a an authorized engagement were mindset failures, not validation failures. Engagement flow: every finding through `triage-validation` 7-Question Gate, but with the red-team adjustment that "exploitable only with chain" is still a finding, not a no-finding.- **`evidence-hygiene`** — Red-team engagements often span weeks; without disciplined evidence capture the deliverable suffers. Engagement flow: red-team mindset triggered → set up `evidence-hygiene` capture cadence (screenshots, request/response dumps, timestamped logs) at session start, not at session close.diff --git a/skills/redteam-report-template/SKILL.md b/skills/redteam-report-template/SKILL.mdindex d33bf1a..35810b9 100644--- a/skills/redteam-report-template/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/redteam-report-template/SKILL.md@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@---name: redteam-report-template-description: Client-facing red-team deliverable format — codifies the Subject / Observations / Description / Impact / Recommendation / PoC structure used for external red-team engagements (not bug-bounty platform reports). Different audience, different tone, different cadence. Built from the redacted-client deliverable (May 2026) where 14 findings were packaged into a 52KB MD + 2.2MB DOCX with 16 embedded screenshots. Use when the engagement is "external red team for an enterprise client" (not H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti), when generating the final report, when the client has specified a custom report format, or when packaging findings into DOCX/PDF.-sources: redacted-client-deliverable, enterprise-redteam-report-conventions+description: Client-facing red-team deliverable format — codifies the Subject / Observations / Description / Impact / Recommendation / PoC structure used for external red-team engagements (not bug-bounty platform reports). Different audience, different tone, different cadence. Built from a an authorized engagement deliverable where 14 findings were packaged into a 52KB MD + 2.2MB DOCX with 16 embedded screenshots. Use when the engagement is "external red team for an enterprise client" (not H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti), when generating the final report, when the client has specified a custom report format, or when packaging findings into DOCX/PDF.+sources: engagement-redacted-deliverable, enterprise-redteam-report-conventionsreport_count: 1---@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ This is the field that distinguishes red-team deliverables from bug-bounty repor----## Mistakes to avoid (from the redacted-client engagement)+## Mistakes to avoid (from engagement-redacted)### 1. Don't retract findings that stopped reproducingIf a finding was confirmed and then stopped working, that is almost always a CLIENT PATCH, not a finding-was-false. The correct response is "Confirmed; patched mid-engagement" with timestamps showing when it broke. See `mid-engagement-ir-detection`.@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ Example: hardcoded JWT in APK| Section | Technical framing | CISO framing | Board framing ||---|---|---|---|-| Impact | "JWT signing key extracted from APK enables forging admin tokens" | "Anyone with the redacted-brand2 mobile app can read any customer's invoice" | "A leaked secret in our mobile app lets attackers impersonate users" |+| Impact | "JWT signing key extracted from APK enables forging admin tokens" | "Anyone with the customer-facing mobile app can read any customer's invoice" | "A leaked secret in our mobile app lets attackers impersonate users" |The same finding's Impact paragraph should cover both ends — start with the business outcome, then drop into technical detail.@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ Pre-delivery checklist:----## Real engagement metric (redacted-client, May 2026)+## Real engagement metric (engagement-redacted)For calibration:- 14 findings shipped (2 Critical, 4 High, 5 Medium, 3 Low/Info)diff --git a/skills/supply-chain-attack-recon/SKILL.md b/skills/supply-chain-attack-recon/SKILL.mdindex 67cccd7..5594227 100644--- a/skills/supply-chain-attack-recon/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/supply-chain-attack-recon/SKILL.md@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Target Org## Step 1 — GitHub org discovery```bash-TARGET="redacted-client" # or target brand+TARGET="<brand>" # set to target brand name# Direct guessesfor guess in $TARGET "${TARGET}-tech" "${TARGET}corp" "${TARGET}-io" "${TARGET}-eng"; dodiff --git a/skills/triage-validation/SKILL.md b/skills/triage-validation/SKILL.mdindex 53939b2..aadd36c 100644--- a/skills/triage-validation/SKILL.md+++ b/skills/triage-validation/SKILL.md@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ description: Finding validation before writing any report — 7-Question Gate (a# TRIAGE & VALIDATION-One wrong answer = STOP. Kill it. Move on.+One wrong answer = STOP **this finding**. Kill **the finding**. Move on **to the next test class**.++> **Scope of "STOP" in this skill:** This skill's gates kill INDIVIDUAL FINDINGS that fail validation. They do NOT authorize stopping the engagement. Killing a finding via the 7-Question Gate just means *that finding* doesn't get submitted — every other test class in the engagement is still pending. See `redteam-mindset` "DO NOT STOP primary directive" for the coverage-axis rule.> "N/A hurts your validity ratio. Informative is neutral. Only submit what passes all 7 questions."@@ -328,7 +330,7 @@ Without the 7Q gate, expect 10-20% submission validity loss across an engagement### Pre-Severity Gate before reporting Critical-The May-2026 redacted-portal.ch engagement nearly submitted a Critical when the chain didn't actually complete end-to-end — a primitive that read auth state was conflated with a primitive that mutated it. The Pre-Severity Gate (run all 7 questions specifically against the **Critical claim**, not the generic "is this a bug" claim) would have caught it.+A May-2026 SharePoint engagement nearly submitted a Critical when the chain didn't actually complete end-to-end — a primitive that read auth state was conflated with a primitive that mutated it. The Pre-Severity Gate (run all 7 questions specifically against the **Critical claim**, not the generic "is this a bug" claim) would have caught it.Process: write your draft Critical title. Take each of the 7 questions and answer them with the Critical claim substituted for "the bug." If Q6 (impact beyond technically possible) returns "I have a primitive that should let me do X, but I haven't demonstrated X end-to-end on a test account," downgrade. Critical means impact-demonstrated, not impact-inferable.