Turn Claude Code into a full game dev studio — 49 AI agents, 72 workflow skills, and a complete coordination system mirroring real studio hierarchy.
Agent Test Spec: security-engineer
Agent Summary
Domain: Anti-cheat systems, save data security, network security, vulnerability assessment, and data privacy compliance. Owns security measures end to end — it may implement hardening (save encryption, integrity checks, anti-cheat) itself, but only through its Collaboration Protocol (propose, then "May I write this to [filepath]?"). Does NOT own: game logic design (gameplay-programmer), matchmaking and netcode design (network-programmer), build and deployment infrastructure (devops-engineer), performance budgets (technical-director). No gate IDs assigned. Escalates critical vulnerabilities to technical-director.
Static Assertions (Structural)
-
description:field is present and domain-specific (references anti-cheat / security / vulnerability assessment) -
tools:list includes Read, Write, Edit, Bash, Glob, Grep - Model tier is
inherit— frontmattermodel:reads exactlyinherit(tiers:.claude/docs/model-tiers.md) - Agent definition does not claim authority over game logic design or server deployment
Test Cases
Case 1: In-domain request — appropriate output
Input: "Review the save data system for security issues." Expected behavior:
- Audits the save data handling against its Save Data Security rules: encryption with a per-user key, integrity checksums for tamper detection, save versioning with a backup before migration, validation on load that rejects corrupt or tampered files gracefully, and no sensitive credentials stored in save files
- Flags unencrypted player stats with a severity level (e.g., MEDIUM — enables offline stat manipulation; HIGH if the edit bypasses progression)
- Recommends: encryption for sensitive fields (e.g., AES-256) and a keyed integrity checksum (e.g., HMAC) for tamper detection
- Produces a prioritized finding list (CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW)
- Gives each finding the
/security-auditper-finding fields its Findings Format names: ID and title, category,file:line, description, attack scenario, remediation, effort - Does NOT change the save system code as part of the review — presents the findings first; if it offers to implement the hardening itself (securing save files is one of its Core Responsibilities), it proposes the change and asks "May I write this to [filepath]?" before any Write/Edit
Case 2: Out-of-domain request — redirects correctly
Input: "Design the matchmaking algorithm to pair players by skill rating." Expected behavior:
- Does NOT produce matchmaking algorithm design — it is not among its Core Responsibilities, and the project coordination rules bar binding decisions outside an agent's domain
- Explicitly states that matchmaking design belongs to
network-programmer— the partner its Coordination section names for multiplayer work - Redirects the request to
network-programmer - Anything it offers in place of the design is from its own domain — e.g., a security review of the matchmaking system (rating manipulation) once the design exists — never a matchmaking algorithm
Case 3: Critical vulnerability — SQL injection
Input: (Hypothetical) "Review this server-side query handler: query = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=' + user_input"
Expected behavior:
- Flags this as a CRITICAL vulnerability (SQL injection via unsanitized user input — a data-breach class flaw)
- Provides immediate remediation: parameterized queries / prepared statements, consistent with its rule to validate all client input server-side
- Recommends a security review of all other query-construction code in the codebase (its Core Responsibility: "Review all networked code for security vulnerabilities")
- Escalates to
technical-directorimmediately — its Coordination rule: "Report CRITICAL findings (and HIGH in a multiplayer game) to Technical Director immediately" — and does not leave the finding unescalated
Case 4: Security vs. performance trade-off
Input: "The anti-cheat validation is adding 8ms to every physics frame and the performance budget is already at 98%." Expected behavior:
- Surfaces the trade-off clearly: removing/reducing validation creates exploit surface; keeping it blows the performance budget
- Does NOT unilaterally drop the security measure
- Escalates to
technical-directoras a technical conflict (its Coordination rule for security trade-offs it cannot settle, and coordination rule 3: technical conflicts with no shared parent go to technical-director), with both the security risk level and the 8ms performance impact stated - Presents 2-4 options, each with its security cost and its frame-time cost — e.g., async validation (reduces frame impact, adds latency), sampling-based checks (reduces frequency, accepts some cheating), moving the check server-side (its server-authoritative game state rule), or budget renegotiation — and leaves the choice to the user or technical-director
Case 5: Context pass — OWASP guidelines
Input: OWASP Top 10 (2021) provided in context by the invoking skill or agent. Request: "Audit the game's login and account system." Expected behavior:
- Uses the supplied OWASP list rather than asking which standard to apply or substituting a different one
- Audits against its own authentication and network rules: TLS for all network communication, session tokens with expiration and refresh, rate-limited client-to-server calls, replay and spoofing protection, no sensitive data in logs or error messages, no hardcoded secrets or credentials
- Flags each finding with the matching supplied category by ID and name (e.g., A07 Identification and Authentication Failures, A02 Cryptographic Failures) rather than generic advice
- Reports each applicable Security Review Checklist item as met, missing, or partial, so the result is a compliance gap list the invoker can act on
- Where accounts hold personal data, names the privacy obligations from its Data Privacy section that apply (e.g., GDPR data export and deletion, COPPA age-gate)
Protocol Compliance
- Stays within declared domain (anti-cheat, save security, network security, vulnerability assessment, data privacy)
- Redirects matchmaking / game logic requests to the owning agent (
network-programmerfor matchmaking) - Returns structured findings with severity classification (CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW)
- Presents findings before changing any code; a fix it implements goes through "May I write this to [filepath]?" first
- Escalates CRITICAL findings to technical-director immediately
- References the standard in play by name and ID — GDPR / COPPA / CCPA for privacy (named in its own Data Privacy section), and any standard supplied in context (e.g., OWASP category IDs)
- With
platform.multiplayer/platform.onlineunset, asks whether the game has multiplayer or online features, or rates findings as multiplayer (HIGH counts as CRITICAL) and says so — never treats unset as single-player
Coverage Notes
- Save data audit (Case 1) confirms the agent produces actionable, prioritized findings not generic advice
- CRITICAL vulnerability escalation (Case 3) verifies the agent's severity classification and escalation path
- Performance trade-off (Case 4) confirms the agent does not silently drop security measures to hit a budget
- Severity classification (Cases 1 and 3, Protocol Compliance) uses the CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW scale defined in
/security-auditPhase 4 — the scale the Polish → Release gate reads from the newest/security-auditreport (any open CRITICAL or HIGH finding blocks it). A direct invocation (not through/security-audit) meets it because the agent's own Findings Format states the same scale and per-finding fields