A team of long-lived bots for DeepSeek Harness, with main bots, bot-to-bot messages and group chats.
Close private subagent paths
Fei2411d04d8805da8b
diff --git a/docs/plans/2026-10-27-private-bots.md b/docs/plans/2026-10-27-private-bots.mdindex 880d32ed..cede5a56 100644--- a/docs/plans/2026-10-27-private-bots.md+++ b/docs/plans/2026-10-27-private-bots.md@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@- `list_bots` 只向其他 Bot 显示隐私 Bot 的名字、角色和隐私状态,不显示它的指令、当前工作、模型或文件夹。- 其他 Bot 不能向它发 `message_bot`,不能用 `stop_bot` 或 `update_bot` 操作它,不能用 `attach_capability` 或 `detach_capability` 改它的能力,也不能通过 `recall`、`remember`、`forget` 读取或修改它的记忆。-- 文件工具、图片读取、`glob`、`grep`、`working_directory` 和会话查询会检查目标;命中隐私 Bot 的文件夹、记忆或会话就拒绝。其他 Bot 做跨会话搜索时必须给出经过检查的安全会话或父会话 id,不能做未过滤的全局搜索。-- 团队状态文件、共享聊天索引、记忆变更日志和暂存文件也对其他 Bot 关闭。存在隐私 Bot 或其保留的归档时,其他 Bot 不能在数据位置做目录遍历搜索,也不能直接读取其中的共享数据文件;自己的文件夹和总工作区仍可正常使用。+- 文件工具、图片读取、`glob`、`grep`、`working_directory`、`subagent` / `subagent_fork` 的 `cwd` 和会话查询会检查目标;命中隐私 Bot 的文件夹、记忆或会话就拒绝。其他 Bot 做跨会话搜索时必须给出经过检查的安全会话或父会话 id,不能做未过滤的全局搜索。+- 会话目标会沿 `parentSession` 追踪;隐私 Bot 的子 agent Session 也同样关闭。+- 团队状态文件、共享聊天索引、记忆变更日志和暂存文件也对其他 Bot 关闭。存在隐私 Bot 或其保留的归档时,其他 Bot 不能在数据位置做目录遍历搜索,也不能直接读取其中的共享数据文件;自己的文件夹、总工作区和团队共享记忆仍可正常使用。- 隐私 Bot 的记忆变更日志保存在它自己的受保护目录,条目的前后正文不写进团队共享日志。- 子 agent 继承最上层 Bot 的身份,多层嵌套不会改变这道边界。diff --git a/ds-bot/src/host/privacy.js b/ds-bot/src/host/privacy.jsindex 4607de01..e11c80d4 100644--- a/ds-bot/src/host/privacy.js+++ b/ds-bot/src/host/privacy.js@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ export function install(rt) {].filter(Boolean).map(spellings))).flat()const teamFolder = () => rt.teamFolder() ?? resolve(rt.defaultTeamFolder())+ const teamMemory = join(rt.home, 'memory', 'team')// The private Bot that `path` belongs to, other than `self`; undefined when it is open.// `search` is for tools that walk a folder: a folder that holds a closed one is closed@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ export function install(rt) {const ownBot = rt.botOf(self)const ownIds = ownBot === undefined ? [] : sessionsOf(ownBot).map(fold)const ownRegions = ownBot === undefined ? [] : await regionsOf(ownBot)- const open = [rt.workDirOf({ botId: self }), teamFolder(), ...ownRegions].filter(Boolean)+ const open = [rt.workDirOf({ botId: self }), teamFolder(), teamMemory, ...ownRegions].filter(Boolean)const folders = (await Promise.all(open.map(spellings))).flat()const roots = (await Promise.all(dataRoots().map(spellings))).flat()for (const key of keys) {@@ -208,6 +209,26 @@ export function install(rt) {}}+ // A Session started under a private Bot is closed too, even when its own id is not in+ // the Bot's chat history. Walk the same parent chain as the caller check.+ async function ownerOfSession(id, self) {+ const bots = protectedBots()+ const owns = (sessionId, bot) => bot.id !== self && sessionsOf(bot).includes(sessionId)+ const direct = bots.find(bot => owns(id, bot))+ if (direct) return direct+ const seen = new Set([id])+ let current = id+ for (;;) {+ const agent = await rt.resolveAgent(current).catch(() => undefined)+ const parent = agent?.session?.header?.parentSession+ if (parent === undefined || seen.has(parent)) return undefined+ const owner = bots.find(bot => owns(parent, bot))+ if (owner) return owner+ seen.add(parent)+ current = parent+ }+ }+// The file tools, the shell and the session search: where the path or text names a// closed place, the call fails before it runs.async function guardFiles(exec, self) {@@ -223,7 +244,8 @@ export function install(rt) {// A private Bot's file changes stay in its own folder unless the user allows them.if (isPrivate(self) && WRITE_TOOLS.includes(name)) {const own = await spellings(rt.botOf(self).workDir)- const target = await spellings(resolve(folder(), path))+ const base = folder()+ const target = await spellings(base === undefined ? path : resolve(base, path))if (!target.every(key => own.some(root => within(key, root)))) await approve(exec, { en: `Let ${rt.botOf(self).name} change ${path}? It is outside its own folder.`, zh: `允许 ${rt.botOf(self).name} 修改 ${path} 吗?它在自己的文件夹之外。` })}return@@ -240,6 +262,11 @@ export function install(rt) {if (bot) refuse(bot)return}+ if ((name === 'subagent' || name === 'subagent_fork') && typeof args.cwd === 'string') {+ const bot = await ownerOfPath(args.cwd, { self, search: true, base: folder() })+ if (bot) refuse(bot)+ return+ }if (name === 'working_directory' && typeof args.cd === 'string') {const bot = await ownerOfPath(args.cd, { self, search: true, base: folder() })if (bot) refuse(bot)@@ -247,8 +274,10 @@ export function install(rt) {}if (SESSION_TOOLS.includes(name)) {const asked = strings([args.session_id, args.session_ids, args.parent_session_ids])- const bot = protectedBots().find(found => found.id !== self && sessionsOf(found).some(id => asked.includes(id)))- if (bot) refuse(bot)+ for (const id of asked) {+ const bot = await ownerOfSession(id, self)+ if (bot) refuse(bot)+ }// DSH scopes Session search to the caller's cwd. A subagent can have another cwd,// so an unfiltered search is closed too; explicit safe ids still narrow it.if (name === 'session_search' && args.session_ids === undefined && args.parent_session_ids === undefined) {diff --git a/ds-bot/test/privacy.test.js b/ds-bot/test/privacy.test.jsindex c7e85413..265f75cc 100644--- a/ds-bot/test/privacy.test.js+++ b/ds-bot/test/privacy.test.js@@ -258,6 +258,8 @@ test('other Bots cannot read, write or search what a private Bot keeps', async (await refused('bash', { command: `cat ${posix(join(home, 'chat-index.sqlite'))}` })await refused('working_directory', { cd: diary })await refused('working_directory', { cd: root })+ await refused('subagent', { cwd: diary, prompt: 'read notes.txt' })+ await refused('subagent_fork', { cwd: relative(team, diary), prompt: 'read notes.txt' })await refused('session_search', { query: 'x' })await refused('session_search', { query: 'x', session_id: P })await refused('session_trace', { session_ids: ['b', P] })@@ -268,10 +270,13 @@ test('other Bots cannot read, write or search what a private Bot keeps', async (['read', { file_path: 'a.txt' }],['write', { file_path: join(team, 'a.txt'), content: 'x' }],['read', { file_path: join(dsh, 'sessions', 'b.jsonl') }],+ ['read', { file_path: join(home, 'memory', 'team', 'MEMORY.md') }],+ ['glob', { pattern: '**/*', path: join(home, 'memory', 'team') }],['glob', { pattern: '**/*', path: project }],['glob', { pattern: '**/*', path: team }],['grep', { pattern: 'x' }],['bash', { command: 'ls', workdir: project }],+ ['subagent', { cwd: project, prompt: 'work in the open folder' }],['working_directory', { cd: join(team, 'sub') }],['session_search', { query: 'x', session_ids: ['b'] }],]) {@@ -306,6 +311,9 @@ test('the private Bot reads its own and the team\'s files; a Session it starts sassert.deepEqual(await run('glob', { pattern: '**/*', path: home }, P), { ran: true })assert.deepEqual(await run('read', { file_path: join(project, 'a.txt') }, P), { ran: true })assert.deepEqual(await run('glob', { pattern: '**/*', path: team }, P), { ran: true })+ assert.deepEqual(await run('read', { file_path: join(home, 'memory', 'team', 'MEMORY.md') }, P), { ran: true })+ assert.deepEqual(await run('glob', { pattern: '**/*', path: join(home, 'memory', 'team') }, P), { ran: true })+ assert.deepEqual(await run('subagent', { cwd: diary, prompt: 'work in my folder' }, P), { ran: true })const sub = parent => ({ id: 'sub1', session: { id: 'sub1', header: { cwd: team, parentSession: parent } } })const fromWriter = await run('read', { file_path: join(diary, 'notes.txt') }, 'b', sub('b'))assert.equal(fromWriter.ran, false)@@ -354,7 +362,7 @@ test('a message of a private Bot that the user does not allow is not sent', asyntest('a private Bot changes files outside its folder only with the user\'s approval', async (t) => {const approval = fakeApproval('allowed-once')- const { run, diary, project, stop } = await start({ services: { approval } })+ const { run, ctx, diary, project, stop } = await start({ services: { approval } })t.after(stop)assert.deepEqual(await run('write', { file_path: join(diary, 'today.txt'), content: 'x' }, P), { ran: true })assert.deepEqual(await run('write', { file_path: 'today.txt', content: 'x' }, P), { ran: true })@@ -368,6 +376,15 @@ test('a private Bot changes files outside its folder only with the user\'s appro// Reading is free.assert.deepEqual(await run('read', { file_path: join(project, 'a.txt') }, P), { ran: true })assert.equal(approval.requests.length, 2)+ // A subagent can have no cwd of its own; an absolute path still needs no TypeError.+ const getWorkspace = ctx.workspaceRegistry.get+ try {+ ctx.workspaceRegistry.get = () => undefined+ const noCwd = { id: 'sub-no-cwd', session: { id: 'sub-no-cwd', header: { parentSession: P } } }+ assert.deepEqual(await run('write', { file_path: join(diary, 'no-cwd.txt'), content: 'x' }, P, noCwd), { ran: true })+ } finally {+ ctx.workspaceRegistry.get = getWorkspace+ }})test('a write of a private Bot outside its folder that the user does not allow is not made', async (t) => {@@ -421,11 +438,18 @@ test('a nested subagent speaks for the private Bot at its root', async (t) => {const { run, diary, agentOf, stop } = await start({ services: { approval } })t.after(stop)agentOf('sub1').session.header.parentSession = P- const nested = { id: 'sub2', session: { id: 'sub2', header: { cwd: diary, parentSession: 'sub1' } } }+ const nested = agentOf('sub2')+ nested.session.header.cwd = diary+ nested.session.header.parentSession = 'sub1'assert.deepEqual(await run('read', { file_path: join(diary, 'notes.txt') }, P, nested), { ran: true })assert.deepEqual(await run('message_bot', { to: 'Writer', message: 'from a nested subagent' }, P, nested), { ran: true })assert.equal(approval.requests.length, 1)assert.match(approval.requests[0].reason, /from a nested subagent/)+ for (const id of ['sub1', 'sub2']) {+ const result = await run('session_trace', { session_id: id }, 'b')+ assert.equal(result.ran, false, id)+ assert.match(result.error, CLOSED)+ }})test('deleting a private Bot keeps its folder and archived memory closed', async (t) => {