Dodaios is an open-source agent OS for your desktop: it runs your coding agents, browser and apps by voice or chat, on your own machine. Formerly Personal Jarvis.
Self-Mod Pipeline — User Documentation (Phase 7)
Plan reference: docsplansphase-7-self-mod/JARVIS_SELFMOD_PLAN.md Bootstrap context: docsplansphase-7-self-mod/PROJEKT_KONTEXT.md
1. What can I (the user) do, and what not?
Dodaios can, at runtime and on a voice or chat command, change a hardcoded list of its own settings and create new skills. Both are possible ONLY via speech/chat — the web UI is read-only.
Mutable settings (Plan §7.1 allowlist):
| Path | Risk tier | Restart? | What it does |
|---|---|---|---|
tts.provider |
ASK | no | TTS provider (e.g. from ElevenLabs to Gemini Flash) |
tts.voice_de |
ASK | no | German TTS voice |
tts.voice_en |
ASK | no | English TTS voice |
tts.speed |
SAFE | no | Speaking speed (0.5..2.0) |
stt.provider |
ASK | yes | STT provider (speech-to-text) |
brain.primary |
ASK | yes | Primary brain provider |
ui.theme |
SAFE | no | UI theme (light/dark/auto) |
profile.language |
ASK | no | Profile language (DE/EN/auto) |
What Dodaios does NOT mutate:
- API keys (only via the UI in Phase 7.7+)
security.*,mcp_server.*,harness.*paths (privilege protection)- Generic tool configuration
2. What it sounds like (example conversation)
User: "Wechsle TTS auf Gemini Flash."
Dodaios: "Verstanden — TTS-Provider wechselt von elevenlabs zu
gemini-flash-tts. Bestätigen?" <!-- i18n-allow -->
User: "Ja."
Dodaios: "Erledigt — TTS-Provider ist jetzt gemini-flash-tts."
The end-focus pattern (old value first, new value last) is intentional: STT misshears stand out at the end of the sentence, because the brain focuses on the last tokens. A faked STT output of "Karen" instead of "Charon" would therefore be noticed immediately in the echo — the user answers "nein" (no) and no mutation happens.
SAFE-tier paths (tts.speed, ui.theme) skip the echo confirmation
to protect against confirmation fatigue: "Setze Speed auf 1.3" →
immediate persistence, a terse confirmation "Geht klar —
Sprechgeschwindigkeit jetzt 1.3."
3. Audit trail
Every mutation — success, reject, veto, timeout, pre-validate fail,
rollback — is stored in data/self_mod.log as JSON Lines. Plan §AD-6:
no rotate, no truncate, append-only. Format:
{
"ts": "2026-04-26T11:42:08.123Z",
"audit_id": "uuid4",
"source": "voice|chat|ui",
"requested_by": "hauptjarvis|sub-jarvis|user",
"path": "tts.provider",
"old_value": "elevenlabs",
"new_value": "gemini-flash-tts",
"ok": true,
"rolled_back": false,
"error": null
}
Values for sensitive paths (e.g. *_api_key, *_token) are masked with
* of the same length before being written (Plan §AP-2 defense-in-depth).
UI view: SelfModView in the sidebar → History tab. Clicking an audit row opens a detail drawer with the full JSON. Sensitive paths explicitly show a "***" badge instead of cleartext.
4. Rollback behavior
Before every mutation the AtomicConfigWriter creates a backup under
JARVIS_DATA_DIR/backups/self_mod/, or under the platform user-data directory
when JARVIS_DATA_DIR is not set. This keeps backup writes outside the config
watchdog scope. Backups from older installations remain discoverable and
restorable from <jarvis.toml.parent>/.backups/, but new backups are never
written there. If, after the write, the reload test
(ConfigLoader.load(jarvis.toml)) crashes — e.g.
because a subtle schema error slipped through pre-validate — the backup is
restored automatically and a ReloadError is raised. The user hears
a TTS message "Konnte nicht gespeichert werden, hab den vorherigen
Zustand wiederhergestellt." (Could not be saved, I restored the previous
state.) and the audit has rolled_back=true.
Manual restore via the UI: Backups tab → "Wiederherstellen" (Restore)
button next to the desired backup file. Requires admin_password. The
restore itself is also audited.
Backup GC: automatic after every mutation. Keeps at least 10 (floor), at most 50 (FIFO cap). Backups older than 30 days are checked, but not removed below the floor.
5. The mutable set — schema-derived (Voice-First Config Control, Wave 1.1)
The mutable set is no longer a hand-maintained list. It is computed once
(lazily, then cached) by walking the JarvisConfig schema: every leaf primitive
field (str/int/float/bool, incl. Optional/Literal) becomes voice-mutable,
minus FORBIDDEN_PATTERNS. See dodaios/core/self_mod/schema_introspect.py
(introspect_mutable_specs) and the curated overrides.OVERRIDES table.
AD-1 / AP-11 are preserved (reinterpreted): the set is still fixed by code
(the schema + overrides) and is computed at first use, NOT a runtime
register() the model could call. A new mutable field appears only by editing
JarvisConfig (which is code-reviewed). We only moved from "explicit list" to
"whole schema minus the deny layer". The model still cannot widen the set.
Adding/refining a setting:
- A new leaf field on a
JarvisConfigsection is mutable automatically — no registry edit needed. - To refine it (a SAFE risk-tier so REST/CLI auto-applies it, a hot-reload
needs_restart=False, a nicer spokendescription), add aSpecOverridefor its path indodaios/core/self_mod/overrides.py. - For an undeclared
extra="allow"key the schema walk can't see (e.g.ui.theme), the override must carrypydantic_model_name+field_nameto force-include it. - The parity guard (
tests/unit/self_mod/test_registry.py::TestAllowlistField Parity) checks every emitted spec against the real schema automatically.
Forbidden paths (dodaios/core/self_mod/forbidden.py): secrets / API keys /
privileged sections (security.*, safety.*, harness.*, mcp_server.*,
*_api_key, …) are NEVER in the set — read or write. They surface as an honest
voice refusal, not a confirmation. The "self-lockout" class is mostly closed
by architecture (no STT/TTS enable flags exist; the provider enabled list is a
list, which the walk skips; a broken config is rolled back) — see the module
docstring before adding any path there.
Voice vs. REST/CLI confirmation: the brain (voice/chat) wiring uses
auto_apply="all" (apply immediately, then an honest deterministic readback —
dodaios/voice/config_readback.py); REST/CLI keep the SAFE-auto / ASK-confirm
split (auto_apply="safe_only").
6. Skill authoring
A voice or chat request like "Create a skill that pauses the music when I
speak" reaches the router tool create-skill
(dodaios/plugins/tool/create_skill.py). It makes one bounded call, never a
worker spawn: SkillCreatorService.author
(dodaios/skills/creator_service.py) builds the authoring context (attached
tools and installed skills), asks the brain ladder (active provider, then the
Tool Model, quality and frontier tiers) for a complete SKILL.md, and commits it
through the shared skill writer with state: draft forced (AP-15). When no
model can write the draft, the tool fails honestly and nothing lands on disk.
The Skills view's creator dialog uses the same service over
POST /api/skills/creator/{draft,refine,validate,commit,author}.
The draft lands in the user skills directory and is visible in the hot-reload pool, but is not active.
spawn_skill_author (dodaios/brain/tools/skill_authoring.py), the earlier
plan for a mission-based author, is not wired: it is not in
ROUTER_TOOLS and its constructor needs a runner the tool loader cannot
supply. Its module docstring explains why it stays unregistered.
Manual activation:
- Web UI: the Skills view shows the draft; enabling it
(
POST /api/skills/{name}/enable) promotes a healthy draft. - CLI:
python -m dodaios.skills.cli --promote <slug>.
The pre-promote lint blocks eval/exec/os.system/subprocess(shell=True)
as well as reflective bypasses (getattr(__builtins__, "eval")). Skills
that violate the allowlist fail at promote time (Plan §AP-11).
7. Invariants (AP-SM1..14)
Code changes in dodaios/core/self_mod/, the config writer and the
skill-authoring path must keep these:
- Enforced in code, not in the prompt (AP-SM1). The mutable set is decided
in Python; it can never be widened by editing
jarvis.toml(AP-SM11), and never includessecurity.*,auth.*, keyring entries or API keys (AP-SM9). - Secrets never travel by voice or chat (AP-SM2).
- Write pipeline order: check the path, read, apply, validate the whole
config with Pydantic before writing (AP-SM3), back up (AP-SM4), temp file +
os.replace, reload synchronously withConfigLoader.load()(AP-SM14), restore the backup and auditrolled_back=trueif the reload fails, never swallow that failure (AP-SM5). - Backups live outside the watched config directory (AP-SM13), or the hot reload loops.
- Discrete tools (
list_mutable_settings,get_config_value,set_config_value,create-skill), no universal setter (AP-SM8). Skill authoring writes only through the skill registry's writer, and only drafts (AP-SM7; the mission-basedspawn_skill_authorroute is not wired, see §6). - Yes/no confirmation is a deterministic pattern match, not an LLM call (AP-SM12).
- Generated skills stay drafts: the writer forces
state=drafteven if the frontmatter says otherwise, the trigger matcher skips drafts (AP-SM6), and drafts are written to the user skills directory, never tododaios/skills/builtin/(AP-SM10). The one exception is a skill the self-build service made and proved by replay: it is promoted through the registry's ownpromoteand goes live on trial (ADR-0043).