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The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.

fix: harden GateGuard destructive bash tokenizer

SeungHyun0e169fecbce3
diff --git a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
index eb0356aad..3568dc3cc 100644
--- a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
+++ b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
@@ -42,7 +42,374 @@ const EDIT_WRITE_HOOK_ID = 'pre:edit-write:gateguard-fact-force';
const BASH_HOOK_ID = 'pre:bash:gateguard-fact-force';
const ECC_DISABLE_VALUES = new Set(['0', 'false', 'off', 'disabled', 'disable']);
-const DESTRUCTIVE_BASH = /\b(rm\s+-rf|git\s+reset\s+--hard|git\s+checkout\s+--|git\s+clean\s+-f|drop\s+table|delete\s+from|truncate|git\s+push\s+--force(?!-with-lease)|git\s+commit\s+--amend|dd\s+if=)\b/i;
+// SQL-keyword + dd patterns stay as a single regex — they are stable
+// phrases without shell-flag ordering concerns. Quoted strings are
+// stripped before this regex runs so a commit message mentioning
+// "drop table" no longer triggers a false positive.
+const DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD = /\b(drop\s+table|delete\s+from|truncate|dd\s+if=)\b/i;
+
+/**
+ * Strip the contents of single- and double-quoted strings so phrases
+ * mentioned inside a commit message or echoed argument do not trigger
+ * the destructive detector. Command substitutions are scanned separately
+ * before this runs because they execute even inside double quotes.
+ *
+ * @param {string} input
+ * @returns {string}
+ */
+function stripQuotedStrings(input) {
+ return input
+ .replace(/'(?:[^'\\]|\\.)*'/g, "''")
+ .replace(/"(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"/g, '""');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Promote subshell delimiters to top-level segment separators so the
+ * destructive check applies inside `$(...)` and backtick subshells.
+ * Without this, `echo y | $(rm -rf /tmp)` and ``echo y | `rm -rf /tmp` ``
+ * slip past the segment splitter because the destructive command lives
+ * inside a sub-expression. Run iteratively to handle a layer of nesting.
+ *
+ * @param {string} input
+ * @returns {string}
+ */
+function explodeSubshells(input) {
+ let out = input;
+ for (let i = 0; i < 4; i += 1) {
+ const before = out;
+ out = out.replace(/\$\(([^()`]*)\)/g, ';$1;');
+ out = out.replace(/`([^`]*)`/g, ';$1;');
+ if (out === before) break;
+ }
+ return out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract executable command-substitution bodies from a shell line. Single
+ * quotes are literal, so substitutions inside them are ignored; double quotes
+ * still permit substitutions, so those bodies are scanned before quoted text
+ * is stripped.
+ *
+ * @param {string} input
+ * @returns {string[]}
+ */
+function extractCommandSubstitutions(input) {
+ const source = String(input || '');
+ const substitutions = [];
+ let inSingle = false;
+ let inDouble = false;
+
+ for (let i = 0; i < source.length; i++) {
+ const ch = source[i];
+ const prev = source[i - 1];
+
+ if (ch === '\\' && !inSingle) {
+ i += 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ch === "'" && !inDouble && prev !== '\\') {
+ inSingle = !inSingle;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ch === '"' && !inSingle && prev !== '\\') {
+ inDouble = !inDouble;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (inSingle) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ch === '`') {
+ let body = '';
+ i += 1;
+ while (i < source.length) {
+ const inner = source[i];
+ if (inner === '\\') {
+ body += inner;
+ if (i + 1 < source.length) {
+ body += source[i + 1];
+ i += 2;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ if (inner === '`') {
+ break;
+ }
+ body += inner;
+ i += 1;
+ }
+ if (body.trim()) {
+ substitutions.push(body);
+ substitutions.push(...extractCommandSubstitutions(body));
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (ch === '$' && source[i + 1] === '(') {
+ let depth = 1;
+ let body = '';
+ i += 2;
+ while (i < source.length && depth > 0) {
+ const inner = source[i];
+ if (inner === '\\') {
+ body += inner;
+ if (i + 1 < source.length) {
+ body += source[i + 1];
+ i += 2;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ if (inner === '(') {
+ depth += 1;
+ } else if (inner === ')') {
+ depth -= 1;
+ if (depth === 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ body += inner;
+ i += 1;
+ }
+ if (body.trim()) {
+ substitutions.push(body);
+ substitutions.push(...extractCommandSubstitutions(body));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return substitutions;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Split a command line into top-level segments at unquoted shell
+ * separators (`;`, `|`, `&`, `&&`, `||`) and across subshells
+ * (`$(...)` / backticks). Quoted strings are stripped first so
+ * separators inside quotes are not split on. Per-segment comments
+ * are also stripped.
+ *
+ * @param {string} input
+ * @returns {string[]}
+ */
+function splitCommandSegments(input) {
+ const stripped = explodeSubshells(stripQuotedStrings(input));
+ return stripped
+ .split(/[;|&]+/)
+ .map(segment => segment.replace(/(^|\s)#.*/, '$1').trim())
+ .filter(Boolean);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Tokenize a single command segment by whitespace. Quoted strings
+ * are already collapsed to empty quotes by `stripQuotedStrings`, so
+ * naive whitespace splitting is sufficient.
+ *
+ * @param {string} segment
+ * @returns {string[]}
+ */
+function tokenize(segment) {
+ return segment.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Strip a leading path and trailing `.exe` from a command token so
+ * `/usr/bin/git`, `git.exe`, and `GIT` all normalize to `git`.
+ *
+ * @param {string} token
+ * @returns {string}
+ */
+function commandBasename(token) {
+ if (!token) return '';
+ return token.replace(/^.*[\\/]/, '').replace(/\.exe$/i, '').toLowerCase();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Detect `rm` invocations that recursively force-delete files. Handles
+ * combined (`-rf`, `-fr`, `-Rf`) and split (`-r -f`) flag forms.
+ *
+ * @param {string[]} tokens
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function isDestructiveRm(tokens) {
+ if (tokens.length === 0 || commandBasename(tokens[0]) !== 'rm') return false;
+ let hasR = false;
+ let hasF = false;
+ for (const t of tokens.slice(1)) {
+ if (t === '--recursive') {
+ hasR = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (t === '--force') {
+ hasF = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) continue;
+ const body = t.slice(1);
+ if (/[rR]/.test(body)) hasR = true;
+ if (/f/.test(body)) hasF = true;
+ }
+ return hasR && hasF;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Locate the git subcommand within a token list, skipping over git's
+ * global options like `-c key=value`, `-C <path>`, `--git-dir=...`,
+ * `--work-tree=...`, `--namespace=...`, `--super-prefix=...`.
+ *
+ * @param {string[]} tokens
+ * @returns {{ command: string, rest: string[] } | null}
+ */
+function findGitSubcommand(tokens) {
+ if (tokens.length === 0 || commandBasename(tokens[0]) !== 'git') return null;
+ const valueConsumingShort = new Set(['-c', '-C']);
+ const valueConsumingLong = new Set(['--git-dir', '--work-tree', '--namespace', '--super-prefix']);
+ let i = 1;
+ while (i < tokens.length) {
+ const t = tokens[i];
+ if (valueConsumingShort.has(t) || valueConsumingLong.has(t)) {
+ i += 2;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (t.startsWith('--git-dir=') || t.startsWith('--work-tree=') || t.startsWith('--namespace=') || t.startsWith('--super-prefix=')) {
+ i += 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (t.startsWith('-')) {
+ // Unknown global option — skip without consuming a value.
+ i += 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ return { command: t.toLowerCase(), rest: tokens.slice(i + 1) };
+ }
+ return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Detect destructive `git` invocations: `reset --hard`, `checkout --`,
+ * `clean -f...`, `push --force` (but not `--force-with-lease`),
+ * `commit --amend`, `rm -rf`.
+ *
+ * @param {string[]} tokens
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function isDestructiveGit(tokens) {
+ const sub = findGitSubcommand(tokens);
+ if (!sub) return false;
+ const { command, rest } = sub;
+
+ if (command === 'reset') {
+ return rest.includes('--hard');
+ }
+
+ if (command === 'checkout') {
+ return rest.includes('--');
+ }
+
+ if (command === 'clean') {
+ // `git clean -f`, `-fd`, `-fdx`, `-df`, `--force`
+ return rest.some(t => {
+ if (t === '--force') return true;
+ if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) return false;
+ return t.slice(1).includes('f');
+ });
+ }
+
+ if (command === 'push') {
+ // Only `--force-with-lease` qualifies as a safety-checked force.
+ // `--force-if-includes` is a no-op when used WITHOUT
+ // `--force-with-lease` (per git-scm.com/docs/git-push), and when
+ // combined with a bare `--force` the bare force is still in effect.
+ // So `--force --force-if-includes` must be treated as destructive.
+ //
+ // A `+` refspec prefix (e.g. `git push origin +main`,
+ // `+refs/heads/main:refs/heads/main`) also forces a non-fast-forward
+ // update of that ref and is destructive on its own.
+ let withLease = false;
+ let bareForce = false;
+ let plusRefspecForce = false;
+ for (const t of rest) {
+ if (t === '--force-with-lease' || t.startsWith('--force-with-lease=')) {
+ withLease = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (t === '--force' || t.startsWith('--force=')) {
+ bareForce = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (t.startsWith('-') && !t.startsWith('--') && t.slice(1).includes('f')) {
+ bareForce = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+ // Refspec prefix: `+<src>[:<dst>]`. Match tokens like `+main`,
+ // `+refs/heads/main`, `+HEAD:branch`, `+:branch`. Exclude bare
+ // `+` and numeric-only `+123` which are not refspecs.
+ if (t.startsWith('+') && t.length > 1 && /^\+(?:[a-zA-Z_/.:]|HEAD)/.test(t)) {
+ plusRefspecForce = true;
+ }
+ }
+ return bareForce || (plusRefspecForce && !withLease);
+ }
+
+ if (command === 'commit') {
+ return rest.includes('--amend');
+ }
+
+ if (command === 'rm') {
+ // `git rm -r` / `-rf` / `-r -f` — destructive within the index too.
+ let hasR = false;
+ for (const t of rest) {
+ if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) continue;
+ if (/[rR]/.test(t.slice(1))) hasR = true;
+ }
+ return hasR;
+ }
+
+ if (command === 'switch') {
+ // `git switch` can discard local working-tree changes in three forms:
+ // --discard-changes explicit discard
+ // --force / -f ignore conflicts and overwrite
+ // -C <branch> force-create (overwrites existing branch)
+ return rest.some(t => {
+ if (t === '--discard-changes' || t === '--force') return true;
+ if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) return false;
+ // Short combined form: -f, -fC, -Cf, -C
+ const body = t.slice(1);
+ return /[fC]/.test(body);
+ });
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decide whether a bash command line contains a destructive action
+ * the fact-forcing gate should challenge. Combines SQL-keyword
+ * detection (regex on quote-stripped input) with per-segment shell
+ * tokenization for shell commands.
+ *
+ * @param {string} command
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function isDestructiveBash(command) {
+ // The SQL/dd phrases live in command bodies, not as flag-bearing
+ // arguments, so we still match them by regex — but on the input
+ // after quoting AND subshell delimiters are normalized so phrases
+ // inside `$(...)` or backticks are also caught.
+ const raw = String(command || '');
+ const flattened = explodeSubshells(stripQuotedStrings(raw));
+ if (DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD.test(flattened)) return true;
+
+ const segments = [raw, ...extractCommandSubstitutions(raw)].flatMap(splitCommandSegments);
+ for (const segment of segments) {
+ if (DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD.test(stripQuotedStrings(segment))) return true;
+ const tokens = tokenize(segment);
+ if (isDestructiveRm(tokens)) return true;
+ if (isDestructiveGit(tokens)) return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
// --- State management (per-session, atomic writes, bounded) ---
@@ -483,7 +850,7 @@ function run(rawInput) {
return rawInput;
}
- if (DESTRUCTIVE_BASH.test(command)) {
+ if (isDestructiveBash(command)) {
// Gate destructive commands on first attempt; allow retry after facts presented
const key = '__destructive__' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(command).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
if (!isChecked(key)) {
diff --git a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
index 0443d54d0..00ad94865 100644
--- a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
+++ b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
@@ -1143,6 +1143,145 @@ function runTests() {
'second subagent edit should pass even on a new file');
})) passed++; else failed++;
+ // --- Shell-words tokenizer: bypasses the old regex missed ---
+
+ function expectDestructiveDeny(command, label) {
+ clearState();
+ const input = { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command } };
+ const result = runBashHook(input);
+ assert.strictEqual(result.code, 0, `${label}: exit code should be 0`);
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(output, `${label}: should produce JSON output`);
+ assert.strictEqual(output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', `${label}: should deny`);
+ assert.ok(output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason.includes('Destructive'),
+ `${label}: reason should mention "Destructive"`);
+ }
+
+ function expectAllow(command, label) {
+ clearState();
+ writeState({ checked: ['__bash_session__'], last_active: Date.now() });
+ const input = { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command } };
+ const result = runBashHook(input);
+ assert.strictEqual(result.code, 0, `${label}: exit code should be 0`);
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(output, `${label}: should produce JSON output`);
+ if (output.hookSpecificOutput) {
+ assert.notStrictEqual(output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', `${label}: should not deny`);
+ } else {
+ assert.strictEqual(output.tool_name, 'Bash', `${label}: pass-through should preserve input`);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (test('denies short-form git push -f as destructive', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git push -f origin main', 'git push -f');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies git reset --hard even with intervening -c global option', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git -c core.foo=bar reset --hard', 'git -c ... reset --hard');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies rm -fr (reverse flag order)', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('rm -fr /tmp/junk', 'rm -fr');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies rm -r -f (split flag form)', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('rm -r -f /tmp/junk', 'rm -r -f');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies rm --recursive --force (long flag form)', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('rm --recursive --force /tmp/junk', 'rm --recursive --force');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies git reset HEAD --hard (with intervening ref)', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git reset HEAD --hard', 'git reset HEAD --hard');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies git clean -fd (combined force+dirs flag)', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git clean -fd', 'git clean -fd');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies destructive command in second chained segment', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('echo y | rm -rf /tmp/junk', 'echo y | rm -rf');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies destructive command inside command substitution', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('echo $(rm -rf /tmp/junk)', 'rm -rf inside $()');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies destructive command inside backticks', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('echo `git push -f origin main`', 'git push -f inside backticks');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('allows destructive phrase quoted inside a commit message', () => {
+ expectAllow('git commit -m "fix: rm -rf race in worker"', 'rm -rf in -m');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('allows SQL phrase quoted inside a commit message', () => {
+ expectAllow('git commit -m "docs: explain when drop table is safe"', 'drop table in -m');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('allows git push --force-if-includes as a safety-checked variant', () => {
+ expectAllow('git push --force-with-lease --force-if-includes origin main',
+ 'git push --force-if-includes');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ // --- Review-round-2 findings ---
+
+ if (test('denies git push --force even with --force-if-includes present', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git push --force --force-if-includes origin main',
+ 'git push --force --force-if-includes');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies git push when bare --force is mixed with lease flags', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git push --force-with-lease --force origin main',
+ 'git push --force-with-lease --force');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies git push with +refspec prefix (bare branch)', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git push origin +main', 'git push origin +main');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies git push with +refspec prefix (full ref)', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git push origin +refs/heads/main:refs/heads/main',
+ 'git push origin +refs/heads/main:refs/heads/main');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies git switch --discard-changes', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git switch --discard-changes feature',
+ 'git switch --discard-changes');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies git switch --force', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git switch --force main', 'git switch --force');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies git switch -f short form', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git switch -f main', 'git switch -f');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies git switch -C force-create', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('git switch -C feature', 'git switch -C');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('still allows plain git switch', () => {
+ expectAllow('git switch feature', 'git switch feature');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies rm -rf nested inside a backtick subshell', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('echo y | `rm -rf /tmp/junk`',
+ 'backtick subshell');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies rm -rf nested inside a $(...) subshell', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('echo y | $(rm -rf /tmp/junk)',
+ 'dollar-paren subshell');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('denies rm -rf inside double-quoted command substitution', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('echo "$(rm -rf /tmp/junk)"',
+ 'double-quoted dollar-paren subshell');
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
// Cleanup only the temp directory created by this test file.
try {
if (fs.existsSync(stateDir)) {