The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.
fix(security): harden worker approval, hook traversal, MCP exec, install scripts, git hooks
Geronimo27667bc7463a
diff --git a/install.ps1 b/install.ps1index 752ac2ec4..e04db118f 100644--- a/install.ps1+++ b/install.ps1@@ -35,12 +35,13 @@ $scriptDir = Split-Path -Parent $scriptPath$installerScript = Join-Path -Path (Join-Path -Path $scriptDir -ChildPath 'scripts') -ChildPath 'install-apply.js'# Auto-install Node dependencies when running from a git clone+# SECURITY: --ignore-scripts blocks preinstall/postinstall RCE from a compromised dependency.$nodeModules = Join-Path -Path $scriptDir -ChildPath 'node_modules'if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $nodeModules)) {Write-Host '[ECC] Installing dependencies...'Push-Location $scriptDirtry {- & npm install --no-audit --no-fund --loglevel=error+ & npm install --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund --loglevel=errorif ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {Write-Error "npm install failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE"exit $LASTEXITCODEdiff --git a/install.sh b/install.shindex f14c057cd..c69a11dd7 100755--- a/install.sh+++ b/install.sh@@ -14,10 +14,12 @@ while [ -L "$SCRIPT_PATH" ]; dodoneSCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$SCRIPT_PATH")" && pwd)"-# Auto-install Node dependencies when running from a git clone+# Auto-install Node dependencies when running from a git clone.+# SECURITY: --ignore-scripts blocks preinstall/postinstall RCE from a+# compromised dependency. ECC deps are pure JS (no native build step).if [ ! -d "$SCRIPT_DIR/node_modules" ]; thenecho "[ECC] Installing dependencies..."- (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && npm install --no-audit --no-fund --loglevel=error)+ (cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" && npm install --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund --loglevel=error)fi# On MSYS2/Git Bash, convert the POSIX path to a Windows path so Node.jsdiff --git a/scripts/claw.js b/scripts/claw.jsindex 982ce5c22..b85cfc81c 100644--- a/scripts/claw.js+++ b/scripts/claw.js@@ -95,20 +95,28 @@ function askClaude(systemPrompt, history, userMessage, model) {}args.push('-p');- // On Windows the `claude` binary installed via npm is `claude.cmd`/`claude.ps1`,- // and Node's spawn() cannot resolve those wrappers via PATH without shell: true.- // But shell mode concatenates args *unescaped*, so a multi-line prompt passed as- // an arg gets mangled (newlines and the `===` section markers truncate it, and- // claude receives an empty prompt). Fix: send the prompt over stdin via `input`- // and keep only the short, safe flags (`--model`, `-p`) as args.- // 'claude' is a hardcoded literal here (not user input), so shell mode is safe.- const result = spawnSync('claude', args, {+ // SECURITY: never use shell:true — on Windows Node concatenates command+args+ // unquoted (DEP0190), so a model value like `x & calc &` breaks out.+ // Validate the model token and spawn without a shell; resolve .cmd shim explicitly.+ if (model && !/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,63}$/.test(model)) {+ return `[Error: invalid model name]`;+ }+ let bin = 'claude';+ if (process.platform === 'win32') {+ for (const ext of ['.cmd', '.exe', '.ps1']) {+ try {+ const found = require('child_process').spawnSync('where', [`claude${ext}`], { encoding: 'utf8' });+ if (found.status === 0 && found.stdout.trim()) { bin = found.stdout.trim().split(/\r?\n/)[0]; break; }+ } catch { /* ignore */ }+ }+ }+ const result = spawnSync(bin, args, {input: fullPrompt,encoding: 'utf8',stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],env: { ...process.env, CLAUDECODE: '' },timeout: 300000,- shell: process.platform === 'win32'+ shell: false});if (result.error) {diff --git a/scripts/codex-git-hooks/pre-commit b/scripts/codex-git-hooks/pre-commitindex 98c495fef..b4c608c76 100644--- a/scripts/codex-git-hooks/pre-commit+++ b/scripts/codex-git-hooks/pre-commit@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ set -euo pipefail# Blocks commits that add high-signal secrets.if [[ "${ECC_SKIP_GIT_HOOKS:-0}" == "1" || "${ECC_SKIP_PRECOMMIT:-0}" == "1" ]]; then+ printf '[ECC pre-commit] WARNING: hook bypassed via env (ECC_SKIP_*=1)\n' >&2exit 0fi-if [[ -f ".ecc-hooks-disable" || -f ".git/ecc-hooks-disable" ]]; then- exit 0-fi+# NOTE: file-based disables (.ecc-hooks-disable) were removed — a malicious+# repo could ship that file and silently turn off secret scanning exactly+# where it is most needed. Use the env bypass above (audible warning) instead.if ! git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree >/dev/null 2>&1; thenexit 0diff --git a/scripts/codex-git-hooks/pre-push b/scripts/codex-git-hooks/pre-pushindex 2ee23c7f4..f98f3ef7d 100755--- a/scripts/codex-git-hooks/pre-push+++ b/scripts/codex-git-hooks/pre-push@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ set -euo pipefail# Runs a lightweight verification flow before pushes.if [[ "${ECC_SKIP_GIT_HOOKS:-0}" == "1" || "${ECC_SKIP_PREPUSH:-0}" == "1" ]]; then+ printf '[ECC pre-push] WARNING: hook bypassed via env (ECC_SKIP_*=1)\n' >&2exit 0fi-if [[ -f ".ecc-hooks-disable" || -f ".git/ecc-hooks-disable" ]]; then- exit 0-fi+# NOTE: file-based disables (.ecc-hooks-disable) were removed — a malicious+# repo could ship that file and silently disable verification.if ! git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree >/dev/null 2>&1; thenexit 0@@ -85,8 +85,14 @@ run_node_script() {}if [[ -f "package.json" ]]; then- pm="$(detect_pm)"- log "Node project detected (package manager: $pm)"+ # SECURITY: executing a cloned repo's lint/test/build scripts on push is+ # arbitrary code execution (package.json scripts run as you). Opt-in only:+ # set ECC_PREPUSH_RUN_CHECKS=1 for repos you trust.+ if [[ "${ECC_PREPUSH_RUN_CHECKS:-0}" != "1" ]]; then+ log "Node project detected but ECC_PREPUSH_RUN_CHECKS!=1; skipping repo script execution (set =1 to opt in)."+ else+ pm="$(detect_pm)"+ log "Node project detected (package manager: $pm)"for script_name in lint typecheck test build; doif has_node_script "$script_name"; then@@ -109,8 +115,12 @@ if [[ -f "package.json" ]]; then*) npm audit --omit=dev || fail "npm audit failed" ;;esacfi+ fifi+# SECURITY: go test / pytest execute repo-controlled code (TestMain,+# conftest.py). Same opt-in gate as Node scripts above.+if [[ "${ECC_PREPUSH_RUN_CHECKS:-0}" == "1" ]]; thenif [[ -f "go.mod" ]] && command -v go >/dev/null 2>&1; thenran_any_check=1log "Go project detected. Running: go test ./..."@@ -126,6 +136,11 @@ if [[ -f "pyproject.toml" || -f "requirements.txt" ]]; thenlog "Python project detected but pytest is not installed. Skipping."fifi+else+ if [[ -f "go.mod" || -f "pyproject.toml" || -f "requirements.txt" ]]; then+ log "Go/Python project detected but ECC_PREPUSH_RUN_CHECKS!=1; skipping test execution."+ fi+fiif [[ "$ran_any_check" -eq 0 ]]; thenlog "No supported checks found in this repository. Skipping."diff --git a/scripts/codex/install-global-git-hooks.sh b/scripts/codex/install-global-git-hooks.shindex ea11d8524..33a7daf8d 100755--- a/scripts/codex/install-global-git-hooks.sh+++ b/scripts/codex/install-global-git-hooks.sh@@ -54,12 +54,24 @@ run_or_echo chmod +x "$DEST_DIR/pre-commit" "$DEST_DIR/pre-push"if [[ "$MODE" == "apply" ]]; thenprev_hooks_path="$(git config --global core.hooksPath || true)"- if [[ -n "$prev_hooks_path" ]]; then- log "Previous global hooksPath: $prev_hooks_path"+ if [[ -n "$prev_hooks_path" && "$prev_hooks_path" != "$DEST_DIR" ]]; then+ # SECURITY: never silently displace another tool's global hooks — that+ # turns every commit/push in every repo into ECC code execution and breaks+ # the user's existing security controls. Require explicit opt-in to replace.+ if [[ "${ECC_FORCE_GLOBAL_HOOKS:-0}" != "1" ]]; then+ log "ERROR: global core.hooksPath already set to: $prev_hooks_path"+ log "Refusing to overwrite. Options:"+ log " 1) Per-repo install (recommended): git config core.hooksPath \"$DEST_DIR\""+ log " 2) Force replace: ECC_FORCE_GLOBAL_HOOKS=1 $0"+ log " 3) Restore afterwards: git config --global core.hooksPath \"$prev_hooks_path\""+ exit 1+ fi+ log "WARNING: replacing previous global hooksPath: $prev_hooks_path (ECC_FORCE_GLOBAL_HOOKS=1)"+ log "Restore with: git config --global core.hooksPath \"$prev_hooks_path\""fifirun_or_echo git config --global core.hooksPath "$DEST_DIR"log "Installed ECC global git hooks."-log "Disable per repo by creating .ecc-hooks-disable in project root."-log "Temporary bypass: ECC_SKIP_PRECOMMIT=1 or ECC_SKIP_PREPUSH=1"+log "Per-repo alternative (recommended): git config core.hooksPath \"$DEST_DIR\""+log "Temporary bypass (audible): ECC_SKIP_GIT_HOOKS=1 (logs a warning to stderr)"diff --git a/scripts/hooks/mcp-health-check.js b/scripts/hooks/mcp-health-check.jsindex b78b5ac57..edc28a6cc 100644--- a/scripts/hooks/mcp-health-check.js+++ b/scripts/hooks/mcp-health-check.js@@ -182,6 +182,12 @@ function extractMcpTargetFromRaw(raw) {}function resolveServerConfig(serverName) {+ // SECURITY: serverName flows into env-var lookup and shell-adjacent paths.+ // Reject anything outside a strict token so config-controlled names cannot+ // inject shell metachars ($(..), backticks, ;) downstream.+ if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/.test(String(serverName || ''))) {+ return null;+ }for (const filePath of configPaths()) {const data = readJsonFile(filePath);const server = data?.mcpServers?.[serverName]@@ -306,9 +312,21 @@ function probeCommandServer(serverName, config) {const command = config.command;const args = Array.isArray(config.args) ? config.args.map(arg => String(arg)) : [];const timeoutMs = envNumber('ECC_MCP_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MS', DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS);+ // SECURITY: config.env comes from repo-committed MCP configs. Never let it+ // override process-critical loader vars that turn into code execution+ // (LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_*, NODE_OPTIONS, PATH tampering, etc.).+ const BLOCKED_ENV_PREFIXES = ['LD_', 'DYLD_', 'NODE_OPTIONS', 'NODE_PATH', 'PATH', 'PYTHONPATH', 'RUBYLIB', 'PERL5LIB'];+ const rawEnv = (config.env && typeof config.env === 'object' && !Array.isArray(config.env) ? config.env : {});+ const safeConfigEnv = {};+ for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(rawEnv)) {+ if (BLOCKED_ENV_PREFIXES.some(p => String(k).toUpperCase().startsWith(p))) {+ continue;+ }+ safeConfigEnv[k] = String(v);+ }const mergedEnv = {...process.env,- ...(config.env && typeof config.env === 'object' && !Array.isArray(config.env) ? config.env : {})+ ...safeConfigEnv};let done = false;@@ -515,6 +533,29 @@ function probeCommandServer(serverName, config) {async function probeServer(serverName, resolvedConfig) {const config = resolvedConfig.config;+ // SECURITY: cloning a malicious repo must not auto-execute its MCP servers.+ // Workspace configs (cwd .claude.json / .claude/settings.json) are untrusted+ // by default; only probe them with explicit operator opt-in.+ // Home configs (~/.claude.json) and explicit ECC_MCP_CONFIG_PATH remain allowed.+ try {+ const src = String(resolvedConfig.source || '');+ const cwd = process.cwd();+ const isWorkspaceSource = src === require('path').join(cwd, '.claude.json')+ || src === require('path').join(cwd, '.claude', 'settings.json')+ || src.startsWith(cwd + require('path').sep + '.claude' + require('path').sep);+ if (isWorkspaceSource && !/^(1|true|yes)$/i.test(String(process.env.ECC_MCP_ALLOW_WORKSPACE_PROBE || ''))) {+ return {+ ok: false,+ failureCode: null,+ reason: 'untrusted workspace MCP config skipped (set ECC_MCP_ALLOW_WORKSPACE_PROBE=1 to probe)',+ source: resolvedConfig.source+ };+ }+ } catch {+ // Fail closed on path errors for workspace sources is handled below;+ // continue to normal probing for non-workspace sources.+ }+if (config.type === 'http' || config.url) {const result = await requestHttp(config.url, config.headers || {}, envNumber('ECC_MCP_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MS', DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS));@@ -546,6 +587,15 @@ async function probeServer(serverName, resolvedConfig) {}function reconnectCommand(serverName) {+ // SECURITY: reconnect commands are shell strings from env. Disabled by+ // default; require explicit opt-in so a malicious .env/direnv cannot gain+ // shell execution through this hook.+ if (!/^(1|true|yes)$/i.test(String(process.env.ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_ALLOW || ''))) {+ return null;+ }+ if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/.test(String(serverName || ''))) {+ return null;+ }const key = `ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_${String(serverName).toUpperCase().replace(/[^A-Z0-9]/g, '_')}`;const command = process.env[key] || process.env.ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_COMMAND || '';if (!command.trim()) {@@ -563,8 +613,60 @@ function attemptReconnect(serverName) {return { attempted: false, success: false, reason: 'no reconnect command configured' };}- const result = spawnSync(command, {- shell: true,+ // SECURITY: never run reconnect strings through a shell. Split on+ // whitespace (no glob/expansion/substitution) and spawn directly.+ // Supports single/double quotes for paths with spaces (e.g. node+ // "/tmp/dir with space/reconnect.js"). No variable, command, tilde, or+ // glob expansion is performed. {server} was already validated above.+ function splitReconnectCommand(s) {+ const parts = [];+ let cur = '';+ let quote = null;+ let inToken = false;+ for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {+ const ch = s[i];+ if (quote) {+ if (ch === quote) {+ quote = null;+ } else if (ch === '\\' && quote === '"' && i + 1 < s.length && (s[i + 1] === '"' || s[i + 1] === '\\')) {+ cur += s[i + 1];+ i++;+ } else {+ cur += ch;+ }+ } else if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {+ quote = ch;+ inToken = true;+ } else if (/\s/.test(ch)) {+ if (inToken) {+ parts.push(cur);+ cur = '';+ inToken = false;+ }+ } else {+ cur += ch;+ inToken = true;+ }+ }+ if (quote) {+ return null; // unbalanced quote+ }+ if (inToken) {+ parts.push(cur);+ }+ return parts;+ }+ const parts = splitReconnectCommand(String(command).trim());+ if (!parts || parts.length === 0) {+ return { attempted: false, success: false, reason: 'invalid reconnect command' };+ }+ const [bin, ...argv] = parts;+ if (/[&|<>^%!`$();]/.test(bin) || argv.some(a => /[`$]/.test(a))) {+ return { attempted: false, success: false, reason: 'reconnect command contains unsafe characters' };+ }++ const result = spawnSync(bin, argv, {+ shell: false,env: process.env,cwd: process.cwd(),encoding: 'utf8',diff --git a/scripts/hooks/run-with-flags-shell.sh b/scripts/hooks/run-with-flags-shell.shindex 227b8fc7b..9599e303f 100755--- a/scripts/hooks/run-with-flags-shell.sh+++ b/scripts/hooks/run-with-flags-shell.sh@@ -22,9 +22,31 @@ if [[ "$ENABLED" != "yes" ]]; thenexit 0fi-SCRIPT_PATH="${PLUGIN_ROOT}/${REL_SCRIPT_PATH}"-if [[ ! -f "$SCRIPT_PATH" ]]; then- echo "[Hook] Script not found for ${HOOK_ID}: ${SCRIPT_PATH}" >&2+# Reject traversal / absolute / env-escape paths before touching the filesystem.+# Mirrors the containment check in run-with-flags.js (resolvedRoot prefix).+case "$REL_SCRIPT_PATH" in+ /*|\\*|~*|*..*|*\$*|*\`*|*\|*|*\;*|*\&*|*\<*|*\>*|*\"*|*\'*|*\ *|*" "*)+ echo "[Hook] Path traversal rejected for ${HOOK_ID}: ${REL_SCRIPT_PATH}" >&2+ printf '%s' "$INPUT"+ exit 0+ ;;+esac++# Canonicalize PLUGIN_ROOT (CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT is env-controlled) and the+# candidate script path, then enforce containment inside the plugin root.+PLUGIN_ROOT_CANON="$(realpath -m "$PLUGIN_ROOT" 2>/dev/null || readlink -f "$PLUGIN_ROOT" 2>/dev/null || printf '%s' "$PLUGIN_ROOT")"+SCRIPT_PATH="${PLUGIN_ROOT_CANON}/${REL_SCRIPT_PATH}"+SCRIPT_CANON="$(realpath -m "$SCRIPT_PATH" 2>/dev/null || readlink -f "$SCRIPT_PATH" 2>/dev/null || printf '%s' "$SCRIPT_PATH")"+case "$SCRIPT_CANON" in+ "$PLUGIN_ROOT_CANON"/*) ;;+ *)+ echo "[Hook] Path traversal rejected for ${HOOK_ID}: ${REL_SCRIPT_PATH}" >&2+ printf '%s' "$INPUT"+ exit 0+ ;;+esac+if [[ ! -f "$SCRIPT_CANON" ]]; then+ echo "[Hook] Script not found for ${HOOK_ID}: ${SCRIPT_CANON}" >&2printf '%s' "$INPUT"exit 0fi@@ -33,4 +55,4 @@ fi# This is needed by scripts like observe.sh that behave differently for PreToolUse vs PostToolUseHOOK_PHASE="${HOOK_ID%%:*}"-printf '%s' "$INPUT" | "$SCRIPT_PATH" "$HOOK_PHASE"+printf '%s' "$INPUT" | "$SCRIPT_CANON" "$HOOK_PHASE"diff --git a/scripts/orchestrate-codex-worker.sh b/scripts/orchestrate-codex-worker.shindex d73ad0cf2..135a639e8 100755--- a/scripts/orchestrate-codex-worker.sh+++ b/scripts/orchestrate-codex-worker.sh@@ -48,6 +48,35 @@ fiwrite_status "running" "- Task file: \`$task_file\`"+# SECURITY: never auto-approve agent tool execution. The worker prompt is built+# from a task file that may contain LLM-generated or third-party content+# (indirect prompt injection). `codex exec -p yolo` would execute+# rm -rf / exfiltration commands without confirmation.+# Default to the most restrictive approval mode; allow an explicit operator+# override only via env (e.g. ECC_CODEX_APPROVAL_MODE=on-request for trusted runs).+APPROVAL_MODE="${ECC_CODEX_APPROVAL_MODE:-never}"+case "$APPROVAL_MODE" in+ never|on-request|on-failure) ;;+ *)+ echo "[ECC worker] Refusing to run: unsupported ECC_CODEX_APPROVAL_MODE='$APPROVAL_MODE' (expected never|on-request|on-failure)" >&2+ write_status "failed" "- Error: unsupported approval mode"+ exit 1+ ;;+esac++# Contain the task file to the current worktree so a malicious launcher cannot+# point the worker at /etc/passwd or a sibling checkout.+task_real="$(realpath -m "$task_file" 2>/dev/null || readlink -f "$task_file" 2>/dev/null || printf '%s' "$task_file")"+work_real="$(pwd -P 2>/dev/null || pwd)"+case "$task_real" in+ "$work_real"/*) ;;+ *)+ echo "[ECC worker] Refusing to run: task file outside worktree: $task_file" >&2+ write_status "failed" "- Error: task file outside worktree"+ exit 1+ ;;+esac+prompt_file="$(mktemp)"output_file="$(mktemp)"cleanup() {@@ -77,7 +106,7 @@ Task file: $task_file$(cat "$task_file")EOF-if codex exec -p yolo -m gpt-5.4 --color never -C "$(pwd)" -o "$output_file" - < "$prompt_file"; then+if codex exec -p "$APPROVAL_MODE" -m gpt-5.4 --color never -C "$(pwd)" -o "$output_file" - < "$prompt_file"; then{echo "# Handoff"echodiff --git a/tests/hooks/mcp-health-check.test.js b/tests/hooks/mcp-health-check.test.jsindex fe86290e4..beb2488e1 100644--- a/tests/hooks/mcp-health-check.test.js+++ b/tests/hooks/mcp-health-check.test.js@@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ async function runTests() {ECC_MCP_CONFIG_PATH: null,ECC_MCP_HEALTH_STATE_PATH: null,ECC_MCP_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MS: '100',+ // Workspace configs are untrusted by default; this test uses a+ // temp dir it created itself, so opt in explicitly.+ ECC_MCP_ALLOW_WORKSPACE_PROBE: '1',HOME: homeDir,USERPROFILE: homeDir},@@ -619,6 +622,7 @@ async function runTests() {CLAUDE_HOOK_EVENT_NAME: 'PreToolUse',ECC_MCP_CONFIG_PATH: configPath,ECC_MCP_HEALTH_STATE_PATH: statePath,+ ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_ALLOW: '1',ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_COMMAND: `${JSON.stringify(process.execPath)} ${JSON.stringify(reconnectScript)}`,ECC_MCP_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MS: '1000',ECC_MCP_HEALTH_BACKOFF_MS: '10'@@ -682,6 +686,7 @@ async function runTests() {CLAUDE_HOOK_EVENT_NAME: 'PostToolUseFailure',ECC_MCP_CONFIG_PATH: configPath,ECC_MCP_HEALTH_STATE_PATH: statePath,+ ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_ALLOW: '1',ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_COMMAND: `node ${JSON.stringify(reconnectScript)}`,ECC_MCP_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MS: '1000'}@@ -773,6 +778,7 @@ async function runTests() {{CLAUDE_HOOK_EVENT_NAME: 'PostToolUseFailure',ECC_MCP_HEALTH_STATE_PATH: statePath,+ ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_ALLOW: '1',ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_COMMAND: `${JSON.stringify(process.execPath)} ${JSON.stringify(reconnectScript)}`});@@ -810,6 +816,7 @@ async function runTests() {CLAUDE_HOOK_EVENT_NAME: 'PostToolUseFailure',ECC_MCP_HEALTH_STATE_PATH: statePath,ECC_MCP_CONFIG_PATH: path.join(tempDir, 'missing.json'),+ ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_ALLOW: '1',ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_COMMAND: null,ECC_MCP_RECONNECT_FOO_BAR: `${JSON.stringify(process.execPath)} ${JSON.stringify(reconnectScript)} ${JSON.stringify(markerFile)} {server}`}