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The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.

fix: block unsafe privileged workflow checkouts

Affaan Mustafa3792b69a38ea
diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
index 04972a2c5..1177a249c 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -190,6 +190,10 @@ jobs:
run: node scripts/ci/validate-install-manifests.js
continue-on-error: false
+ - name: Validate workflow security
+ run: node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
+ continue-on-error: false
+
- name: Validate rules
run: node scripts/ci/validate-rules.js
continue-on-error: false
diff --git a/.github/workflows/reusable-validate.yml b/.github/workflows/reusable-validate.yml
index 7d3748aec..a606404b5 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/reusable-validate.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/reusable-validate.yml
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ jobs:
- name: Validate install manifests
run: node scripts/ci/validate-install-manifests.js
+ - name: Validate workflow security
+ run: node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
+
- name: Validate rules
run: node scripts/ci/validate-rules.js
diff --git a/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js b/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7f6183bac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * Reject unsafe GitHub Actions patterns that execute or checkout untrusted PR code
+ * from privileged events such as workflow_run or pull_request_target.
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR = path.join(__dirname, '../../.github/workflows');
+
+const RULES = [
+ {
+ event: 'workflow_run',
+ eventPattern: /\bworkflow_run\s*:/m,
+ description: 'workflow_run must not checkout an untrusted workflow_run head ref/repository',
+ expressionPattern: /\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.workflow_run\.(?:head_branch|head_sha|head_repository(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_.]+)?)\s*\}\}|\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.workflow_run\.pull_requests\[\d+\]\.head\.(?:ref|sha|repo\.full_name)\s*\}\}/g,
+ },
+ {
+ event: 'pull_request_target',
+ eventPattern: /\bpull_request_target\s*:/m,
+ description: 'pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository',
+ expressionPattern: /\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.pull_request\.head\.(?:ref|sha|repo\.full_name)\s*\}\}/g,
+ },
+];
+
+function getWorkflowFiles(workflowsDir) {
+ if (!fs.existsSync(workflowsDir)) {
+ return [];
+ }
+
+ return fs.readdirSync(workflowsDir)
+ .filter(file => /\.(?:yml|yaml)$/i.test(file))
+ .map(file => path.join(workflowsDir, file))
+ .sort();
+}
+
+function getLineNumber(source, index) {
+ return source.slice(0, index).split(/\r?\n/).length;
+}
+
+function extractCheckoutSteps(source) {
+ const blocks = [];
+ const lines = source.split(/\r?\n/);
+ let current = null;
+
+ for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+ const line = lines[i];
+ const stepStart = line.match(/^(\s*)-\s+/);
+
+ if (stepStart) {
+ if (current) {
+ blocks.push(current);
+ }
+
+ current = {
+ indent: stepStart[1].length,
+ startLine: i + 1,
+ lines: [line],
+ };
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (current) {
+ current.lines.push(line);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (current) {
+ blocks.push(current);
+ }
+
+ return blocks
+ .map(block => ({
+ startLine: block.startLine,
+ text: block.lines.join('\n'),
+ }))
+ .filter(block => /uses:\s*actions\/checkout@/m.test(block.text));
+}
+
+function findViolations(filePath, source) {
+ const violations = [];
+ const checkoutSteps = extractCheckoutSteps(source);
+
+ for (const rule of RULES) {
+ if (!rule.eventPattern.test(source)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (const step of checkoutSteps) {
+ for (const match of step.text.matchAll(rule.expressionPattern)) {
+ violations.push({
+ filePath,
+ event: rule.event,
+ description: rule.description,
+ expression: match[0],
+ line: step.startLine + getLineNumber(step.text, match.index) - 1,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return violations;
+}
+
+function validateWorkflowSecurity(workflowsDir = DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR) {
+ const files = getWorkflowFiles(workflowsDir);
+ const violations = [];
+
+ for (const filePath of files) {
+ const source = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
+ violations.push(...findViolations(filePath, source));
+ }
+
+ if (violations.length > 0) {
+ for (const violation of violations) {
+ console.error(
+ `ERROR: ${path.basename(violation.filePath)}:${violation.line} - ${violation.description}`,
+ );
+ console.error(` Unsafe expression: ${violation.expression}`);
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ console.log(`Validated workflow security for ${files.length} workflow files`);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+if (require.main === module) {
+ process.exit(validateWorkflowSecurity(process.env.ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR || DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR));
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+ DEFAULT_WORKFLOWS_DIR,
+ extractCheckoutSteps,
+ findViolations,
+ validateWorkflowSecurity,
+};
diff --git a/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js b/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b1e69a390
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * Validate workflow security guardrails for privileged GitHub Actions events.
+ */
+
+const assert = require('assert');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+
+const SCRIPT_PATH = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'ci', 'validate-workflow-security.js');
+
+function test(name, fn) {
+ try {
+ fn();
+ console.log(` ✓ ${name}`);
+ return true;
+ } catch (error) {
+ console.log(` ✗ ${name}`);
+ console.log(` Error: ${error.message}`);
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+function runValidator(files) {
+ const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'ecc-workflow-security-'));
+ try {
+ for (const [name, contents] of Object.entries(files)) {
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(tempDir, name), contents);
+ }
+
+ return spawnSync('node', [SCRIPT_PATH], {
+ encoding: 'utf8',
+ env: {
+ ...process.env,
+ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR: tempDir,
+ },
+ });
+ } finally {
+ fs.rmSync(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+ }
+}
+
+function run() {
+ console.log('\n=== Testing workflow security validation ===\n');
+
+ let passed = 0;
+ let failed = 0;
+
+ if (test('allows safe workflow_run workflow that only checks out the base repository', () => {
+ const result = runValidator({
+ 'safe.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n workflow_run:\n workflows: ["CI"]\n types: [completed]\njobs:\n repair:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n - run: echo safe\n`,
+ });
+ assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('rejects workflow_run checkout using github.event.workflow_run.head_branch', () => {
+ const result = runValidator({
+ 'unsafe-workflow-run.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_run:\n workflows: ["CI"]\n types: [completed]\njobs:\n repair:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: \${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}\n`,
+ });
+ assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
+ assert.match(result.stderr, /workflow_run must not checkout an untrusted workflow_run head ref\/repository/);
+ assert.match(result.stderr, /head_branch/);
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('rejects workflow_run checkout using github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name', () => {
+ const result = runValidator({
+ 'unsafe-repository.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_run:\n workflows: ["CI"]\n types: [completed]\njobs:\n repair:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n repository: \${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name }}\n`,
+ });
+ assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
+ assert.match(result.stderr, /head_repository\.full_name/);
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout using github.event.pull_request.head.sha', () => {
+ const result = runValidator({
+ 'unsafe-pr-target.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: \${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n`,
+ });
+ assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail');
+ assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref\/repository/);
+ assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ console.log(`\nPassed: ${passed}`);
+ console.log(`Failed: ${failed}`);
+
+ process.exit(failed > 0 ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+run();