The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.
fix(scripts): confine plan-canvas artifact assets and escape 404 paths
WRG742395bca70a
diff --git a/scripts/lib/plan-canvas/server.js b/scripts/lib/plan-canvas/server.jsindex 11b44062a..961dd559c 100644--- a/scripts/lib/plan-canvas/server.js+++ b/scripts/lib/plan-canvas/server.js@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ const http = require('http');const path = require('path');const { buildAllowedHostnames, isAllowedHostHeader, isAllowedOrigin } = require('../loopback-guard');-const { renderMarkdown } = require('./markdown');+const { escapeHtml, renderMarkdown } = require('./markdown');const { artifactSdkJs } = require('./sdk');const {canvasCss,@@ -101,9 +101,21 @@ function sendJson(res, statusCode, payload) {res.end(body);}+// Artifact pages render inside a sandboxed iframe (no allow-same-origin) and+// legitimately run CDN scripts (Mermaid) plus inline loaders, so the default+// restrictive CSP cannot apply. A sandbox-only CSP mirrors the iframe+// attribute instead: scripts keep working, but the document gets an opaque+// origin, which neuters direct-navigation abuse of the loopback API (no CORS+// reads, JSON POSTs are preflight-blocked) without changing in-iframe+// behavior. A hostile <meta> CSP in a raw HTML artifact can only narrow this+// further, never loosen it.+const ARTIFACT_CSP = 'sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups';+function sendHtml(res, statusCode, html, { csp = true } = {}) {const headers = { 'content-type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8', 'cache-control': 'no-store' };- if (csp) {+ if (csp === 'artifact') {+ headers['content-security-policy'] = ARTIFACT_CSP;+ } else if (csp) {headers['content-security-policy'] ="default-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; frame-src 'self'";}@@ -493,7 +505,7 @@ function createPlanCanvasServer({try {content = fs.readFileSync(session.file, 'utf8');} catch {- return sendHtml(res, 404, `<h1>Artifact missing</h1><p>${session.file} no longer exists.</p>`, { csp: false });+ return sendHtml(res, 404, `<h1>Artifact missing</h1><p>${escapeHtml(session.file)} no longer exists.</p>`);}const ext = path.extname(session.file).toLowerCase();if (ext === '.md' || ext === '.markdown') {@@ -501,29 +513,41 @@ function createPlanCanvasServer({title: path.basename(session.file),sdkSrc: '/sdk.js'});- return sendHtml(res, 200, html, { csp: false });+ return sendHtml(res, 200, html, { csp: 'artifact' });}const sdkTag = '<script src="/sdk.js"></script>';const injected = content.includes('</body>')? content.replace('</body>', `${sdkTag}\n</body>`): `${content}\n${sdkTag}`;- return sendHtml(res, 200, injected, { csp: false });+ return sendHtml(res, 200, injected, { csp: 'artifact' });}// Sibling assets resolve relative to the artifact's directory and must- // stay confined to it.+ // stay confined to it. The prefix check alone is insufficient: a symlink+ // inside the directory can point outside it, so the check is repeated+ // against the real paths and fails closed when they cannot be resolved.const baseDir = path.dirname(session.file);const resolved = path.resolve(baseDir, assetPath);if (resolved !== baseDir && !resolved.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep)) {return sendJson(res, 403, { error: 'asset path escapes artifact directory' });}+ let realTarget;+ try {+ const realBase = fs.realpathSync(baseDir);+ realTarget = fs.realpathSync(resolved);+ if (realTarget !== realBase && !realTarget.startsWith(realBase + path.sep)) {+ return sendJson(res, 403, { error: 'asset path escapes artifact directory' });+ }+ } catch {+ return sendJson(res, 404, { error: 'asset not found' });+ }let data;try {- data = fs.readFileSync(resolved);+ data = fs.readFileSync(realTarget);} catch {return sendJson(res, 404, { error: 'asset not found' });}- const type = CONTENT_TYPES[path.extname(resolved).toLowerCase()] || 'application/octet-stream';+ const type = CONTENT_TYPES[path.extname(realTarget).toLowerCase()] || 'application/octet-stream';res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': type, 'cache-control': 'no-store' });return res.end(data);}diff --git a/tests/scripts/plan-canvas.test.js b/tests/scripts/plan-canvas.test.jsindex 5d1e8745f..152d9c35b 100644--- a/tests/scripts/plan-canvas.test.js+++ b/tests/scripts/plan-canvas.test.js@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ async function main() {assert.ok(res.body.includes('<h1 id="plan-demo">'));assert.ok(res.body.includes('<table>'));assert.ok(res.body.includes('<script src="/sdk.js">'));- assert.strictEqual(res.headers['content-security-policy'], undefined);+ assert.strictEqual(res.headers['content-security-policy'], 'sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups');// No diagram in this plan → no Mermaid loader shipped.assert.ok(!res.body.includes('mermaid.run'));})) passed++; else failed++;@@ -214,6 +214,36 @@ async function main() {assert.strictEqual(escape.statusCode, 403);})) passed++; else failed++;+ if (await test('artifact responses carry a sandbox CSP (direct-navigation hardening)', async () => {+ const md = await request(port, 'GET', `/artifact/${key}/`);+ assert.strictEqual(md.statusCode, 200);+ assert.strictEqual(md.headers['content-security-policy'], 'sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups');+ const html = await request(port, 'GET', `/artifact/${htmlKey}/`);+ assert.strictEqual(html.statusCode, 200);+ assert.strictEqual(html.headers['content-security-policy'], 'sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups');+ })) passed++; else failed++;++ if (await test('missing-artifact 404 escapes the file path', async () => {+ const evilFile = path.join(tmp, 'evil<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>.plan.md');+ fs.writeFileSync(evilFile, '# Evil\n');+ const opened = jsonBody(await request(port, 'POST', '/api/sessions', { body: { file: evilFile } }));+ fs.rmSync(evilFile);+ const res = await request(port, 'GET', `/artifact/${opened.key}/`);+ assert.strictEqual(res.statusCode, 404);+ assert.ok(!res.body.includes('<img src=x'), 'raw filename must not appear in the 404 page');+ assert.ok(res.body.includes('<img'), 'filename must be HTML-escaped in the 404 page');+ })) passed++; else failed++;++ if (await test('symlinked sibling assets escaping the artifact dir are blocked', async () => {+ fs.symlinkSync(path.join(outsideDir, 'secret.txt'), path.join(tmp, 'evil-link.txt'));+ const blocked = await request(port, 'GET', `/artifact/${key}/evil-link.txt`);+ assert.strictEqual(blocked.statusCode, 403);+ fs.symlinkSync(path.join(tmp, 'style.css'), path.join(tmp, 'ok-link.css'));+ const allowed = await request(port, 'GET', `/artifact/${key}/ok-link.css`);+ assert.strictEqual(allowed.statusCode, 200);+ assert.ok(allowed.body.includes('color: red'));+ })) passed++; else failed++;+if (await test('static chrome assets are served', async () => {for (const asset of ['/canvas.css', '/client.js', '/sdk.js']) {const res = await request(port, 'GET', asset);