The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.
refactor(hooks): split gateguard gate and classifiers into smaller units
Affaan Mustafa7b1756670f23
diff --git a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.jsindex 1a2c54cd9..15b2a5da5 100644--- a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js+++ b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js@@ -651,13 +651,14 @@ const DD_LAUNCHER_OPTIONS = {};/** Return the command position after one explicitly supported launcher's options. */+function ddLauncherCommandIndex(argv, index, name) {- const { values, optional, flags, nonCommand } = DD_LAUNCHER_OPTIONS[name];+ const options = DD_LAUNCHER_OPTIONS[name];// GNU time uses getopt_long: unique prefixes resolve against its complete// eight-option table, including terminating help/version. Other launchers// retain their explicit spellings; this does not affect shell-keyword time.const timeLongOptions = name === 'time'- ? [...values, ...flags, ...nonCommand].filter(flag => flag.startsWith('--'))+ ? [...options.values, ...options.flags, ...options.nonCommand].filter(flag => flag.startsWith('--')): null;index += 1;while (index < argv.length) {@@ -672,38 +673,47 @@ function ddLauncherCommandIndex(argv, index, name) {index += 1;continue;}- if (arg.startsWith('--')) {- const separator = arg.indexOf('=');- let flag = separator === -1 ? arg : arg.slice(0, separator);- if (timeLongOptions && !timeLongOptions.includes(flag)) {- const matches = timeLongOptions.filter(option => option.startsWith(flag));- if (matches.length !== 1) return argv.length;- [flag] = matches;- }- if (nonCommand && nonCommand.has(flag)) return argv.length;- if (values.has(flag)) index += separator === -1 ? 2 : 1;- else if (optional.has(flag) || (separator === -1 && flags.has(flag))) index += 1;- else return argv.length;- continue;- }- let consumesNext = false;- for (let offset = 1; offset < arg.length; offset += 1) {- const flag = `-${arg[offset]}`;- if (nonCommand && nonCommand.has(flag)) return argv.length;- if (values.has(flag)) {- consumesNext = offset + 1 === arg.length;- break;- }- if (optional.has(flag)) break;- if (!flags.has(flag)) return argv.length;- }- index += consumesNext ? 2 : 1;+ const step = arg.startsWith('--')+ ? ddLauncherLongOptionStep(arg, options, timeLongOptions)+ : ddLauncherShortClusterStep(arg, options);+ if (step === -1) return argv.length;+ index += step;}// timeout's duration and taskset's mask or CPU list are data, followed by// exactly one executable position.return name === 'timeout' || name === 'taskset' ? index + 1 : index;}+// One long option of a dd launcher: how many argv positions it consumes, or+// -1 when the launcher can no longer reach a command position.+function ddLauncherLongOptionStep(arg, options, timeLongOptions) {+ const { values, optional, flags, nonCommand } = options;+ const separator = arg.indexOf('=');+ let flag = separator === -1 ? arg : arg.slice(0, separator);+ if (timeLongOptions && !timeLongOptions.includes(flag)) {+ const matches = timeLongOptions.filter(option => option.startsWith(flag));+ if (matches.length !== 1) return -1;+ [flag] = matches;+ }+ if (nonCommand && nonCommand.has(flag)) return -1;+ if (values.has(flag)) return separator === -1 ? 2 : 1;+ if (optional.has(flag) || (separator === -1 && flags.has(flag))) return 1;+ return -1;+}++// One short-option cluster of a dd launcher, same contract as above.+function ddLauncherShortClusterStep(arg, options) {+ const { values, optional, flags, nonCommand } = options;+ for (let offset = 1; offset < arg.length; offset += 1) {+ const flag = `-${arg[offset]}`;+ if (nonCommand && nonCommand.has(flag)) return -1;+ if (values.has(flag)) return offset + 1 === arg.length ? 2 : 1;+ if (optional.has(flag)) return 1;+ if (!flags.has(flag)) return -1;+ }+ return 1;+}+/*** Resolve leading assignments, shell prefixes and sudo/doas/env into command* argv. Wrapper-specific option values never become executable names. Every@@ -715,6 +725,7 @@ function ddLauncherCommandIndex(argv, index, name) {* @param {boolean} [allowDdLaunchers] opt-in; other shared callers retain their grammar* @returns {string[]} normalized argv, or [] when no literal command resolves*/+function unwrapLeadWrappers(tokens, allowShellBuiltins = true, allowDdLaunchers = false) {let argv = tokens.slice();let index = 0;@@ -722,114 +733,136 @@ function unwrapLeadWrappers(tokens, allowShellBuiltins = true, allowDdLauncherslet allowShellTime = allowShellBuiltins;const timeTokens = SHELL_TIME_TOKENS.get(tokens);let budget = tokens.reduce((size, token) => size + token.length + 1, 1);- while (index < argv.length && budget-- > 0) {- while (allowAssignments && index < argv.length && SHELL_ASSIGNMENT.test(argv[index])) {- index += 1;- allowShellTime = false;- }- if (index >= argv.length) return [];- const base = commandBasename(argv[index]);- if (allowDdLaunchers && allowShellTime && argv[index] === 'time' && timeTokens && timeTokens.has(index)) {- // Current Bash accepts only raw -p and -- as reserved-time options.- // Quotes/escapes make them executable words, unlike external time argv.- // The next command/exec builtin or assignment keeps shell semantics.- index += 1;- if (argv[index] === '-p' && timeTokens.has(index)) index += 1;- if (argv[index] === '--' && timeTokens.has(index)) index += 1;- continue;++ // Each wrapper handler consumes its own options and returns true when no+ // literal command can resolve behind it.+ function isReservedTime() {+ return allowDdLaunchers && allowShellTime && argv[index] === 'time' && timeTokens && timeTokens.has(index);+ }+ function skipReservedTime() {+ // Current Bash accepts only raw -p and -- as reserved-time options.+ // Quotes/escapes make them executable words, unlike external time argv.+ // The next command/exec builtin or assignment keeps shell semantics.+ index += 1;+ if (argv[index] === '-p' && timeTokens.has(index)) index += 1;+ if (argv[index] === '--' && timeTokens.has(index)) index += 1;+ return false;+ }+ function skipCommandBuiltin() {+ allowShellTime = false;+ index += 1;+ while (index < argv.length && argv[index].startsWith('-') && argv[index] !== '-') {+ const flag = argv[index++];+ if (flag === '--') break;+ // -v/-V (including -pv) only describe names; no command executes.+ if (!/^-[pVv]+$/.test(flag) || /[vV]/.test(flag)) return true;}- if (allowShellBuiltins && base === 'command') {- allowShellTime = false;- index += 1;- while (index < argv.length && argv[index].startsWith('-') && argv[index] !== '-') {- const flag = argv[index++];- if (flag === '--') break;- // -v/-V (including -pv) only describe names; no command executes.- if (!/^-[pVv]+$/.test(flag) || /[vV]/.test(flag)) return [];+ allowAssignments = false;+ return false;+ }+ function skipExecBuiltin() {+ allowShellTime = false;+ index += 1;+ while (index < argv.length && argv[index].startsWith('-') && argv[index] !== '-') {+ const flag = argv[index];+ if (flag === '--') {+ index += 1;+ break;}- allowAssignments = false;- continue;- }- if (allowShellBuiltins && base === 'exec') {- allowShellTime = false;- index += 1;- while (index < argv.length && argv[index].startsWith('-') && argv[index] !== '-') {- const flag = argv[index];- if (flag === '--') {- index += 1;- break;- }- const option = wrapperValueOption(flag, EXEC_VALUE_FLAGS);- const flagLetters = option ? flag.slice(1, flag.indexOf('a')) : flag.slice(1);- if (!/^[cl]*$/.test(flagLetters)) return [];- index += option && option.value === undefined ? 2 : 1;+ const option = wrapperValueOption(flag, EXEC_VALUE_FLAGS);+ const flagLetters = option ? flag.slice(1, flag.indexOf('a')) : flag.slice(1);+ if (!/^[cl]*$/.test(flagLetters)) return true;+ index += option && option.value === undefined ? 2 : 1;+ }+ // exec replaces the shell with an external executable; its argument+ // 'command' is not the shell's builtin, and A=1 is not an assignment.+ allowShellBuiltins = false;+ allowAssignments = false;+ return false;+ }+ function skipDdLauncher(base) {+ index = ddLauncherCommandIndex(argv, index, base);+ allowShellTime = false;+ allowShellBuiltins = false;+ allowAssignments = false;+ return false;+ }+ function skipPrivilegeWrapper(base) {+ allowShellTime = false;+ allowShellBuiltins = false;+ allowAssignments = true;+ const valueFlags = base === 'sudo' ? SUDO_VALUE_FLAGS : DOAS_VALUE_FLAGS;+ index += 1;+ while (index < argv.length) {+ const flag = argv[index];+ if (flag === '--') {+ index += 1;+ break;}- // exec replaces the shell with an external executable; its argument- // 'command' is not the shell's builtin, and A=1 is not an assignment.- allowShellBuiltins = false;- allowAssignments = false;- continue;- }- if (allowDdLaunchers && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DD_LAUNCHER_OPTIONS, base)) {- index = ddLauncherCommandIndex(argv, index, base);- allowShellTime = false;- allowShellBuiltins = false;- allowAssignments = false;- continue;+ if (flag === '-' || !flag.startsWith('-')) break;+ const option = wrapperValueOption(flag, valueFlags);+ index += option && option.value === undefined ? 2 : 1;}- if (base === 'sudo' || base === 'doas') {- allowShellTime = false;- allowShellBuiltins = false;- allowAssignments = true;- const valueFlags = base === 'sudo' ? SUDO_VALUE_FLAGS : DOAS_VALUE_FLAGS;- index += 1;- while (index < argv.length) {- const flag = argv[index];- if (flag === '--') {- index += 1;- break;- }- if (flag === '-' || !flag.startsWith('-')) break;- const option = wrapperValueOption(flag, valueFlags);- index += option && option.value === undefined ? 2 : 1;+ return false;+ }+ function expandEnvSplit(option) {+ const separate = option.value === undefined;+ const source = separate ? argv[index + 1] : option.value;+ if (source === undefined || budget-- <= 0) return true;+ const expanded = splitEnvWords(source);+ if (!expanded) return true;+ argv = [...expanded, ...argv.slice(index + (separate ? 2 : 1))];+ index = 0;+ return false;+ }+ function skipEnvWrapper() {+ allowShellTime = false;+ allowShellBuiltins = false;+ allowAssignments = true;+ index += 1;+ while (index < argv.length) {+ const arg = argv[index];+ if (arg === '--') {+ index += 1;+ break;}- continue;+ const option = wrapperValueOption(arg, ENV_VALUE_FLAGS);+ if (option && (option.name === '-S' || option.name === '--split-string')) {+ if (expandEnvSplit(option)) return true;+ continue;+ }+ if (option) {+ index += option.value === undefined ? 2 : 1;+ continue;+ }+ if (arg.startsWith('-') || SHELL_ASSIGNMENT.test(arg)) {+ index += 1;+ continue;+ }+ break;}- if (base === 'env') {- allowShellTime = false;- allowShellBuiltins = false;- allowAssignments = true;+ return false;+ }+ function leadWrapperFor(base) {+ if (isReservedTime()) return skipReservedTime;+ if (allowShellBuiltins && base === 'command') return skipCommandBuiltin;+ if (allowShellBuiltins && base === 'exec') return skipExecBuiltin;+ if (allowDdLaunchers && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DD_LAUNCHER_OPTIONS, base)) return skipDdLauncher;+ if (base === 'sudo' || base === 'doas') return skipPrivilegeWrapper;+ if (base === 'env') return skipEnvWrapper;+ return null;+ }++ while (index < argv.length && budget-- > 0) {+ while (allowAssignments && index < argv.length && SHELL_ASSIGNMENT.test(argv[index])) {index += 1;- while (index < argv.length) {- const arg = argv[index];- if (arg === '--') {- index += 1;- break;- }- const option = wrapperValueOption(arg, ENV_VALUE_FLAGS);- if (option && (option.name === '-S' || option.name === '--split-string')) {- const separate = option.value === undefined;- const source = separate ? argv[index + 1] : option.value;- if (source === undefined || budget-- <= 0) return [];- const expanded = splitEnvWords(source);- if (!expanded) return [];- argv = [...expanded, ...argv.slice(index + (separate ? 2 : 1))];- index = 0;- continue;- }- if (option) {- index += option.value === undefined ? 2 : 1;- continue;- }- if (arg.startsWith('-') || SHELL_ASSIGNMENT.test(arg)) {- index += 1;- continue;- }- break;- }- continue;+ allowShellTime = false;}- return argv.slice(index);+ if (index >= argv.length) return [];+ const base = commandBasename(argv[index]);+ const wrapper = leadWrapperFor(base);+ if (!wrapper) return argv.slice(index);+ if (wrapper(base)) return [];}return [];}@@ -1067,6 +1100,113 @@ function pushTargetsSharedBranch(rest) {return false;}+/** Short-option cluster carrying `letter` (`-f`, `-fd`); long options never match. */+function hasShortFlag(token, letter) {+ return token.startsWith('-') && !token.startsWith('--') && token.slice(1).includes(letter);+}++// `git checkout -- <path>`, `git checkout .`, and the force forms+// (`--force` / `-f`) all discard uncommitted working-tree changes,+// mirroring the `switch` handler.+function isDestructiveGitCheckout(rest) {+ return rest.some(t => t === '--' || t === '.' || t === '--force' || hasShortFlag(t, 'f'));+}++// `git switch` can discard local working-tree changes in three forms:+// --discard-changes explicit discard+// --force / -f ignore conflicts and overwrite+// -C <branch> force-create (overwrites existing branch)+// Short combined form: -f, -fC, -Cf, -C+function isDestructiveGitSwitch(rest) {+ return rest.some(t => t === '--discard-changes' || t === '--force'+ || (t.startsWith('-') && !t.startsWith('--') && /[fC]/.test(t.slice(1))));+}++// Only `--force-with-lease` qualifies as a safety-checked force.+// `--force-if-includes` is a no-op when used WITHOUT+// `--force-with-lease` (per git-scm.com/docs/git-push), and when+// combined with a bare `--force` the bare force is still in effect.+// So `--force --force-if-includes` must be treated as destructive.+//+// A `+` refspec prefix (e.g. `git push origin +main`,+// `+refs/heads/main:refs/heads/main`) also forces a non-fast-forward+// update of that ref and is destructive on its own.+function isDestructiveGitPush(rest) {+ let withLease = false;+ let bareForce = false;+ let plusRefspecForce = false;+ for (const t of rest) {+ if (t === '--force-with-lease' || t.startsWith('--force-with-lease=')) {+ withLease = true;+ continue;+ }+ if (t === '--force' || t.startsWith('--force=') || hasShortFlag(t, 'f')) {+ bareForce = true;+ continue;+ }+ // Refspec prefix: `+<src>[:<dst>]`. Match tokens like `+main`,+ // `+refs/heads/main`, `+HEAD:branch`, `+:branch`. Exclude bare+ // `+` and numeric-only `+123` which are not refspecs.+ if (t.startsWith('+') && t.length > 1 && /^\+(?:[a-zA-Z_/.:]|HEAD)/.test(t)) plusRefspecForce = true;+ }+ if (bareForce || (plusRefspecForce && !withLease)) return true;+ // A lease-checked force still rewrites a shared branch's history.+ return withLease && pushTargetsSharedBranch(rest);+}++// `git branch -D` (long spelling: `--delete --force`) deletes a+// branch even when it is unmerged, orphaning its commits. Plain+// `-d` refuses when unmerged, so it is safe to leave ungated.+function isDestructiveGitBranch(rest) {+ let del = false;+ let force = false;+ for (const t of rest) {+ if (t === '--delete') { del = true; continue; }+ if (t === '--force') { force = true; continue; }+ if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) continue;+ const body = t.slice(1);+ if (body.includes('D')) return true;+ if (body.includes('d')) del = true;+ if (body.includes('f')) force = true;+ }+ return del && force;+}++// `git restore <path>` overwrites the working tree from the index+// by default, the modern spelling of gated `git checkout -- <path>`.+// Only `--staged` alone is non-destructive (it leaves the file on+// disk untouched); `--worktree` (the default target) is destructive.+function isDestructiveGitRestore(rest) {+ const has = (long, short) => rest.some(t => t === long || hasShortFlag(t, short));+ const staged = has('--staged', 'S');+ const worktree = has('--worktree', 'W');+ return worktree || !staged;+}++// Subcommand -> predicate over the tokens after it. Each entry is the+// smallest rule that identifies the destructive spelling of that command.+const DESTRUCTIVE_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS = new Map([+ ['reset', rest => rest.includes('--hard')],+ ['checkout', isDestructiveGitCheckout],+ // `git clean -f`, `-fd`, `-fdx`, `-df`, `--force`+ ['clean', rest => rest.some(t => t === '--force' || hasShortFlag(t, 'f'))],+ ['push', isDestructiveGitPush],+ ['commit', rest => rest.includes('--amend')],+ // `git rm -r` / `-rf` / `-r -f`: destructive within the index too.+ ['rm', rest => rest.some(t => t.startsWith('-') && !t.startsWith('--') && /[rR]/.test(t.slice(1)))],+ ['switch', isDestructiveGitSwitch],+ ['branch', isDestructiveGitBranch],+ // `drop` destroys one stash entry, `clear` the entire stash.+ // `list`, `show`, `pop` and `apply` keep the entries recoverable.+ ['stash', rest => rest[0] === 'drop' || rest[0] === 'clear'],+ // `expire` and `delete` remove the recovery net that makes every+ // other gated git command recoverable.+ ['reflog', rest => rest[0] === 'expire' || rest[0] === 'delete'],+ // `git update-ref -d <ref>` deletes a ref directly.+ ['update-ref', rest => rest.includes('-d') || rest.includes('--delete')],+ ['restore', isDestructiveGitRestore]+]);+/*** Detect destructive `git` invocations: `reset --hard`, `checkout --`,* `clean -f...`, `push --force` (`--force-with-lease` only to a shared@@ -1077,149 +1217,12 @@ function pushTargetsSharedBranch(rest) {* @param {string[]} tokens* @returns {boolean}*/+function isDestructiveGit(tokens) {const sub = findGitSubcommand(tokens);if (!sub) return false;- const { command, rest } = sub;-- if (command === 'reset') {- return rest.includes('--hard');- }-- if (command === 'checkout') {- // `git checkout -- <path>`, `git checkout .`, and the force forms- // (`--force` / `-f`) all discard uncommitted working-tree changes,- // mirroring the `switch` handler below.- return rest.some(t => {- if (t === '--' || t === '.' || t === '--force') return true;- if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) return false;- return t.slice(1).includes('f');- });- }-- if (command === 'clean') {- // `git clean -f`, `-fd`, `-fdx`, `-df`, `--force`- return rest.some(t => {- if (t === '--force') return true;- if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) return false;- return t.slice(1).includes('f');- });- }-- if (command === 'push') {- // Only `--force-with-lease` qualifies as a safety-checked force.- // `--force-if-includes` is a no-op when used WITHOUT- // `--force-with-lease` (per git-scm.com/docs/git-push), and when- // combined with a bare `--force` the bare force is still in effect.- // So `--force --force-if-includes` must be treated as destructive.- //- // A `+` refspec prefix (e.g. `git push origin +main`,- // `+refs/heads/main:refs/heads/main`) also forces a non-fast-forward- // update of that ref and is destructive on its own.- let withLease = false;- let bareForce = false;- let plusRefspecForce = false;- for (const t of rest) {- if (t === '--force-with-lease' || t.startsWith('--force-with-lease=')) {- withLease = true;- continue;- }- if (t === '--force' || t.startsWith('--force=')) {- bareForce = true;- continue;- }- if (t.startsWith('-') && !t.startsWith('--') && t.slice(1).includes('f')) {- bareForce = true;- continue;- }- // Refspec prefix: `+<src>[:<dst>]`. Match tokens like `+main`,- // `+refs/heads/main`, `+HEAD:branch`, `+:branch`. Exclude bare- // `+` and numeric-only `+123` which are not refspecs.- if (t.startsWith('+') && t.length > 1 && /^\+(?:[a-zA-Z_/.:]|HEAD)/.test(t)) {- plusRefspecForce = true;- }- }- if (bareForce || (plusRefspecForce && !withLease)) return true;- // A lease-checked force still rewrites a shared branch's history.- return withLease && pushTargetsSharedBranch(rest);- }-- if (command === 'commit') {- return rest.includes('--amend');- }-- if (command === 'rm') {- // `git rm -r` / `-rf` / `-r -f` — destructive within the index too.- let hasR = false;- for (const t of rest) {- if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) continue;- if (/[rR]/.test(t.slice(1))) hasR = true;- }- return hasR;- }-- if (command === 'switch') {- // `git switch` can discard local working-tree changes in three forms:- // --discard-changes explicit discard- // --force / -f ignore conflicts and overwrite- // -C <branch> force-create (overwrites existing branch)- return rest.some(t => {- if (t === '--discard-changes' || t === '--force') return true;- if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) return false;- // Short combined form: -f, -fC, -Cf, -C- const body = t.slice(1);- return /[fC]/.test(body);- });- }-- if (command === 'branch') {- // `git branch -D` (long spelling: `--delete --force`) deletes a- // branch even when it is unmerged, orphaning its commits. Plain- // `-d` refuses when unmerged, so it is safe to leave ungated.- let del = false;- let force = false;- for (const t of rest) {- if (t === '--delete') { del = true; continue; }- if (t === '--force') { force = true; continue; }- if (!t.startsWith('-') || t.startsWith('--')) continue;- const body = t.slice(1);- if (body.includes('D')) return true;- if (body.includes('d')) del = true;- if (body.includes('f')) force = true;- }- return del && force;- }-- if (command === 'stash') {- // `drop` destroys one stash entry, `clear` the entire stash.- // `list`, `show`, `pop` and `apply` keep the entries recoverable.- return rest[0] === 'drop' || rest[0] === 'clear';- }-- if (command === 'reflog') {- // `expire` and `delete` remove the recovery net that makes every- // other gated git command recoverable.- return rest[0] === 'expire' || rest[0] === 'delete';- }-- if (command === 'update-ref') {- // `git update-ref -d <ref>` deletes a ref directly.- return rest.includes('-d') || rest.includes('--delete');- }-- if (command === 'restore') {- // `git restore <path>` overwrites the working tree from the index- // by default, the modern spelling of gated `git checkout -- <path>`.- // Only `--staged` alone is non-destructive (it leaves the file on- // disk untouched); `--worktree` (the default target) is destructive.- const has = (long, short) => rest.some(t =>- t === long || (t.startsWith('-') && !t.startsWith('--') && t.slice(1).includes(short)));- const staged = has('--staged', 'S');- const worktree = has('--worktree', 'W');- return worktree || !staged;- }-- return false;+ const check = DESTRUCTIVE_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS.get(sub.command);+ return check ? check(sub.rest) : false;}/**@@ -1298,6 +1301,7 @@ const FIND_EXEC_ACTIONS = new Set(['-exec', '-execdir', '-ok', '-okdir']);* @param {string | string[]} command raw segment or already dequoted argv* @returns {boolean}*/+function isDestructiveFindExec(command) {const quoteAware = Array.isArray(command);const tokens = quoteAware ? command : tokenize(String(command || '').trim());@@ -1314,30 +1318,41 @@ function isDestructiveFindExec(command) {continue;}if (!FIND_EXEC_ACTIONS.has(action)) continue;- const execTokens = [];- for (index += 1; index < tokens.length; index += 1) {- const token = tokens[index];- if (token === ';' || token === '\\;' || (- token === '+' && (action === '-exec' || action === '-execdir') &&- execTokens[execTokens.length - 1] === '{}'- )) break;- execTokens.push(token);- }- if (execTokens.length === 0) continue;- // The legacy raw fallback can split quoted prose into apparent actions.- // Preserve its old rm/Git coverage, but classify dd only from real argv.- if (quoteAware && isDestructiveDd(execTokens, false)) return true;- const baseCmd = commandBasename(execTokens[0]);- // Preserve main's existing rm/rmdir/unlink and git-reset handling.- if (baseCmd === 'rm' || baseCmd === 'rmdir' || baseCmd === 'unlink') return true;- if (baseCmd === 'git') {- const sub = findGitSubcommand(execTokens);- if (sub && sub.command === 'reset' && sub.rest.includes('--hard')) return true;- }+ const exec = readFindExecArgv(tokens, index + 1, action);+ index = exec.index;+ if (exec.argv.length && isDestructiveFindExecArgv(exec.argv, quoteAware)) return true;}return false;}+// Collect the argv of one find action starting at `start`. Returns the argv+// and the index of its terminator (or the end of the token list).+function readFindExecArgv(tokens, start, action) {+ const argv = [];+ let index = start;+ for (; index < tokens.length; index += 1) {+ const token = tokens[index];+ if (token === ';' || token === '\\;' || (+ token === '+' && (action === '-exec' || action === '-execdir') &&+ argv[argv.length - 1] === '{}'+ )) break;+ argv.push(token);+ }+ return { argv, index };+}++function isDestructiveFindExecArgv(argv, quoteAware) {+ // The legacy raw fallback can split quoted prose into apparent actions.+ // Preserve its old rm/Git coverage, but classify dd only from real argv.+ if (quoteAware && isDestructiveDd(argv, false)) return true;+ const baseCmd = commandBasename(argv[0]);+ // Preserve main's existing rm/rmdir/unlink and git-reset handling.+ if (baseCmd === 'rm' || baseCmd === 'rmdir' || baseCmd === 'unlink') return true;+ if (baseCmd !== 'git') return false;+ const sub = findGitSubcommand(argv);+ return Boolean(sub && sub.command === 'reset' && sub.rest.includes('--hard'));+}+function isDestructiveBash(command) {// SQL phrases live in command bodies, not as flag-bearing// arguments, so we still match them by regex - but on the input@@ -1817,37 +1832,51 @@ function inRange(code, [lo, hi]) {return code >= lo && code <= hi;}+function sanitizePath(filePath) {- // Strip control chars (including null), bidi overrides, separators,- // and the dangerous invisible characters defined by the constants- // above (mirroring scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js), so a denial- // message cannot carry content a human reviewer cannot see.let sanitized = '';for (const char of String(filePath || '')) {- const code = char.codePointAt(0);- const isAsciiControl =- code <= ASCII_CONTROL_MAX || code === ASCII_DELETE || inRange(code, C1_CONTROLS);- const isBidiOverride =- inRange(code, BIDI_MARKS) || inRange(code, BIDI_EMBEDDINGS) || inRange(code, BIDI_ISOLATES);- const isUnicodeSeparator = code === LINE_SEPARATOR || code === PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR;- const isDangerousInvisible =- inRange(code, ZERO_WIDTHS) ||- code === WORD_JOINER ||- code === BYTE_ORDER_MARK ||- code === SOFT_HYPHEN ||- inRange(code, VARIATION_SELECTORS) ||- inRange(code, VARIATION_SUPPLEMENTS) ||- inRange(code, TAG_BLOCK) ||- code === MONGOLIAN_VOWEL_SEPARATOR ||- code === HANGUL_CHOSEONG_FILLER ||- code === HANGUL_JUNGSEONG_FILLER ||- code === HANGUL_FILLER ||- inRange(code, INVISIBLE_MATH_OPERATORS);- sanitized += isAsciiControl || isBidiOverride || isUnicodeSeparator || isDangerousInvisible ? ' ' : char;+ sanitized += isUnsafePathCodePoint(char.codePointAt(0)) ? ' ' : char;}return sanitized.trim().slice(0, SANITIZED_PATH_MAX_LENGTH);}+// Control chars (including null), bidi overrides, separators, and the+// dangerous invisible characters defined by the constants above (mirroring+// scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js), so a denial message cannot carry+// content a human reviewer cannot see.+function isUnsafePathCodePoint(code) {+ return isAsciiControlCodePoint(code)+ || isBidiOverrideCodePoint(code)+ || code === LINE_SEPARATOR || code === PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR+ || isDangerousInvisibleCodePoint(code);+}++function isAsciiControlCodePoint(code) {+ return code <= ASCII_CONTROL_MAX || code === ASCII_DELETE || inRange(code, C1_CONTROLS);+}++function isBidiOverrideCodePoint(code) {+ return inRange(code, BIDI_MARKS) || inRange(code, BIDI_EMBEDDINGS) || inRange(code, BIDI_ISOLATES);+}++function isDangerousInvisibleCodePoint(code) {+ return (+ inRange(code, ZERO_WIDTHS) ||+ code === WORD_JOINER ||+ code === BYTE_ORDER_MARK ||+ code === SOFT_HYPHEN ||+ inRange(code, VARIATION_SELECTORS) ||+ inRange(code, VARIATION_SUPPLEMENTS) ||+ inRange(code, TAG_BLOCK) ||+ code === MONGOLIAN_VOWEL_SEPARATOR ||+ code === HANGUL_CHOSEONG_FILLER ||+ code === HANGUL_JUNGSEONG_FILLER ||+ code === HANGUL_FILLER ||+ inRange(code, INVISIBLE_MATH_OPERATORS)+ );+}+function normalizeForMatch(value) {return String(value || '').replace(/\\/g, '/')@@ -1859,75 +1888,47 @@ function isClaudeSettingsPath(filePath) {return /(^|\/)\.claude\/settings(?:\.[^/]+)?\.json$/.test(normalized);}+function isReadOnlyGitIntrospection(command) {const trimmed = String(command || '').trim();- if (!trimmed || /[\r\n;&|><`$()]/.test(trimmed)) {- return false;- }-- const segments = splitCommandSegments(trimmed);- if (segments.length !== 1) {- return false;- }-+ if (!trimmed || /[\r\n;&|><`$()]/.test(trimmed)) return false;+ if (splitCommandSegments(trimmed).length !== 1) return false;const tokens = tokenizeAllowlistedShellWords(trimmed);- if (!tokens) {- return false;- }- if (commandBasename(tokens[0]) !== 'git' || tokens.length < 2) {- return false;- }-- const subcommand = tokens[1].toLowerCase();- const args = tokens.slice(2);-- if (subcommand === 'status') {- return args.every(arg => ['--porcelain', '--short', '--branch'].includes(arg));- }-- if (subcommand === 'diff') {- const allowedDiffArgs = new Set(['--name-only', '--name-status', '--cached', '--staged', '--stat']);- // git diff without arguments is read-only introspection- if (args.length === 0) return true;- return args.length <= 2 && args.every(arg => allowedDiffArgs.has(arg));- }+ if (!tokens || commandBasename(tokens[0]) !== 'git' || tokens.length < 2) return false;+ const check = READ_ONLY_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS.get(tokens[1].toLowerCase());+ return check ? check(tokens.slice(2)) : false;+}- if (subcommand === 'log') {- return args.every(arg => arg === '--oneline' || /^--max-count=\d+$/.test(arg));- }+const READ_ONLY_GIT_SHOW_REF = /^[a-zA-Z0-9._:/ -]+$/;+const READ_ONLY_GIT_DIFF_ARGS = new Set(['--name-only', '--name-status', '--cached', '--staged', '--stat']);- if (subcommand === 'show') {- // Permite: git show <ref>, git show --stat, git show --name-only,- // git show <ref> --stat, git show <ref> --name-only- if (args.length === 0) return false;- if (args.length === 1) {- const arg = args[0];- if (arg === '--stat' || arg === '--name-only') return true;- // ref- return !arg.startsWith('--') && /^[a-zA-Z0-9._:/ -]+$/.test(arg);- }- if (args.length === 2) {- const [first, second] = args;- // ref + flag- if (!first.startsWith('--') && /^[a-zA-Z0-9._:/ -]+$/.test(first) && (second === '--stat' || second === '--name-only')) {- return true;- }- return false;- }- return false;+// Permits: git show <ref>, git show --stat, git show --name-only,+// git show <ref> --stat, git show <ref> --name-only+function isReadOnlyGitShow(args) {+ if (args.length === 1) {+ const arg = args[0];+ if (arg === '--stat' || arg === '--name-only') return true;+ return !arg.startsWith('--') && READ_ONLY_GIT_SHOW_REF.test(arg);}-- if (subcommand === 'branch') {- return args.length === 1 && args[0] === '--show-current';+ if (args.length === 2) {+ const [first, second] = args;+ return !first.startsWith('--') && READ_ONLY_GIT_SHOW_REF.test(first) && (second === '--stat' || second === '--name-only');}-- if (subcommand === 'rev-parse') {- return args.length === 2 && args[0] === '--abbrev-ref' && /^head$/i.test(args[1]);- }-return false;}+// Subcommand -> predicate over its arguments. Only these exact spellings are+// treated as read-only introspection that skips the shell gate.+const READ_ONLY_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS = new Map([+ ['status', args => args.every(arg => ['--porcelain', '--short', '--branch'].includes(arg))],+ // git diff without arguments is read-only introspection+ ['diff', args => args.length === 0 || (args.length <= 2 && args.every(arg => READ_ONLY_GIT_DIFF_ARGS.has(arg)))],+ ['log', args => args.every(arg => arg === '--oneline' || /^--max-count=\d+$/.test(arg))],+ ['show', isReadOnlyGitShow],+ ['branch', args => args.length === 1 && args[0] === '--show-current'],+ ['rev-parse', args => args.length === 2 && args[0] === '--abbrev-ref' && /^head$/i.test(args[1])]+]);+// --- Gate messages ---/**@@ -1971,7 +1972,7 @@ function firstTouchGateMsg(filePath, isWrite, cls, profile) {* (#2142). Carries the denial ordinal so consecutive denials differ* textually, and a one-line recovery hint instead of the multi-line block.*/-function condensedGateMsg(action, filePath, ordinal, cls = 'code', targetNote = '', profile = null, missNote = '') {+function condensedGateMsg(action, filePath, ordinal, { cls = 'code', targetNote = '', profile = null, missNote = '' } = {}) {const safe = sanitizePath(filePath);const hint = condensedHintFor(cls, action === 'creation', profile, questionOptions());return (@@ -2018,7 +2019,7 @@ function firstTouchDenial(filePath, { isWrite, denials, cls, sensitive, linked =});if (denials > getFullDenialBudget()) {const action = isWrite ? 'creation' : 'edit';- return denyResult(condensedGateMsg(action, filePath, denials, cls, targetNote, profile, missNote), { includeRecoveryHint: false });+ return denyResult(condensedGateMsg(action, filePath, denials, { cls, targetNote, profile, missNote }), { includeRecoveryHint: false });}const message = withNoteBeforeRetry(firstTouchGateMsg(filePath, isWrite, cls, profile), missNote);return denyResult(targetNote ? withNoteBeforeRetry(message, targetNote) : message, {@@ -2331,6 +2332,7 @@ function run(rawInput) {}}+function gate(rawInput) {let data;try {@@ -2348,212 +2350,259 @@ function gate(rawInput) {const rawToolName = data.tool_name || '';const toolInput = data.tool_input || {};- // Normalize: case-insensitive matching via lookup map- const TOOL_MAP = { edit: 'Edit', write: 'Write', multiedit: 'MultiEdit', notebookedit: 'NotebookEdit', bash: 'Bash', powershell: 'PowerShell' };const toolName = TOOL_MAP[rawToolName.toLowerCase()] || rawToolName;if (isMetricsEnabled()) {pendingMetrics = { tool: toolName, data, entries: [], keys: new Set() };}- const inSubagent = isSubagentInvocation(data);let turnScanner = null;- const getTurnScan = () => (turnScanner || (turnScanner = createTurnScanner(data)))();+ const ctx = {+ rawInput,+ data,+ toolInput,+ toolName,+ inSubagent: isSubagentInvocation(data),+ getTurnScan: () => (turnScanner || (turnScanner = createTurnScanner(data)))()+ };- if (toolName === 'Edit' || toolName === 'Write' || toolName === 'NotebookEdit') {- const filePath = (toolName === 'NotebookEdit' ? toolInput.notebook_path : toolInput.file_path) || '';- const exempt = exemptReason(filePath, data);- if (exempt) {- recordDecision('pass-exempt', exempt, { target: filePath });- return rawInput; // allow- }+ if (toolName === 'Edit' || toolName === 'Write' || toolName === 'NotebookEdit') return gateSingleEdit(ctx);+ if (toolName === 'MultiEdit') return gateMultiEdit(ctx);+ if (toolName === 'Bash' || toolName === 'PowerShell') return gateShell(ctx);+ return rawInput; // allow+}- if (inSubagent) {- const denial = subagentRestrictedDenial(filePath, data, toolName === 'Write');- if (!denial) recordDecision('pass-subagent', 'subagent', { target: filePath });- return denial || rawInput;- }+// Normalize: case-insensitive matching via lookup map+const TOOL_MAP = { edit: 'Edit', write: 'Write', multiedit: 'MultiEdit', notebookedit: 'NotebookEdit', bash: 'Bash', powershell: 'PowerShell' };- const fileKey = canonicalPathKey(filePath, data);- if (!isChecked([fileKey, filePath])) {- const isNewFile = toolName === 'Write' && isNewFileTarget(filePath, data);- const cls = classifyTargetFor(filePath, data);- // see docs/gateguard/design-notes.md#sensitive-targets- const { sensitive, linked, restricted } = allowanceFacts(filePath, data);- const credit = restricted ? null : findCreditingSearch(getTurnScan(), filePath, isNewFile, data);- if (credit) {- if (!markCheckedAndCountCredit(fileKey, cls)) {- return allowWithStateWarning();- }- recordDecision('credit', 'prior-search', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive });- return { additionalContext: creditNote(credit, filePath), exitCode: 0 };- }- const profile = restricted || toolName === 'NotebookEdit' || !needsProfile(toolName, cls)- ? null- : changeProfileFor(toolName, filePath, [toolInput], toolInput.content, data);- if (toolName === 'Edit' && isTrivialChange(cls, restricted, profile)) {- if (!countTrivialAllow()) {- return allowWithStateWarning();- }- recordDecision('trivial', 'comment-whitespace', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, profile });- return { additionalContext: trivialNote(filePath), exitCode: 0 };- }- const turnId = isNewFile && !restricted ? currentTurnId(getTurnScan()) : null;- const collapsible = isNewFile && !restricted && (turnId !== null || !transcriptPathFor(data));- const gateKey = collapsible ? newFileGateKey(filePath, data, cls) : null;- const sibling = gateKey ? findSiblingGate(gateKey, turnId) : null;- if (sibling) {- if (!markCheckedAndCountSibling(fileKey)) {- return allowWithStateWarning();- }- recordDecision('sibling', 'same-turn-dir', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, profile });- return { additionalContext: siblingNote(sibling), exitCode: 0 };- }- const dirGate = gateKey ? { key: gateKey, turn: turnId, first: sanitizePath(filePath) } : undefined;- const cap = restricted ? Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY : getMaxDenialBudget();- const { ok, denials } = markCheckedAndCountDenial(fileKey, { cls, dirGate, cap });- if (!ok) {- return allowWithStateWarning();- }- if (denials === null) {- // see docs/gateguard/design-notes.md#denial-cap- recordDecision('cap', 'max-denials', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, profile });- return rawInput;- }- const miss = restricted ? null : findClosestMiss(getTurnScan(), filePath, isNewFile, data);- return firstTouchDenial(filePath, { isWrite: toolName === 'Write', denials, cls, sensitive, linked, profile, miss });- }+// --- Edit / Write / NotebookEdit ---- recordDecision('pass-checked', 'checked', { target: filePath });+function gateSingleEdit(ctx) {+ const { toolName, toolInput, data, rawInput, inSubagent } = ctx;+ const filePath = (toolName === 'NotebookEdit' ? toolInput.notebook_path : toolInput.file_path) || '';+ const exempt = exemptReason(filePath, data);+ if (exempt) {+ recordDecision('pass-exempt', exempt, { target: filePath });return rawInput; // allow}- if (toolName === 'MultiEdit') {- const edits = multiEditEntries(toolInput);- if (inSubagent) {- for (const edit of edits) {- const filePath = (edit && edit.file_path) || '';- if (!filePath || isClaudeSettingsPath(filePath) || isExemptPath(filePath, data)) continue;- const denial = subagentRestrictedDenial(filePath, data, false);- if (denial) return denial;- }- recordDecision('pass-subagent', 'subagent');- return rawInput;- }+ if (inSubagent) {+ const denial = subagentRestrictedDenial(filePath, data, toolName === 'Write');+ if (!denial) recordDecision('pass-subagent', 'subagent', { target: filePath });+ return denial || rawInput;+ }- const notes = [];- const trivialKeys = new Set();- for (const edit of edits) {- const filePath = (edit && edit.file_path) || '';- const exempt = exemptReason(filePath, data);- if (exempt) {- recordDecision('pass-exempt', exempt, { target: filePath, key: `exempt:${filePath}` });- continue;- }- const fileKey = canonicalPathKey(filePath, data);- if (trivialKeys.has(fileKey)) continue;- if (!isChecked([fileKey, filePath])) {- const cls = classifyTargetFor(filePath, data);- const { sensitive, linked, restricted } = allowanceFacts(filePath, data);- const credit = restricted ? null : findCreditingSearch(getTurnScan(), filePath, false, data);- if (credit) {- if (!markCheckedAndCountCredit(fileKey, cls)) {- return allowWithStateWarning();- }- recordDecision('credit', 'prior-search', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, key: fileKey });- notes.push(creditNote(credit, filePath));- continue;- }- const profile = restricted || !needsProfile('MultiEdit', cls)- ? null- : changeProfileFor('Edit', filePath, entriesFor(edits, fileKey, data), undefined, data);- if (isTrivialChange(cls, restricted, profile)) {- if (!countTrivialAllow()) {- return allowWithStateWarning();- }- trivialKeys.add(fileKey);- recordDecision('trivial', 'comment-whitespace', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, profile, key: fileKey });- notes.push(trivialNote(filePath));- continue;- }- const cap = restricted ? Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY : getMaxDenialBudget();- const { ok, denials } = markCheckedAndCountDenial(fileKey, { cls, cap });- if (!ok) {- return allowWithStateWarning();- }- if (denials === null) {- // see docs/gateguard/design-notes.md#denial-cap- recordDecision('cap', 'max-denials', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, profile, key: fileKey });- continue;- }- const miss = restricted ? null : findClosestMiss(getTurnScan(), filePath, false, data);- return firstTouchDenial(filePath, { isWrite: false, denials, cls, sensitive, linked, profile, miss });- }- recordDecision('pass-checked', 'checked', { target: filePath, key: fileKey });+ const fileKey = canonicalPathKey(filePath, data);+ if (!isChecked([fileKey, filePath])) return firstTouchSingleEdit(ctx, filePath, fileKey);++ recordDecision('pass-checked', 'checked', { target: filePath });+ return rawInput; // allow+}++function singleEditProfile(ctx, filePath, cls, restricted) {+ const { toolName, toolInput, data } = ctx;+ if (restricted || toolName === 'NotebookEdit' || !needsProfile(toolName, cls)) return null;+ return changeProfileFor(toolName, filePath, [toolInput], toolInput.content, data);+}++// see docs/gateguard/design-notes.md#sibling-collapse+function newFileCollapse(ctx, filePath, cls, isNewFile, restricted) {+ if (!isNewFile || restricted) return { sibling: null, dirGate: undefined };+ const turnId = currentTurnId(ctx.getTurnScan());+ const collapsible = turnId !== null || !transcriptPathFor(ctx.data);+ const gateKey = collapsible ? newFileGateKey(filePath, ctx.data, cls) : null;+ const sibling = gateKey ? findSiblingGate(gateKey, turnId) : null;+ const dirGate = gateKey ? { key: gateKey, turn: turnId, first: sanitizePath(filePath) } : undefined;+ return { sibling, dirGate };+}++function firstTouchSingleEdit(ctx, filePath, fileKey) {+ const { toolName, data, rawInput, getTurnScan } = ctx;+ const isNewFile = toolName === 'Write' && isNewFileTarget(filePath, data);+ const cls = classifyTargetFor(filePath, data);+ // see docs/gateguard/design-notes.md#sensitive-targets+ const { sensitive, linked, restricted } = allowanceFacts(filePath, data);+ const credit = restricted ? null : findCreditingSearch(getTurnScan(), filePath, isNewFile, data);+ if (credit) {+ if (!markCheckedAndCountCredit(fileKey, cls)) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ recordDecision('credit', 'prior-search', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive });+ return { additionalContext: creditNote(credit, filePath), exitCode: 0 };+ }+ const profile = singleEditProfile(ctx, filePath, cls, restricted);+ if (toolName === 'Edit' && isTrivialChange(cls, restricted, profile)) {+ if (!countTrivialAllow()) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ recordDecision('trivial', 'comment-whitespace', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, profile });+ return { additionalContext: trivialNote(filePath), exitCode: 0 };+ }+ const { sibling, dirGate } = newFileCollapse(ctx, filePath, cls, isNewFile, restricted);+ if (sibling) {+ if (!markCheckedAndCountSibling(fileKey)) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ recordDecision('sibling', 'same-turn-dir', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, profile });+ return { additionalContext: siblingNote(sibling), exitCode: 0 };+ }+ const cap = restricted ? Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY : getMaxDenialBudget();+ const { ok, denials } = markCheckedAndCountDenial(fileKey, { cls, dirGate, cap });+ if (!ok) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ if (denials === null) {+ // see docs/gateguard/design-notes.md#denial-cap+ recordDecision('cap', 'max-denials', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, profile });+ return rawInput;+ }+ const miss = restricted ? null : findClosestMiss(getTurnScan(), filePath, isNewFile, data);+ return firstTouchDenial(filePath, { isWrite: toolName === 'Write', denials, cls, sensitive, linked, profile, miss });+}++// --- MultiEdit ---++function gateMultiEdit(ctx) {+ const { toolInput, data, rawInput, inSubagent } = ctx;+ const edits = multiEditEntries(toolInput);+ if (inSubagent) return gateMultiEditSubagent(edits, data, rawInput);++ const batch = { notes: [], trivialKeys: new Set() };+ for (const edit of edits) {+ const filePath = (edit && edit.file_path) || '';+ const exempt = exemptReason(filePath, data);+ if (exempt) {+ recordDecision('pass-exempt', exempt, { target: filePath, key: `exempt:${filePath}` });+ continue;}- if (notes.length > 0) {- return { additionalContext: notes, exitCode: 0 };+ const fileKey = canonicalPathKey(filePath, data);+ if (batch.trivialKeys.has(fileKey)) continue;+ if (isChecked([fileKey, filePath])) {+ recordDecision('pass-checked', 'checked', { target: filePath, key: fileKey });+ continue;}- return rawInput; // allow+ const result = firstTouchMultiEdit(ctx, edits, filePath, fileKey, batch);+ if (result) return result;+ }+ if (batch.notes.length > 0) {+ return { additionalContext: batch.notes, exitCode: 0 };}+ return rawInput; // allow+}- if (toolName === 'Bash' || toolName === 'PowerShell') {- const command = toolInput.command || '';- if (isReadOnlyGitIntrospection(command)) {- recordDecision('pass', 'readonly-git');- return rawInput;- }+function gateMultiEditSubagent(edits, data, rawInput) {+ for (const edit of edits) {+ const filePath = (edit && edit.file_path) || '';+ if (!filePath || isClaudeSettingsPath(filePath) || isExemptPath(filePath, data)) continue;+ const denial = subagentRestrictedDenial(filePath, data, false);+ if (denial) return denial;+ }+ recordDecision('pass-subagent', 'subagent');+ return rawInput;+}- if (classifyDestructiveCommand(toolName, command).length > 0) {- // Gate destructive commands on first attempt; allow retry after facts presented- const key = '__destructive__' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(command).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);- if (!isChecked(key)) {- if (!markChecked(key)) {- return allowWithStateWarning();- }- recordDecision('destructive-deny', 'destructive');- return denyResult(destructiveBashMsg(), { includeRecoveryHint: false });- }- recordDecision('pass-checked', 'destructive-retry');- return rawInput; // allow retry after facts presented+// Returns a gate result to stop on, or null when the batch loop should move+// to the next edit. `batch` collects notes and trivially allowed file keys.+function firstTouchMultiEdit(ctx, edits, filePath, fileKey, batch) {+ const { data, getTurnScan } = ctx;+ const cls = classifyTargetFor(filePath, data);+ const { sensitive, linked, restricted } = allowanceFacts(filePath, data);+ const credit = restricted ? null : findCreditingSearch(getTurnScan(), filePath, false, data);+ if (credit) {+ if (!markCheckedAndCountCredit(fileKey, cls)) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();}-- // Operator opt-out: skip the routine shell gate entirely. The destructive- // gate above still fires. This is the documented escape hatch for hosts- // (Cursor, OpenCode, etc.) where the once-per-session routine gate is- // friction without signal.- if (isRoutineBashGateDisabled()) {- recordDecision('pass-exempt', 'routine-disabled');- return rawInput; // routine gate opted out via env+ recordDecision('credit', 'prior-search', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, key: fileKey });+ batch.notes.push(creditNote(credit, filePath));+ return null;+ }+ const profile = restricted || !needsProfile('MultiEdit', cls)+ ? null+ : changeProfileFor('Edit', filePath, entriesFor(edits, fileKey, data), undefined, data);+ if (isTrivialChange(cls, restricted, profile)) {+ if (!countTrivialAllow()) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();}+ batch.trivialKeys.add(fileKey);+ recordDecision('trivial', 'comment-whitespace', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, profile, key: fileKey });+ batch.notes.push(trivialNote(filePath));+ return null;+ }+ const cap = restricted ? Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY : getMaxDenialBudget();+ const { ok, denials } = markCheckedAndCountDenial(fileKey, { cls, cap });+ if (!ok) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ if (denials === null) {+ // see docs/gateguard/design-notes.md#denial-cap+ recordDecision('cap', 'max-denials', { target: filePath, cls, sensitive, profile, key: fileKey });+ return null;+ }+ const miss = restricted ? null : findClosestMiss(getTurnScan(), filePath, false, data);+ return firstTouchDenial(filePath, { isWrite: false, denials, cls, sensitive, linked, profile, miss });+}- if (!isChecked(ROUTINE_BASH_SESSION_KEY)) {- if (isReadOnlyShellCommand(toolName, command)) {- if (!countRoutineReadonlyPass()) {- return allowWithStateWarning();- }- recordDecision('routine-readonly', 'readonly');- return rawInput;- }- if (!markChecked(ROUTINE_BASH_SESSION_KEY)) {- return allowWithStateWarning();- }- recordDecision('routine-deny', 'first-command');- const hookId = toolName === 'PowerShell' ? POWERSHELL_HOOK_ID : BASH_HOOK_ID;- const narrowRecoveryHint = toolName === 'PowerShell'- ? ROUTINE_POWERSHELL_NARROW_RECOVERY_HINT- : ROUTINE_BASH_NARROW_RECOVERY_HINT;- return denyResult(routineShellMsg(toolName), {- hookIds: [hookId],- narrowRecoveryHint- });- }+// --- Bash / PowerShell ---- recordDecision('pass-checked', 'routine-checked');- return rawInput; // allow+function gateShell(ctx) {+ const { toolName, toolInput, rawInput } = ctx;+ const command = toolInput.command || '';+ if (isReadOnlyGitIntrospection(command)) {+ recordDecision('pass', 'readonly-git');+ return rawInput;+ }++ if (classifyDestructiveCommand(toolName, command).length > 0) return gateDestructiveShell(command, rawInput);++ // Operator opt-out: skip the routine shell gate entirely. The destructive+ // gate above still fires. This is the documented escape hatch for hosts+ // (Cursor, OpenCode, etc.) where the once-per-session routine gate is+ // friction without signal.+ if (isRoutineBashGateDisabled()) {+ recordDecision('pass-exempt', 'routine-disabled');+ return rawInput; // routine gate opted out via env}+ if (!isChecked(ROUTINE_BASH_SESSION_KEY)) return gateRoutineShell(toolName, command, rawInput);++ recordDecision('pass-checked', 'routine-checked');return rawInput; // allow}+// Gate destructive commands on first attempt; allow retry after facts presented+function gateDestructiveShell(command, rawInput) {+ const key = '__destructive__' + crypto.createHash('sha256').update(command).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);+ if (isChecked(key)) {+ recordDecision('pass-checked', 'destructive-retry');+ return rawInput; // allow retry after facts presented+ }+ if (!markChecked(key)) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ recordDecision('destructive-deny', 'destructive');+ return denyResult(destructiveBashMsg(), { includeRecoveryHint: false });+}++function gateRoutineShell(toolName, command, rawInput) {+ if (isReadOnlyShellCommand(toolName, command)) {+ if (!countRoutineReadonlyPass()) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ recordDecision('routine-readonly', 'readonly');+ return rawInput;+ }+ if (!markChecked(ROUTINE_BASH_SESSION_KEY)) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ recordDecision('routine-deny', 'first-command');+ const hookId = toolName === 'PowerShell' ? POWERSHELL_HOOK_ID : BASH_HOOK_ID;+ const narrowRecoveryHint = toolName === 'PowerShell'+ ? ROUTINE_POWERSHELL_NARROW_RECOVERY_HINT+ : ROUTINE_BASH_NARROW_RECOVERY_HINT;+ return denyResult(routineShellMsg(toolName), {+ hookIds: [hookId],+ narrowRecoveryHint+ });+}+module.exports = {run,classifyDestructiveCommand,