Skip to content

armgit / ECC

Public Imported from GitHub
0

The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.

Merge upstream/main into feat/gateguard-fewer-round-trips

montjeffrey92947a68dfb9
diff --cc hooks/hooks.metadata.json
index 9760d32da,e598a823e..829151763
--- a/hooks/hooks.metadata.json
+++ b/hooks/hooks.metadata.json
@@@ -44,8 -44,20 +44,20 @@@
},
{
"id": "pre:edit-write:gateguard-fact-force",
- "description": "Fact-forcing gate: block first Edit/Write/MultiEdit per file and demand investigation (importers, data schemas, user instruction) before allowing",
- "fingerprint": "32c4a312b4c2"
+ "description": "Fact-forcing gate: deny the first Edit/Write/MultiEdit/NotebookEdit of each file with questions chosen by target class and by what the change touches; a completed search naming the file in the current turn, a comment or whitespace-only edit, or a same-turn sibling of a new file already gated passes with a note instead; sensitive targets (secrets, keys, auth/payment code, migrations, CI workflows) and hard-linked files are always gated, also in subagents",
+ "fingerprint": "45fbef2d7f27"
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "pre:hookify-runtime",
+ "description": "Evaluate project-local Hookify rules before Bash, PowerShell, and file tools run",
+ "fingerprint": "65b5a5d6bbd5"
+ }
+ ],
+ "UserPromptSubmit": [
+ {
+ "id": "prompt:hookify-runtime",
+ "description": "Evaluate project-local Hookify prompt rules before a user prompt is processed",
+ "fingerprint": "89b4809a5a7e"
}
],
"PreCompact": [
diff --cc manifests/context-packs/[email protected]
index 95e9e37f8,bd5dd19ec..51d8fa993
--- a/manifests/context-packs/[email protected]
+++ b/manifests/context-packs/[email protected]
@@@ -1,288 -1,1 +1,1 @@@
- {
- "coverage": {
- "skills": 293,
- "withTriggers": 32
- },
- "generatedAt": "2026-09-24T23:51:22.784Z",
- "id": "skill-triggers@1",
- "model": {
- "effort": null,
- "id": "hand-seeded",
- "source": "manual-curation-pending-regeneration"
- },
- "registryDigest": "369bc6c55fae8081fe66b125ddb9ee9a8e377c8266975af1200c0be2d4984311",
- "schemaVersion": 1,
- "triggers": {
- "skill:api-connector-builder": [
- "add api integration",
- "new provider connector",
- "match existing integration pattern"
- ],
- "skill:api-design": [
- "rest endpoint design",
- "pagination api",
- "status codes",
- "api versioning",
- "rate limiting api",
- "resource naming",
- "filtering api",
- "api error responses",
- "offset pagination",
- "limit query parameter",
- "pagination defaults"
- ],
- "skill:backend-patterns": [
- "express api",
- "node backend architecture",
- "nextjs api routes",
- "server side patterns",
- "data access layer",
- "static file server",
- "url path handling",
- "file server"
- ],
- "skill:browser-qa": [
- "deployed feature test",
- "visual regression screenshots",
- "core web vitals check",
- "axe accessibility audit",
- "ship do not ship",
- "staging verification"
- ],
- "skill:canary-watch": [
- "post deploy monitoring",
- "smoke test url",
- "production url check",
- "console errors production",
- "sse stream check",
- "after deploy verification"
- ],
- "skill:code-tour": [
- "onboarding walkthrough",
- "explain subsystem",
- "architecture tour",
- "pr walkthrough",
- "rca tour"
- ],
- "skill:coding-standards": [
- "code review standards",
- "naming conventions",
- "readability review",
- "immutability conventions",
- "fix naming typo",
- "export naming",
- "consistent exports"
- ],
- "skill:content-hash-cache-pattern": [
- "cache file processing",
- "content addressed cache",
- "sha256 hash cache"
- ],
- "skill:database-migrations": [
- "zero downtime migration",
- "schema change production",
- "add column large table",
- "backfill data",
- "expand contract",
- "concurrent index",
- "migration rollback",
- "prisma migration",
- "django migration"
- ],
- "skill:deployment-patterns": [
- "ci cd setup",
- "dockerize app",
- "health checks",
- "rollback strategy",
- "production readiness",
- "deploy pipeline",
- "containerize application"
- ],
- "skill:design-system": [
- "design tokens",
- "visual consistency audit",
- "css custom properties",
- "ui audit",
- "design system bootstrap"
- ],
- "skill:django-patterns": [
- "django orm",
- "drf api",
- "django rest framework",
- "django caching",
- "django signals",
- "django middleware"
- ],
- "skill:django-security": [
- "django authentication",
- "csrf protection",
- "sql injection prevention",
- "xss prevention",
- "django deployment security",
- "role based access control",
- "authorization middleware",
- "permissions checks"
- ],
- "skill:docker-patterns": [
- "dockerfile review",
- "docker compose setup",
- "container security",
- "multi service orchestration"
- ],
- "skill:error-handling": [
- "error types",
- "retry logic",
- "circuit breaker",
- "user facing errors",
- "exception handling patterns",
- "typed errors",
- "error boundaries",
- "go error handling",
- "custom error class",
- "error codes",
- "config validation"
- ],
- "skill:evm-token-decimals": [
- "token decimals",
- "wei conversion",
- "erc20 balance off",
- "bridge token precision"
- ],
- "skill:frontend-a11y": [
- "aria attributes",
- "screen reader support",
- "focus management",
- "semantic html",
- "form labeling",
- "keyboard navigation react",
- "a11y lint errors"
- ],
- "skill:git-workflow": [
- "merge vs rebase",
- "commit conventions",
- "resolve merge conflict",
- "branching strategy",
- "clean up commits",
- "pull request cleanup",
- "git history tidy"
- ],
- "skill:hexagonal-architecture": [
- "ports and adapters",
- "dependency injection boundaries",
- "decouple domain from io"
- ],
- "skill:kubernetes-patterns": [
- "kubernetes manifests",
- "kubectl debugging",
- "pod probes",
- "k8s rbac",
- "autoscaling config",
- "configmap secrets"
- ],
- "skill:orch-fix-defect": [
- "fix a bug",
- "broken behavior",
- "regression fix",
- "reproduce bug",
- "defect repair"
- ],
- "skill:postgres-patterns": [
- "slow postgres query",
- "query optimization",
- "index design",
- "rls policies",
- "supabase schema",
- "postgres indexing",
- "database performance",
- "schema design postgres",
- "postgres driver",
- "node postgres",
- "query planner"
- ],
- "skill:python-patterns": [
- "pythonic code",
- "pep 8",
- "type hints python",
- "python code review",
- "idiomatic python"
- ],
- "skill:python-testing": [
- "pytest fixtures",
- "mocking python",
- "parametrized tests",
- "coverage python",
- "tdd python"
- ],
- "skill:redis-patterns": [
- "cache aside pattern",
- "distributed lock",
- "redis rate limiting",
- "cache invalidation"
- ],
- "skill:regex-vs-llm-structured-text": [
- "parse invoice",
- "extract receipt data",
- "text extraction pipeline",
- "parse form fields",
- "cheap document parser",
- "extract table data",
- "parse log lines",
- "parse access logs",
- "common log format",
- "log line parsing"
- ],
- "skill:rust-patterns": [
- "rust ownership",
- "borrow checker",
- "rust error handling",
- "traits rust",
- "rust concurrency",
- "idiomatic rust"
- ],
- "skill:search-first": [
- "find existing library",
- "npm package research",
- "before writing custom code",
- "evaluate existing tools",
- "add dependency research"
- ],
- "skill:security-review": [
- "security audit",
- "authentication review",
- "sanitize user input",
- "secrets handling",
- "payment security checklist",
- "prevent injection attacks",
- "secure api endpoints",
- "authn authz review",
- "vulnerability checklist",
- "input validation security",
- "parameterized queries",
- "sql injection"
- ],
- "skill:security-scan": [
- "audit claude config",
- "claudemd security",
- "mcp server audit",
- "agentshield scan",
- "hook configuration audit",
- "settings json security"
- ],
- "skill:tdd-workflow": [
- "write test first",
- "failing test",
- "red green refactor",
- "test driven development",
- "regression test first",
- "write a regression test"
- ],
- "skill:verification-loop": [
- "pre pr checks",
- "verification report",
- "quality gates",
- "build lint test coverage",
- "before creating a pr"
- ]
- },
- "triggersDigest": "25b97a9e06fc336c7cf95ab854ed1a41033a54bcd6e1fb1cf69dc906332462aa"
- }
-{"coverage":{"skills":302,"withTriggers":32},"generatedAt":"2026-09-24T23:51:22.784Z","id":"skill-triggers@1","model":{"effort":null,"id":"hand-seeded","source":"manual-curation-pending-regeneration"},"registryDigest":"ffac257ab8a4b8e7450ddf1f933e65335542fc444034c8242dd758346417d76e","schemaVersion":1,"triggers":{"skill:api-connector-builder":["add api integration","new provider connector","match existing integration pattern"],"skill:api-design":["rest endpoint design","pagination api","status codes","api versioning","rate limiting api","resource naming","filtering api","api error responses","offset pagination","limit query parameter","pagination defaults"],"skill:backend-patterns":["express api","node backend architecture","nextjs api routes","server side patterns","data access layer","static file server","url path handling","file server"],"skill:browser-qa":["deployed feature test","visual regression screenshots","core web vitals check","axe accessibility audit","ship do not ship","staging verification"],"skill:canary-watch":["post deploy monitoring","smoke test url","production url check","console errors production","sse stream check","after deploy verification"],"skill:code-tour":["onboarding walkthrough","explain subsystem","architecture tour","pr walkthrough","rca tour"],"skill:coding-standards":["code review standards","naming conventions","readability review","immutability conventions","fix naming typo","export naming","consistent exports"],"skill:content-hash-cache-pattern":["cache file processing","content addressed cache","sha256 hash cache"],"skill:database-migrations":["zero downtime migration","schema change production","add column large table","backfill data","expand contract","concurrent index","migration rollback","prisma migration","django migration"],"skill:deployment-patterns":["ci cd setup","dockerize app","health checks","rollback strategy","production readiness","deploy pipeline","containerize application"],"skill:design-system":["design tokens","visual consistency audit","css custom properties","ui audit","design system bootstrap"],"skill:django-patterns":["django orm","drf api","django rest framework","django caching","django signals","django middleware"],"skill:django-security":["django authentication","csrf protection","sql injection prevention","xss prevention","django deployment security","role based access control","authorization middleware","permissions checks"],"skill:docker-patterns":["dockerfile review","docker compose setup","container security","multi service orchestration"],"skill:error-handling":["error types","retry logic","circuit breaker","user facing errors","exception handling patterns","typed errors","error boundaries","go error handling","custom error class","error codes","config validation"],"skill:evm-token-decimals":["token decimals","wei conversion","erc20 balance off","bridge token precision"],"skill:frontend-a11y":["aria attributes","screen reader support","focus management","semantic html","form labeling","keyboard navigation react","a11y lint errors"],"skill:git-workflow":["merge vs rebase","commit conventions","resolve merge conflict","branching strategy","clean up commits","pull request cleanup","git history tidy"],"skill:hexagonal-architecture":["ports and adapters","dependency injection boundaries","decouple domain from io"],"skill:kubernetes-patterns":["kubernetes manifests","kubectl debugging","pod probes","k8s rbac","autoscaling config","configmap secrets"],"skill:orch-fix-defect":["fix a bug","broken behavior","regression fix","reproduce bug","defect repair"],"skill:postgres-patterns":["slow postgres query","query optimization","index design","rls policies","supabase schema","postgres indexing","database performance","schema design postgres","postgres driver","node postgres","query planner"],"skill:python-patterns":["pythonic code","pep 8","type hints python","python code review","idiomatic python"],"skill:python-testing":["pytest fixtures","mocking python","parametrized tests","coverage python","tdd python"],"skill:redis-patterns":["cache aside pattern","distributed lock","redis rate limiting","cache invalidation"],"skill:regex-vs-llm-structured-text":["parse invoice","extract receipt data","text extraction pipeline","parse form fields","cheap document parser","extract table data","parse log lines","parse access logs","common log format","log line parsing"],"skill:rust-patterns":["rust ownership","borrow checker","rust error handling","traits rust","rust concurrency","idiomatic rust"],"skill:search-first":["find existing library","npm package research","before writing custom code","evaluate existing tools","add dependency research"],"skill:security-review":["security audit","authentication review","sanitize user input","secrets handling","payment security checklist","prevent injection attacks","secure api endpoints","authn authz review","vulnerability checklist","input validation security","parameterized queries","sql injection"],"skill:security-scan":["audit claude config","claudemd security","mcp server audit","agentshield scan","hook configuration audit","settings json security"],"skill:tdd-workflow":["write test first","failing test","red green refactor","test driven development","regression test first","write a regression test"],"skill:verification-loop":["pre pr checks","verification report","quality gates","build lint test coverage","before creating a pr"]},"triggersDigest":"25b97a9e06fc336c7cf95ab854ed1a41033a54bcd6e1fb1cf69dc906332462aa"}
++{"coverage":{"skills":302,"withTriggers":32},"generatedAt":"2026-09-24T23:51:22.784Z","id":"skill-triggers@1","model":{"effort":null,"id":"hand-seeded","source":"manual-curation-pending-regeneration"},"registryDigest":"ee5d05c974d849b60567586a81958bb40cb36512d0b985560aa3e0b1433f6149","schemaVersion":1,"triggers":{"skill:api-connector-builder":["add api integration","new provider connector","match existing integration pattern"],"skill:api-design":["rest endpoint design","pagination api","status codes","api versioning","rate limiting api","resource naming","filtering api","api error responses","offset pagination","limit query parameter","pagination defaults"],"skill:backend-patterns":["express api","node backend architecture","nextjs api routes","server side patterns","data access layer","static file server","url path handling","file server"],"skill:browser-qa":["deployed feature test","visual regression screenshots","core web vitals check","axe accessibility audit","ship do not ship","staging verification"],"skill:canary-watch":["post deploy monitoring","smoke test url","production url check","console errors production","sse stream check","after deploy verification"],"skill:code-tour":["onboarding walkthrough","explain subsystem","architecture tour","pr walkthrough","rca tour"],"skill:coding-standards":["code review standards","naming conventions","readability review","immutability conventions","fix naming typo","export naming","consistent exports"],"skill:content-hash-cache-pattern":["cache file processing","content addressed cache","sha256 hash cache"],"skill:database-migrations":["zero downtime migration","schema change production","add column large table","backfill data","expand contract","concurrent index","migration rollback","prisma migration","django migration"],"skill:deployment-patterns":["ci cd setup","dockerize app","health checks","rollback strategy","production readiness","deploy pipeline","containerize application"],"skill:design-system":["design tokens","visual consistency audit","css custom properties","ui audit","design system bootstrap"],"skill:django-patterns":["django orm","drf api","django rest framework","django caching","django signals","django middleware"],"skill:django-security":["django authentication","csrf protection","sql injection prevention","xss prevention","django deployment security","role based access control","authorization middleware","permissions checks"],"skill:docker-patterns":["dockerfile review","docker compose setup","container security","multi service orchestration"],"skill:error-handling":["error types","retry logic","circuit breaker","user facing errors","exception handling patterns","typed errors","error boundaries","go error handling","custom error class","error codes","config validation"],"skill:evm-token-decimals":["token decimals","wei conversion","erc20 balance off","bridge token precision"],"skill:frontend-a11y":["aria attributes","screen reader support","focus management","semantic html","form labeling","keyboard navigation react","a11y lint errors"],"skill:git-workflow":["merge vs rebase","commit conventions","resolve merge conflict","branching strategy","clean up commits","pull request cleanup","git history tidy"],"skill:hexagonal-architecture":["ports and adapters","dependency injection boundaries","decouple domain from io"],"skill:kubernetes-patterns":["kubernetes manifests","kubectl debugging","pod probes","k8s rbac","autoscaling config","configmap secrets"],"skill:orch-fix-defect":["fix a bug","broken behavior","regression fix","reproduce bug","defect repair"],"skill:postgres-patterns":["slow postgres query","query optimization","index design","rls policies","supabase schema","postgres indexing","database performance","schema design postgres","postgres driver","node postgres","query planner"],"skill:python-patterns":["pythonic code","pep 8","type hints python","python code review","idiomatic python"],"skill:python-testing":["pytest fixtures","mocking python","parametrized tests","coverage python","tdd python"],"skill:redis-patterns":["cache aside pattern","distributed lock","redis rate limiting","cache invalidation"],"skill:regex-vs-llm-structured-text":["parse invoice","extract receipt data","text extraction pipeline","parse form fields","cheap document parser","extract table data","parse log lines","parse access logs","common log format","log line parsing"],"skill:rust-patterns":["rust ownership","borrow checker","rust error handling","traits rust","rust concurrency","idiomatic rust"],"skill:search-first":["find existing library","npm package research","before writing custom code","evaluate existing tools","add dependency research"],"skill:security-review":["security audit","authentication review","sanitize user input","secrets handling","payment security checklist","prevent injection attacks","secure api endpoints","authn authz review","vulnerability checklist","input validation security","parameterized queries","sql injection"],"skill:security-scan":["audit claude config","claudemd security","mcp server audit","agentshield scan","hook configuration audit","settings json security"],"skill:tdd-workflow":["write test first","failing test","red green refactor","test driven development","regression test first","write a regression test"],"skill:verification-loop":["pre pr checks","verification report","quality gates","build lint test coverage","before creating a pr"]},"triggersDigest":"25b97a9e06fc336c7cf95ab854ed1a41033a54bcd6e1fb1cf69dc906332462aa"}
diff --cc package.json
index f15dc9987,38c067438..c2c1cfd53
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@@ -124,7 -126,7 +126,8 @@@
"scripts/memory.js",
"scripts/memory-mcp.mjs",
"scripts/gemini-adapt-agents.js",
+ "scripts/gateguard-report.js",
+ "scripts/github-coordination.js",
"scripts/harness-adapter-compliance.js",
"scripts/harness-audit.js",
"scripts/eval-harness.js",
diff --cc tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
index bd2310127,e28df0295..eddb03e5c
--- a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
+++ b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
@@@ -4157,3270 -4183,41 +4199,3270 @@@ function runTests()
passed++;
else failed++;
- // Cleanup only the temp directory created by this test file.
- try {
- if (fs.existsSync(stateDir)) {
- fs.rmSync(stateDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
- }
- } catch (err) {
- console.error(` [cleanup] failed to remove ${stateDir}: ${err.message}`);
- }
+ // --- Canonical checked-path keys ---
+ const decisionOf = result => {
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ return output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;
+ };
+ const denialCount = () => JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8')).fact_force_denials;
- // --- sanitizePath dangerous invisible unicode regression ---
clearState();
if (
- test('sanitizePath strips CI-defined dangerous invisible unicode from denial paths', () => {
- const file_path =
- '/src/eu2028\u2028eu2029\u2029app.js\u200bhidden\u2060name\ufefftail\u00adsoft\u3164x\u0091c1.js';
- const input = {
- tool_name: 'Edit',
- tool_input: { file_path, old_string: 'foo', new_string: 'bar' }
- };
- const result = runHook(input);
- const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
- const reason = String(
- output && output.hookSpecificOutput
- ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason
- : ''
+ test('a.py, ./a.py and <root>/a.py share one checked key (one denial)', () => {
+ const env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-keys' };
+ const edit = file_path => runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } }, env);
+ assert.strictEqual(decisionOf(edit('a.py')), 'deny', 'first touch of a.py is denied');
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decisionOf(edit('./a.py')), 'deny', './a.py is the same file');
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decisionOf(edit('/proj-keys/a.py')), 'deny', 'absolute spelling is the same file');
+ assert.strictEqual(denialCount(), 1, 'exactly one denial counted');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('raw key from an older state file still counts as checked', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: ['a.py'], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 1 });
+ const result = runHook(
+ { tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: 'a.py', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } },
+ { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-keys' }
);
- for (const bad of ['\u2028', '\u2029', '\u200b', '\u2060', '\ufeff', '\u00ad', '\u3164', '\u0091']) {
- assert.ok(!reason.includes(bad), `denial reason must not carry U+${bad.codePointAt(0).toString(16)} (${bad})`);
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decisionOf(result), 'deny', 'raw legacy key must not be re-denied');
+ assert.strictEqual(denialCount(), 1, 'no new denial counted');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('Windows root folds separators and case into one key', () => {
+ const env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: 'C:\\proj' };
+ const write = file_path => runHook({ tool_name: 'Write', tool_input: { file_path, content: 'x' } }, env);
+ assert.strictEqual(decisionOf(write('src\\a.py')), 'deny', 'first touch is denied');
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decisionOf(write('c:/proj/src/a.py')), 'deny', 'forward-slash lowercase spelling is the same file');
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decisionOf(write('C:\\PROJ\\src\\A.py')), 'deny', 'case differs only on win32');
+ assert.strictEqual(denialCount(), 1, 'exactly one denial counted');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('MultiEdit entries use the canonical key', () => {
+ const env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-keys' };
+ assert.strictEqual(
+ decisionOf(runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: 'b.py', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } }, env)),
+ 'deny'
+ );
+ const multi = runHook(
+ { tool_name: 'MultiEdit', tool_input: { edits: [{ file_path: './b.py', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }] } },
+ env
+ );
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decisionOf(multi), 'deny', 'MultiEdit on ./b.py matches the checked b.py');
+ assert.strictEqual(denialCount(), 1, 'exactly one denial counted');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ // --- Relative targets resolve against the tool cwd, not the project root ---
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('relative target resolves against data.cwd before CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR', () => {
+ const env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-cwd' };
+ const edit = file_path =>
+ runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', cwd: '/proj-cwd/sub', tool_input: { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } }, env);
+ assert.strictEqual(decisionOf(edit('src/a.py')), 'deny', 'first touch of src/a.py (cwd sub) is denied');
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decisionOf(edit('/proj-cwd/sub/src/a.py')), 'deny', 'absolute spelling of the same file is checked');
+ assert.strictEqual(decisionOf(edit('/proj-cwd/src/a.py')), 'deny', 'a different file under the project root is gated');
+ assert.strictEqual(denialCount(), 2, 'two distinct files, two denials');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('without data.cwd a relative target still resolves against CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR', () => {
+ const env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-cwd' };
+ const edit = file_path => runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } }, env);
+ assert.strictEqual(decisionOf(edit('src/a.py')), 'deny');
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decisionOf(edit('/proj-cwd/src/a.py')), 'deny', 'project-root fallback unchanged');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ // --- Questions by target class ---
+ const CLASS_ENV = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-classes' };
+ const QUOTE_LINE = "Quote the user's current instruction verbatim";
+ const RETRY_LINE = 'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.';
+ const classDenialReason = (toolName, file_path, env = {}) => {
+ const tool_input = toolName === 'MultiEdit'
+ ? { edits: [{ file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }] }
+ : { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b', content: 'x' };
+ const output = parseOutput(runHook({ tool_name: toolName, tool_input }, { ...CLASS_ENV, ...env }).stdout);
+ assert.ok(output && output.hookSpecificOutput, `${toolName} ${file_path} should be denied`);
+ assert.strictEqual(output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny');
+ return output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason;
+ };
+ const assertNoCodeQuestions = reason => {
+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('call this new file'), 'must not ask the code Write questions');
+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('import/require'), 'must not ask the code Edit questions');
+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('public functions/classes'), 'must not ask the code Edit questions');
+ };
+ const assertFrame = (reason, verb, file) => {
+ assert.ok(reason.startsWith('[Fact-Forcing Gate]\n\n'), 'keeps the gate header');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`Before ${verb} ${file}, present these facts:`), `header names ${verb} ${file}`);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes(QUOTE_LINE), 'list ends with the verbatim-instruction line');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`If this call was sent in a parallel batch, other edits to ${file}`), 'keeps batch-sibling warning');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes(RETRY_LINE), 'keeps the closing retry line');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS'), 'keeps the path-scoped recovery hint');
+ };
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('first-touch Write of docs/guide.md asks prose questions, not code questions', () => {
+ const reason = classDenialReason('Write', 'docs/guide.md');
+ assertFrame(reason, 'creating', 'docs/guide.md');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('supersedes or duplicates'), 'asks what it supersedes');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('linked or referenced from'), 'asks where it is linked from');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('why a new file rather than editing an existing one'), 'asks why a new file');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`4. ${QUOTE_LINE}`), 'quote is item 4');
+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('first-touch Edit of docs/guide.md asks prose Edit questions', () => {
+ const reason = classDenialReason('Edit', 'docs/guide.md');
+ assertFrame(reason, 'editing', 'docs/guide.md');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('reference the section being changed'), 'asks what references the section');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('corrects or adds'), 'asks what the change corrects or adds');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`3. ${QUOTE_LINE}`), 'quote is item 3');
+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('supersedes'), 'Write-only prose question absent');
+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('skills/x/SKILL.md and .claude/agents/a.md get instruction questions', () => {
+ for (const file of ['skills/x/SKILL.md', '.claude/agents/a.md', 'CLAUDE.md']) {
+ const reason = classDenialReason('Write', file);
+ assertFrame(reason, 'creating', file);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('harness/loader'), `${file}: asks which harness reads it`);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('agent behaviour changes'), `${file}: asks what behaviour changes`);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('instruction, skill, or agent file already covers'), `${file}: asks for existing coverage`);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`4. ${QUOTE_LINE}`), `${file}: quote is item 4`);
+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);
}
- assert.ok(reason.includes('app.js'), 'visible path text must remain');
})
- ) {
+ )
passed++;
- } else {
- failed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('src/a.py Write and Edit keep the code text byte-identical', () => {
+ const fullReason = tool_input => {
+ const output = parseOutput(runHook({ tool_name: tool_input.content === undefined ? 'Edit' : 'Write', tool_input }, CLASS_ENV).stdout);
+ assert.ok(output && output.hookSpecificOutput, `${tool_input.file_path} should be denied`);
+ return output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason;
+ };
+ const writeReason = fullReason({ file_path: 'src/a.py', content: 'import json\n' });
+ const expectedWrite = [
+ '[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
+ '',
+ 'Before creating src/a.py, present these facts:',
+ '',
+ '1. Name the file(s) and line(s) that will call this new file',
+ '2. Confirm no existing file serves the same purpose (search the tree — Glob/Grep, or find/grep via Bash)',
+ '3. If this file reads/writes data files, show field names, structure, and date format (use redacted or synthetic values, not raw production data)',
+ '4. Name what outside this repository decides the format, units, timezone or protocol semantics here (the consumer, the producer, or a stated convention), or state that the choice is unconstrained',
+ "5. Quote the user's current instruction verbatim",
+ '',
+ 'If this call was sent in a parallel batch, other edits to src/a.py from that batch may already have been applied. Re-read the file before building on them.',
+ '',
+ 'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.',
+ ''
+ ].join('\n');
+ assert.ok(writeReason.startsWith(expectedWrite), 'code Write block unchanged');
+ const editReason = fullReason({ file_path: 'src/b.py', old_string: 'def load(path):', new_string: 'def load_json(path):' });
+ const expectedEdit = [
+ '[Fact-Forcing Gate]',
+ '',
+ 'Before editing src/b.py, present these facts:',
+ '',
+ '1. List ALL files that import/require this file (search the tree — Glob/Grep, or find/grep via Bash)',
+ '2. List the public functions/classes affected by this change',
+ '3. If this file reads/writes data files, show field names, structure, and date format (use redacted or synthetic values, not raw production data)',
+ '4. Name what outside this repository decides the format, units, timezone or protocol semantics here (the consumer, the producer, or a stated convention), or state that the choice is unconstrained',
+ "5. Quote the user's current instruction verbatim",
+ '',
+ 'If this call was sent in a parallel batch, other edits to src/b.py from that batch may already have been applied. Re-read the file before building on them.',
+ '',
+ 'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.',
+ ''
+ ].join('\n');
+ assert.ok(editReason.startsWith(expectedEdit), 'code Edit block unchanged');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('src/a.test.ts and tests/helpers.js get test questions', () => {
+ for (const file of ['src/a.test.ts', 'tests/helpers.js']) {
+ const reason = classDenialReason('Write', file);
+ assertFrame(reason, 'creating', file);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('behaviour is under test'), `${file}: asks what is under test`);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('existing test file(s)'), `${file}: asks for existing test files`);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`3. ${QUOTE_LINE}`), `${file}: quote is item 3`);
+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);
+ }
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('config/app.yaml and .env.local get config questions', () => {
+ for (const file of ['config/app.yaml', '.env.local']) {
+ const reason = classDenialReason('Write', file);
+ assertFrame(reason, 'creating', file);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('process/tool reads this file'), `${file}: asks what reads it`);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('effect of the change'), `${file}: asks for the effect`);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('no secrets or credentials'), `${file}: asks about secrets`);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`4. ${QUOTE_LINE}`), `${file}: quote is item 4`);
+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);
+ }
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ // --- Questions from the change profile ---
+ const PROFILE_ENV = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-profile' };
+ const profileDenialReason = (toolName, tool_input, env = {}) => {
+ const output = parseOutput(runHook({ tool_name: toolName, tool_input }, { ...PROFILE_ENV, ...env }).stdout);
+ assert.ok(output && output.hookSpecificOutput, `${toolName} ${JSON.stringify(tool_input).slice(0, 80)} should be denied`);
+ assert.strictEqual(output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny');
+ return output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason;
+ };
+ const listedQuestions = reason => reason.split('\n').filter(line => /^\d+\. /.test(line)).map(line => line.replace(/^\d+\. /, ''));
+ const QUESTION_LINES = {
+ importers: 'List ALL files that import/require this file (search the tree — Glob/Grep, or find/grep via Bash)',
+ publicApi: 'List the public functions/classes affected by this change',
+ localCallers: 'List the call sites in this file or its module that rely on the changed behaviour (search the tree — Glob/Grep, or find/grep via Bash)',
+ callers: 'Name the file(s) and line(s) that will call this new file',
+ noDuplicate: 'Confirm no existing file serves the same purpose (search the tree — Glob/Grep, or find/grep via Bash)',
+ dataSchema: 'If this file reads/writes data files, show field names, structure, and date format (use redacted or synthetic values, not raw production data)',
+ externalContract:
+ 'Name what outside this repository decides the format, units, timezone or protocol semantics here (the consumer, the producer, or a stated convention), or state that the choice is unconstrained',
+ quote: QUOTE_LINE
+ };
+ const B2_FULL_EDIT = [QUESTION_LINES.importers, QUESTION_LINES.publicApi, QUESTION_LINES.dataSchema, QUESTION_LINES.externalContract, QUESTION_LINES.quote];
+ const B2_FULL_WRITE = [QUESTION_LINES.callers, QUESTION_LINES.noDuplicate, QUESTION_LINES.dataSchema, QUESTION_LINES.externalContract, QUESTION_LINES.quote];
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('an Edit that changes an exported signature asks for importers and the affected public API', () => {
+ const reason = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'src/api.js', old_string: 'export function load(a) {', new_string: 'export function load(a, b) {' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(reason), [QUESTION_LINES.importers, QUESTION_LINES.publicApi, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ assertFrame(reason, 'editing', 'src/api.js');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('an Edit of a function body asks for call sites in the file or module instead of importers', () => {
+ const reason = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'src/calc.js', old_string: ' return a + 1;', new_string: ' return a * 2;' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(reason), [QUESTION_LINES.localCallers, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ assertFrame(reason, 'editing', 'src/calc.js');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('an Edit that handles data keeps the data-schema question', () => {
+ const reason = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'src/calc.py', old_string: ' x = 1', new_string: ' rows = json.load(fh)' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(reason), [QUESTION_LINES.localCallers, QUESTION_LINES.dataSchema, QUESTION_LINES.externalContract, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('a Write of a new code file without data handling drops the data-schema question', () => {
+ const reason = profileDenialReason('Write', { file_path: 'src/new_mod.js', content: 'export const x = 1;\n' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(reason), [QUESTION_LINES.callers, QUESTION_LINES.noDuplicate, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ const withData = profileDenialReason('Write', { file_path: 'lib/new_io.js', content: "const fs = require('fs');\n" });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(withData), B2_FULL_WRITE);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('an unknown or over-bound change keeps the full code questions byte-identical', () => {
+ const cases = [
+ ['Edit', { file_path: 'src/a.rb', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, B2_FULL_EDIT],
+ ['Edit', { file_path: 'src/big.js', old_string: 'x'.repeat(70 * 1024), new_string: 'y' }, B2_FULL_EDIT],
+ ['Edit', { file_path: 'src/shape.js' }, B2_FULL_EDIT],
+ ['Edit', { file_path: 'src/shape2.js', old_string: 5, new_string: 'b' }, B2_FULL_EDIT],
+ ['Write', { file_path: 'src/d.rb', content: 'x' }, B2_FULL_WRITE],
+ ['Write', { file_path: 'src/e.js' }, B2_FULL_WRITE]
+ ];
+ for (const [tool, input, expected] of cases) {
+ clearState();
+ const reason = profileDenialReason(tool, input);
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(reason), expected, `${input.file_path}`);
+ const header = `Before ${tool === 'Write' ? 'creating' : 'editing'} ${input.file_path}, present these facts:`;
+ const block = ['[Fact-Forcing Gate]', '', header, '', ...expected.map((q, i) => `${i + 1}. ${q}`), ''].join('\n');
+ assert.ok(reason.startsWith(block), `${input.file_path}: block unchanged`);
+ }
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('sensitive code targets always get the full code questions', () => {
+ const reason = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'src/auth/login.js', old_string: ' return a + 1;', new_string: ' return a * 2;' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(reason), B2_FULL_EDIT);
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('Sensitive target'), 'sensitive note');
+ const write = profileDenialReason('Write', { file_path: 'src/billing/new.js', content: 'export const x = 1;\n' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(write), B2_FULL_WRITE);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('config, instruction and test targets keep their class questions whatever the change', () => {
+ const config = listedQuestions(profileDenialReason('Write', { file_path: 'config/app.yaml', content: 'a: 1\n' }));
+ assert.strictEqual(config.length, 4, 'config keeps three questions and the quote');
+ assert.ok(config[2].includes('no secrets or credentials'));
+ const instruction = listedQuestions(profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'CLAUDE.md', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }));
+ assert.strictEqual(instruction.length, 4, 'instruction keeps three questions and the quote');
+ const testFile = listedQuestions(profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'src/a.test.js', old_string: ' return 1;', new_string: ' return 2;' }));
+ assert.ok(testFile[0].includes('behaviour is under test'), 'test questions');
+ assert.strictEqual(testFile.length, 3);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('MultiEdit questions follow every entry for the denied file', () => {
+ const surface = profileDenialReason('MultiEdit', {
+ edits: [
+ { file_path: 'src/m.js', old_string: ' return 1;', new_string: ' return 2;' },
+ { file_path: 'src/m.js', old_string: 'function f() {', new_string: 'export function f() {' }
+ ]
+ });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(surface), [QUESTION_LINES.importers, QUESTION_LINES.publicApi, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ clearState();
+ const local = profileDenialReason('MultiEdit', {
+ edits: [
+ { file_path: 'src/n.js', old_string: ' return 1;', new_string: ' return 2;' },
+ { file_path: 'src/other.js', old_string: 'export const y = 1;', new_string: 'export const y = 2;' }
+ ]
+ });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(local), [QUESTION_LINES.localCallers, QUESTION_LINES.quote], 'entries for other files do not count');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('shell scripts ask the questions their change warrants', () => {
+ const local = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'scripts/q1.sh', old_string: ' echo "a"', new_string: ' echo "b"' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(local), [QUESTION_LINES.localCallers, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ clearState();
+ const fn = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'scripts/q2.sh', old_string: 'deploy() {', new_string: 'deploy_all() {' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(fn), [QUESTION_LINES.importers, QUESTION_LINES.publicApi, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ clearState();
+ const exported = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'scripts/q3.sh', old_string: 'export MODE=a', new_string: 'export MODE=b' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(exported), [QUESTION_LINES.importers, QUESTION_LINES.publicApi, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ clearState();
+ const fetch = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'scripts/q4.sh', old_string: ' run', new_string: ' curl -s "$URL" > out.json' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(fetch), [QUESTION_LINES.localCallers, QUESTION_LINES.dataSchema, QUESTION_LINES.externalContract, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ clearState();
+ const ps = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'scripts/q5.ps1', old_string: 'function Get-A {', new_string: 'function Get-B {' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(ps), [QUESTION_LINES.importers, QUESTION_LINES.publicApi, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ clearState();
+ const bat = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'scripts/q6.bat', old_string: 'echo a', new_string: 'echo b' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(bat), [QUESTION_LINES.importers, QUESTION_LINES.publicApi, QUESTION_LINES.quote], 'batch always counts as surface');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('a one-line edit of a Python module constant asks for importers', () => {
+ const reason = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'tools/q7.py', old_string: 'BASE = "https://a.test/#home"', new_string: 'BASE = "https://a.test/#admin"' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(reason), [QUESTION_LINES.importers, QUESTION_LINES.publicApi, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ clearState();
+ const local = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'tools/q8.py', old_string: 'result = compute(a)', new_string: 'result = compute(b)' });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(listedQuestions(local), [QUESTION_LINES.localCallers, QUESTION_LINES.quote]);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('condensed denials follow the change profile', () => {
+ const env = { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_FULL_DENIALS: '0' };
+ const local = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'src/c1.js', old_string: ' return 1;', new_string: ' return 2;' }, env);
+ assert.ok(local.includes('the call sites in this file or its module that rely on the change'), local);
+ assert.ok(!local.includes('importers/callers'), 'no importer hint for a local change');
+ assert.ok(!local.includes('data schemas'), 'no data hint for a change without data');
+ const created = profileDenialReason('Write', { file_path: 'src/c3.js', content: 'export const a = 1;\n' }, env);
+ assert.ok(created.includes('that no existing file serves the same purpose'), created);
+ assert.ok(created.includes('(denial #') && created.includes('parallel batch') && created.includes('ECC_GATEGUARD=off'), 'keeps ordinal and hints');
+ const data = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'src/c4.js', old_string: ' return 1;', new_string: ' return JSON.parse(raw);' }, env);
+ assert.ok(data.includes('the data schemas it reads or writes'), data);
+ const full = profileDenialReason('Edit', { file_path: 'src/c2.rb', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, env);
+ assert.ok(full.includes('briefly state importers/callers, affected API, data schemas if any'), 'unknown profile keeps the hint');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ // --- Comment and whitespace-only edits ---
+ const trivialRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-trivial-'));
+ const seedTrivialFiles = tool_input => {
+ const entries = Array.isArray(tool_input.edits) ? tool_input.edits : [tool_input];
+ const byFile = new Map();
+ for (const entry of entries) {
+ if (!entry || typeof entry !== 'object') continue;
+ const rel = entry.file_path || tool_input.file_path;
+ if (typeof rel !== 'string' || typeof entry.old_string !== 'string') continue;
+ byFile.set(rel, [...(byFile.get(rel) || []), entry.old_string]);
+ }
+ for (const [rel, parts] of byFile) {
+ const file = path.join(trivialRoot, rel);
+ if (fs.existsSync(file)) continue;
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(file, `${parts.join('\n')}\n`);
+ }
+ };
+ const trivialRun = (toolName, tool_input, env = {}) => {
+ seedTrivialFiles(tool_input);
+ const result = runHook({ tool_name: toolName, tool_input }, { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: trivialRoot, ...env });
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ const hso = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput : {};
+ const context = Array.isArray(hso.additionalContext) ? hso.additionalContext.join('\n') : String(hso.additionalContext || '');
+ return { result, decision: hso.permissionDecision, context, reason: hso.permissionDecisionReason || '' };
+ };
+ const trivialState = () => (fs.existsSync(stateFile) ? JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8')) : {});
+ const trivialKey = rel => `${trivialRoot}/${rel}`;
+ const TRIVIAL_NOTE = 'Comment or whitespace-only change to';
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('a comment-only Edit of an unchecked code file passes with a note and is not marked checked', () => {
+ const out = trivialRun('Edit', { file_path: 'src/t1.js', old_string: '// old note\nfoo();', new_string: '// new note\nfoo();' });
+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', out.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes(`${TRIVIAL_NOTE} src/t1.js`), out.context);
+ assert.strictEqual(out.result.code, 0);
+ const state = trivialState();
+ assert.ok(!(state.checked || []).includes(trivialKey('src/t1.js')), 'not marked checked');
+ assert.strictEqual(state.trivial_allows, 1);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials || 0, 0, 'denial count untouched');
+ assert.ok(!out.result.stdout.includes('"allow"'), 'never an allow decision');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ if (
+ test('a later code change to the same file is still gated', () => {
+ const out = trivialRun('Edit', { file_path: 'src/t1.js', old_string: 'foo();', new_string: 'bar();' });
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', out.result.stdout);
+ const state = trivialState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.trivial_allows, 1, 'trivial counter kept');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('whitespace-only reindents and trivial test-file edits pass', () => {
+ const js = trivialRun('Edit', { file_path: 'src/t2.js', old_string: 'if (x) {\n foo();\n}', new_string: 'if (x) {\n foo();\n}' });
+ assert.ok(js.context.includes(TRIVIAL_NOTE), js.result.stdout);
+ const spec = trivialRun('Edit', { file_path: 'src/t2.test.js', old_string: "it('a', () => {}); // old", new_string: "it('a', () => {}); // new" });
+ assert.ok(spec.context.includes(TRIVIAL_NOTE), spec.result.stdout);
+ assert.strictEqual(trivialState().trivial_allows, 2);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('comment-only edits of shell, PowerShell and batch scripts pass without marking them checked', () => {
+ const cases = [
+ { file_path: 'scripts/s1.sh', old_string: '# build\n', new_string: '# Build all targets.\n' },
+ { file_path: 'scripts/s2.ps1', old_string: '<# old #>\nGet-Item a', new_string: '<# new #>\nGet-Item a' },
+ { file_path: 'scripts/s3.cmd', old_string: 'REM old\necho a', new_string: 'REM new\necho a' }
+ ];
+ for (const input of cases) {
+ const out = trivialRun('Edit', input);
+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', out.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes(`${TRIVIAL_NOTE} ${input.file_path}`), out.context);
+ assert.ok(!(trivialState().checked || []).includes(trivialKey(input.file_path)), 'not marked checked');
+ }
+ assert.strictEqual(trivialState().trivial_allows, 3);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('trivial-looking edits are still denied where the pass does not apply', () => {
+ const cases = [
+ ['sensitive target', { file_path: 'src/auth/session.js', old_string: '// old\nfoo();', new_string: '// new\nfoo();' }],
+ ['comment plus code', { file_path: 'src/d1.js', old_string: '// old\nfoo(1);', new_string: '// new\nfoo(2);' }],
+ ['python indentation', { file_path: 'src/d2.py', old_string: 'if x:\n y()', new_string: 'if x:\n y()' }],
+ ['unknown extension', { file_path: 'src/d3.rb', old_string: '# old', new_string: '# new' }],
+ ['config target', { file_path: 'config/d4.yaml', old_string: '# old', new_string: '# new' }],
+ ['instruction target', { file_path: 'CLAUDE.md', old_string: '<!-- old -->', new_string: '<!-- new -->' }],
+ ['instruction code file', { file_path: '.claude/hooks/d5.md', old_string: '// old', new_string: '// new' }],
+ ['template literal', { file_path: 'src/d6.js', old_string: '// old\n`;', new_string: '// new\n`;' }],
+ ['over the bound', { file_path: 'src/d7.js', old_string: `// ${'x'.repeat(70 * 1024)}`, new_string: '// y' }],
+ ['missing new_string', { file_path: 'src/d8.js', old_string: '// old' }],
+ ['sensitive shell script', { file_path: 'scripts/auth/rotate.sh', old_string: '# old\nrun', new_string: '# new\nrun' }],
+ ['workflow shell script', { file_path: '.github/workflows/d9.sh', old_string: '# old', new_string: '# new' }],
+ ['shell heredoc', { file_path: 'scripts/d10.sh', old_string: 'cat <<EOF\n# old\nEOF', new_string: 'cat <<EOF\n# new\nEOF' }],
+ ['shell quoted hash', { file_path: 'scripts/d11.sh', old_string: 'echo "a # old"', new_string: 'echo "a # new"' }],
+ ['shell shebang', { file_path: 'scripts/d12.sh', old_string: '#!/bin/bash', new_string: '#!/bin/sh' }],
+ ['powershell requires', { file_path: 'scripts/d13.ps1', old_string: '#Requires -Version 5', new_string: '#Requires -Version 7' }],
+ ['powershell here-string', { file_path: 'scripts/d14.ps1', old_string: '@"\n# old\n"@', new_string: '@"\n# new\n"@' }]
+ ];
+ for (const [label, input] of cases) {
+ clearState();
+ const out = trivialRun('Edit', input);
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes(TRIVIAL_NOTE), `${label}: no trivial note`);
+ assert.strictEqual(trivialState().trivial_allows || 0, 0, `${label}: no trivial count`);
+ }
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('comment-looking edits that change code in their file context are denied', () => {
+ const cases = [
+ ['macro continuation', 'src/ctx/a.c', '#define A 1 \\\n// c\nint x;\n', { old_string: '// c\n', new_string: '' }],
+ ['joined next line', 'src/ctx/b.js', 'a();\n// c\nb();\n', { old_string: '// c\n', new_string: '// c ' }],
+ ['template literal', 'src/ctx/c.js', 'const q = `\n // hint\n SELECT 1\n`;\n', { old_string: ' // hint', new_string: ' // other' }],
+ ['docstring', 'src/ctx/d.py', 'Q = """\n# limit 10\nSELECT 1\n"""\n', { old_string: '# limit 10', new_string: '# limit 99' }],
+ ['heredoc body', 'scripts/ctx/e.sh', 'cat > colors.txt <<EOF\n#ff0000\n#00ff00\nEOF\n', { old_string: '#00ff00', new_string: '#0000ff' }],
+ ['inside a string', 'src/ctx/f.js', 'const s = "abc // q";\n', { old_string: '// q"', new_string: '// r"' }],
+ ['replace_all into a string', 'src/ctx/g.js', 'x = "// a"; // a\n', { old_string: '// a', new_string: '// b', replace_all: true }],
+ ['type directive', 'src/ctx/h.py', 'x = f() # type: ignore\n', { old_string: '# type: ignore', new_string: '# ok' }],
+ ['suppression marker', 'src/ctx/i.py', 'call(cmd, shell=True) # nosec\n', { old_string: '# nosec', new_string: '# reviewed' }],
+ ['build constraint', 'src/ctx/j.go', '//go:build linux\n\npackage j\n', { old_string: '//go:build linux', new_string: '//go:build ignore' }],
+ ['cgo preamble', 'src/ctx/k.go', 'package k\n\n// int add(int a) { return a; }\nimport "C"\n', { old_string: 'return a;', new_string: 'return a + 1;' }]
+ ];
+ for (const [label, rel, content, input] of cases) {
+ clearState();
+ const file = path.join(trivialRoot, rel);
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(file, content);
+ const out = trivialRun('Edit', { file_path: rel, ...input });
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ assert.strictEqual(trivialState().trivial_allows || 0, 0, `${label}: no trivial count`);
+ }
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('the trivial pass needs a readable regular file under the size bound', () => {
+ const input = { old_string: '// old', new_string: '// new' };
+ const cases = [['missing file', 'src/nf/missing.js']];
+ const big = path.join(trivialRoot, 'src/nf/big.js');
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(big), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(big, `// old\n${'x();\n'.repeat(300 * 1024)}`);
+ cases.push(['file over 1 MiB', 'src/nf/big.js']);
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(trivialRoot, 'src/nf/dir.js'), { recursive: true });
+ cases.push(['directory', 'src/nf/dir.js']);
+ if (process.platform !== 'win32' && spawnSync('mkfifo', [path.join(trivialRoot, 'src/nf/pipe.js')]).status === 0) {
+ cases.push(['named pipe', 'src/nf/pipe.js']);
+ }
+ for (const [label, rel] of cases) {
+ clearState();
+ const started = Date.now();
+ const result = runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: rel, ...input } }, { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: trivialRoot });
+ const hso = (parseOutput(result.stdout) || {}).hookSpecificOutput || {};
+ assert.strictEqual(hso.permissionDecision, 'deny', `${label}: ${result.stdout}`);
+ assert.ok(Date.now() - started < 10000, `${label}: returned promptly`);
+ }
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('a comment edit next to closed multi-line constructs still passes', () => {
+ const rel = 'src/ctx/ok.js';
+ const file = path.join(trivialRoot, rel);
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(file, 'const q = `a\n${b}\n`;\nconst r = /[/"]+/g;\n\n// old\nfoo();\n');
+ const out = trivialRun('Edit', { file_path: rel, old_string: '// old', new_string: '// new' });
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes(`${TRIVIAL_NOTE} ${rel}`), out.result.stdout);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('a Write is never a trivial edit', () => {
+ const out = trivialRun('Write', { file_path: 'src/w1.js', content: '// only a comment\n' });
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', out.result.stdout);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('MultiEdit passes a file only when all of its entries are trivial', () => {
+ const allTrivial = trivialRun('MultiEdit', {
+ edits: [
+ { file_path: 'src/m1.js', old_string: '// a', new_string: '// b' },
+ { file_path: 'src/m1.js', old_string: 'foo(); // c', new_string: 'foo(); // d' }
+ ]
+ });
+ assert.notStrictEqual(allTrivial.decision, 'deny', allTrivial.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(allTrivial.context.includes(`${TRIVIAL_NOTE} src/m1.js`), allTrivial.context);
+ assert.strictEqual(trivialState().trivial_allows, 1, 'one pass per file');
+ clearState();
+ const mixed = trivialRun('MultiEdit', {
+ edits: [
+ { file_path: 'src/m2.js', old_string: '// a', new_string: '// b' },
+ { file_path: 'src/m2.js', old_string: 'foo(1);', new_string: 'foo(2);' }
+ ]
+ });
+ assert.strictEqual(mixed.decision, 'deny', 'a non-trivial entry for the file denies it');
+ clearState();
+ const twoFiles = trivialRun('MultiEdit', {
+ edits: [
+ { file_path: 'src/m3.js', old_string: '// a', new_string: '// b' },
+ { file_path: 'src/m4.js', old_string: 'foo(1);', new_string: 'foo(2);' }
+ ]
+ });
+ assert.strictEqual(twoFiles.decision, 'deny');
+ assert.ok(twoFiles.reason.includes('src/m4.js'), 'the non-trivial file is the one denied');
+ const state = trivialState();
+ assert.ok(!(state.checked || []).includes(trivialKey('src/m3.js')), 'trivial file not marked checked');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('MultiEdit entries without their own path are gated as the call file_path', () => {
+ const sensitive = trivialRun('MultiEdit', { file_path: '.env', edits: [{ old_string: 'A=1', new_string: 'A=2' }] });
+ assert.strictEqual(sensitive.decision, 'deny', sensitive.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(sensitive.reason.includes('.env'), sensitive.reason);
+ clearState();
+ const code = trivialRun('MultiEdit', { file_path: 'src/mt1.js', edits: [{ old_string: 'f(1);', new_string: 'f(2);' }] });
+ assert.strictEqual(code.decision, 'deny', code.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(code.reason.includes('src/mt1.js'), code.reason);
+ clearState();
+ const trivial = trivialRun('MultiEdit', { file_path: 'src/mt2.js', edits: [{ old_string: 'f(); // a', new_string: 'f(); // b' }] });
+ assert.ok(trivial.context.includes(`${TRIVIAL_NOTE} src/mt2.js`), trivial.result.stdout);
+ clearState();
+ const input = { file_path: 'config/.env.local', edits: [{ old_string: 'A=1', new_string: 'A=2' }] };
+ seedTrivialFiles(input);
+ const result = runHook({ tool_name: 'MultiEdit', tool_input: input, agent_id: 'sub-1' }, { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: trivialRoot });
+ const hso = (parseOutput(result.stdout) || {}).hookSpecificOutput || {};
+ assert.strictEqual(hso.permissionDecision, 'deny', `subagent: ${result.stdout}`);
+ clearState();
+ const odd = trivialRun('MultiEdit', { file_path: 'src/mt3.js', edits: [null, 7, { old_string: 'g(1);', new_string: 'g(2);' }] });
+ assert.strictEqual(odd.decision, 'deny', `malformed entries: ${odd.result.stdout}`);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('the trivial pass comes before the denial cap and never consumes it', () => {
+ const out = trivialRun('Edit', { file_path: 'src/cap1.js', old_string: '// a', new_string: '// b' }, { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '0' });
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes(TRIVIAL_NOTE), out.result.stdout);
+ const state = trivialState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows || 0, 0);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.trivial_allows, 1);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('trivial_allows merges by maximum with a concurrent state file', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), trivial_allows: 5 });
+ trivialRun('Edit', { file_path: 'src/merge1.js', old_string: '// a', new_string: '// b' });
+ assert.strictEqual(trivialState().trivial_allows, 6);
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), trivial_allows: 'junk' });
+ trivialRun('Edit', { file_path: 'src/merge2.js', old_string: '// a', new_string: '// b' });
+ assert.strictEqual(trivialState().trivial_allows, 1, 'malformed counter reads as zero');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('scripts/hooks/x.js is code, not instruction', () => {
+ const reason = classDenialReason('Write', 'scripts/hooks/x.js');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('call this new file'), 'code Write questions');
+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('harness/loader'), 'not instruction questions');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('MultiEdit on a .md entry uses the prose Edit variant', () => {
+ const reason = classDenialReason('MultiEdit', 'docs/multi.md');
+ assertFrame(reason, 'editing', 'docs/multi.md');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('reference the section being changed'), 'prose Edit questions');
+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('condensed denial for .md after the budget carries the prose hint and ordinal', () => {
+ const env = { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_FULL_DENIALS: '0' };
+ const writeReason = classDenialReason('Write', 'docs/late.md', env);
+ assert.ok(!writeReason.includes('\n'), 'condensed denial is one line');
+ assert.ok(writeReason.includes('(denial #1 this session) First creation of docs/late.md: '), 'keeps ordinal and target');
+ assert.ok(writeReason.includes('briefly state what this supersedes, where it is linked from'), 'prose Write hint');
+ assert.ok(!writeReason.includes('importers/callers'), 'no code hint');
+ assert.ok(writeReason.includes('parallel batch'), 'keeps batch-sibling warning');
+ assert.ok(writeReason.includes('GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS') && writeReason.includes('ECC_GATEGUARD=off'), 'keeps exemption hint');
+ const editReason = classDenialReason('Edit', 'docs/late-edit.md', env);
+ assert.ok(editReason.includes('(denial #2 this session) First edit of docs/late-edit.md: '), 'ordinal advances');
+ assert.ok(editReason.includes('what references the changed section'), 'prose Edit hint');
+ const codeReason = classDenialReason('Edit', 'src/late.rb', env);
+ assert.ok(codeReason.includes('briefly state importers/callers, affected API, data schemas if any'), 'code hint unchanged');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('class denials still sanitize the path', () => {
+ const reason = classDenialReason('Write', 'docs/hid\u200bden.md');
+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('\u200b'), 'zero-width space stripped');
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('supersedes or duplicates'), 'still prose questions');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ // --- Prior-search credit in the current human turn ---
+ const creditRoot = '/proj-credit';
+ // An ambient CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH must not leak into cases that pass no transcript.
+ const creditEnv = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: creditRoot, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' };
+ const transcriptDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-transcripts-'));
+ const creditOutputs = [];
+ let transcriptSeq = 0;
+ let uuidSeq = 0;
+ const nextUuid = () => `uuid-${++uuidSeq}`;
+ const humanRecord = (text, extra = {}) =>
+ ({ type: 'user', uuid: nextUuid(), message: { role: 'user', content: text }, ...extra });
+ // Real assistant records carry message.id; a search without one is never credited.
+ const toolUseRecord = (id, name, input, extra = {}) => ({
+ type: 'assistant',
+ uuid: nextUuid(),
+ message: { id: `msg_${id}`, role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id, name, input }] },
+ ...extra
+ });
+ const toolResultRecord = (id, isError = false, extra = {}) => ({
+ type: 'user',
+ uuid: nextUuid(),
+ message: { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'tool_result', tool_use_id: id, is_error: isError, content: 'ok' }] },
+ ...extra
+ });
+ const searchRecords = (id, name, input) => [toolUseRecord(id, name, input), toolResultRecord(id)];
+ // Like Claude Code, a fixture ends with the pending call's own assistant record and runners pass its id.
+ const pendingToolUseIds = new Map();
+ const writeTranscript = (records, { pending = true } = {}) => {
+ transcriptSeq += 1;
+ const file = path.join(transcriptDir, `t-${transcriptSeq}.jsonl`);
+ const all = records.slice();
+ if (pending) {
+ const id = `toolu_pending_${transcriptSeq}`;
+ all.push({
+ type: 'assistant',
+ uuid: nextUuid(),
+ message: { id: `msg_pending_${transcriptSeq}`, role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id, name: 'Edit', input: {} }] }
+ });
+ pendingToolUseIds.set(file, id);
+ }
+ const lines = all.map(r => (typeof r === 'string' ? r : JSON.stringify(r)));
+ fs.writeFileSync(file, lines.join('\n') + '\n', 'utf8');
+ return file;
+ };
+ const creditRun = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, env = {}) => {
+ const payload = { tool_name: toolName, tool_input: toolInput, cwd: creditRoot };
+ if (transcriptPath !== undefined) payload.transcript_path = transcriptPath;
+ if (pendingToolUseIds.has(transcriptPath)) payload.tool_use_id = pendingToolUseIds.get(transcriptPath);
+ const result = runHook(payload, { ...creditEnv, ...env });
+ creditOutputs.push(result.stdout);
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ const hso = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput : {};
+ return { result, decision: hso.permissionDecision, context: hso.additionalContext || '', reason: hso.permissionDecisionReason || '' };
+ };
+ const creditEdit = (file_path, transcriptPath, env) =>
+ creditRun('Edit', { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, transcriptPath, env);
+ const creditWrite = (file_path, transcriptPath, env) => creditRun('Write', { file_path, content: 'x' }, transcriptPath, env);
+ const readState = () => (fs.existsSync(stateFile) ? JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8')) : {});
+ const gateCase = (name, fn) => {
+ clearState();
+ if (test(name, fn)) passed++;
+ else failed++;
+ };
+ const assertNotCredited = (out, label) => {
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny`);
+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Prior search seen'), `${label}: no credit note`);
+ };
+ const assertCredited = (out, label) => {
+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: must not deny`);
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), `${label}: credit note expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ };
+
+ gateCase('Grep stem in this turn credits the first Edit (note, no denial counted)', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('please fix the widget factory'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_g1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory', path: creditRoot })
+ ]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);
+ assertCredited(out, 'Grep stem');
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('(Grep widget_factory, 1 tool call ago)'), out.context);
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes(`first-touch check satisfied for ${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`), out.context);
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.ok(!state.fact_force_denials, 'denial count unchanged');
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1, 'credit counted');
+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`)), 'canonical key marked checked');
+ const again = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);
+ assert.notStrictEqual(again.decision, 'deny');
+ assert.strictEqual(again.context, '', 'already checked: plain allow, no second note');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().fact_force_credited, 1, 'no double credit');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('Glob directory credits a Write of a new file there', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('add a component'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_gl', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/components/*.tsx', path: creditRoot })
+ ]);
+ assertCredited(creditWrite(`${creditRoot}/src/components/NewThing.tsx`, t), 'Glob dir');
+ assert.ok(!readState().fact_force_denials);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('LS directory credits a Write there', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('add a page'), ...searchRecords('toolu_ls', 'LS', { path: `${creditRoot}/docs` })]);
+ assertCredited(creditWrite(`${creditRoot}/docs/brand-new-page.md`, t), 'LS dir');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('Bash rg stem credits an Edit', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('fix it'), ...searchRecords('toolu_b1', 'Bash', { command: 'cd /proj-credit && rg foo_bar src' })]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/foo_bar.js`, t);
+ assertCredited(out, 'Bash rg');
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('(Bash rg foo_bar src,'), out.context);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('PowerShell Get-ChildItem stem credits an Edit', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('fix it'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_p1', 'PowerShell', { command: 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Filter *foo_bar*' })
+ ]);
+ assertCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/foo_bar.ps1`, t), 'PowerShell gci');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('git grep qualifies, git log does not', () => {
+ const ok = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_gg', 'Bash', { command: 'git grep -n foo_bar' })]);
+ assertCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/foo_bar.js`, ok), 'git grep');
+ const no = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_gl2', 'Bash', { command: 'git log -- src/baz_qux.js' })]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/baz_qux.js`, no), 'git log');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('stem only in a non-search shell segment does not credit', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_b2', 'Bash', { command: 'echo foo_bar | grep something; ls' })]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/foo_bar.js`, t), 'stem in echo segment');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('command substitution in a search command is ambiguous (no credit)', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_b3', 'Bash', { command: 'rg $(echo foo_bar) src' })]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/foo_bar.js`, t), 'substitution');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('cd before a search disables directory credit (stem still counts)', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_cd', 'Bash', { command: 'cd /elsewhere && ls docs' })]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditWrite(`${creditRoot}/docs/brand-new-page.md`, t), 'cd then ls dir');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a search in the same assistant batch as the pending call never credits', () => {
+ const batch = (id, name, input) => ({
+ type: 'assistant',
+ uuid: nextUuid(),
+ message: { id: 'msg_batch', role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id, name, input }] }
+ });
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ batch('toolu_bg', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),
+ batch('toolu_be', 'Edit', { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py` }),
+ toolResultRecord('toolu_bg')
+ ]);
+ const input = { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' };
+ const same = runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_use_id: 'toolu_be', cwd: creditRoot, transcript_path: t, tool_input: input }, creditEnv);
+ creditOutputs.push(same.stdout);
+ assert.strictEqual(parseOutput(same.stdout).hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', 'same batch denied');
+ clearState();
+ const later = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ batch('toolu_bg2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),
+ toolResultRecord('toolu_bg2'),
+ { type: 'assistant', uuid: nextUuid(), message: { id: 'msg_next', role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id: 'toolu_be2', name: 'Edit', input }] } }
+ ]);
+ const next = runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_use_id: 'toolu_be2', cwd: creditRoot, transcript_path: later, tool_input: input }, creditEnv);
+ creditOutputs.push(next.stdout);
+ assert.ok(next.stdout.includes('Prior search seen'), 'search from an earlier message credits');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('no search in the turn -> deny', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('edit it'), ...searchRecords('toolu_r0', 'Read', { file_path: `${creditRoot}/other.js` })]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);
+ assertNotCredited(out, 'no search');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().fact_force_denials, 1);
+ assert.ok(!readState().fact_force_credited, 'no credit counted on deny');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('search tool_use without a tool_result (same batch) -> deny', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), toolUseRecord('toolu_pending', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'pending search');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('search whose tool_result is_error -> deny', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ toolUseRecord('toolu_err', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),
+ toolResultRecord('toolu_err', true)
+ ]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'errored search');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('search before the latest human message -> deny', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('first request'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_old', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),
+ humanRecord('second request')
+ ]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'previous turn search');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('tool_result user records do not reset the turn', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_s1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_s2', 'Read', { file_path: `${creditRoot}/a.js` }),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_s3', 'Bash', { command: 'npm test' })
+ ]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);
+ assertCredited(out, 'tool_results between');
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('3 tool calls ago'), out.context);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('isMeta and sidechain user records are not turn boundaries', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_m1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),
+ humanRecord('<system-reminder>meta</system-reminder>', { isMeta: true }),
+ humanRecord('subagent prompt', { isSidechain: true })
+ ]);
+ assertCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'meta/sidechain boundary');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('sidechain search records are ignored', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ toolUseRecord('toolu_sc', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }, { isSidechain: true }),
+ toolResultRecord('toolu_sc', false, { isSidechain: true })
+ ]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'sidechain search');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('Read of the target never credits an Edit', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_rd', 'Read', { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py` })
+ ]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'Read target');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('directory match does not credit an Edit (stem only)', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_ls2', 'LS', { path: `${creditRoot}/src` })]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'LS dir for Edit');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('generic stems (index.js) are not credited', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_ix', 'Grep', { pattern: 'index' })]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/index.js`, t), 'generic stem');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('stems shorter than 4 characters are not credited', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_ab', 'Grep', { pattern: 'abc' })]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/abc.js`, t), 'short stem');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('missing or non-file transcript -> deny', () => {
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, path.join(transcriptDir, 'nope.jsonl')), 'missing file');
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/other_widget.py`, transcriptDir), 'directory path');
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/third_widget.py`), 'no transcript_path');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('garbage lines -> deny; garbage around a valid turn is skipped', () => {
+ const junk = writeTranscript(['not json', '{"type":', '{"type":"assistant","message":null}', '[1,2]', 'null']);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, junk), 'garbage only');
+ const mixed = writeTranscript([
+ 'garbage {',
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ '{"broken":',
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_gm', 'Grep', { pattern: 'other_widget' }),
+ '\u0000\u0001'
+ ]);
+ assertCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/other_widget.py`, mixed), 'garbage around valid turn');
+ });
+
+ const fillerRecords = prefix => {
+ const filler = [];
+ for (let i = 0; i < 40; i++) {
+ const id = `toolu_${prefix}${i}`;
+ filler.push(toolUseRecord(id, 'Bash', { command: 'npm test' }));
+ filler.push({
+ type: 'user',
+ message: { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'tool_result', tool_use_id: id, content: 'y'.repeat(10 * 1024) }] }
+ });
+ }
+ return filler;
+ };
+
+ gateCase('tail truncated, no boundary in window, search + result inside -> credited (turn id null)', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('long ago'),
+ ...fillerRecords('fill'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_late', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })
+ ]);
+ assert.ok(fs.statSync(t).size > 300 * 1024, 'fixture exceeds the tail window');
+ const { scanCurrentTurn } = loadDirectHook();
+ const scan = scanCurrentTurn(t);
+ assert.strictEqual(scan.turnId, null, 'no boundary: no turn id');
+ assert.ok(scan.searches.some(s => s.name === 'Grep'), 'search inside the window is collected');
+ assertCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'clipped window is the current turn');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('tail truncated, search tool_use before the window, result inside -> not credited', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('long ago'),
+ toolUseRecord('toolu_early', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),
+ ...fillerRecords('fill2'),
+ toolResultRecord('toolu_early')
+ ]);
+ assert.ok(fs.statSync(t).size > 300 * 1024, 'fixture exceeds the tail window');
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'tool_use outside the window');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('whole file scanned with no boundary -> no credit', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([...searchRecords('toolu_nob', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'no human record at all');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('MultiEdit credits per entry; first uncredited entry is denied', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_me', 'Grep', { pattern: 'alpha_mod' })]);
+ const out = creditRun(
+ 'MultiEdit',
+ {
+ edits: [
+ { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/alpha_mod.js`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' },
+ { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/beta_mod.js`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }
+ ]
+ },
+ t
+ );
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny');
+ assert.ok(out.reason.includes('beta_mod.js'), 'uncredited entry is the one denied');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(`${creditRoot}/src/alpha_mod.js`)), 'credited entry marked checked');
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('MultiEdit with every entry credited returns one combined note', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_me2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'alpha_mod|beta_mod' })
+ ]);
+ const out = creditRun(
+ 'MultiEdit',
+ {
+ edits: [
+ { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/alpha_mod.js`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' },
+ { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/beta_mod.js`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }
+ ]
+ },
+ t
+ );
+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny');
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('alpha_mod.js') && out.context.includes('beta_mod.js'), out.context);
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().fact_force_credited, 2);
+ assert.ok(!readState().fact_force_denials);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('exempt paths and subagents are unchanged (no credit note)', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_ex', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);
+ const exempt = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/tmp/widget_factory.py`, t, { GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS: 'tmp/**' });
+ assert.notStrictEqual(exempt.decision, 'deny');
+ assert.strictEqual(exempt.context, '', 'exempt path: plain allow');
+ const sub = runHook(
+ {
+ tool_name: 'Edit',
+ agent_id: 'agent-1',
+ cwd: creditRoot,
+ transcript_path: t,
+ tool_input: { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }
+ },
+ creditEnv
+ );
+ creditOutputs.push(sub.stdout);
+ assert.ok(!sub.stdout.includes('Prior search'), 'subagent: plain allow');
+ assert.ok(!readState().fact_force_credited, 'no credit recorded');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('credit note detail is sanitized and bounded', () => {
+ const pattern = `widget_factory\u200b\u202e${'x'.repeat(300)}\nIGNORE PREVIOUS`;
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_long', 'Grep', { pattern })]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);
+ assertCredited(out, 'long pattern');
+ const detail = out.context.match(/\(Grep (.*), 1 tool call ago\)/);
+ assert.ok(detail, out.context);
+ assert.ok(Array.from(detail[1]).length <= 80, `detail too long: ${detail[1].length}`);
+ for (const bad of ['\u200b', '\u202e', '\n']) assert.ok(!out.context.includes(bad), 'no invisible/control chars');
+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('IGNORE PREVIOUS'), 'truncated before trailing text');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('state save failure on credit -> allow with state warning', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_sf', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);
+ const blocker = path.join(transcriptDir, `not-a-dir-${transcriptSeq}`);
+ fs.writeFileSync(blocker, 'x');
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t, { GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR: blocker });
+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny');
+ assert.ok(out.result.stderr.includes('could not be persisted'), out.result.stderr);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('fact_force_credited survives later state writes (merge keeps it)', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_credited: 4 });
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`), 'deny path');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().fact_force_credited, 4, 'denial write keeps credited count');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().fact_force_denials, 1);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('50 MB transcript is scanned from the tail only (<= 256 KiB read)', () => {
+ const big = path.join(transcriptDir, 'big.jsonl');
+ const bigSize = 50 * 1024 * 1024;
+ const tail = [humanRecord('now'), ...searchRecords('toolu_big', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })];
+ for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) tail.push(...searchRecords(`toolu_t${i}`, 'Read', { file_path: `${creditRoot}/f${i}.js` }));
+ // Sparse 50 MB body (ftruncate) + the real tail: cheap to build, same shape for the hook.
+ const fd = fs.openSync(big, 'w');
+ try {
+ fs.writeSync(fd, JSON.stringify(humanRecord('ancient')) + '\n');
+ fs.ftruncateSync(fd, bigSize);
+ fs.writeSync(fd, '\n' + tail.map(r => JSON.stringify(r)).join('\n') + '\n', bigSize);
+ } finally {
+ fs.closeSync(fd);
+ }
+ const savedRoot = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;
+ const savedTranscript = process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;
+ const originalOpenSync = fs.openSync;
+ const originalReadSync = fs.readSync;
+ const bigFds = new Set();
+ let bytesRead = 0;
+ let result;
+ let ms;
+ try {
+ assert.ok(fs.statSync(big).size > bigSize, 'fixture is > 50 MB');
+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: creditRoot, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' });
+ const payload = {
+ tool_name: 'Edit',
+ cwd: creditRoot,
+ transcript_path: big,
+ tool_input: { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }
+ };
+ fs.openSync = function countingOpenSync(target) {
+ const opened = originalOpenSync.apply(fs, arguments);
+ if (String(target) === big) bigFds.add(opened);
+ return opened;
+ };
+ fs.readSync = function countingReadSync(readFd) {
+ const n = originalReadSync.apply(fs, arguments);
+ if (bigFds.has(readFd)) bytesRead += n;
+ return n;
+ };
+ const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
+ result = hook.run(payload);
+ ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6;
+ } finally {
+ fs.openSync = originalOpenSync;
+ fs.readSync = originalReadSync;
+ if (savedRoot === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;
+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = savedRoot;
+ if (savedTranscript === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;
+ else process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH = savedTranscript;
+ fs.rmSync(big, { force: true });
+ }
+ console.log(` (run() on 50 MB transcript: ${bytesRead} bytes read, ${ms.toFixed(1)} ms)`);
+ assert.ok(result && String(result.additionalContext || '').includes('Prior search seen'), 'credited from the tail');
+ assert.ok(bigFds.size >= 1 && bytesRead > 0, 'transcript was read through fs.readSync');
+ assert.ok(bytesRead <= 256 * 1024, `read ${bytesRead} bytes; must stay within the 256 KiB tail`);
+ assert.ok(ms < 1000, `wall-clock backstop: run() took ${ms.toFixed(1)} ms`);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('no prior-search credit output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {
+ assert.ok(creditOutputs.length > 20, 'collected outputs');
+ for (const stdout of creditOutputs) {
+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);
+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);
+ }
+ });
+
+ // --- Denials name the closest search that did not count ---
+ const MISS_PREFIX = 'Closest search this turn did not count';
+ const missLine = reason => reason.split('\n').find(line => line.startsWith(MISS_PREFIX)) || '';
+
+ gateCase('a denial names a search that looked outside the file directory', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_o1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory', path: `${creditRoot}/docs` })]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);
+ assertNotCredited(out, 'out of scope');
+ const line = missLine(out.reason);
+ assert.ok(line.includes('(Grep widget_factory)'), line || out.reason);
+ assert.ok(line.includes("its search path does not contain this file"), line);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a denial names a search whose filters excluded the file', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_x1', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!*.py' widget_factory ." })]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);
+ assertNotCredited(out, 'excluded');
+ assert.ok(missLine(out.reason).includes('its filters exclude this file'), out.reason);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a denial names a search sent in the same batch', () => {
+ const batch = (id, name, input) => ({
+ type: 'assistant',
+ uuid: nextUuid(),
+ message: { id: 'msg_b4batch', role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id, name, input }] }
+ });
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_far', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory', path: `${creditRoot}/docs` }),
+ batch('toolu_sb', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),
+ batch('toolu_se', 'Edit', { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py` }),
+ toolResultRecord('toolu_sb')
+ ], { pending: false });
+ const input = { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' };
+ const result = runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_use_id: 'toolu_se', cwd: creditRoot, transcript_path: t, tool_input: input }, creditEnv);
+ const reason = parseOutput(result.stdout).hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason;
+ const line = missLine(reason);
+ assert.ok(line.includes('same batch as this call'), `same batch outranks out of scope: ${line}`);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a denial names a search that only read piped input', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_p1', 'Bash', { command: 'git diff | grep widget_factory' })]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);
+ assertNotCredited(out, 'stdin');
+ assert.ok(missLine(out.reason).includes('it searched piped input, not the tree'), out.reason);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a denial names a Read or a non-search command of the file', () => {
+ const read = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ toolUseRecord('toolu_r1', 'Read', { file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py` }),
+ toolResultRecord('toolu_r1')
+ ]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, read);
+ assertNotCredited(out, 'read');
+ const line = missLine(out.reason);
+ assert.ok(line.includes(`(Read ${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py)`), line || out.reason);
+ assert.ok(line.includes('only Glob, Grep, LS and shell search commands count'), line);
+ clearState();
+ const cat = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_c1', 'Bash', { command: 'cat src/widget_factory.py' })]);
+ assert.ok(missLine(creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, cat).reason).includes('(Bash cat src/widget_factory.py)'));
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a denial explains that a generic file name never matches', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_g1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'index' })]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/index.py`, t);
+ assertNotCredited(out, 'generic');
+ assert.ok(missLine(out.reason).includes('this file name is too generic to match a search'), out.reason);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('no closest-search line when nothing in the turn mentions the file', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_n1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'unrelated_thing' })]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);
+ assertNotCredited(out, 'unrelated');
+ assert.strictEqual(missLine(out.reason), '');
+ assert.ok(!out.reason.includes(MISS_PREFIX));
+ const none = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/other_file.py`, undefined);
+ assert.ok(!none.reason.includes(MISS_PREFIX), 'no transcript, no line');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('the closest-search detail is sanitized and bounded', () => {
+ const noisy = `widget_factory \u202e\u200b${'z'.repeat(200)}\u0007`;
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_s1', 'Grep', { pattern: noisy, path: `${creditRoot}/docs` })]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);
+ const line = missLine(out.reason);
+ assert.ok(line, out.reason);
+ for (const bad of ['\u202e', '\u200b', '\u0007']) assert.ok(!line.includes(bad), `no U+${bad.codePointAt(0).toString(16)}`);
+ const detail = line.slice(line.indexOf('(Grep ') + 6, line.indexOf('):'));
+ assert.ok(Array.from(detail).length <= 60, `detail bounded: ${detail.length}`);
+ assert.ok(detail.endsWith('...'), 'truncation marked');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('sensitive targets never get a closest-search line', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_k1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'login_view', path: `${creditRoot}/docs` })]);
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/auth/login_view.py`, t);
+ assertNotCredited(out, 'sensitive');
+ assert.ok(!out.reason.includes(MISS_PREFIX), out.reason);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('condensed denials and MultiEdit denials carry the closest-search line', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('x'), ...searchRecords('toolu_m1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory', path: `${creditRoot}/docs` })]);
+ const condensed = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, t, { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_FULL_DENIALS: '0' });
+ assert.ok(!condensed.reason.includes('\n'), 'still one line');
+ assert.ok(condensed.reason.includes(`${MISS_PREFIX} (Grep widget_factory)`), condensed.reason);
+ clearState();
+ const multi = creditRun('MultiEdit', { edits: [{ file_path: `${creditRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }] }, t);
+ assert.ok(missLine(multi.reason).includes('(Grep widget_factory)'), multi.reason);
+ });
+
+ // --- Exclusion globs never earn search credit ---
+ const exclusionTarget = `${creditRoot}/src/widget.py`;
+ let exclusionSeq = 0;
+ const exclusionTurn = (name, input) => {
+ exclusionSeq += 1;
+ return writeTranscript([humanRecord('fix the widget'), ...searchRecords(`toolu_r2_${exclusionSeq}`, name, input)]);
+ };
+ const exclusionDenied = [
+ ['Grep glob !widget.py', 'Grep', { pattern: 'TODO', glob: '!widget.py', path: creditRoot }],
+ ['Grep glob list with an exclusion', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '*.js,!widget.py', path: creditRoot }],
+ ['Grep path-style exclusion covering the target', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '!src/**', path: creditRoot }],
+ ['Grep positive basename glob that misses the target', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '*.md', path: creditRoot }],
+ ["rg -g '!widget.py'", 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!widget.py' TODO ." }],
+ ['rg --glob=!widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'rg --glob=!widget.py TODO .' }],
+ ['rg --iglob exclusion, other case', 'Bash', { command: "rg --iglob '!WIDGET.py' TODO ." }],
+ ['rg -g exclusion of the directory', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!src/' widget ." }],
+ ['rg -g positive glob that misses the target', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '*.md' widget ." }],
+ ['grep --exclude=widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'grep -r --exclude=widget.py TODO .' }],
+ ['grep --exclude-dir of the target dir', 'Bash', { command: 'grep -rn --exclude-dir=src widget .' }],
+ ['grep --exclude-from (unknown exclusions)', 'Bash', { command: 'grep -r --exclude-from=skip.txt widget .' }],
+ ['grep --include that misses the target', 'Bash', { command: 'grep -r --include=*.md widget .' }],
+ ['find -not -name', 'Bash', { command: 'find . -not -name widget.py' }],
+ ['find ! -name', 'Bash', { command: 'find . ! -name widget.py -type f' }],
+ ['find -path ... -prune', 'Bash', { command: 'find . -path ./src/widget.py -prune -o -print' }],
+ ['find -name that misses the target', 'Bash', { command: 'find . -name widget.md' }],
+ ['fd -E widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'fd -E widget.py py src' }],
+ ['fd --exclude widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'fd --exclude widget.py py .' }],
+ ['ls -I widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'ls -I widget.py src' }],
+ ["tree -I 'widget*'", 'Bash', { command: "tree -I 'widget*' src" }],
+ ['Get-ChildItem -Exclude', 'PowerShell', { command: 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Exclude widget.py' }],
+ ['rg brace exclusion', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!*.{py,js}' widget ." }],
+ ['rg deep directory exclusion', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!**/src/**' widget ." }],
+ ['rg character-class exclusion', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!w[i]dget.py' TODO ." }],
+ ['rg exclusion in a short-flag cluster', 'Bash', { command: "rg -ig'!widget.py' TODO ." }],
+ ['find negated group', 'Bash', { command: 'find . ! ( -name widget.py -o -name x.py ) -print' }],
+ ['git ls-files -x', 'Bash', { command: 'git ls-files -x widget.py src' }]
+ ];
+ for (const [label, name, input] of exclusionDenied) {
+ gateCase(`an exclusion never credits the excluded target (${label})`, () => {
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(exclusionTarget, exclusionTurn(name, input)), label);
+ assert.ok(!readState().fact_force_credited, `${label}: nothing credited`);
+ });
+ }
+ const exclusionCredited = [
+ ["rg -g '*.py' widget", 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '*.py' widget ." }],
+ ['Grep widget glob *.py', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '*.py', path: creditRoot }],
+ ["rg -g '!*.md' widget (exclusion does not cover the target)", 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!*.md' widget ." }],
+ ['Grep widget glob *.{py,js} (braces are one glob)', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '*.{py,js}', path: creditRoot }],
+ ['Grep widget glob !node_modules/**', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '!node_modules/**', path: creditRoot }],
+ ['grep --exclude-dir=node_modules widget', 'Bash', { command: 'grep -r --exclude-dir=node_modules widget .' }],
+ ['find -name widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'find . -name widget.py' }],
+ ['Grep TODO glob widget.py (positive glob names the stem)', 'Grep', { pattern: 'TODO', glob: 'widget.py', path: creditRoot }]
+ ];
+ for (const [label, name, input] of exclusionCredited) {
+ gateCase(`control still credits (${label})`, () => {
+ assertCredited(creditEdit(exclusionTarget, exclusionTurn(name, input)), label);
+ });
+ }
+
+ // --- Bracket classes in filter globs match exactly ---
+ const bracketCases = [
+ ['include class of a dot does not admit another character', 'src/fooXjs', "rg -g 'foo[.]js' fooXjs .", false],
+ ['include class of a dot admits the dot', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'widget[.]py' widget .", true],
+ ['include negated class admits another character', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'widge[!x].py' widget .", true],
+ ['include negated class rejects its member', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'widge[!t].py' widget .", false],
+ ['include caret-negated class rejects its member', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'widge[^t].py' widget .", false],
+ ['include range admits a member', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'widge[r-u].py' widget .", true],
+ ['include range rejects a non-member', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'widge[a-f].py' widget .", false],
+ ['include range is case-insensitive', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'widge[R-U].py' widget .", true],
+ ['include class with a literal ] first', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'widge[]t].py' widget .", true],
+ ['Grep include class of a dot does not admit another character', 'src/fooXjs', { pattern: 'fooXjs', glob: 'foo[.]js' }, false],
+ ['include with an unclosed class admits nothing', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'widget[.py' widget .", false],
+ ['include with an empty class admits nothing', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'widget[].py' widget .", false],
+ ['exclusion class covering the target blocks it', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g '!widge[t].py' widget .", false],
+ ['exclusion range covering the target blocks it', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g '!widge[s-u].py' widget .", false],
+ ['exclusion class of a dot does not cover another character', 'src/widgetXjs', "rg -g '!widget[.]js' widgetXjs .", true],
+ ['exclusion negated class does not cover its member', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g '!widge[!t].py' widget .", true],
+ ['exclusion with an unclosed class covers the target', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g '!zzz[' widget .", false],
+ ['exclusion with an empty negated class covers the target', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g '!zzz[!]' widget .", false]
+ ];
+ for (const [label, rel, search, credited] of bracketCases) {
+ gateCase(`bracket class: ${label}`, () => {
+ const input = typeof search === 'string' ? { command: search } : { ...search, path: creditRoot };
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/${rel}`, exclusionTurn(typeof search === 'string' ? 'Bash' : 'Grep', input));
+ if (credited) assertCredited(out, label);
+ else assertNotCredited(out, label);
+ });
+ }
+
+ // --- Directory-qualified include globs restrict the search ---
+ const longInclude = `${'a'.repeat(300)}*.py`;
+ const pathIncludeCases = [
+ ['rg include in another directory', 'lib/fooXjs.js', "rg -g 'src/*.js' fooXjs .", false],
+ ['rg --glob include in another directory', 'src/widget.py', 'rg --glob=docs/*.py widget .', false],
+ ['rg recursive include of another directory', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'lib/**' widget .", false],
+ ['rg include anchored at the search root', 'vendor/src/widget.py', "rg -g 'src/*.py' widget .", false],
+ ['rg include that does not cross a directory', 'src/deep/widget.py', "rg -g 'src/*.py' widget .", false],
+ ['rg include relative to a narrower search path', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'src/*.py' widget src", false],
+ ['Grep include in another directory', 'src/widget.py', { pattern: 'widget', glob: 'lib/*.py' }, false],
+ ['grep --include matches base names only', 'src/widget.py', 'grep -r --include=src/*.py widget .', false],
+ ['find -name with a slash matches nothing', 'src/widget.py', "find . -name 'src/widget.py'", false],
+ ['PowerShell -Include with a path matches nothing', 'src/widget.py', 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include src/widget.py', false],
+ ['rg include past the length bound admits nothing', 'src/widget.py', `rg -g '${longInclude}' widget .`, false],
+ ['rg include of the target directory', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g 'src/*.py' widget .", true],
+ ['rg include with a leading slash', 'src/widget.py', "rg -g '/src/*.py' widget .", true],
+ ['rg include with a leading **/', 'vendor/src/widget.py', "rg -g '**/src/*.py' widget .", true],
+ ['rg recursive include of the target directory', 'src/deep/widget.py', "rg -g 'src/**' widget .", true],
+ ['rg include relative to the search path', 'src/deep/widget.py', "rg -g 'deep/*.py' widget src", true],
+ ['Grep include of the target directory', 'src/widget.py', { pattern: 'widget', glob: 'src/**/*.py' }, true]
+ ];
+ for (const [label, rel, search, credited] of pathIncludeCases) {
+ gateCase(`path include: ${label}`, () => {
+ const input = typeof search === 'string' ? { command: search } : { ...search, path: creditRoot };
+ const tool = typeof search !== 'string' ? 'Grep' : /^Get-ChildItem/.test(search) ? 'PowerShell' : 'Bash';
+ const out = creditEdit(`${creditRoot}/${rel}`, exclusionTurn(tool, input));
+ if (credited) assertCredited(out, label);
+ else assertNotCredited(out, label);
+ });
+ }
+
+ // --- The search prefilter never hides a search that names the target ---
+ const prefilterCases = [
+ ["rg wid''get .", true],
+ ['rg "wid"get .', true],
+ ['rg WIDGET .', true],
+ ['rg gadget .', false]
+ ];
+ for (const [command, credited] of prefilterCases) {
+ gateCase(`search prefilter: ${command}`, () => {
+ const out = creditEdit(exclusionTarget, exclusionTurn('Bash', { command }));
+ if (credited) assertCredited(out, command);
+ else assertNotCredited(out, command);
+ });
+ }
+
+ // --- Every PowerShell spelling of -Exclude is an exclusion ---
+ const psExcludeDenied = [
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -ex widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -EXC widget.py',
+ 'gci -Recurse -Excl widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Exclude:widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -exclu:widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Exclude: widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Exclude a.py, widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Exclude a.py ,widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Exclude a.py , widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Exclude a.py,widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Exclude:a.py, widget.py',
+ 'Select-String -Pattern TODO -Path src/* -ex widget.py',
+ 'sls TODO src/* -Exclude a.py, widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -e:widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Nonesuch:widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -in widget.py'
+ ];
+ for (const command of psExcludeDenied) {
+ gateCase(`PowerShell exclusion never credits the excluded target (${command})`, () => {
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(exclusionTarget, exclusionTurn('PowerShell', { command })), command);
+ assert.ok(!readState().fact_force_credited, `${command}: nothing credited`);
+ });
+ }
+ const psCredited = [
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Path src -Recurse -Filter widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Filt:widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include a.md, widget.py',
+ 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Exclude a.md, b.md -Filter widget.py',
+ 'Select-String -Pattern widget -Path src/* -Exclude a.md'
+ ];
+ for (const command of psCredited) {
+ gateCase(`PowerShell control still credits (${command})`, () => {
+ assertCredited(creditEdit(exclusionTarget, exclusionTurn('PowerShell', { command })), command);
+ });
+ }
+ gateCase('PowerShell include lists spread across tokens still filter the target', () => {
+ const command = 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include a.md, widget.md';
+ assertNotCredited(creditEdit(exclusionTarget, exclusionTurn('PowerShell', { command })), command);
+ });
+
+ // --- Same-turn sibling creations and counters ---
+ const projectRoot = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-proj-')));
+ const projectEnv = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: projectRoot, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' };
+ const siblingOutputs = [];
+ const projectRun = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, env = {}) => {
+ const payload = { tool_name: toolName, tool_input: toolInput, cwd: projectRoot };
+ if (transcriptPath !== undefined) payload.transcript_path = transcriptPath;
+ if (pendingToolUseIds.has(transcriptPath)) payload.tool_use_id = pendingToolUseIds.get(transcriptPath);
+ const result = runHook(payload, { ...projectEnv, ...env });
+ siblingOutputs.push(result.stdout);
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ const hso = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput : {};
+ return { result, decision: hso.permissionDecision, context: hso.additionalContext || '', reason: hso.permissionDecisionReason || '' };
+ };
+ const projectWrite = (file_path, transcriptPath, env) => projectRun('Write', { file_path, content: 'x' }, transcriptPath, env);
+ const projectEdit = (file_path, transcriptPath, env) =>
+ projectRun('Edit', { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, transcriptPath, env);
+ const assertSibling = (out, label) => {
+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: must not deny (${out.result.stdout})`);
+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'allow', `${label}: never permissionDecision allow`);
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of '), `${label}: sibling note expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ };
+ const assertDeniedNoSibling = (out, label) => {
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Sibling of'), `${label}: no sibling note`);
+ };
+ // dir_gates keys are `<class>\u0000<canonicalDir>`.
+ const dirGateKey = (dir, cls = 'code') => `${cls}\u0000${stateKey(dir)}`;
+ const newTurn = text => {
+ const human = humanRecord(text);
+ return { human, transcript: writeTranscript([human]) };
+ };
+
+ gateCase('checked lookups under a simulated Windows root (both spellings share one key)', () => {
+ const winRoot = 'C:\\Users\\RUNNER~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\gateguard-proj-abc';
+ const savedRoot = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;
+ const savedTranscript = process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;
+ let first;
+ let second;
+ try {
+ // Fixed synthetic paths: keys need no real disk, and the target is absent on any host.
+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: winRoot, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' });
+ const write = file_path => hook.run({ tool_name: 'Write', cwd: winRoot, tool_input: { file_path, content: 'x' } });
+ first = write(`${winRoot}/src/widgets/w0.js`);
+ second = write(`${winRoot}\\src\\widgets\\w1.js`);
+ } finally {
+ if (savedRoot === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;
+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = savedRoot;
+ if (savedTranscript === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;
+ else process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH = savedTranscript;
+ }
+ assert.strictEqual(parseOutput(first.stdout).hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny');
+ const state = readState();
+ if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+ assert.ok(second && /Sibling of/.test(String(second.additionalContext || '')), JSON.stringify(second));
+ assert.strictEqual(Object.keys(state.dir_gates || {}).length, 1, 'one dir gate for both spellings');
+ } else {
+ assert.strictEqual(parseOutput(second.stdout).hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', JSON.stringify(second));
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(Object.keys(state.dir_gates || {}), [], 'no dir gate for an unresolvable directory');
+ }
+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(`${winRoot}/src/widgets/w0.js`)), `w0 checked: ${JSON.stringify(state.checked)}`);
+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(`${winRoot}\\src\\widgets\\w1.js`)), 'w1 checked (backslash spelling)');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('8 new files in one dir in the same turn -> 1 deny + 7 sibling notes', () => {
+ const { human, transcript } = newTurn('scaffold the widgets');
+ const first = projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/widgets/w0.js`, transcript);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(first, 'first file');
+ for (let i = 1; i < 8; i++) {
+ const out = projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/widgets/w${i}.js`, transcript);
+ assertSibling(out, `file ${i}`);
+ assert.strictEqual(
+ out.context,
+ `[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of ${projectRoot}/src/widgets/w0.js (gated earlier at denial #1 this session); proceeding without a repeat denial.`
+ );
+ }
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1, 'one denial');
+ assert.strictEqual(state.sibling_allows, 7, 'seven sibling allows');
+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/widgets/w7.js`)), 'sibling marked checked (canonical key)');
+ const gate = state.dir_gates[dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/widgets`)];
+ assert.ok(gate, 'dir gate keyed by canonical dir');
+ assert.strictEqual(gate.turn, human.uuid);
+ assert.strictEqual(gate.first, `${projectRoot}/src/widgets/w0.js`);
+ assert.strictEqual(gate.ordinal, 1);
+ assert.ok(typeof gate.at === 'number' && gate.at > 0);
+ const retry = projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/widgets/w3.js`, transcript);
+ assert.strictEqual(retry.decision, undefined);
+ assert.strictEqual(retry.context, '', 'already checked: plain allow');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a different directory gets its own denial', () => {
+ const { transcript } = newTurn('x');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/a/one.js`, transcript), 'dir a');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/b/two.js`, transcript), 'dir b');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/a/nested/three.js`, transcript), 'subdirectory is not a sibling');
+ assertSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/b/four.js`, transcript), 'dir b sibling');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('the next human turn in the same dir is denied again', () => {
+ const turn1 = humanRecord('first');
+ const t1 = writeTranscript([turn1]);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/w/one.js`, t1), 'turn 1');
+ const t2 = writeTranscript([turn1, humanRecord('second')]);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/w/two.js`, t2), 'turn 2');
+ assertSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/w/three.js`, t2), 'turn 2 sibling');
+ assert.ok(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/w/three.js`, t2).context === '', 'checked');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().dir_gates[dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/w`)].ordinal, 2, 'latest denial ordinal recorded');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a Write over an existing file in the gated dir is still denied (per-file)', () => {
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(projectRoot, 'src', 'e'), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(projectRoot, 'src', 'e', 'existing.js'), 'old');
+ const { transcript } = newTurn('x');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/e/new.js`, transcript), 'new file');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/e/existing.js`, transcript), 'existing file');
+ assert.ok(!readState().sibling_allows, 'no sibling allow');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('an existing-file Write denial does not open a dir gate', () => {
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(projectRoot, 'src', 'f'), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(projectRoot, 'src', 'f', 'present.js'), 'old');
+ const { transcript } = newTurn('x');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/f/present.js`, transcript), 'existing file');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/f/brand_new.js`, transcript), 'new file after existing');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('fs error resolving the target -> treated as existing (no collapse)', () => {
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(projectRoot, 'src'), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(projectRoot, 'src', 'blocker'), 'not a dir');
+ const { transcript } = newTurn('x');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/blocker/one.js`, transcript), 'ENOTDIR first');
+ if (process.platform === 'win32') return;
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/blocker/two.js`, transcript), 'ENOTDIR second');
+ assert.ok(!Object.keys(readState().dir_gates || {}).some(k => k.endsWith(`${projectRoot}/src/blocker`)), 'no dir gate recorded');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('Edit and MultiEdit in a gated dir are never collapsed', () => {
+ const { transcript } = newTurn('x');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/m/one.js`, transcript), 'write');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectEdit(`${projectRoot}/src/m/two.js`, transcript), 'edit sibling');
+ const multi = projectRun(
+ 'MultiEdit',
+ { edits: [{ file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/m/three.js`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }] },
+ transcript
+ );
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(multi, 'multiedit sibling');
+ assertSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/m/four.js`, transcript), 'write sibling still works');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('an Edit denial does not open a dir gate', () => {
+ const { transcript } = newTurn('x');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectEdit(`${projectRoot}/src/n/one.js`, transcript), 'edit');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/n/two.js`, transcript), 'write after edit');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('instruction-class siblings are each denied', () => {
+ const { transcript } = newTurn('x');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/skills/foo/one.md`, transcript), 'instruction 1');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/skills/foo/two.md`, transcript), 'instruction 2');
+ assert.ok(!Object.keys(readState().dir_gates || {}).some(k => k.endsWith(`${projectRoot}/skills/foo`)), 'instruction denial opens no dir gate');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/skills/foo/helper.js`, transcript), 'code file after instruction denials');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/skills/foo/three.md`, transcript), 'instruction after a code dir gate');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('no transcript -> sibling within 120 s, denied after', () => {
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/nt/one.js`), 'first');
+ assertSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/nt/two.js`), 'within window');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.dir_gates[dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/nt`)].turn, null, 'turn null without transcript');
+ state.dir_gates[dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/nt`)].at = Date.now() - 121000;
+ writeState(state);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/nt/three.js`), 'after window');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a turn-scoped gate is not matched without a turn id, and vice versa', () => {
+ const { transcript } = newTurn('x');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/tt/one.js`, transcript), 'turn gate');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/tt/two.js`), 'no-turn call vs turn gate');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/tt/three.js`, transcript), 'turn call vs null-turn gate');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a prior search credits before the sibling rule', () => {
+ const human = humanRecord('x');
+ const t = writeTranscript([human]);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/cr/one.js`, t), 'first');
+ const t2 = writeTranscript([human, ...searchRecords('toolu_c4g', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);
+ const out = projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/cr/widget_factory.js`, t2);
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), out.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Sibling of'));
+ assert.ok(!readState().sibling_allows, 'credit is not a sibling allow');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('counters record class names for denial, credit and sibling events', () => {
+ const human = humanRecord('x');
+ const t = writeTranscript([human, ...searchRecords('toolu_c4c', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/cc/one.js`, t), 'code deny');
+ assertSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/cc/two.js`, t), 'code sibling');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/docs/guide_page.md`, t), 'prose deny');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectEdit(`${projectRoot}/tests/a.test.js`, t), 'test deny');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/skills/x/SKILL.md`, t), 'instruction deny');
+ assertCredited(projectEdit(`${projectRoot}/lib/widget_factory.js`, t), 'code credit');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.denials_by_class, { code: 1, prose: 1, test: 1, instruction: 1 });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.credited_by_class, { code: 1 });
+ assert.strictEqual(state.sibling_allows, 1);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 4);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1);
+ const json = JSON.stringify({ d: state.denials_by_class, c: state.credited_by_class });
+ assert.ok(!json.includes('/'), 'counters hold class names only, never paths');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a state file without the counter fields loads and gains them', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: ['/elsewhere/x.js'], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 2 });
+ const { transcript } = newTurn('x');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/old/one.js`, transcript), 'deny');
+ assertSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/old/two.js`, transcript), 'sibling');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes('/elsewhere/x.js'));
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 3);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.dir_gates[dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/old`)].ordinal, 3);
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.denials_by_class, { code: 1 });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.credited_by_class, {});
+ assert.strictEqual(state.sibling_allows, 1);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 0);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('malformed counter fields are tolerated (treated as empty/zero)', () => {
+ writeState({
+ checked: [],
+ last_active: Date.now(),
+ dir_gates: { [dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/bad`)]: 'nope', [dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/bad2`)]: { at: 'x' }, other: [1, 2] },
+ denials_by_class: [5],
+ credited_by_class: { code: -3, prose: 'x', test: 2 },
+ sibling_allows: 'many'
+ });
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/bad/one.js`), 'malformed gate ignored');
+ assertSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/bad/two.js`), 'fresh gate works');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(Object.keys(state.dir_gates), [dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/bad`)]);
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.denials_by_class, { code: 1 });
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.credited_by_class, { test: 2 });
+ assert.strictEqual(state.sibling_allows, 1);
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), dir_gates: 'garbage', denials_by_class: null, sibling_allows: -1 });
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/bad3/one.js`), 'garbage dir_gates');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().sibling_allows, 0);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('dir_gates is capped at 50 (oldest evicted)', () => {
+ const now = Date.now();
+ const gates = {};
+ for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) gates[dirGateKey(`/cap/d${i}`)] = { turn: null, at: now - 100000 + i, first: `/cap/d${i}/f.js`, ordinal: i + 1 };
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: now, dir_gates: gates });
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/cap/one.js`), 'new gate');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(Object.keys(state.dir_gates).length, 50, 'capped at 50');
+ assert.ok(state.dir_gates[dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/cap`)], 'newest kept');
+ assert.ok(!state.dir_gates[dirGateKey('/cap/d0')], 'oldest evicted');
+ assert.ok(state.dir_gates[dirGateKey('/cap/d1')], 'second-oldest kept');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('dir_gate first path is stored sanitized', () => {
+ const file_path = `${projectRoot}/src/san/evil\u202ename\u200b.js`;
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(file_path), 'deny');
+ const gate = readState().dir_gates[dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/san`)];
+ assert.ok(gate && !gate.first.includes('\u202e') && !gate.first.includes('\u200b'), JSON.stringify(gate));
+ const out = projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/san/ok.js`);
+ assertSibling(out, 'sibling');
+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('\u202e'));
+ });
+
+ gateCase('merges dir_gates and counters written by another process during save', () => {
+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: projectRoot, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' });
+ const originalMkdirSync = fs.mkdirSync;
+ const now = Date.now();
+ let injected = false;
+ fs.mkdirSync = function patchedMkdirSync(target) {
+ const result = originalMkdirSync.apply(fs, arguments);
+ if (!injected && path.resolve(String(target)) === path.resolve(stateDir)) {
+ injected = true;
+ fs.writeFileSync(
+ stateFile,
+ JSON.stringify({
+ checked: ['/src/concurrent.js'],
+ last_active: now,
+ fact_force_denials: 7,
+ dir_gates: {
+ [dirGateKey('/other/dir')]: { turn: 'u-other', at: now, first: '/other/dir/a.js', ordinal: 7 },
+ [dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/conc`)]: { turn: 'u-old', at: 1, first: 'stale', ordinal: 1 }
+ },
+ denials_by_class: { code: 5, prose: 2 },
+ credited_by_class: { test: 3 },
+ sibling_allows: 9
+ }),
+ 'utf8'
+ );
+ }
+ return result;
+ };
+ const savedRoot = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;
+ const savedTranscript = process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;
+ try {
+ const result = hook.run({ tool_name: 'Write', cwd: projectRoot, tool_input: { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/conc/new.js`, content: 'x' } });
+ assert.strictEqual(parseOutput(result.stdout).hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny');
+ } finally {
+ fs.mkdirSync = originalMkdirSync;
+ if (savedRoot === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;
+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = savedRoot;
+ if (savedTranscript === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;
+ else process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH = savedTranscript;
+ }
+ const persisted = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8'));
+ assert.ok(persisted.dir_gates[dirGateKey('/other/dir')], 'concurrent dir gate preserved');
+ const mine = persisted.dir_gates[dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/conc`)];
+ assert.ok(mine && mine.first === `${projectRoot}/src/conc/new.js` && mine.turn === null, 'newer in-memory gate wins');
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(persisted.denials_by_class, { code: 5, prose: 2 }, 'per-key max(disk, mem)');
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(persisted.credited_by_class, { test: 3 });
+ assert.strictEqual(persisted.sibling_allows, 9);
+ assert.ok(persisted.checked.includes('/src/concurrent.js'));
+ });
+
+ gateCase('sibling state save failure -> allow with state warning', () => {
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/sf/one.js`), 'deny');
+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: projectRoot, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' });
+ const originalWriteFileSync = fs.writeFileSync;
+ fs.writeFileSync = function patchedWriteFileSync(target) {
+ if (String(target).includes('.json.tmp.')) throw Object.assign(new Error('EIO'), { code: 'EIO' });
+ return originalWriteFileSync.apply(fs, arguments);
+ };
+ const savedRoot = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;
+ const savedTranscript = process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;
+ let result;
+ try {
+ result = hook.run({ tool_name: 'Write', cwd: projectRoot, tool_input: { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/sf/two.js`, content: 'x' } });
+ } finally {
+ fs.writeFileSync = originalWriteFileSync;
+ if (savedRoot === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;
+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = savedRoot;
+ if (savedTranscript === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;
+ else process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH = savedTranscript;
+ }
+ assert.ok(!result.stdout, 'no deny and no sibling note');
+ assert.ok(String(result.stderr).includes('could not be persisted'), JSON.stringify(result));
+ });
+
+ gateCase('clipped window keeps the promptId turn id; a sibling gate from earlier in the turn still matches', () => {
+ const { scanCurrentTurn } = loadDirectHook();
+ const pid = 'prompt-heavy';
+ const human = humanRecord('scaffold', { promptId: pid });
+ const early = writeTranscript([human]);
+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(early).turnId, pid);
+ const gateDir = `${projectRoot}/src/heavy`;
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${gateDir}/one.js`, early), 'first file, boundary in window');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().dir_gates[dirGateKey(gateDir)].turn, pid, 'gate recorded under the promptId');
+ const filler = fillerRecords('pid').map(r => (r.type === 'user' ? { ...r, promptId: pid } : r));
+ const late = writeTranscript([human, ...filler]);
+ assert.ok(fs.statSync(late).size > 300 * 1024, 'boundary scrolled out of the tail');
+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(late).turnId, pid, 'turn id stable after the turn outgrows the tail');
+ assertSibling(projectWrite(`${gateDir}/two.js`, late), 'sibling after the boundary left the window');
+ const next = writeTranscript([humanRecord('next', { promptId: 'prompt-next' })]);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${gateDir}/three.js`, next), 'next prompt is a new turn');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a new human turn uses its own promptId even when a late tool_result carries the previous one', () => {
+ const turnOneHuman = humanRecord('turn one', { promptId: 'P1' });
+ const t1 = writeTranscript([turnOneHuman]);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/late-result/aaa1.py`, t1), 'turn P1');
+ const late = { ...toolResultRecord('toolu_n3late'), promptId: 'P1' };
+ const t2 = writeTranscript([turnOneHuman, humanRecord('turn two', { promptId: 'P2' }), toolUseRecord('toolu_n3late', 'Bash', { command: 'true' }), late]);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/late-result/aaa2.py`, t2), 'turn P2 with a late P1 tool_result');
+ assertSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/late-result/aaa3.py`, t2), 'sibling within turn P2');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().dir_gates[dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/late-result`)].turn, 'P2', 'gate recorded under the boundary promptId');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a transcript that yields no turn id never falls back to the no-turn 120 s rule', () => {
+ const asDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-transcript-dir-'));
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/null-scan/one.js`, asDir), 'transcript path is a directory (scan null)');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/null-scan/two.js`, asDir), 'no collapse with a null scan');
+ const noBoundary = writeTranscript([toolUseRecord('toolu_n4x', 'Bash', { command: 'true' }), toolResultRecord('toolu_n4x')]);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/no-boundary/one.js`, noBoundary), 'whole file without a boundary (turn id null)');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/no-boundary/two.js`, noBoundary), 'no collapse without a turn id');
+ const missing = path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-missing-transcript.jsonl');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/missing-transcript/one.js`, missing), 'missing transcript file');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/missing-transcript/two.js`, missing), 'no collapse with a missing transcript');
+ const malformed = path.join(tmpRoot, `gateguard-malformed-transcript-${process.pid}.jsonl`);
+ fs.writeFileSync(malformed, [humanRecord('t1', { promptId: 'M1' }), humanRecord('t2', { promptId: 'M2' })].map(r => JSON.stringify(r)).join('\n') + '\n{"type":"assistant"}\n');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/malformed-record/one.js`, malformed), 'malformed assistant record');
+ assertSibling(projectWrite(`${projectRoot}/src/malformed-record/two.js`, malformed), 'malformed record skipped: same turn M2 still collapses');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().dir_gates[dirGateKey(`${projectRoot}/src/malformed-record`)].turn, 'M2');
+ fs.rmSync(asDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+ fs.rmSync(malformed, { force: true });
+ });
+
+ gateCase('no sibling-collapse output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {
+ assert.ok(siblingOutputs.length > 20, 'collected outputs');
+ for (const stdout of siblingOutputs) {
+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);
+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);
+ }
+ });
+
+ // --- Prior-search credit: scope and matching rules ---
+ const scopeRoot = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-scope-proj-')));
+ // Shell fixtures use forward slashes: bash treats unquoted backslashes as escapes.
+ const scopeRootSh = scopeRoot.replace(/\\/g, '/');
+ for (const dir of ['src/handlers', 'handlers', 'f']) fs.mkdirSync(path.join(scopeRoot, dir), { recursive: true });
+ for (const file of ['src/payment.py', 'src/auth.py', 'src/payment_service.py', 'top.py']) {
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(scopeRoot, file), 'x');
+ }
+ const scopeEnv = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: scopeRoot, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' };
+ const scopeOutputs = [];
+ let scopeSession = 0;
+ // Each call gets a fresh session unless the case passes session_id explicitly.
+ const scopeRun = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, extra = {}) => {
+ scopeSession += 1;
+ const payload = { tool_name: toolName, tool_input: toolInput, cwd: scopeRoot, transcript_path: transcriptPath, session_id: `scope-${scopeSession}` };
+ if (pendingToolUseIds.has(transcriptPath)) payload.tool_use_id = pendingToolUseIds.get(transcriptPath);
+ Object.assign(payload, extra);
+ if (payload.tool_use_id === null) delete payload.tool_use_id;
+ const result = runHook(payload, scopeEnv);
+ scopeOutputs.push(result.stdout);
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ const hso = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput : {};
+ return { result, decision: hso.permissionDecision, context: hso.additionalContext || '', reason: hso.permissionDecisionReason || '' };
+ };
+ const scopePath = rel => `${scopeRoot}/${rel}`;
+ const scopeEdit = (rel, t, extra) => scopeRun('Edit', { file_path: scopePath(rel), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t, extra);
+ const scopeWrite = (rel, t, extra) => scopeRun('Write', { file_path: scopePath(rel), content: 'x' }, t, extra);
+ const scopeTurn = (...records) => writeTranscript([humanRecord('fix'), ...records]);
+ const bashSearch = (id, command) => searchRecords(id, 'Bash', { command });
+ const assertScopeDenied = (out, label) => {
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Prior search seen'), `${label}: no credit note`);
+ };
+ const assertScopeCredited = (out, label) => {
+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: must not deny (${out.result.stdout})`);
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), `${label}: credit note expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ };
+ const assistantMessage = (id, messageId, name, input) => ({
+ type: 'assistant',
+ uuid: nextUuid(),
+ message: { id: messageId, role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id, name, input }] }
+ });
+ const toolResult = (id, extra) => ({
+ type: 'user',
+ uuid: nextUuid(),
+ message: { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'tool_result', tool_use_id: id, content: 'ok', ...extra }] }
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a directory listing does not credit a Write that overwrites an existing file', () => {
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_h1a', 'LS', { path: 'src' }))), 'LS src -> overwrite payment.py');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('top.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_h1b', 'grep -rn TODO .'))), 'grep -rn TODO . -> overwrite top.py');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('src/handlers/../payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_h1c', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/*.py' }))), 'Glob src/*.py -> overwrite');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('shell patterns and flag values are not directories', () => {
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('handlers/zzzz_new.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_h2a', 'grep -r handlers src'))), 'grep pattern as dir');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('f/qqqq_new.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_h2b', 'find . -type f -name x'))), 'find -type value as dir');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('handlers/rg_new.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_h2c', 'rg -g handlers TODO src'))), 'rg -g value as dir');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('handlers/sls_new.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_h2d', 'PowerShell', { command: 'Select-String handlers src/*.py' }))), 'sls pattern');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('bare cwd operands and missing directories give no directory credit', () => {
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('zzz_new.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_h2e', 'grep -rn TODO .'))), 'grep -rn TODO .');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('nothere/new_mod.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_h2f', 'ls nothere'))), 'ls of a missing dir');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('top.py/new_mod.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_h2g', 'ls top.py'))), 'ls of a file, not a dir');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('Glob with no literal prefix, or no glob characters, names no directory', () => {
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('brandnew.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_h2h', 'Glob', { pattern: '**/*' }))), 'Glob **/*');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('otherzz.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_h2i', 'Glob', { pattern: 'qqq.txt' }))), 'Glob qqq.txt');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('src/handlers/brand_new.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_h2j', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/handlers/x.py' }))), 'Glob file lookup');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('stems match on word boundaries only', () => {
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/auth.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1a', 'Grep', { pattern: 'author' }))), 'author vs auth');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1b', 'Grep', { pattern: 'TODO', glob: '**/payments/**' }))), 'payments glob');
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeEdit('src/auth.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1c', 'Grep', { pattern: 'def auth(' }))), 'auth( boundary');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('shell segments that only read stdin never credit', () => {
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_m1d', 'echo payment | grep payment'))), 'echo | grep');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_m1e', 'cat README | grep -c payment'))), 'cat | grep -c');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_m1f', 'echo payment | rg payment'))), 'piped rg with no path');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a shell segment that only reads the target is not a search', () => {
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_m1g', 'ls src/payment.py'))), 'ls target');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_m1h', 'grep -n . src/payment.py'))), 'grep . target');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_m1i', 'grep -n payment ./src/payment.py'))), 'grep stem in target only');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1j', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment', path: 'src/payment.py' }))), 'Grep path = target');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('Grep/Glob/LS with an explicit path only credit targets inside it', () => {
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1k', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment', path: '/nonexistent/elsewhere' }))), 'Grep elsewhere');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1l', 'Glob', { pattern: 'payment.md', path: '/nonexistent-dir' }))), 'Glob elsewhere');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1m', 'Grep', { pattern: 'TODO', path: 'x', glob: 'src/payments/**' }))), 'glob in another directory');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1n', 'Glob', { pattern: 'lib/**/payment*' }))), 'Glob prefix elsewhere');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1o', 'Glob', { pattern: 'payment.md', path: scopeRoot }))), 'file lookup in an ancestor dir');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1p', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/payment.py' }))), 'lookup of the target itself');
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_m1q', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/payment.md' }))), 'file lookup beside the target');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('same-batch searches are excluded when the pending call cannot be located', () => {
+ const edit = scopePath(`src/payment.py`);
+ const sameBatch = writeTranscript(
+ [humanRecord('fix'), assistantMessage('g1', 'msg_B', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' }), assistantMessage('e1', 'msg_B', 'Edit', { file_path: edit }), toolResult('g1')],
+ { pending: false }
+ );
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', sameBatch), 'no tool_use_id: newest message excluded');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', sameBatch, { tool_use_id: 'e1' }), 'tool_use_id located');
+ const notYet = writeTranscript([humanRecord('fix'), assistantMessage('g2', 'msg_C', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' }), toolResult('g2')], { pending: false });
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', notYet, { tool_use_id: 'e2' }), 'tool_use_id not in transcript yet');
+ const noMsgId = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('fix'),
+ { type: 'assistant', uuid: nextUuid(), message: { role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id: 'g3', name: 'Grep', input: { pattern: 'payment' } }] } },
+ toolResult('g3')
+ ]);
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', noMsgId), 'search without message.id');
+ const earlier = writeTranscript(
+ [humanRecord('fix'), assistantMessage('g4', 'msg_D', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' }), toolResult('g4'), assistantMessage('e4', 'msg_E', 'Edit', { file_path: edit })],
+ { pending: false }
+ );
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', earlier), 'no tool_use_id: search in an older message still credits');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a boundary without uuid yields a hashed turn id; siblings do not cross turns', () => {
+ const { scanCurrentTurn } = loadDirectHook();
+ const noUuid = text => ({ type: 'user', message: { role: 'user', content: text } });
+ const t1 = writeTranscript([noUuid('turn one')], { pending: false });
+ const t2 = writeTranscript([noUuid('turn one'), noUuid('turn TWO new request')], { pending: false });
+ const id1 = scanCurrentTurn(t1).turnId;
+ const id2 = scanCurrentTurn(t2).turnId;
+ assert.ok(/^h:[0-9a-f]{16}$/.test(id1), `hashed turn id, got ${id1}`);
+ assert.notStrictEqual(id1, id2, 'different boundary lines, different turn ids');
+ const w1 = scopeWrite('src/hashed-turn/hhh1.py', t1, { tool_use_id: null, session_id: 'hashed-turn-session' });
+ assert.strictEqual(w1.decision, 'deny', w1.result.stdout);
+ const w2 = scopeWrite('src/hashed-turn/hhh2.py', t2, { tool_use_id: null, session_id: 'hashed-turn-session' });
+ assert.strictEqual(w2.decision, 'deny', `turn 2 sibling must be denied: ${w2.result.stdout}`);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('compaction is a turn boundary', () => {
+ const pre = [humanRecord('orig task'), ...searchRecords('toolu_l2a', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' })];
+ const summary = { type: 'user', uuid: nextUuid(), isCompactSummary: true, message: { role: 'user', content: 'Summary: ...' } };
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', writeTranscript([...pre, { type: 'system', subtype: 'compact_boundary' }, summary])), 'summary');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', writeTranscript([...pre, { type: 'system', uuid: 'cb-1', subtype: 'compact_boundary' }])), 'boundary only');
+ const { scanCurrentTurn } = loadDirectHook();
+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(writeTranscript([...pre, summary], { pending: false })).turnId, summary.uuid, 'summary uuid is the turn id');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('error results are recognised without a boolean is_error', () => {
+ const errored = extra => scopeTurn(toolUseRecord('toolu_l3', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' }), toolResult('toolu_l3', extra));
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', errored({ is_error: 'true', content: 'Error: denied' })), 'is_error "true"');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', errored({ content: '<tool_use_error>Permission denied</tool_use_error>' })), 'string content');
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', errored({ content: [{ type: 'text', text: ' <tool_use_error>x</tool_use_error>' }] })), 'text block');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a tool_use id seen more than once in the turn never qualifies', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('x'),
+ assistantMessage('g', 'msg_1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'unrelated' }),
+ toolResult('g'),
+ assistantMessage('g', 'msg_2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' })
+ ]);
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', t), 'duplicate id');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a cd anywhere in the turn disables shell directory credit (stem counts with a known base)', () => {
+ const t = scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_l7a', 'cd src'), ...bashSearch('toolu_l7b', 'ls handlers'));
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeWrite('handlers/new_mod.py', t), 'cd then ls handlers');
+ const control = scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_l7c', 'ls handlers'));
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeWrite('handlers/new_mod2.py', control), 'control without cd');
+ const stem = scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_l7d', 'cd src'), ...bashSearch('toolu_l7e', 'rg -n payment ..'));
+ assertScopeDenied(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', stem), 'relative operand after a cd in another call');
+ const absolute = scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_l7f', 'cd src'), ...bashSearch('toolu_l7g', `rg -n payment ${scopeRootSh}/src`));
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', absolute), 'stem after cd with an absolute operand');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('documented search forms still credit', () => {
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_p1', 'rg -n payment src'))), 'rg -n payment src');
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeEdit('src/payment_service.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_p2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment_service', path: 'src' }))), 'Grep path src');
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeWrite('src/handlers/new_handler.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_p3', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/handlers/*.py' }))), 'Glob dir');
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeWrite('src/handlers/ls_new.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_p4', 'LS', { path: 'src/handlers' }))), 'LS dir');
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeWrite('src/handlers/x_new.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_p5', 'find src/handlers -name "*.py"'))), 'find dir');
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeEdit('src/auth.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_p6', 'grep -r . -e auth'))), '-e supplies the pattern');
+ assertScopeCredited(scopeWrite('src/handlers/grep_new.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch('toolu_p7', 'grep -rn --include "*.py" TODO src/handlers/'))), 'grep dir');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a shell search only credits targets inside what it searched', () => {
+ const edit = (id, command) => scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch(id, command)));
+ assertScopeDenied(edit('toolu_n1a', 'grep -rn payment /usr/share/doc'), 'grep -rn outside the project');
+ assertScopeDenied(edit('toolu_n1b', 'rg payment docs'), 'rg in another directory');
+ assertScopeDenied(edit('toolu_n1c', 'find /etc -name payment'), 'find outside the project');
+ assertScopeDenied(edit('toolu_n1d', 'rg payment < /etc/hostname'), 'rg reading stdin via <');
+ assertScopeDenied(edit('toolu_n1e', 'rg payment </etc/hostname'), 'rg reading stdin via <file');
+ assertScopeDenied(edit('toolu_n1f', 'grep -rn payment 0< /etc/hostname'), 'grep with only an input redirection');
+ assertScopeDenied(edit('toolu_n1g', 'rg payment</etc/hostname'), 'redirection glued to the pattern');
+ assertScopeDenied(edit('toolu_n1h', 'fd payment /etc'), 'fd outside the project');
+ assertScopeDenied(edit('toolu_n1i', 'cd /elsewhere && rg payment src'), 'relative operand after an absolute cd');
+ assertScopeDenied(edit('toolu_n1j', 'git grep -n payment -- docs'), 'git grep limited to another directory');
+ assertScopeDenied(
+ scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...searchRecords('toolu_n1k', 'PowerShell', { command: 'Select-String -Path docs/*.md -Pattern payment' }))),
+ 'Select-String -Path in another directory'
+ );
+ });
+
+ gateCase('scoped shell searches still credit (positive controls)', () => {
+ const edit = (id, command) => scopeEdit('src/payment.py', scopeTurn(...bashSearch(id, command)));
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p1', 'rg -n payment src'), 'rg -n payment src');
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p2', 'grep -rn payment .'), 'grep -rn payment . (cwd scope)');
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p3', 'find src -name "payment*"'), 'find src');
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p4', 'rg payment'), 'rg with no operand searches the cwd');
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p5', 'find . -name "payment*"'), 'find .');
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p6', 'rg payment docs src'), 'one of several operands contains the target');
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p7', 'rg -n payment src/payment.py src/auth.py'), 'the target itself among other operands');
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p8', 'rg payment src < /dev/null'), 'operand before an input redirection');
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p9', `cd ${scopeRootSh} && rg payment src`), 'relative operand after an absolute cd into the project');
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p10', `grep -rn payment ${scopeRootSh}/src`), 'absolute operand');
+ assertScopeCredited(edit('toolu_n1p11', 'rg payment src/*.py'), 'glob operand scopes to its literal directory');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('no credit-scoping output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {
+ assert.ok(scopeOutputs.length > 30, 'collected outputs');
+ for (const stdout of scopeOutputs) {
+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);
+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);
+ }
+ });
+
+ // --- Sibling collapse keyed by target class ---
+ // The project root sits under an ancestor `tests/` on purpose: `src/a.py` must still be code.
+ const classBase = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-class-')));
+ const classRoot = path.join(classBase, 'tests', 'proj');
+ fs.mkdirSync(classRoot, { recursive: true });
+ const classEnv = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: classRoot, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' };
+ const classOutputs = [];
+ const classPath = rel => `${classRoot}/${rel}`;
+ const classRun = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath) => {
+ const payload = { tool_name: toolName, tool_input: toolInput, cwd: classRoot };
+ if (transcriptPath !== undefined) payload.transcript_path = transcriptPath;
+ if (pendingToolUseIds.has(transcriptPath)) payload.tool_use_id = pendingToolUseIds.get(transcriptPath);
+ const result = runHook(payload, classEnv);
+ classOutputs.push(result.stdout);
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ const hso = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput : {};
+ return { result, decision: hso.permissionDecision, context: hso.additionalContext || '', reason: hso.permissionDecisionReason || '' };
+ };
+ const classWrite = (rel, t) => classRun('Write', { file_path: classPath(rel), content: 'x' }, t);
+ const classEdit = (rel, t) => classRun('Edit', { file_path: classPath(rel), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t);
+ const scaffoldTurn = () => writeTranscript([humanRecord('scaffold it')]);
+ const classGateKey = (cls, relDir) => `${cls}\u0000${stateKey(`${classRoot}/${relDir}`)}`;
+ const assertClassDenied = (out, label) => {
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Sibling of'), `${label}: no sibling note`);
+ };
+ const assertClassSibling = (out, label) => {
+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: must not deny (${out.result.stdout})`);
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of '), `${label}: sibling note expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ };
+
+ gateCase('a code denial does not collapse other classes in the same dir', () => {
+ const t = scaffoldTurn();
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/newmod.py', t), 'code first');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/.env.production', t), 'config sibling of code');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/newmod.test.py', t), 'test sibling of code');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/README.md', t), 'prose sibling of code');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/settings.yaml', t), 'config sibling of code');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/.env.local', t), '.env sibling of code');
+ assertClassSibling(classWrite('src/other.py', t), 'code sibling of code still collapses');
+ assertClassSibling(classWrite('src/other.test.py', t), 'test sibling of test collapses');
+ assertClassSibling(classWrite('src/CHANGES.md', t), 'prose sibling of prose collapses');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('harness, instruction and config paths never collapse', () => {
+ const t = scaffoldTurn();
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.github/notes.md', t), '.github prose');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.github/more.md', t), '.github prose never collapses');
+ const instructionOut = classWrite('.github/copilot-instructions.md', t);
+ assertClassDenied(instructionOut, 'copilot-instructions');
+ assert.ok(instructionOut.reason.includes('harness/loader'), 'copilot-instructions.md is instruction class');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('READMEX.md', t), 'root prose');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('AGENT.md', t), 'AGENT.md');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.cursorrules', t), '.cursorrules');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.windsurfrules', t), '.windsurfrules');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.mcp.json', t), '.mcp.json');
+ assertClassSibling(classWrite('NOTES.md', t), 'ordinary prose sibling at root still collapses');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.claude/hooks/a.sh', t), '.claude/hooks');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.claude/hooks/evil.sh', t), '.claude/hooks sibling');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.husky/pre-commit', t), '.husky');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.husky/pre-push', t), '.husky sibling');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('config/app.yaml', t), 'config');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('config/db.yaml', t), 'config sibling');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('lib/.hidden.js', t), 'dotfile');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('lib/.other.js', t), 'dotfile sibling');
+ const gates = readState().dir_gates || {};
+ for (const key of Object.keys(gates)) {
+ assert.ok(!/\.github|\.claude|\.husky|^config|^instruction/.test(key), `no gate recorded for ${JSON.stringify(key)}`);
+ }
+ });
+
+ gateCase('classification uses the project-relative path (ancestor tests/ dir, worktrees)', () => {
+ const t = scaffoldTurn();
+ const code = classWrite('src/a.py', t);
+ assertClassDenied(code, 'code');
+ assert.ok(code.reason.includes('Name the file(s) and line(s) that will call this new file'), 'code questions');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.denials_by_class, { code: 1 }, 'counter uses the same class as the questions');
+ assert.ok(state.dir_gates[classGateKey('code', 'src')], `gate key uses the same class: ${JSON.stringify(Object.keys(state.dir_gates))}`);
+ assert.ok(classEdit('lib/b.py', t).reason.includes('List the call sites in this file or its module'), 'Edit code questions');
+ fs.mkdirSync(classPath('.claude/worktrees/feat-x'), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(classPath('.claude/worktrees/feat-x/.git'), 'gitdir: ../../../.git/worktrees/feat-x\n');
+ const wt = classWrite('.claude/worktrees/feat-x/docs/guide.md', t);
+ assertClassDenied(wt, 'worktree prose');
+ assert.ok(wt.reason.includes('supersedes or duplicates'), `worktree .md is prose: ${wt.reason}`);
+ assertClassSibling(classWrite('.claude/worktrees/feat-x/docs/guide2.md', t), 'worktree prose sibling');
+ const wtHook = classWrite('.claude/worktrees/feat-x/.claude/hooks/x.md', t);
+ assertClassDenied(wtHook, 'worktree harness');
+ assert.ok(wtHook.reason.includes('which harness loads this file'), `worktree .claude/hooks/*.md is instruction: ${wtHook.reason}`);
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.claude/worktrees/feat-x/.claude/hooks/y.md', t), 'worktree harness sibling');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('sibling note wording and class-prefixed gate key', () => {
+ const t = scaffoldTurn();
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/w/one.js', t), 'first');
+ const out = classWrite('src/w/two.js', t);
+ assertClassSibling(out, 'sibling');
+ assert.strictEqual(
+ out.context,
+ `[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of ${classRoot}/src/w/one.js (gated earlier at denial #1 this session); proceeding without a repeat denial.`
+ );
+ const gates = readState().dir_gates;
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(Object.keys(gates), [classGateKey('code', 'src/w')]);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a future `at` or a zero ordinal is never honored', () => {
+ const now = Date.now();
+ const gate = (at, ordinal, turn = null) => ({ turn, at, first: '/forged.js', ordinal });
+ writeState({
+ checked: [],
+ last_active: now,
+ dir_gates: {
+ [classGateKey('code', 'src/fut')]: gate(now + 3600 * 1000, 1),
+ [classGateKey('code', 'src/zero')]: gate(now - 1000, 0),
+ [classGateKey('code', 'src/ok')]: gate(now - 1000, 1)
+ }
+ });
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/fut/a.js'), 'future at (no turn)');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/zero/a.js'), 'ordinal 0');
+ assertClassSibling(classWrite('src/ok/a.js'), 'control: valid gate still matches');
+ const human = humanRecord('x');
+ const t = writeTranscript([human]);
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: now, dir_gates: { [classGateKey('code', 'src/futt')]: gate(now + 3600 * 1000, 1, human.uuid) } });
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/futt/a.js', t), 'future at (same turn)');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('old-shape dir_gates keys (no class prefix) are ignored and dropped', () => {
+ const now = Date.now();
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: now, dir_gates: { [`${classRoot}/src/legacy`]: { turn: null, at: now - 1000, first: 'forged', ordinal: 1 } } });
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/legacy/a.js'), 'old-shape gate ignored');
+ const keys = Object.keys(readState().dir_gates);
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(keys, [classGateKey('code', 'src/legacy')], 'old-shape key dropped, new key recorded');
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: now, dir_gates: { [`bogus\u0000${classRoot}/src/b`]: { turn: null, at: now - 1000, first: 'x', ordinal: 1 } } });
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/b/a.js'), 'unknown class prefix ignored');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('prototype keys in state are rejected and never pollute', () => {
+ const now = Date.now();
+ const legacy = classGateKey('code', 'src/pp');
+ fs.mkdirSync(stateDir, { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(
+ stateFile,
+ '{"checked":[],"last_active":' + now + ',"dir_gates":{"__proto__":{"turn":null,"at":1,"first":"x","ordinal":1},' +
+ '"constructor":{"turn":null,"at":' + (now - 1000) + ',"first":"x","ordinal":1},' +
+ '"prototype":{"turn":null,"at":' + (now - 1000) + ',"first":"x","ordinal":1},' +
+ JSON.stringify(legacy) + ':{"turn":null,"at":' + (now - 1000) + ',"first":"forged","ordinal":"NaN"}},' +
+ '"denials_by_class":{"__proto__":{"polluted":1},"constructor":5,"prototype":4,"code":7},' +
+ '"credited_by_class":{"constructor":2},"sibling_allows":0}',
+ 'utf8'
+ );
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/pp/a.js'), 'NaN ordinal gate not honored');
+ assert.strictEqual({}.polluted, undefined, 'Object.prototype not polluted');
+ const raw = fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8');
+ const state = JSON.parse(raw);
+ for (const field of ['dir_gates', 'denials_by_class', 'credited_by_class']) {
+ for (const bad of ['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype']) {
+ assert.ok(!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(state[field], bad), `${field} drops ${bad}`);
+ }
+ }
+ assert.strictEqual(state.denials_by_class.code, 8, 'code counter incremented from 7');
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.credited_by_class, {});
+ });
+
+ gateCase('second writes into dot-directories are denied', () => {
+ const t = scaffoldTurn();
+ for (const [a, b] of [
+ ['.devcontainer/a.sh', '.devcontainer/post-create.sh'],
+ ['.githooks/a', '.githooks/pre-commit'],
+ ['.kiro/steering/a.md', '.kiro/steering/b.md'],
+ ['.clinerules/a.md', '.clinerules/b.md'],
+ ['.idea/a.xml', '.idea/run.xml'],
+ ['.continue/prompts/a.prompt', '.continue/prompts/b.prompt']
+ ]) {
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite(a, t), `${a} first`);
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite(b, t), `${b} second`);
+ }
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(Object.keys(readState().dir_gates || {}), [], 'no dir gate recorded for any dot-directory');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a symlinked directory is screened (and keyed) by its real location', () => {
+ const t = scaffoldTurn();
+ fs.mkdirSync(classPath('.claude/hooks'), { recursive: true });
+ fs.mkdirSync(classPath('src/realdir'), { recursive: true });
+ try {
+ fs.symlinkSync(classPath('.claude/hooks'), classPath('src/tools'), 'dir');
+ fs.symlinkSync(classPath('src/realdir'), classPath('src/aliasdir'), 'dir');
+ } catch (e) {
+ if (process.platform === 'win32' && e.code === 'EPERM') return; // no symlink privilege
+ throw e;
+ }
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/tools/a.sh', t), 'first write through the symlink');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/tools/evil.sh', t), 'second write lands in .claude/hooks');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('src/realdir/one.js', t), 'real dir first');
+ assertClassSibling(classWrite('src/aliasdir/two.js', t), 'alias of the same real dir shares its gate');
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(Object.keys(readState().dir_gates), [classGateKey('code', 'src/realdir')], 'gate keyed by the real directory');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a .claude/worktrees/<name>/ prefix without a .git is not stripped', () => {
+ const t = scaffoldTurn();
+ fs.mkdirSync(classPath('.claude/worktrees/fake/src'), { recursive: true });
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.claude/worktrees/fake/src/a.py', t), 'fake worktree first');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.claude/worktrees/fake/src/b.py', t), 'fake worktree sibling');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.claude/worktrees/fake/a.sh', t), 'fake worktree root first');
+ assertClassDenied(classWrite('.claude/worktrees/fake/statusline.sh', t), 'fake worktree root sibling');
+ const md = classWrite('.claude/worktrees/fake/docs/g.md', t);
+ assertClassDenied(md, 'fake worktree .md');
+ assert.ok(md.reason.includes('which harness loads this file') || md.reason.includes('harness/loader'), `stays instruction: ${md.reason}`);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('no class-keyed collapse output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {
+ assert.ok(classOutputs.length > 30, 'collected outputs');
+ for (const stdout of classOutputs) {
+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);
+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);
+ }
+ });
+
+ // --- Opt-in session cap on first-touch denials ---
+ const capEnvName = 'GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS';
+ const capOutputs = [];
+ const capRun = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, cap) => {
+ const out = projectRun(toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, cap === undefined ? {} : { [capEnvName]: cap });
+ capOutputs.push(out.result.stdout);
+ return out;
+ };
+ const capAssertPassThrough = (out, toolName, label) => {
+ const output = parseOutput(out.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(output, `${label}: valid JSON`);
+ assert.ok(!output.hookSpecificOutput, `${label}: pass-through expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ assert.strictEqual(output.tool_name, toolName, `${label}: pass-through preserves input`);
+ };
+ const capWarning = value =>
+ `[Fact-Forcing Gate] ignoring malformed ${capEnvName}=${value}; the denial cap is not active.`;
+ // Same-process run with stderr captured; restores the env var that loadDirectHook sets.
+ const capInProcess = (fn) => {
+ const saved = process.env[capEnvName];
+ const originalStderrWrite = process.stderr.write.bind(process.stderr);
+ const captured = [];
+ process.stderr.write = chunk => {
+ const s = typeof chunk === 'string' ? chunk : chunk.toString();
+ if (s.includes(capEnvName)) captured.push(s.replace(/\n$/, ''));
+ return true;
+ };
+ try {
+ return fn(captured);
+ } finally {
+ process.stderr.write = originalStderrWrite;
+ if (saved === undefined) delete process.env[capEnvName];
+ else process.env[capEnvName] = saved;
+ }
+ };
+ const capDirectEdit = (hook, file) =>
+ parseOutput(hook.run(JSON.stringify({ tool_name: 'Edit', cwd: projectRoot, tool_input: { file_path: `${projectRoot}/${file}` } })).stdout);
+
+ for (const malformed of ['3.9', '+3', 'abc', '-1', '3oops', '0x3', ' 3 oops', '99999999999999999999']) {
+ gateCase(`malformed cap ${JSON.stringify(malformed)} warns once and leaves the gate uncapped`, () => {
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 9 });
+ capInProcess(captured => {
+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ ...projectEnv, [capEnvName]: malformed });
+ const first = capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-malformed-a.py');
+ const second = capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-malformed-b.py');
+ assert.strictEqual(first.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', 'uncapped: first denied');
+ assert.strictEqual(second.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', 'uncapped: second denied');
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(captured, [capWarning(malformed.trim())], 'exactly one warning with the sanitized value');
+ });
+ assert.ok(!readState().cap_allows, 'no cap allow recorded');
+ });
+ }
+
+ gateCase('a different malformed cap warns again; valid, empty and unset values never warn', () => {
+ capInProcess(captured => {
+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ ...projectEnv, [capEnvName]: 'abc' });
+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-1.py');
+ process.env[capEnvName] = 'xyz';
+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-2.py');
+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-3.py');
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(captured, [capWarning('abc'), capWarning('xyz')]);
+ process.env[capEnvName] = '50';
+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-4.py');
+ process.env[capEnvName] = '';
+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-5.py');
+ delete process.env[capEnvName];
+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-6.py');
+ assert.strictEqual(captured.length, 2, `no further warnings: ${JSON.stringify(captured)}`);
+ });
+ });
+
+ gateCase('the warning value is sanitized and bounded', () => {
+ capInProcess(captured => {
+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ ...projectEnv, [capEnvName]: `3\u202e\u200b${'9'.repeat(200)}x` });
+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-sanitize.py');
+ assert.strictEqual(captured.length, 1, JSON.stringify(captured));
+ assert.ok(!/[\u202e\u200b]/.test(captured[0]), 'no invisible characters');
+ assert.ok(captured[0].length < 200, `bounded: ${captured[0].length}`);
+ });
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a malformed cap also warns from the spawned hook (stderr), stdout still denies', () => {
+ const out = capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/cap-spawn.py` }, undefined, 'abc');
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny');
+ assert.ok(out.result.stderr.includes(capWarning('abc')), out.result.stderr);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('surrounding whitespace is trimmed (" 2 " caps at 2, no warning)', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 2 });
+ const out = capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/cap-trim.py` }, undefined, ' 2 ');
+ capAssertPassThrough(out, 'Edit', 'trimmed cap');
+ assert.ok(!out.result.stderr.includes(capEnvName), out.result.stderr);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a cap pass marks the target checked, counts cap_allows, never counts a denial', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 2 });
+ const a = `${projectRoot}/src/cap-counted-a.py`;
+ capAssertPassThrough(capRun('Edit', { file_path: a }, undefined, '2'), 'Edit', 'first past cap');
+ let state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 1, 'cap_allows counted');
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 2, 'denials unchanged');
+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(a)), 'cap-passed target marked checked');
+ capAssertPassThrough(capRun('Edit', { file_path: a }, undefined, '2'), 'Edit', 'retry');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().cap_allows, 1, 'a retry of a checked target is not recounted');
+ capAssertPassThrough(capRun('Write', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/cap-counted-b.py`, content: 'x' }, undefined, '2'), 'Write', 'second');
+ state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 2);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 2);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('cap_allows loads from old or malformed state and survives later writes', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 1, cap_allows: 'garbage' });
+ capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/cap-old-a.py` }, undefined, '1');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().cap_allows, 1, 'malformed counter treated as zero');
+ writeState({ ...readState(), cap_allows: 7 });
+ capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/cap-old-b.py` }, undefined, '1');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().cap_allows, 8, 'increments the persisted count');
+ capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/cap-old-c.py` });
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().cap_allows, 8, 'kept across an unrelated state write');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('cap 0 passes the first new path without a denial', () => {
+ capAssertPassThrough(capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/cap-zero.py` }, undefined, '0'), 'Edit', 'cap 0');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.ok(!state.fact_force_denials, 'no denial counted');
+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 1);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('credit and sibling allows run before the cap and do not consume it', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('build the gadget and fix the widget factory'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_cap_g1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory', path: projectRoot }),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_cap_g2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'gadget_maker', path: projectRoot })
+ ]);
+ const credited = capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/widget_factory.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t, '1');
+ assert.ok(credited.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), credited.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(!readState().fact_force_denials, 'credit consumes no denial');
+ const first = capRun('Write', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/capgen/g0.js`, content: 'x' }, t, '1');
+ assert.strictEqual(first.decision, 'deny', 'the one denial the cap allows');
+ const sibling = capRun('Write', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/capgen/g1.js`, content: 'x' }, t, '1');
+ assert.ok(sibling.context.includes('[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of '), `sibling note, not a cap pass: ${sibling.result.stdout}`);
+ const creditedAfterCap = capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/gadget_maker.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t, '1');
+ assert.ok(creditedAfterCap.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), 'credit still wins once the cap is reached');
+ let state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.sibling_allows, 1);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 2);
+ assert.ok(!state.cap_allows, 'no cap pass yet');
+ const capped = capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${projectRoot}/src/unrelated_module.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t, '1');
+ capAssertPassThrough(capped, 'Edit', 'uncredited target past the cap');
+ state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 1);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('MultiEdit past the cap passes every entry and counts each', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 1 });
+ const files = ['src/cap-multi-a.py', 'src/cap-multi-b.py', 'src/cap-multi-c.py'].map(f => `${projectRoot}/${f}`);
+ const out = capRun('MultiEdit', { edits: files.map(file_path => ({ file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' })) }, undefined, '1');
+ capAssertPassThrough(out, 'MultiEdit', 'MultiEdit past cap');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 3);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1);
+ for (const f of files) assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(f)), `${f} checked`);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('destructive and routine Bash stay gated once the cap is reached', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 5 });
+ const env = { ...projectEnv, [capEnvName]: '0' };
+ const destructive = parseOutput(runBashHook({ tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'rm -rf build' } }, env).stdout);
+ assert.strictEqual(destructive.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', 'destructive gate unchanged');
+ const routine = parseOutput(runBashHook({ tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'npm test' } }, env).stdout);
+ assert.strictEqual(routine.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', 'routine gate unchanged');
+ assert.ok(!readState().cap_allows, 'Bash never counts a cap pass');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('no cap output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {
+ assert.ok(capOutputs.length > 10, `collected outputs: ${capOutputs.length}`);
+ for (const stdout of capOutputs) {
+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);
+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);
+ }
+ });
+
+ // --- Sensitive targets are never auto-passed ---
+ const sensLine = 'Sensitive target: prior-search credit, sibling collapse, and the denial cap do not apply.';
+ const sensTargets = [
+ '.env', '.env.local', 'config/.env.production', 'certs/server.pem', 'certs/server.key', 'certs/client.p12',
+ 'certs/client.pfx', 'keys/id_rsa', 'keys/id_rsa.pub', 'keys/id_ed25519', 'keys/id_ecdsa', 'keys/id_dsa',
+ '.netrc', 'home/.pgpass', 'config/credentials.json',
+ 'config/secrets.yaml', 'src/auth/login_flow.py', 'src/authn/token_check.py', 'src/authz/policy_rules.py',
+ 'src/security/hardening.py', 'src/secrets/vault_client.py', 'src/payment/charge_card.py',
+ 'src/payments/refund_flow.py', 'src/billing/invoice_maker.py', 'db/migrations/0001_initial.py',
+ '.github/workflows/release.yml', 'SRC/Auth/Upper_Case.py'
+ ];
+ const sensOutputs = [];
+ const sensRun = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, env = {}) => {
+ const out = projectRun(toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, env);
+ sensOutputs.push(out.result.stdout);
+ return out;
+ };
+ const sensAbs = rel => `${projectRoot}/${rel}`;
+ const sensDir = rel => path.posix.dirname(sensAbs(rel));
+ const sensStem = rel => path.posix.basename(rel).replace(/\.[^.]*$/, '') || path.posix.basename(rel);
+ const sensAssertDenied = (out, label) => {
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ assert.ok(!out.context, `${label}: no credit/sibling note`);
+ assert.ok(out.reason.includes(sensLine), `${label}: sensitive line expected: ${out.reason}`);
+ };
+ // Search evidence that credits a Write of a new file in `rel`'s directory, and an Edit of its stem.
+ const sensCreditTranscript = (rel, n) => writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('update it'),
+ ...searchRecords(`toolu_sens_ls_${n}`, 'LS', { path: sensDir(rel) }),
+ ...searchRecords(`toolu_sens_gr_${n}`, 'Grep', { pattern: sensStem(rel), path: projectRoot }),
+ ...searchRecords(`toolu_sens_ctl_${n}`, 'LS', { path: sensAbs('src/plain') })
+ ]);
+
+ gateCase('each sensitive target is denied on first Write despite a qualifying search (control credited)', () => {
+ sensTargets.forEach((rel, n) => {
+ clearState();
+ const t = sensCreditTranscript(rel, n);
+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs(rel), content: 'x' }, t), `Write ${rel}`);
+ const control = sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs(`src/plain/ctl_${n}.py`), content: 'x' }, t);
+ assert.ok(control.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), `control credited for ${rel}: ${control.result.stdout}`);
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1, `${rel}: the denial counts`);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1, `${rel}: only the control was credited`);
+ });
+ });
+
+ gateCase('sensitive Edit and MultiEdit targets are denied despite a stem search', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('fix the billing'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_sens_e1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'invoice_maker|login_flow|plain_helper', path: projectRoot })
+ ]);
+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('src/billing/invoice_maker.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t), 'Edit');
+ const multi = sensRun('MultiEdit', {
+ edits: [
+ { file_path: sensAbs('src/plain/plain_helper.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' },
+ { file_path: sensAbs('src/auth/login_flow.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }
+ ]
+ }, t);
+ sensAssertDenied(multi, 'MultiEdit sensitive entry');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1, 'the ordinary entry was credited');
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 2);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a sensitive new file never joins a same-dir sibling gate', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('scaffold keys')]);
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/keys/loader.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'ordinary first');
+ for (const rel of ['src/keys/server.key', 'src/keys/server.pem', 'src/keys/credentials.py', 'src/keys/secrets.py', 'src/keys/id_rsa_test_fixture.py']) {
+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs(rel), content: 'x' }, t), rel);
+ }
+ assertSibling(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/keys/other.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'ordinary sibling still collapses');
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().sibling_allows, 1);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a sensitive denial opens no sibling gate; sensitive dirs never collapse', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('scaffold auth')]);
+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/vault/api.key'), content: 'x' }, t), 'sensitive first');
+ assertDeniedNoSibling(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/vault/client.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'ordinary after sensitive');
+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/auth/a.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'auth first');
+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/auth/b.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'auth second');
+ const gates = Object.keys(readState().dir_gates || {});
+ assert.ok(!gates.some(k => k.endsWith(stateKey(sensAbs('src/auth')))), `no auth gate: ${JSON.stringify(gates)}`);
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(gates, [dirGateKey(sensAbs('src/vault'))], 'only the ordinary denial opened a gate');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('sensitive targets are denied after the denial cap is reached (and still count)', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 5 });
+ const env = { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '1' };
+ sensTargets.forEach((rel, n) => {
+ const tool = n % 2 ? 'Edit' : 'Write';
+ const input = tool === 'Edit' ? { file_path: sensAbs(rel), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } : { file_path: sensAbs(rel), content: 'x' };
+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun(tool, input, undefined, env), `${tool} ${rel} past cap`);
+ });
+ const multi = sensRun('MultiEdit', { edits: [
+ { file_path: sensAbs('src/plain/capped.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' },
+ { file_path: sensAbs('src/payments/capped.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }
+ ] }, undefined, env);
+ sensAssertDenied(multi, 'MultiEdit sensitive entry past cap');
+ const control = sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('src/plain/also_capped.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, undefined, env);
+ assert.ok(!parseOutput(control.result.stdout).hookSpecificOutput, 'ordinary target passes the cap');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 5 + sensTargets.length + 1, 'every sensitive denial counts');
+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 2);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('the sensitive line also appears in condensed denials; ordinary denials are unchanged', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 9 });
+ const condensed = sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('src/auth/condensed.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' });
+ sensAssertDenied(condensed, 'condensed');
+ assert.ok(condensed.reason.includes('(denial #10 this session)'), condensed.reason);
+ clearState();
+ const full = sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('src/auth/full.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' });
+ sensAssertDenied(full, 'full');
+ assert.ok(full.reason.includes(`${sensLine}\n\nPresent the facts, then retry the same operation.`), full.reason);
+ clearState();
+ const ordinary = sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('src/author.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' });
+ assert.strictEqual(ordinary.decision, 'deny');
+ assert.ok(!ordinary.reason.includes('Sensitive target'), 'segment-exact: author.py is ordinary');
+ for (const rel of ['docs/authoring.md', 'lib/paymentutils.py']) {
+ clearState();
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('go'), ...searchRecords(`toolu_ord_${rel.length}`, 'LS', { path: sensDir(rel) })]);
+ const out = sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs(rel), content: 'x' }, t);
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), `${rel} is ordinary and credited: ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ }
+ });
+
+ // --- A symlinked directory cannot launder a sensitive real location ---
+ // symlinked/src/tools -> symlinked/src/auth (a real directory inside the project).
+ const aliasReady = (() => {
+ fs.mkdirSync(sensAbs('symlinked/src/auth'), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(sensAbs('symlinked/src/auth/login_flow.py'), 'x');
+ fs.mkdirSync(sensAbs('symlinked/src/plain'), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(sensAbs('symlinked/src/plain/plain_login.py'), 'x');
+ try {
+ fs.symlinkSync(sensAbs('symlinked/src/auth'), sensAbs('symlinked/src/tools'), 'dir');
+ return true;
+ } catch (e) {
+ if (process.platform === 'win32' && e.code === 'EPERM') return false; // no symlink privilege
+ throw e;
+ }
+ })();
+ const aliasEdit = (rel, t, env) => sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs(rel), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t, env);
+ const assertAliasCredited = (out, label) =>
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), `${label}: credit expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+
+ gateCase('an Edit through a symlink into auth/ is denied despite a crediting search (direct control credited)', () => {
+ if (!aliasReady) return;
+ const t = writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('fix login'),
+ ...searchRecords('toolu_r1_g1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'login_flow|plain_login|new_login', path: projectRoot })
+ ]);
+ sensAssertDenied(aliasEdit('symlinked/src/tools/login_flow.py', t), 'Edit via the alias');
+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('symlinked/src/tools/new_login.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'Write via the alias');
+ assertAliasCredited(aliasEdit('symlinked/src/plain/plain_login.py', t), 'direct non-sensitive path');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 2);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a new file through a symlink into auth/ never joins a same-turn sibling gate', () => {
+ if (!aliasReady) return;
+ const { human, transcript } = newTurn('scaffold handlers');
+ const gate = { turn: human.uuid, at: Date.now() - 1000, first: 'seeded.py', ordinal: 1 };
+ writeState({
+ checked: [],
+ last_active: Date.now(),
+ fact_force_denials: 1,
+ dir_gates: {
+ [dirGateKey(sensAbs('symlinked/src/auth'))]: gate,
+ [dirGateKey(sensAbs('symlinked/src/tools'))]: gate,
+ [dirGateKey(sensAbs('symlinked/src/plain'))]: gate
+ }
+ });
+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('symlinked/src/tools/new_handler.py'), content: 'x' }, transcript), 'sibling via alias');
+ assertSibling(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('symlinked/src/plain/new_handler.py'), content: 'x' }, transcript), 'control sibling');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('an Edit through a symlink into auth/ is denied past the denial cap (control passes)', () => {
+ if (!aliasReady) return;
+ const env = { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '0' };
+ sensAssertDenied(aliasEdit('symlinked/src/tools/login_flow.py', undefined, env), 'alias past cap 0');
+ const control = aliasEdit('symlinked/src/plain/plain_login.py', undefined, env);
+ assert.ok(!parseOutput(control.result.stdout).hookSpecificOutput, `control passes the cap: ${control.result.stdout}`);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('no sensitive output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {
+ assert.ok(sensOutputs.length > 60, `collected outputs: ${sensOutputs.length}`);
+ for (const stdout of sensOutputs) {
+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);
+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;
+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);
+ }
+ });
+
+ // --- Read-only first shell command ---
+ const roDecision = result => {
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ return output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;
+ };
+ const roReason = result => {
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ return output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? String(output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason) : '';
+ };
+ const roBash = (command, extra = {}, env = {}) => runBashHook({ tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command }, ...extra }, env);
+ const roPs = command => runPowerShellHook({ tool_name: 'PowerShell', tool_input: { command } });
+
+ gateCase('a read-only first Bash command passes without using the routine gate', () => {
+ const first = roBash('ls -la src');
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(first), undefined, first.stdout);
+ assert.ok(!first.stdout.includes('permissionDecision'), first.stdout);
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.routine_readonly_passes, 1);
+ assert.ok(!(state.checked || []).includes('__bash_session__'), 'routine gate must stay unchecked');
+ const second = roBash('git status --short | head');
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(second), undefined, second.stdout);
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().routine_readonly_passes, 2);
+ const routine = roBash('npm test');
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(routine), 'deny');
+ assert.ok(roReason(routine).includes('current user request'));
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(roBash('npm test')), undefined, 'retry after the routine gate passes');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('read-only commands after the routine gate is checked are not counted', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: ['__bash_session__'], last_active: Date.now() });
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(roBash('ls')), undefined);
+ assert.ok(!readState().routine_readonly_passes, 'no read-only pass counted once the gate is checked');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a read-only first PowerShell command passes and the next cmdlet is still gated', () => {
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(roPs('Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Filter *.js')), undefined);
+ const routine = roPs('Get-Date');
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(routine), 'deny');
+ assert.ok(roReason(routine).includes('Before the first PowerShell command'));
+ });
+
+ gateCase('commands that write, substitute or run unknown programs still draw the routine gate', () => {
+ for (const command of ['ls > out.txt', 'ls | tee out.txt', 'cat $(pwd)/a', 'find . -exec ls {} +', 'find . -name x -delete', 'git log | xargs echo', 'FOO=1 ls', 'sed -i s/a/b/ f', 'git commit -m x']) {
+ clearState();
+ const result = roBash(command);
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(result), 'deny', `${command}: ${result.stdout}`);
+ assert.ok(roReason(result).includes('current user request'), `${command}: routine gate expected`);
+ assert.ok(!readState().routine_readonly_passes, `${command}: no read-only pass`);
+ }
+ for (const command of ['Get-ChildItem | Out-File a.txt', 'Get-Content a | Set-Content b', 'pwsh -Command Get-ChildItem', 'Get-Content $env:X']) {
+ clearState();
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(roPs(command)), 'deny', command);
+ }
+ });
+
+ gateCase('destructive commands are gated before the read-only check', () => {
+ for (const command of ['find . -name x -exec rm {} +', 'rm -rf build', 'git branch -D old']) {
+ clearState();
+ const result = roBash(command);
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(result), 'deny', command);
+ assert.ok(roReason(result).includes('Destructive command detected'), `${command}: destructive gate expected`);
+ }
+ clearState();
+ const ps = roPs('Remove-Item -Recurse -Force C:/tmp/demo');
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(ps), 'deny');
+ assert.ok(roReason(ps).includes('Destructive command detected'));
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a read-only first command in a subagent passes and other commands stay gated', () => {
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(roBash('pwd', { agent_id: 'agent-ro' })), undefined);
+ const routine = roBash('npm test', { agent_id: 'agent-ro' });
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(routine), 'deny');
+ assert.ok(roReason(routine).includes('current user request'));
+ });
+
+ // --- Idle window follows the session key ---
+ const idleEnvNoIds = { CLAUDE_SESSION_ID: '', ECC_SESSION_ID: '', CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' };
+ const idleStateFiles = () => fs.readdirSync(stateDir).filter(f => f.startsWith('state-') && f.endsWith('.json'));
+ const idleSeed = (fileName, ageMs) => {
+ fs.mkdirSync(stateDir, { recursive: true });
+ const file = path.join(stateDir, fileName);
+ fs.writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify({ checked: ['__bash_session__'], last_active: Date.now() - ageMs }), 'utf8');
+ return file;
+ };
+ const HOUR = 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+ gateCase('state keyed by a session id survives two idle hours', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: ['__bash_session__'], last_active: Date.now() - 2 * HOUR });
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(roBash('npm test')), undefined);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('state keyed by a session id expires after eight idle hours', () => {
+ writeState({ checked: ['__bash_session__'], last_active: Date.now() - 8 * HOUR - 60 * 1000 });
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(roBash('npm test')), 'deny');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('state keyed by a transcript path survives two idle hours', () => {
+ const transcript = path.join(stateDir, 'idle-session.jsonl');
+ roBash('npm test', { transcript_path: transcript }, idleEnvNoIds);
+ const [file] = idleStateFiles();
+ assert.ok(/^state-tx-/.test(file), file);
+ const state = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(stateDir, file), 'utf8'));
+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(stateDir, file), JSON.stringify({ ...state, last_active: Date.now() - 2 * HOUR }), 'utf8');
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(roBash('npm test', { transcript_path: transcript }, idleEnvNoIds)), undefined);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('state keyed by the project fallback still expires after 30 idle minutes', () => {
+ const env = { ...idleEnvNoIds, CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: path.join(stateDir, 'idle-project') };
+ roBash('npm test', {}, env);
+ const [file] = idleStateFiles();
+ assert.ok(/^state-proj-/.test(file), file);
+ idleSeed(file, 31 * 60 * 1000);
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(roBash('npm test', {}, env)), 'deny');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('module-load pruning keeps session files for the long window and project files for the short one', () => {
+ const age = (file, ms) => fs.utimesSync(file, new Date(Date.now() - ms), new Date(Date.now() - ms));
+ const recentSession = idleSeed('state-recent-session.json', 0);
+ const oldSession = idleSeed('state-old-session.json', 0);
+ const recentTx = idleSeed(`state-tx-${'a'.repeat(24)}.json`, 0);
+ const oldProj = idleSeed(`state-proj-${'b'.repeat(24)}.json`, 0);
+ const oldTmp = path.join(stateDir, 'state-recent-session.json.tmp.1.abcd');
+ fs.writeFileSync(oldTmp, '{}', 'utf8');
+ age(recentSession, 2 * HOUR);
+ age(recentTx, 2 * HOUR);
+ age(oldSession, 17 * HOUR);
+ age(oldProj, 61 * 60 * 1000);
+ age(oldTmp, 61 * 60 * 1000);
+ loadDirectHook();
+ assert.ok(fs.existsSync(recentSession), 'session file inside the long window is kept');
+ assert.ok(fs.existsSync(recentTx), 'transcript file inside the long window is kept');
+ assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(oldSession), 'session file past the long window is pruned');
+ assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(oldProj), 'project fallback file past the short window is pruned');
+ assert.ok(!fs.existsSync(oldTmp), 'stale temp file is pruned on the short window');
+ });
+
+ // --- Sensitive targets in subagents ---
+ const subRun = (tool, toolInput, extra = {}) =>
+ runHook({ tool_name: tool, tool_input: toolInput, session_id: 'subagent-sensitive-session', ...extra }, { CLAUDE_SESSION_ID: '', ECC_SESSION_ID: '' });
+ const subEdit = (file_path, extra) => subRun('Edit', { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, extra);
+ const subAgent = { agent_id: 'agent-sens' };
+
+ gateCase('a subagent Edit of a sensitive file is denied once, then its retry passes', () => {
+ const first = subEdit('/src/.env', subAgent);
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(first), 'deny', first.stdout);
+ assert.ok(roReason(first).includes(sensLine));
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(subEdit('/src/.env', subAgent)), undefined, 'subagent retry passes');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a subagent pass on a sensitive file does not unlock it for the parent', () => {
+ subEdit('/src/auth/login.js', subAgent);
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(subEdit('/src/auth/login.js', subAgent)), undefined);
+ const parent = subEdit('/src/auth/login.js');
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(parent), 'deny', 'parent first touch is still gated');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a sensitive file the parent already gated passes in a subagent', () => {
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(subEdit('/src/secrets.json')), 'deny');
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(subEdit('/src/secrets.json', { parent_tool_use_id: 'toolu_parent' })), undefined);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('subagent Write and MultiEdit of sensitive targets are denied; ordinary targets still pass', () => {
+ const write = subRun('Write', { file_path: '/repo/.github/workflows/ci.yml', content: 'x' }, subAgent);
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(write), 'deny');
+ const multi = subRun('MultiEdit', {
+ edits: [
+ { file_path: '/src/plain.js', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' },
+ { file_path: '/src/payments/charge.js', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }
+ ]
+ }, subAgent);
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(multi), 'deny');
+ assert.ok(roReason(multi).includes('charge.js'));
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(subEdit('/src/ordinary.js', subAgent)), undefined);
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(subRun('Write', { file_path: '/src/new-file.js', content: 'x' }, subAgent)), undefined);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('subagent sensitive denials ignore prior-search credit and the denial cap', () => {
+ const transcript = writeTranscript([humanRecord('fix it'), ...searchRecords('toolu_sub1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'login', path: '/src' })]);
+ const result = subRun('Edit', { file_path: '/src/auth/login.js', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, { ...subAgent, transcript_path: transcript });
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(result), 'deny');
+ clearState();
+ const capped = runHook(
+ { tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: '/src/.env.local', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, session_id: 'subagent-sensitive-session', ...subAgent },
+ { CLAUDE_SESSION_ID: '', ECC_SESSION_ID: '', GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '0' }
+ );
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(capped), 'deny');
+ });
+
+ // --- NotebookEdit ---
+ const notebookInput = (rel, extra = {}) => ({ notebook_path: sensAbs(rel), new_source: 'x = 1', cell_id: 'c1', ...extra });
+ const notebookRun = (rel, transcriptPath, env, extra) => projectRun('NotebookEdit', notebookInput(rel, extra), transcriptPath, env);
+ const FULL_CODE_QUESTIONS = [
+ 'List ALL files that import/require this file',
+ 'List the public functions/classes affected by this change',
+ 'If this file reads/writes data files',
+ "Quote the user's current instruction verbatim"
+ ];
+
+ gateCase('a first NotebookEdit is denied with the full code questions, then its retry passes', () => {
+ const first = notebookRun('nb/analysis.ipynb');
+ assert.strictEqual(first.decision, 'deny', first.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(first.reason.includes(`Before editing ${sensAbs('nb/analysis.ipynb')}`), first.reason);
+ for (const line of FULL_CODE_QUESTIONS) assert.ok(first.reason.includes(line), `${line}: ${first.reason}`);
+ assert.ok(!first.reason.includes(sensLine), 'ordinary notebook has no sensitive line');
+ const retry = notebookRun('nb/analysis.ipynb');
+ assert.strictEqual(retry.decision, undefined, retry.result.stdout);
+ assert.strictEqual(readState().fact_force_denials, 1);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('NotebookEdit and Edit share one checked key for a notebook', () => {
+ assert.strictEqual(notebookRun('nb/shared.ipynb').decision, 'deny');
+ assert.strictEqual(projectEdit(sensAbs('nb/shared.ipynb')).decision, undefined, 'Edit after a NotebookEdit denial passes');
+ assert.strictEqual(projectEdit(sensAbs('nb/other.ipynb')).decision, 'deny');
+ assert.strictEqual(notebookRun('nb/other.ipynb').decision, undefined, 'NotebookEdit after an Edit denial passes');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('NotebookEdit is gated by notebook_path, not by a file_path field', () => {
+ projectEdit(sensAbs('src/checked.py'));
+ const out = notebookRun('nb/target.ipynb', undefined, {}, { file_path: sensAbs('src/checked.py') });
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', out.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(out.reason.includes('target.ipynb'), out.reason);
+ const exempt = notebookRun('nb/exempt-by-file-path.ipynb', undefined, { GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS: '**/other.py' }, { file_path: sensAbs('src/other.py') });
+ assert.strictEqual(exempt.decision, 'deny', 'an exempt file_path does not exempt the notebook');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a NotebookEdit is never a trivial pass', () => {
+ const out = notebookRun('nb/comment.ipynb', undefined, {}, { new_source: '# just a comment', edit_mode: 'replace' });
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', out.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Comment or whitespace-only'), out.context);
+ assert.ok(!readState().trivial_allows, 'no trivial pass counted');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a notebook under tests/ gets the test questions', () => {
+ const out = notebookRun('tests/notebooks/check.ipynb');
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny');
+ assert.ok(out.reason.includes('Name what behaviour is under test'), out.reason);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a search naming the notebook credits its first NotebookEdit', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('update the notebook'), ...searchRecords('toolu_nb1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'forecast', path: projectRoot })]);
+ const out = notebookRun('nb/forecast.ipynb', t);
+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', out.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), out.result.stdout);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a sensitive notebook is denied despite a crediting search and past the denial cap', () => {
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('update it'), ...searchRecords('toolu_nb2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'tokens', path: projectRoot })]);
+ sensAssertDenied(notebookRun('src/auth/tokens.ipynb', t), 'credited sensitive notebook');
+ clearState();
+ sensAssertDenied(notebookRun('src/auth/tokens.ipynb', undefined, { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '0' }), 'sensitive notebook past cap 0');
+ const control = notebookRun('nb/capped.ipynb', undefined, { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '0' });
+ assert.strictEqual(control.decision, undefined, 'ordinary notebook passes the cap like Edit');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('NotebookEdit honours exempt globs', () => {
+ const out = notebookRun('scratch/play.ipynb', undefined, { GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS: '**/scratch/**' });
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, undefined, out.result.stdout);
+ assert.strictEqual(out.context, '');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a subagent NotebookEdit passes for an ordinary notebook and is denied for a sensitive one', () => {
+ const agent = { agent_id: 'agent-notebook' };
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(subRun('NotebookEdit', { notebook_path: '/src/nb/plain.ipynb', new_source: 'x' }, agent)), undefined);
+ const sensitive = subRun('NotebookEdit', { notebook_path: '/src/payments/ledger.ipynb', new_source: 'x' }, agent);
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(sensitive), 'deny');
+ assert.ok(roReason(sensitive).includes(sensLine));
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a lower-case notebookedit tool name is gated the same way', () => {
+ assert.strictEqual(projectRun('notebookedit', notebookInput('nb/lower.ipynb')).decision, 'deny');
+ });
+
+ // --- Hard-linked targets ---
+ const linkedLine = 'Hard-linked target: prior-search credit, sibling collapse, and the denial cap do not apply.';
+ const linkPair = (rel, alias, content = '// old\nfoo();\n') => {
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(sensAbs(rel)), { recursive: true });
+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(sensAbs(alias)), { recursive: true });
+ fs.writeFileSync(sensAbs(rel), content);
+ try {
+ fs.linkSync(sensAbs(rel), sensAbs(alias));
+ return true;
+ } catch (e) {
+ if (['EPERM', 'ENOTSUP', 'EXDEV', 'ENOSYS', 'EOPNOTSUPP'].includes(e.code)) return false;
+ throw e;
+ }
+ };
+ const linksReady = linkPair('linked/src/report.js', 'linked/vendor/report.js')
+ && linkPair('linked/src/auth/token.js', 'linked/vendor/token.js')
+ && linkPair('linked/src/sub.js', 'linked/vendor/sub.js')
+ && linkPair('linked/scratch/tmp.js', 'linked/vendor/tmp.js');
+ for (const rel of ['linked/src/plain.js', 'linked/src/plain_two.js']) fs.writeFileSync(sensAbs(rel), '// old\nfoo();\n');
+ const assertLinkedDenied = (out, label) => {
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny, got ${out.result.stdout}`);
+ assert.ok(!out.context, `${label}: no credit, trivial or sibling note`);
+ assert.ok(out.reason.includes(linkedLine), `${label}: hard-link line expected: ${out.reason}`);
+ assert.ok(!out.reason.includes(sensLine), `${label}: no sensitive wording`);
+ };
+ const linkedSearch = n => writeTranscript([
+ humanRecord('update the report'),
+ ...searchRecords(`toolu_linked_${n}`, 'Grep', { pattern: 'report|plain|tmp', path: projectRoot })
+ ]);
+
+ gateCase('an Edit of a hard-linked file is denied despite a crediting search (control credited)', () => {
+ if (!linksReady) return;
+ const t = linkedSearch(1);
+ assertLinkedDenied(projectEdit(sensAbs('linked/src/report.js'), t), 'original name');
+ assertLinkedDenied(projectEdit(sensAbs('linked/vendor/report.js'), t), 'second name');
+ assertCredited(projectEdit(sensAbs('linked/src/plain.js'), t), 'single-link control');
+ const state = readState();
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 2);
+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('the full code questions are asked for a hard-linked file', () => {
+ if (!linksReady) return;
+ const out = projectRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('linked/src/report.js'), old_string: 'foo();', new_string: 'bar();' });
+ assertLinkedDenied(out, 'body-only change');
+ for (const line of FULL_CODE_QUESTIONS) assert.ok(out.reason.includes(line), `${line}: ${out.reason}`);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a comment-only Edit of a hard-linked file is denied (control passes as trivial)', () => {
+ if (!linksReady) return;
+ const input = rel => ({ file_path: sensAbs(rel), old_string: '// old', new_string: '// new' });
+ assertLinkedDenied(projectRun('Edit', input('linked/src/report.js')), 'Edit');
+ const multi = projectRun('MultiEdit', { file_path: sensAbs('linked/vendor/tmp.js'), edits: [{ old_string: '// old', new_string: '// new' }] });
+ assertLinkedDenied(multi, 'MultiEdit');
+ const control = projectRun('Edit', input('linked/src/plain_two.js'));
+ assert.notStrictEqual(control.decision, 'deny', control.result.stdout);
+ assert.ok(control.context.includes('Comment or whitespace-only change'), control.context);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a hard-linked file is denied past the denial cap (control passes)', () => {
+ if (!linksReady) return;
+ const env = { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '0' };
+ assertLinkedDenied(projectEdit(sensAbs('linked/src/report.js'), undefined, env), 'Edit past cap 0');
+ const multi = projectRun('MultiEdit', { edits: [
+ { file_path: sensAbs('linked/src/plain.js'), old_string: 'foo();', new_string: 'bar();' },
+ { file_path: sensAbs('linked/vendor/tmp.js'), old_string: 'foo();', new_string: 'bar();' }
+ ] }, undefined, env);
+ assertLinkedDenied(multi, 'MultiEdit entry past cap 0');
+ assert.ok(multi.reason.includes('tmp.js'), multi.reason);
+ const control = projectEdit(sensAbs('linked/src/plain_two.js'), undefined, env);
+ assert.strictEqual(control.decision, undefined, control.result.stdout);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a MultiEdit with a hard-linked entry is denied despite a crediting search', () => {
+ if (!linksReady) return;
+ const t = linkedSearch(2);
+ const multi = projectRun('MultiEdit', { edits: [
+ { file_path: sensAbs('linked/src/plain.js'), old_string: 'foo();', new_string: 'bar();' },
+ { file_path: sensAbs('linked/src/report.js'), old_string: 'foo();', new_string: 'bar();' }
+ ] }, t);
+ assertLinkedDenied(multi, 'MultiEdit');
+ assert.ok(multi.reason.includes('report.js'), multi.reason);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a subagent Edit of a hard-linked file is denied once; single-link targets still pass', () => {
+ if (!linksReady) return;
+ const agent = { agent_id: 'agent-linked', cwd: projectRoot };
+ const first = subEdit(sensAbs('linked/vendor/sub.js'), agent);
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(first), 'deny', first.stdout);
+ assert.ok(roReason(first).includes(linkedLine), roReason(first));
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(subEdit(sensAbs('linked/vendor/sub.js'), agent)), undefined, 'subagent retry passes');
+ assert.strictEqual(roDecision(subEdit(sensAbs('linked/src/plain.js'), agent)), undefined);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a hard-linked sensitive file carries the sensitive wording', () => {
+ if (!linksReady) return;
+ const out = projectEdit(sensAbs('linked/src/auth/token.js'));
+ sensAssertDenied(out, 'sensitive and hard-linked');
+ assert.ok(!out.reason.includes(linkedLine), out.reason);
+ const alias = projectEdit(sensAbs('linked/vendor/token.js'));
+ assertLinkedDenied(alias, 'ordinary name of a hard link into auth/');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('a new file next to a hard-linked file keeps its allowances', () => {
+ if (!linksReady) return;
+ const t = writeTranscript([humanRecord('add a module'), ...searchRecords('toolu_linked_ls', 'LS', { path: sensAbs('linked/src') })]);
+ const out = projectWrite(sensAbs('linked/src/new_module.js'), t);
+ assertCredited(out, 'missing new file');
+ });
+
+ gateCase('an exempt glob still exempts a hard-linked file', () => {
+ if (!linksReady) return;
+ const out = projectEdit(sensAbs('linked/scratch/tmp.js'), undefined, { GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS: 'linked/scratch/**' });
+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, undefined, out.result.stdout);
+ });
+
+ gateCase('no hard-link output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {
+ for (const stdout of siblingOutputs) {
+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);
+ assert.notStrictEqual(output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined, 'allow', stdout);
+ }
+ });
+
+ fs.rmSync(classBase, { recursive: true, force: true });
+ fs.rmSync(scopeRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+
+ fs.rmSync(projectRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
+
+ fs.rmSync(transcriptDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+
+ // Cleanup only the temp directory created by this test file.
+ try {
+ if (fs.existsSync(stateDir)) {
+ fs.rmSync(stateDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+ }
+ } catch (err) {
+ console.error(` [cleanup] failed to remove ${stateDir}: ${err.message}`);
+ }
+
+ // --- sanitizePath dangerous invisible unicode regression ---
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('sanitizePath strips CI-defined dangerous invisible unicode from denial paths', () => {
+ const file_path =
- '/src/eu2028\u2028eu2029\u2029app.js\u200bhidden\u2060name\ufefftail\u3164x\u0091c1.js';
++ '/src/eu2028\u2028eu2029\u2029app.js\u200bhidden\u2060name\ufefftail\u00adsoft\u3164x\u0091c1.js';
+ const input = {
+ tool_name: 'Edit',
+ tool_input: { file_path, old_string: 'foo', new_string: 'bar' }
+ };
+ const result = runHook(input);
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ const reason = String(
+ output && output.hookSpecificOutput
+ ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason
+ : ''
+ );
- for (const bad of ['\u2028', '\u2029', '\u200b', '\u2060', '\ufeff', '\u3164', '\u0091']) {
++ for (const bad of ['\u2028', '\u2029', '\u200b', '\u2060', '\ufeff', '\u00ad', '\u3164', '\u0091']) {
+ assert.ok(!reason.includes(bad), `denial reason must not carry U+${bad.codePointAt(0).toString(16)} (${bad})`);
+ }
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('app.js'), 'visible path text must remain');
+ })
+ ) {
+ passed++;
+ } else {
+ failed++;
+ }
+
+ // --- Modules load only on the paths that need them ---
+ const loadedLibs = (payload, setup = []) => {
+ const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-lazy-'));
+ const env = { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: dir, GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR: path.join(dir, 'state'), CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: dir };
+ const probe = [
+ 'const hook = require(process.argv[1]);',
+ 'hook.run(process.argv[2]);',
+ "const names = Object.keys(require.cache).map(f => require('path').basename(f, '.js'));",
+ "const libs = names.filter(n => /^(gateguard-|transcript-context$|file-tail$)/.test(n) && !/^gateguard-(fact-force|heredoc)$/.test(n));",
+ 'process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(libs.sort()));'
+ ].join('\n');
+ try {
+ for (const step of setup) spawnSync(process.execPath, ['-e', probe, hookScript, JSON.stringify(step)], { env });
+ const out = spawnSync(process.execPath, ['-e', probe, hookScript, JSON.stringify(payload)], { encoding: 'utf8', env });
+ return JSON.parse(out.stdout);
+ } finally {
+ fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+ }
+ };
+ const lazyEdit = { session_id: 'lazy', tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: '/tmp/gateguard-lazy/src/widget.js', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } };
+ const lazyBash = command => ({ session_id: 'lazy', tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command } });
+ const lazyCases = [
+ ['a first shell command loads only the read-only check', lazyBash('npm test'), [], ['gateguard-readonly-shell', 'gateguard-state']],
+ ['a shell command after the routine gate loads only the state helpers', lazyBash('npm run build'), [lazyBash('npm test')], ['gateguard-state']],
+ ['an edit of a checked file loads only the target classification', lazyEdit, [lazyEdit], ['gateguard-state', 'gateguard-target-class']],
+ ['a first touch without a transcript loads no search matching', lazyEdit, [], ['file-tail', 'gateguard-change-profile', 'gateguard-code-lexer', 'gateguard-file-context', 'gateguard-state', 'gateguard-target-class', 'gateguard-turn-scan']],
+ ['a first touch of an instruction file skips the change profile', { ...lazyEdit, tool_input: { ...lazyEdit.tool_input, file_path: '/tmp/gateguard-lazy/CLAUDE.md' } }, [], ['file-tail', 'gateguard-state', 'gateguard-target-class', 'gateguard-turn-scan']]
+ ];
+ for (const [label, payload, setup, expected] of lazyCases) {
+ if (test(`lazy loading: ${label}`, () => assert.deepStrictEqual(loadedLibs(payload, setup), expected))) passed++;
+ else failed++;
}
const ddResults = runDdRegressionTests();