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The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.

fix(gateguard): sanitize dangerous invisible unicode in denial paths (#3103)

xsfbf70150eb2df
diff --git a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
index 53d8424fe..6756a0b79 100644
--- a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
+++ b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
@@ -1262,16 +1262,62 @@ function isChecked(key) {
// --- Sanitize file path against injection ---
+// Unicode policy for sanitizePath, mirroring the repo-wide dangerous set in
+// scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js. Named so the ranges stay auditable and
+// drift against the CI policy is visible in one place.
+const ASCII_CONTROL_MAX = 0x1f;
+const ASCII_DELETE = 0x7f;
+const C1_CONTROLS = [0x80, 0x9f]; // Unicode C1 control block (U+0080..U+009F)
+const BIDI_MARKS = [0x200e, 0x200f]; // LRM/RLM
+const BIDI_EMBEDDINGS = [0x202a, 0x202e]; // LRE..PDF
+const BIDI_ISOLATES = [0x2066, 0x2069]; // LRI..PDI
+const ZERO_WIDTHS = [0x200b, 0x200d]; // ZWSP..ZWJ
+const WORD_JOINER = 0x2060;
+const BYTE_ORDER_MARK = 0xfeff;
+const VARIATION_SELECTORS = [0xfe00, 0xfe0f];
+const VARIATION_SUPPLEMENTS = [0xe0100, 0xe01ef]; // MONGOLIAN..TAGS (VS17..VS256)
+const TAG_BLOCK = [0xe0000, 0xe007f]; // ASCII-smuggling tag characters
+const MONGOLIAN_VOWEL_SEPARATOR = 0x180e;
+const HANGUL_CHOSEONG_FILLER = 0x115f;
+const HANGUL_JUNGSEONG_FILLER = 0x1160;
+const HANGUL_FILLER = 0x3164;
+const INVISIBLE_MATH_OPERATORS = [0x2061, 0x2064]; // FUNCTION APPLICATION..INVISIBLE PLUS
+const LINE_SEPARATOR = 0x2028;
+const PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR = 0x2029;
+const SANITIZED_PATH_MAX_LENGTH = 500;
+
+function inRange(code, [lo, hi]) {
+ return code >= lo && code <= hi;
+}
+
function sanitizePath(filePath) {
- // Strip control chars (including null), bidi overrides, and newlines
+ // Strip control chars (including null), bidi overrides, separators,
+ // and the dangerous invisible characters defined by the constants
+ // above (mirroring scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js), so a denial
+ // message cannot carry content a human reviewer cannot see.
let sanitized = '';
for (const char of String(filePath || '')) {
const code = char.codePointAt(0);
- const isAsciiControl = code <= 0x1f || code === 0x7f;
- const isBidiOverride = (code >= 0x200e && code <= 0x200f) || (code >= 0x202a && code <= 0x202e) || (code >= 0x2066 && code <= 0x2069);
- sanitized += isAsciiControl || isBidiOverride ? ' ' : char;
- }
- return sanitized.trim().slice(0, 500);
+ const isAsciiControl =
+ code <= ASCII_CONTROL_MAX || code === ASCII_DELETE || inRange(code, C1_CONTROLS);
+ const isBidiOverride =
+ inRange(code, BIDI_MARKS) || inRange(code, BIDI_EMBEDDINGS) || inRange(code, BIDI_ISOLATES);
+ const isUnicodeSeparator = code === LINE_SEPARATOR || code === PARAGRAPH_SEPARATOR;
+ const isDangerousInvisible =
+ inRange(code, ZERO_WIDTHS) ||
+ code === WORD_JOINER ||
+ code === BYTE_ORDER_MARK ||
+ inRange(code, VARIATION_SELECTORS) ||
+ inRange(code, VARIATION_SUPPLEMENTS) ||
+ inRange(code, TAG_BLOCK) ||
+ code === MONGOLIAN_VOWEL_SEPARATOR ||
+ code === HANGUL_CHOSEONG_FILLER ||
+ code === HANGUL_JUNGSEONG_FILLER ||
+ code === HANGUL_FILLER ||
+ inRange(code, INVISIBLE_MATH_OPERATORS);
+ sanitized += isAsciiControl || isBidiOverride || isUnicodeSeparator || isDangerousInvisible ? ' ' : char;
+ }
+ return sanitized.trim().slice(0, SANITIZED_PATH_MAX_LENGTH);
}
function normalizeForMatch(value) {
diff --git a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
index 399cca83b..9e6a18334 100644
--- a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
+++ b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
@@ -3369,6 +3369,34 @@ function runTests() {
console.error(` [cleanup] failed to remove ${stateDir}: ${err.message}`);
}
+ // --- sanitizePath dangerous invisible unicode regression ---
+ clearState();
+ if (
+ test('sanitizePath strips CI-defined dangerous invisible unicode from denial paths', () => {
+ const file_path =
+ '/src/eu2028\u2028eu2029\u2029app.js\u200bhidden\u2060name\ufefftail\u3164x\u0091c1.js';
+ const input = {
+ tool_name: 'Edit',
+ tool_input: { file_path, old_string: 'foo', new_string: 'bar' }
+ };
+ const result = runHook(input);
+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);
+ const reason = String(
+ output && output.hookSpecificOutput
+ ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason
+ : ''
+ );
+ for (const bad of ['\u2028', '\u2029', '\u200b', '\u2060', '\ufeff', '\u3164', '\u0091']) {
+ assert.ok(!reason.includes(bad), `denial reason must not carry U+${bad.codePointAt(0).toString(16)} (${bad})`);
+ }
+ assert.ok(reason.includes('app.js'), 'visible path text must remain');
+ })
+ ) {
+ passed++;
+ } else {
+ failed++;
+ }
+
console.log(`\n ${passed} passed, ${failed} failed\n`);
process.exit(failed > 0 ? 1 : 0);
}