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The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.

docs: add supply-chain incident response playbook

Affaan Mustafacbecf5689d8d
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 0cd2bb804..fb00b0087 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -96,5 +96,6 @@ Do not sanitize repo files in response to ephemeral reminders; they are not the
- **AgentShield**: Scan your agent config for vulnerabilities — `npx ecc-agentshield scan`
- **Security Guide**: [The Shorthand Guide to Everything Agentic Security](./the-security-guide.md)
+- **Supply-chain incident response**: [npm/GitHub Actions package-registry playbook](./docs/security/supply-chain-incident-response.md)
- **OWASP MCP Top 10**: [owasp.org/www-project-mcp-top-10](https://owasp.org/www-project-mcp-top-10/)
- **OWASP Agentic Applications Top 10**: [genai.owasp.org](https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/)
diff --git a/docs/security/supply-chain-incident-response.md b/docs/security/supply-chain-incident-response.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..339d19672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/security/supply-chain-incident-response.md
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# Supply-Chain Incident Response
+
+This playbook is the ECC operator runbook for npm, GitHub Actions, and
+cross-ecosystem package-registry incidents. It is intentionally conservative:
+registry signatures, provenance, and trusted publishing are useful signals, but
+they do not prove that the workflow executed the intended code path.
+
+## Current External Trigger
+
+As of 2026-05-13, the active incident class is the May 2026 TanStack npm
+supply-chain compromise:
+
+- TanStack reported 84 malicious versions across 42 `@tanstack/*` packages,
+ published on 2026-05-11 between 19:20 and 19:26 UTC.
+- GitHub advisory `GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx` / `CVE-2026-45321` describes
+ install-time malware that harvests cloud credentials, GitHub tokens, npm
+ credentials, Vault tokens, Kubernetes tokens, and SSH private keys.
+- The attack chain combined `pull_request_target`, GitHub Actions cache
+ poisoning across a fork/base trust boundary, and OIDC token extraction from a
+ GitHub Actions runner.
+- npm trusted publishing/provenance can confirm a package came from a bound CI
+ identity. It cannot by itself prove that the CI cache, lifecycle scripts, or
+ publish path were safe.
+
+Primary references:
+
+- <https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem>
+- <https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx>
+- <https://tanstack.com/blog/incident-followup>
+- <https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers/>
+- <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/09/23/widespread-supply-chain-compromise-impacting-npm-ecosystem>
+
+## ECC Exposure Check
+
+Run this before a release candidate, after a broad dependency bump, and after
+any package-registry incident.
+
+```bash
+rg -n '(@tanstack|mistralai|uipath|opensearch|guardrails|axios)' \
+ package.json package-lock.json .opencode/package.json .opencode/package-lock.json
+npm ci --ignore-scripts
+npm audit signatures
+npm audit --audit-level=high
+node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
+node tests/scripts/npm-publish-surface.test.js
+node tests/run-all.js
+```
+
+If a search hit appears only in documentation examples, note it in the release
+evidence but do not rotate credentials for a docs-only reference.
+
+## Immediate Response
+
+If ECC or a maintainer machine installed a known-bad package version:
+
+1. Stop the host from publishing or deploying.
+2. Preserve evidence before cleanup:
+ - package manager command history;
+ - `package-lock.json`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, or `yarn.lock`;
+ - CI run URLs and runner logs;
+ - npm package versions and tarball integrity hashes;
+ - outbound network logs where available.
+3. Treat the install host as compromised if lifecycle scripts may have run.
+4. Rotate every credential reachable by the process:
+ - npm automation tokens and maintainer tokens;
+ - GitHub PATs, fine-grained tokens, deploy keys, and Actions secrets;
+ - cloud credentials, Vault tokens, Kubernetes service-account tokens, SSH
+ keys, and local `.npmrc` tokens;
+ - any MCP, plugin, or harness credentials available in environment variables
+ or user-scope config.
+5. Purge GitHub Actions caches for affected repositories.
+6. Reinstall from a clean environment with `npm ci --ignore-scripts` first.
+7. Re-enable lifecycle scripts only after the dependency tree and package
+ versions are pinned to known-clean releases.
+
+## GitHub Actions Rules
+
+ECC enforces these rules through `scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js`:
+
+- privileged workflows must not checkout untrusted PR refs;
+- workflows with write permissions must use `npm ci --ignore-scripts`;
+- workflows with `id-token: write` must not restore or save shared dependency
+ caches;
+- workflows that run `npm audit` must also run `npm audit signatures`;
+- `pull_request_target` workflows must not restore or save shared dependency
+ caches.
+
+Treat any violation as a release blocker.
+
+## Publication Rules
+
+Before tagging or publishing ECC:
+
+1. Verify there is no unexpected dependency on packages in the active advisory.
+2. Use a clean checkout or throwaway worktree for release commands.
+3. Do not mix PR/test caches with publish jobs.
+4. Keep `id-token: write` limited to release workflows that do not use shared
+ dependency caches.
+5. Prefer trusted publishing/provenance where supported, while still requiring
+ local package-surface tests and registry-signature verification.
+6. Confirm npm dist-tag, GitHub release, Claude plugin, Codex plugin, and
+ OpenCode package state in the publication-readiness evidence document.
+
+## When To Escalate
+
+Escalate to a maintainer security review before any release or merge if:
+
+- a dependency lockfile references a package named in an active advisory;
+- a workflow combines `pull_request_target` with dependency installation,
+ cache restore/save, PR-head checkout, or write permissions;
+- a release workflow combines `id-token: write` with shared cache usage;
+- a publish workflow uses a long-lived npm token without a documented reason;
+- AgentShield, GitGuardian, Dependabot, npm audit, or registry-signature checks
+ disagree.
diff --git a/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js b/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
index 5b1e22800..eae0c2264 100644
--- a/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
+++ b/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
@@ -129,6 +129,16 @@ function findViolations(filePath, source) {
});
}
+ if (/\bpull_request_target\s*:/m.test(source) && ACTIONS_CACHE_PATTERN.test(source)) {
+ violations.push({
+ filePath,
+ event: 'pull_request_target cache',
+ description: 'pull_request_target workflows must not restore or save shared dependency caches',
+ expression: 'pull_request_target + actions/cache',
+ line: getLineNumber(source, source.search(/\bpull_request_target\s*:/m)),
+ });
+ }
+
if (NPM_AUDIT_PATTERN.test(source) && !NPM_AUDIT_SIGNATURES_PATTERN.test(source)) {
violations.push({
filePath,
diff --git a/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js b/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
index a3bad9cc9..a21d253e9 100644
--- a/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
+++ b/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
@@ -99,6 +99,14 @@ function run() {
assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
+ if (test('rejects shared cache use in pull_request_target workflows', () => {
+ const result = runValidator({
+ 'unsafe-pr-target-cache.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/cache@v5\n with:\n path: ~/.npm\n key: cache\n - run: echo inspect\n`,
+ });
+ assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on pull_request_target cache use');
+ assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target workflows must not restore or save shared dependency caches/);
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
if (test('rejects npm ci without ignore-scripts in workflows with write permissions', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-write-install.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n workflow_dispatch:\npermissions:\n contents: read\n issues: write\njobs:\n audit:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - run: npm ci\n`,