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The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.

fix(ci): flag refs/pull checkouts under pull_request_target

Jamkriscdbc925d8938
diff --git a/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js b/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
index bdefcdb7a..4e65cdef3 100644
--- a/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
+++ b/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
@@ -21,6 +21,15 @@ const RULES = [
eventPattern: /\bpull_request_target\s*:/m,
description: 'pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository',
expressionPattern: /\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.pull_request\.head\.(?:ref|sha|repo\.full_name)\s*\}\}/g,
+ // Even without the standard `github.event.pull_request.head.*` expression,
+ // a checkout under `pull_request_target` that fetches a `refs/pull/<N>/{head,merge}`
+ // ref pulls attacker-controlled code into a workflow with write-scoped
+ // tokens. GitHub's security guidance treats both forms equivalently;
+ // we match the ref value directly so any interpolation that resolves
+ // to such a ref (`refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge`,
+ // a hardcoded `refs/pull/123/head`, a `${{ env.X }}` that the maintainer
+ // assumes is safe, etc.) trips the same rule.
+ refPattern: /^\s*ref:\s*['"]?[^'"\n]*refs\/(?:remotes\/)?pull\/[^'"\n\s]+/m,
},
];
@@ -127,6 +136,18 @@ function findViolations(filePath, source) {
line: step.startLine + getLineNumber(step.text, match.index) - 1,
});
}
+ if (rule.refPattern) {
+ const refMatch = step.text.match(rule.refPattern);
+ if (refMatch) {
+ violations.push({
+ filePath,
+ event: rule.event,
+ description: rule.description,
+ expression: refMatch[0].trim(),
+ line: step.startLine + getLineNumber(step.text, refMatch.index) - 1,
+ });
+ }
+ }
}
}
diff --git a/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js b/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
index cacbcc397..9c51d6d2a 100644
--- a/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
+++ b/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
@@ -99,6 +99,34 @@ function run() {
assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
})) passed++; else failed++;
+ // `refs/pull/<N>/{head,merge}` under `pull_request_target` is the canonical
+ // privilege-escalation pattern that the standard `github.event.pull_request.head.*`
+ // expression check did not cover. Either form pulls attacker-controlled code
+ // into a privileged workflow.
+
+ if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout fetching refs/pull/N/merge', () => {
+ const result = runValidator({
+ 'unsafe-pr-target-merge-ref.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n types: [opened]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: refs/pull/\${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge\n persist-credentials: false\n`,
+ });
+ assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on refs/pull/N/merge under pull_request_target');
+ assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/);
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout fetching hardcoded refs/pull/N/head', () => {
+ const result = runValidator({
+ 'unsafe-pr-target-head-ref.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n ref: refs/pull/123/head\n persist-credentials: false\n`,
+ });
+ assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on hardcoded refs/pull/N/head');
+ assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/);
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+ if (test('allows pull_request_target checkout of the base ref (no with.ref)', () => {
+ const result = runValidator({
+ 'safe-pr-target-base.yml': `name: Safe\non:\n pull_request_target:\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/checkout@v4\n with:\n persist-credentials: false\n - run: echo inspecting base\n`,
+ });
+ assert.strictEqual(result.status, 0, result.stderr || result.stdout);
+ })) passed++; else failed++;
+
if (test('rejects shared cache use in pull_request_target workflows', () => {
const result = runValidator({
'unsafe-pr-target-cache.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n pull_request_target:\n branches: [main]\njobs:\n inspect:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - uses: actions/cache@v5\n with:\n path: ~/.npm\n key: cache\n - run: echo inspect\n`,