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The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.

fix(gateguard): fail closed on unmodelled wrapper options and past the nesting limit

L4XBe2a69ff5dfa5
diff --git a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
index e0b44c972..04e60eb81 100644
--- a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
+++ b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ const EXECUTION_PREFIXES = {
// `runuser -c '<string>'` hands the string to a shell.
commandStringOptions: ['-c', '--command', '--session-command'],
},
- chroot: { positionals: 1 },
+ chroot: { valueOptions: ['--userspec', '--groups'], positionals: 1 },
taskset: { valueOptions: ['-c', '--cpu-list'], positionals: 1, positionalUnlessValueOption: true },
};
@@ -412,6 +412,10 @@ const EXECUTION_PREFIXES = {
function stripExecutionPrefixes(tokens) {
let rest = tokens;
let commandStrings = [];
+ // Set once a wrapper option this table does not model is skipped: it may
+ // or may not have consumed a value, so where the command starts is no
+ // longer certain and the caller scans every later token (fail closed).
+ let inconclusive = false;
while (rest.length > 0) {
const spec = EXECUTION_PREFIXES[commandBasename(rest[0])];
if (!spec) break;
@@ -444,6 +448,8 @@ function stripExecutionPrefixes(tokens) {
i += 2;
consumedValueOption = true;
} else {
+ // `--opt=value` carries its value; a bare unknown option may not.
+ if (!(token.startsWith('--') && token.includes('='))) inconclusive = true;
i++;
}
continue;
@@ -454,7 +460,7 @@ function stripExecutionPrefixes(tokens) {
if (spec.positionalUnlessValueOption && consumedValueOption) positionals = 0;
rest = rest.slice(i + positionals);
}
- return { command: rest, commandStrings };
+ return { command: rest, commandStrings, inconclusive };
}
// A short-option cluster of a shell that includes `c` (`-c`, `-lc`, `-ec`,
@@ -465,6 +471,8 @@ const SHELL_COMMAND_OPTION = /^-[A-Za-z]*c[A-Za-z]*$/;
// a filename (`truncate.db`, `psql -f truncate.sql`, `--file=x.sql`), not a
// SQL phrase. `if=...` is kept so `dd if=disk.img` still matches the dd
// pattern. Used on single arguments and on flattened command text.
+// Options of the SQL clients whose next argument is a script file, not SQL.
+const SQL_FILE_OPTIONS = new Set(['-f', '--file']);
const FILE_LIKE_ARGUMENT = /^(?!if=)\S*(?:[\\/]\S*|\.[A-Za-z0-9]{1,8})$/;
const FILE_LIKE_TOKEN = /(^|\s)(?!if=)\S*(?:[\\/]\S*|\.[A-Za-z0-9]{1,8})(?=\s|$)/g;
@@ -475,7 +483,20 @@ const FILE_LIKE_TOKEN = /(^|\s)(?!if=)\S*(?:[\\/]\S*|\.[A-Za-z0-9]{1,8})(?=\s|$)
* @returns {string}
*/
function sqlArgumentText(args) {
- return args.filter(arg => !FILE_LIKE_ARGUMENT.test(arg)).join(' ');
+ const kept = [];
+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
+ const arg = args[i];
+ // A script path given to the client (`-f FILE`, `--file FILE`, `-fFILE`,
+ // `--file=FILE`) is a filename even when it contains spaces.
+ if (SQL_FILE_OPTIONS.has(arg)) {
+ i++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (arg.startsWith('--file=') || (arg.startsWith('-f') && arg.length > 2 && !arg.startsWith('--'))) continue;
+ if (FILE_LIKE_ARGUMENT.test(arg)) continue;
+ kept.push(arg);
+ }
+ return kept.join(' ');
}
/**
@@ -527,33 +548,51 @@ const SQL_CLIENTS = new Set([
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function isDestructiveQuoteAware(raw, depth = 0) {
- if (depth > 4) return false;
+ // Past the nesting limit the payload is not inspected at all, so it is
+ // treated as destructive rather than waved through unseen (fail closed).
+ if (depth > 4) return true;
for (const tokens of quoteAwareSegments(raw)) {
if (tokens.length === 0) continue;
if (isDestructiveRm(tokens)) return true;
if (isDestructiveGit(tokens)) return true;
if (isDestructiveFindExec(tokens.join(' '))) return true;
- const { command, commandStrings } = stripExecutionPrefixes(tokens);
+ const { command, commandStrings, inconclusive } = stripExecutionPrefixes(tokens);
// `env -S '<string>'` executes the string as a command line of its own.
for (const commandString of commandStrings) {
if (isDestructiveQuoteAware(commandString, depth + 1)) return true;
}
if (command.length === 0) continue;
- const base = commandBasename(command[0]);
- // SQL passed to a database client lives inside a quoted argument, which
- // the generic scan strips on purpose (a commit message that mentions
- // "drop table" must not trip the gate). The tokens here carry the
- // unquoted argument text, so test the SQL phrases on them when the
- // executable is a known SQL client — `git commit -m "drop table ..."`
- // still has no SQL client in argv0.
- if (SQL_CLIENTS.has(base) && DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD.test(sqlArgumentText(command.slice(1)))) {
- return true;
+ // With an unmodelled wrapper option the command boundary is uncertain,
+ // so every later token is tried as the command start.
+ const starts = inconclusive ? command.map((_, index) => index) : [0];
+ for (const start of starts) {
+ if (isDestructiveClientCommand(command.slice(start), depth)) return true;
}
- if (SHELL_WRAPPERS.has(base)) {
- const ci = command.findIndex((token, index) => index > 0 && SHELL_COMMAND_OPTION.test(token));
- if (ci !== -1 && command[ci + 1] && isDestructiveQuoteAware(command[ci + 1], depth + 1)) {
- return true;
- }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * SQL passed to a database client lives inside a quoted argument, which the
+ * generic scan strips on purpose (a commit message that mentions "drop
+ * table" must not trip the gate). The tokens here carry the unquoted
+ * argument text, so the SQL phrases are tested on them when argv0 is a known
+ * SQL client — `git commit -m "drop table ..."` still has no client in
+ * argv0. A shell wrapper hands its `-c` string to a recursive scan.
+ *
+ * @param {string[]} command tokens with execution prefixes removed
+ * @param {number} depth recursion guard, forwarded to nested scans
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function isDestructiveClientCommand(command, depth) {
+ const base = commandBasename(command[0]);
+ if (SQL_CLIENTS.has(base) && DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD.test(sqlArgumentText(command.slice(1)))) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (SHELL_WRAPPERS.has(base)) {
+ const ci = command.findIndex((token, index) => index > 0 && SHELL_COMMAND_OPTION.test(token));
+ if (ci !== -1 && command[ci + 1] && isDestructiveQuoteAware(command[ci + 1], depth + 1)) {
+ return true;
}
}
return false;
@@ -1517,4 +1556,4 @@ function run(rawInput) {
return rawInput; // allow
}
-module.exports = { classifyDestructiveCommand, run };
+module.exports = { classifyDestructiveCommand, run, isDestructiveQuoteAware };
diff --git a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
index 69e355f62..316b82a20 100644
--- a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
+++ b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
@@ -1563,6 +1563,12 @@ function runTests() {
expectDestructiveDeny('runuser -u postgres --session-command \'mysql -e "delete from sessions"\'', 'runuser --session-command');
expectDestructiveDeny('runuser -u postgres -s /usr/local/bin/fish -c \'psql -c "drop table users"\'', 'runuser -s SHELL -c command string');
expectDestructiveDeny('runuser --shell=/usr/local/bin/fish -u postgres -c \'psql -c "drop table users"\'', 'runuser --shell= -c command string');
+ expectDestructiveDeny(
+ `runuser --shell /usr/local/bin/fish -u postgres -c 'psql -c "drop table users"'`,
+ 'runuser --shell separate value + -c command string'
+ );
+ expectDestructiveDeny('chroot --userspec nobody:nogroup / psql -c "drop table users"', 'chroot --userspec VALUE + psql');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('chroot --made-up-flag value / psql -c "drop table users"', 'unmodelled wrapper option, fail closed');
})
)
passed++;
@@ -1577,12 +1583,26 @@ function runTests() {
expectAllow('sqlite3 truncate.db "select 1"', 'filename that contains a SQL word');
expectAllow('psql -f truncate.sql', 'script filename via -f');
expectAllow('psql --file=./sql/truncate.sql', 'script path via --file=');
+ expectAllow('psql -f "drop table.sql"', 'script filename with a space via -f');
+ expectAllow('psql --file "drop table.sql"', 'script filename with a space via --file');
+ expectAllow('chroot --userspec nobody:nogroup / ls -la', 'chroot --userspec with a harmless command');
expectAllow('env PGHOST=db psql -c "select 1"', 'prefixed non-destructive SQL');
})
)
passed++;
else failed++;
+ if (
+ test('denies a script plus a destructive statement and fails closed past the nesting limit', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('psql -f schema.sql -c "drop table users"', 'script file plus destructive -c');
+ const { isDestructiveQuoteAware } = require(hookScript);
+ assert.strictEqual(isDestructiveQuoteAware('ls -la', 5), true, 'sixth nesting level is not inspected and fails closed');
+ assert.strictEqual(isDestructiveQuoteAware('ls -la', 4), false, 'fifth nesting level is still inspected');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
if (
test('allows destructive SQL prose inside a quoted heredoc', () => {
expectAllow(