The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.
feat(gateguard): improve first-touch signal quality and session efficiency
Jeffrey Montoyae98a9da2882c
diff --git a/hooks/hooks.metadata.json b/hooks/hooks.metadata.jsonindex c5986e44c..89028f4a3 100644--- a/hooks/hooks.metadata.json+++ b/hooks/hooks.metadata.json@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@},{"id": "pre:edit-write:gateguard-fact-force",- "description": "Fact-forcing gate: block first Edit/Write/MultiEdit per file and demand investigation (importers, data schemas, user instruction) before allowing",+ "description": "Fact-forcing gate: deny the first Edit/Write/MultiEdit of each file with class-specific questions (code, test, prose, config, instruction); a completed search naming the file in the current turn, or a same-turn sibling of a new file already gated, passes with a note instead; sensitive targets (secrets, keys, auth/payment code, migrations, CI workflows) are always gated","fingerprint": "32c4a312b4c2"}],diff --git a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.jsindex b23055b72..85633d774 100644--- a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js+++ b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js@@ -9,10 +9,17 @@* The act of investigation creates awareness that self-evaluation never did.** Gates:- * - Edit/Write: list importers, affected API, verify data schemas, quote instruction+ * - Edit/Write/MultiEdit (first touch of each file): questions chosen by+ * target class (code: list importers, affected API, verify data schemas,+ * quote instruction)* - Bash/PowerShell (destructive): list targets, rollback plan, quote instruction* - Bash/PowerShell (routine): quote current instruction (once per session)*+ * A first touch already covered by a completed search in the current turn,+ * or a new sibling of a file just gated, passes with an additionalContext+ * note (never an "allow" decision). Sensitive targets are always denied, and+ * anything ambiguous falls back to the denial.+ ** Compatible with run-with-flags.js via module.exports.run().* Cross-platform (Windows, macOS, Linux).*@@ -28,6 +35,20 @@ const path = require('path');const { extractCommandSubstitutions, extractSubshellGroups, extractBraceGroups } = require('../lib/shell-substitution');const { classifyPowerShellDestructiveCommand } = require('../lib/powershell-destructive-command');const { stripHeredocBodies } = require('./gateguard-heredoc');+const {+ WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN,+ COLLAPSIBLE_CLASSES,+ CLASS_QUESTIONS,+ CLASS_CONDENSED_HINTS,+ QUOTE_INSTRUCTION,+ resolveTargetPath,+ canonicalPathKey,+ classifyTarget,+ classifyTargetFor,+ collapseGateDir,+ isSensitiveTargetFor+} = require('../lib/gateguard-target-class');+const { scanCurrentTurn, excludedBatchId, createTurnScanner, currentTurnId, transcriptPathFor } = require('../lib/gateguard-turn-scan');// Session state — scoped per session to avoid cross-session races.const STATE_DIR = process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR || path.join(process.env.HOME || process.env.USERPROFILE || '/tmp', '.gateguard');@@ -154,7 +175,7 @@ function getExemptMatchers() {function isExemptPath(filePath, data) {const projectRoot = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR || data.cwd || process.cwd();if (typeof projectRoot !== 'string' || typeof filePath !== 'string') return false;- const paths = /^[a-z]:[\\/]|^\\\\/i.test(projectRoot) ? path.win32 : path.posix;+ const paths = WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN.test(projectRoot) ? path.win32 : path.posix;if (!paths.isAbsolute(projectRoot)) return false;const target = paths.resolve(projectRoot, filePath);const relative = paths.relative(projectRoot, target);@@ -1416,6 +1437,12 @@ function saveState(state) {let mergedChecked = Array.isArray(state.checked) ? state.checked : [];let mergedLastActive = typeof state.last_active === 'number' ? state.last_active : 0;let mergedDenials = getDenialCount(state);+ let mergedCredited = getCreditedCount(state);+ let mergedDirGates = getDirGates(state);+ let mergedDenialsByClass = getClassCounts(state, 'denials_by_class');+ let mergedCreditedByClass = getClassCounts(state, 'credited_by_class');+ let mergedSiblingAllows = getSiblingAllowCount(state);+ let mergedCapAllows = getCapAllowCount(state);try {if (fs.existsSync(stateFile)) {@@ -1427,6 +1454,12 @@ function saveState(state) {mergedLastActive = Math.max(mergedLastActive, diskState.last_active);}mergedDenials = Math.max(mergedDenials, getDenialCount(diskState));+ mergedCredited = Math.max(mergedCredited, getCreditedCount(diskState));+ mergedDirGates = mergeDirGates(getDirGates(diskState), mergedDirGates);+ mergedDenialsByClass = mergeClassCounts(getClassCounts(diskState, 'denials_by_class'), mergedDenialsByClass);+ mergedCreditedByClass = mergeClassCounts(getClassCounts(diskState, 'credited_by_class'), mergedCreditedByClass);+ mergedSiblingAllows = Math.max(mergedSiblingAllows, getSiblingAllowCount(diskState));+ mergedCapAllows = Math.max(mergedCapAllows, getCapAllowCount(diskState));}} catch (_) {/* ignore malformed or transient disk state */@@ -1435,7 +1468,13 @@ function saveState(state) {const finalState = {checked: pruneCheckedEntries(mergedChecked),last_active: Math.max(mergedLastActive, Date.now()),- fact_force_denials: mergedDenials+ fact_force_denials: mergedDenials,+ fact_force_credited: mergedCredited,+ dir_gates: capDirGates(mergedDirGates),+ denials_by_class: mergedDenialsByClass,+ credited_by_class: mergedCreditedByClass,+ sibling_allows: mergedSiblingAllows,+ cap_allows: mergedCapAllows};// Atomic write: temp file + rename prevents partial reads@@ -1500,29 +1539,228 @@ function getFullDenialBudget() {return DEFAULT_FULL_DENIALS;}-function getDenialCount(state) {- const n = Number(state && state.fact_force_denials);+// --- Opt-in session cap on first-touch denials (GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS) ---+// Validated whole, not with parseInt: a prefix parse would turn '3oops' into a+// cap. A malformed value leaves the gate uncapped and says so once on stderr.++const MAX_DENIALS_PATTERN = /^\d+$/;+const MAX_DENIALS_WARN_VALUE_CHARS = 64;+let maxDenialsWarnedFor = null;++function warnMalformedMaxDenials(raw) {+ if (raw === maxDenialsWarnedFor) return;+ maxDenialsWarnedFor = raw;+ const chars = Array.from(sanitizePath(raw));+ const shown = chars.length > MAX_DENIALS_WARN_VALUE_CHARS+ ? `${chars.slice(0, MAX_DENIALS_WARN_VALUE_CHARS - 3).join('')}...`+ : chars.join('');+ try {+ process.stderr.write(+ `[Fact-Forcing Gate] ignoring malformed GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS=${shown}; the denial cap is not active.\n`+ );+ } catch (_) {+ /* stderr write failure is non-fatal */+ }+}++function getMaxDenialBudget() {+ const raw = process.env.GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS || '';+ if (!raw) return Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY;+ const trimmed = raw.trim();+ if (MAX_DENIALS_PATTERN.test(trimmed)) {+ const parsed = Number(trimmed);+ if (Number.isSafeInteger(parsed)) return parsed;+ }+ warnMalformedMaxDenials(raw);+ return Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY;+}++/** A non-negative integer count from untrusted state; anything else is 0. */+function toCount(value) {+ const n = Number(value);return Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0 ? Math.floor(n) : 0;}+function getDenialCount(state) {+ return toCount(state && state.fact_force_denials);+}++function getCreditedCount(state) {+ return toCount(state && state.fact_force_credited);+}++function getCapAllowCount(state) {+ return toCount(state && state.cap_allows);+}++/** Mark a target checked and apply `update` in one state write, so an event is never half-recorded. */+function markCheckedWith(key, update) {+ const loaded = loadState();+ const withKey = loaded.checked.includes(key) ? loaded : { ...loaded, checked: [...loaded.checked, key] };+ const { state, value } = update(withKey);+ return { ok: saveState(state), value };+}+/**- * Record a first-touch target AND count the fact-force denial in the same- * state write. Returns the new denial ordinal (1-based) plus whether the- * write persisted.+ * Record a denial (returns its ordinal) or, once denials reach `cap`, a cap pass+ * (`denials` null). The cap check reads the state the write persists, so a lost+ * concurrent update can add a denial but never passes a target early.*/-function markCheckedAndCountDenial(key) {- const state = loadState();- if (!state.checked.includes(key)) {- state.checked.push(key);+function markCheckedAndCountDenial(key, { cls, dirGate, cap = Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY } = {}) {+ const { ok, value: denials } = markCheckedWith(key, state => {+ if (getDenialCount(state) >= cap) {+ return { state: { ...state, cap_allows: getCapAllowCount(state) + 1 }, value: null };+ }+ const ordinal = getDenialCount(state) + 1;+ const next = {+ ...state,+ fact_force_denials: ordinal,+ ...(cls ? { denials_by_class: incrementClassCount(getClassCounts(state, 'denials_by_class'), cls) } : {}),+ ...(dirGate+ ? { dir_gates: withEntry(getDirGates(state), dirGate.key, { turn: dirGate.turn || null, at: Date.now(), first: dirGate.first, ordinal }) }+ : {})+ };+ return { state: next, value: ordinal };+ });+ return { ok, denials };+}++function markCheckedAndCountCredit(key, cls) {+ return markCheckedWith(key, state => ({+ state: {+ ...state,+ fact_force_credited: getCreditedCount(state) + 1,+ ...(cls ? { credited_by_class: incrementClassCount(getClassCounts(state, 'credited_by_class'), cls) } : {})+ },+ value: undefined+ })).ok;+}++// --- Sibling gates and per-class counters ---+// dir_gates maps `<class>\u0000<canonicalDir>` to { turn, at, first, ordinal }.+// The state file is untrusted, so every map is null-prototype and rejects prototype keys.++const MAX_DIR_GATES = 50;+const SIBLING_NO_TURN_WINDOW_MS = 120 * 1000;+const DIR_GATE_KEY_SEPARATOR = '\u0000';+const UNSAFE_MAP_KEYS = new Set(['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype']);++function isPlainObject(value) {+ return Boolean(value) && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value);+}++function isSafeKey(key) {+ return typeof key === 'string' && key !== '' && !UNSAFE_MAP_KEYS.has(key);+}++function nullMap(entries) {+ const map = Object.create(null);+ for (const [key, value] of entries) map[key] = value;+ return map;+}++function withEntry(map, key, value) {+ return nullMap([...Object.entries(map), [key, value]]);+}++function getClassCounts(state, field) {+ const raw = state && state[field];+ if (!isPlainObject(raw)) return nullMap([]);+ const entries = Object.keys(raw)+ .filter(cls => isSafeKey(cls) && typeof raw[cls] === 'number' && toCount(raw[cls]) > 0)+ .map(cls => [cls, toCount(raw[cls])]);+ return nullMap(entries);+}++function mergeClassCounts(a, b) {+ const merged = nullMap(Object.entries(a));+ for (const [cls, n] of Object.entries(b)) {+ merged[cls] = Math.max(Object.hasOwn(merged, cls) ? merged[cls] : 0, n);+ }+ return merged;+}++function incrementClassCount(counts, cls) {+ if (!isSafeKey(cls)) return counts;+ return withEntry(counts, cls, (Object.hasOwn(counts, cls) ? counts[cls] : 0) + 1);+}++function getSiblingAllowCount(state) {+ return toCount(state && state.sibling_allows);+}++function dirGateKey(cls, dir) {+ return `${cls}${DIR_GATE_KEY_SEPARATOR}${dir}`;+}++function isDirGateKey(key) {+ if (!isSafeKey(key)) return false;+ const at = key.indexOf(DIR_GATE_KEY_SEPARATOR);+ return at > 0 && at < key.length - 1 && COLLAPSIBLE_CLASSES.has(key.slice(0, at));+}++function isDirGateEntry(entry) {+ return (+ isPlainObject(entry) &&+ typeof entry.at === 'number' &&+ Number.isFinite(entry.at) &&+ typeof entry.first === 'string' &&+ (entry.turn === null || entry.turn === undefined || typeof entry.turn === 'string')+ );+}++function getDirGates(state) {+ const raw = state && state.dir_gates;+ if (!isPlainObject(raw)) return nullMap([]);+ const entries = Object.keys(raw)+ .filter(key => isDirGateKey(key) && isDirGateEntry(raw[key]))+ .map(key => {+ const entry = raw[key];+ return [key, { turn: entry.turn || null, at: entry.at, first: entry.first, ordinal: toCount(entry.ordinal) }];+ });+ return nullMap(entries);+}++/** Union by key; the newer `at` wins, so concurrent writers keep the latest gate. */+function mergeDirGates(older, newer) {+ const merged = nullMap(Object.entries(older));+ for (const [key, entry] of Object.entries(newer)) {+ if (!Object.hasOwn(merged, key) || entry.at >= merged[key].at) merged[key] = entry;}- const denials = getDenialCount(state) + 1;- state.fact_force_denials = denials;- return { ok: saveState(state), denials };+ return merged;+}++function capDirGates(gates) {+ const entries = Object.entries(gates);+ if (entries.length <= MAX_DIR_GATES) return gates;+ return nullMap(entries.sort((a, b) => b[1].at - a[1].at).slice(0, MAX_DIR_GATES));+}++function markCheckedAndCountSibling(key) {+ return markCheckedWith(key, state => ({+ state: { ...state, sibling_allows: getSiblingAllowCount(state) + 1 },+ value: undefined+ })).ok;+}++/**+ * Open sibling gate for this key: same turn id, or (no turn id on either side)+ * within 120 s. A gate stamped in the future or without a denial is ignored.+ */+function findSiblingGate(key, turnId, now = Date.now()) {+ const gates = getDirGates(loadState());+ if (!Object.hasOwn(gates, key)) return null;+ const entry = gates[key];+ const age = now - entry.at;+ if (!(age >= 0) || entry.ordinal < 1) return null;+ if (turnId) return entry.turn === turnId ? entry : null;+ return entry.turn === null && age <= SIBLING_NO_TURN_WINDOW_MS ? entry : null;}function isChecked(key) {const state = loadState();- const found = state.checked.includes(key);+ const keys = Array.isArray(key) ? key : [key];+ const found = keys.some(k => state.checked.includes(k));if (found && Date.now() - (state.last_active || 0) > READ_HEARTBEAT_MS) {saveState(state);}@@ -1745,21 +1983,70 @@ function writeGateMsg(filePath) {].join('\n');}+function classGateMsg(filePath, cls, isWrite) {+ const safe = sanitizePath(filePath);+ const questions = [...CLASS_QUESTIONS[cls](isWrite), QUOTE_INSTRUCTION];+ return [+ '[Fact-Forcing Gate]',+ '',+ `Before ${isWrite ? 'creating' : 'editing'} ${safe}, present these facts:`,+ '',+ ...questions.map((question, index) => `${index + 1}. ${question}`),+ '',+ batchSiblingWarning(safe),+ '',+ 'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.'+ ].join('\n');+}++/** Full first-touch denial; code targets keep the editGateMsg/writeGateMsg text. */+function firstTouchGateMsg(filePath, isWrite, cls) {+ if (!CLASS_QUESTIONS[cls]) {+ return isWrite ? writeGateMsg(filePath) : editGateMsg(filePath);+ }+ return classGateMsg(filePath, cls, isWrite);+}+/*** Condensed single-line denial used after the full-block budget is spent* (#2142). Carries the denial ordinal so consecutive denials differ* textually, and a one-line recovery hint instead of the multi-line block.+ * Non-code classes swap the middle clause for a class-specific hint.*/-function condensedGateMsg(action, filePath, ordinal) {+function condensedGateMsg(action, filePath, ordinal, cls = 'code', sensitive = false) {const safe = sanitizePath(filePath);+ const hint = CLASS_CONDENSED_HINTS[cls]+ ? CLASS_CONDENSED_HINTS[cls](action === 'creation')+ : "briefly state importers/callers, affected API, data schemas if any, and the user's verbatim instruction, then retry.";return (`[Fact-Forcing Gate] (denial #${ordinal} this session) First ${action} of ${safe}: ` +- "briefly state importers/callers, affected API, data schemas if any, and the user's verbatim instruction, then retry. " ++ `${hint} ` +`${batchSiblingWarning(safe)} ` +- '(Use GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS for path-scoped exemptions; ECC_GATEGUARD=off disables this gate.)'+ (sensitive ? `${SENSITIVE_TARGET_NOTE} ` : '') ++ '(Use GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS for path-scoped exemptions; GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS caps denials per session; ECC_GATEGUARD=off disables this gate.)');}+const SENSITIVE_TARGET_NOTE = 'Sensitive target: prior-search credit, sibling collapse, and the denial cap do not apply.';+const RETRY_LINE = 'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.';++function withSensitiveNote(message) {+ const at = message.lastIndexOf(RETRY_LINE);+ if (at < 0) return `${message}\n\n${SENSITIVE_TARGET_NOTE}`;+ return `${message.slice(0, at)}${SENSITIVE_TARGET_NOTE}\n\n${message.slice(at)}`;+}++function firstTouchDenial(filePath, { isWrite, denials, cls, sensitive }) {+ if (denials > getFullDenialBudget()) {+ const action = isWrite ? 'creation' : 'edit';+ return denyResult(condensedGateMsg(action, filePath, denials, cls, sensitive), { includeRecoveryHint: false });+ }+ const message = firstTouchGateMsg(filePath, isWrite, cls);+ return denyResult(sensitive ? withSensitiveNote(message) : message, {+ narrowRecoveryHint: EDIT_WRITE_NARROW_RECOVERY_HINT+ });+}+function destructiveBashMsg() {return ['[Fact-Forcing Gate]',@@ -1836,6 +2123,812 @@ function allowWithStateWarning() {};}+// --- Prior-search credit ---+// `Read` never counts: Claude Code already requires a Read before an Edit, so+// crediting it would disable the Edit gate. Any ambiguity or failure means no credit.++const SHELL_SEARCH_COMMANDS = new Set([+ 'rg',+ 'grep',+ 'egrep',+ 'fgrep',+ 'git',+ 'find',+ 'fd',+ 'ls',+ 'tree',+ 'get-childitem',+ 'gci',+ 'select-string',+ 'sls'+]);+const GIT_SEARCH_SUBCOMMANDS = new Set(['grep', 'ls-files']);+const DIRECTORY_CHANGE_COMMANDS = new Set(['cd', 'pushd', 'popd', 'chdir', 'set-location', 'sl', 'push-location', 'pop-location']);+// Search kinds whose first positional argument is the pattern, not a path.+const PATTERN_FIRST_SEARCHES = new Set(['grep', 'egrep', 'fgrep', 'rg', 'git grep', 'select-string', 'sls', 'fd']);+const RECURSIVE_BY_DEFAULT = new Set(['rg', 'git grep', 'git ls-files', 'find', 'fd', 'tree']);+const GREP_FAMILY = new Set(['grep', 'egrep', 'fgrep']);+const POWERSHELL_SEARCHES = new Set(['get-childitem', 'gci', 'select-string', 'sls']);+// Flags whose value is the search pattern (so the first positional is a path).+const PATTERN_VALUE_FLAGS = new Set(['-e', '-f', '--regexp', '--file']);+// Flags that consume the next argument; that argument is never a path operand.+const VALUE_FLAGS = new Set([+ '-e', '-f', '-g', '-t', '-T', '-m', '-A', '-B', '-C',+ '--regexp', '--file', '--type', '--glob', '--iglob', '--include', '--exclude', '--exclude-dir', '--exclude-from',+ '--ignore-file', '--max-count', '--replace',+ '-name', '-iname', '-path', '-ipath', '-type', '-maxdepth', '-mindepth', '-newer', '-regex', '-size', '-user', '-group', '-perm'+]);+// PowerShell parameters are case-insensitive. -Path/-LiteralPath values are paths+// (they count as operands for the stdin/target-only checks) but never directory evidence.+const LS_VALUE_FLAGS = new Set(['-I', '--ignore', '--hide']);+const TREE_VALUE_FLAGS = new Set(['-L', '-P', '-I', '-o']);+// fd: `-E/--exclude <glob>` take a value (fd's `-e` is an extension, also a value).+const FD_VALUE_FLAGS = new Set([...VALUE_FLAGS, '-E']);+// Only these tools take the search pattern from -e/-f (fd's -e is an extension).+const PATTERN_FLAG_SEARCHES = new Set(['grep', 'egrep', 'fgrep', 'rg', 'git grep']);+const POWERSHELL_VALUE_FLAGS = new Set(['-path', '-literalpath', '-filter', '-include', '-exclude', '-depth', '-pattern']);+const POWERSHELL_PATH_FLAGS = new Set(['-path', '-literalpath']);+const GENERIC_STEMS = new Set([+ 'index',+ 'main',+ 'init',+ '__init__',+ 'utils',+ 'util',+ 'types',+ 'readme',+ 'test',+ 'tests',+ 'config',+ 'mod',+ 'lib',+ 'setup',+ 'app',+ 'spec',+ 'helpers',+ 'common'+]);+const MIN_STEM_LENGTH = 4;+const MAX_SEARCH_COMMAND_CHARS = 8192;+const CREDIT_DETAIL_MAX_CHARS = 80;+// Command substitution, process substitution, heredocs and PowerShell+// backtick escapes make the searched text ambiguous: never credit them.+const AMBIGUOUS_SHELL_PATTERN = /`|\$\(|[<>]\(|<</;+const GLOB_CHARS_PATTERN = /[*?[{]/;++function eligibleStem(filePath) {+ const base = String(filePath).split(/[\\/]/).pop() || '';+ const ext = path.posix.extname(base);+ const stem = (ext ? base.slice(0, -ext.length) : base).toLowerCase();+ return stem.length >= MIN_STEM_LENGTH && !GENERIC_STEMS.has(stem) ? stem : null;+}++/** Word-boundary stem matcher; an indexOf scan, never a RegExp built from untrusted text. */+function stemMatcher(stem) {+ if (!stem) return null;+ return { test: text => containsWord(String(text), stem) };+}++function isStemWordChar(ch) {+ return ch !== undefined && ((ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9'));+}++function containsWord(text, word) {+ for (let at = text.indexOf(word); at !== -1; at = text.indexOf(word, at + 1)) {+ if (!isStemWordChar(text[at - 1]) && !isStemWordChar(text[at + word.length])) return true;+ }+ return false;+}++/** Path-resolution context for a target; relative paths resolve against the tool `cwd`. */+function dirContext(targetPath, data) {+ const base = (data && typeof data.cwd === 'string' && data.cwd) || process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR || process.cwd();+ const isWin = WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN.test(base) || WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN.test(targetPath);+ const paths = isWin ? path.win32 : path.posix;+ if (!paths.isAbsolute(base)) return null;+ const resolveNative = (...parts) => paths.resolve(base, ...parts);+ const resolveDir = (...parts) => {+ const dir = resolveNative(...parts).replace(/\\/g, '/');+ return isWin ? dir.toLowerCase() : dir;+ };+ const targetKey = resolveDir(targetPath);+ return { resolveDir, resolveNative, targetKey, targetDir: path.posix.dirname(targetKey) };+}++function isInsideDir(targetKey, dirKey) {+ return targetKey.startsWith(dirKey.endsWith('/') ? dirKey : `${dirKey}/`);+}++function isDirectoryNow(nativePath) {+ try {+ return fs.statSync(nativePath).isDirectory();+ } catch (_) {+ return false;+ }+}++function globLiteralPrefix(pattern) {+ const segments = pattern.split(/[\\/]/);+ const firstGlob = segments.findIndex(segment => GLOB_CHARS_PATTERN.test(segment));+ const literal = firstGlob === -1 ? segments.slice(0, -1) : segments.slice(0, firstGlob);+ const joined = literal.join('/');+ return joined || (literal.length > 0 && pattern.startsWith('/') ? '/' : '');+}++function stringsOf(...values) {+ return values.filter(value => typeof value === 'string' && value);+}++/**+ * Evidence a search offers: stem `texts`, candidate `dirs`, the `scope`/`scopes`+ * the target must lie in, and `operands` that must not all be the target itself.+ */+function searchEvidence(search, shellDirsTrusted) {+ const input = search.input;+ if (search.name === 'Glob') {+ if (typeof input.pattern !== 'string' || !input.pattern) return [];+ const explicit = typeof input.path === 'string' && input.path ? input.path : '';+ const prefix = globLiteralPrefix(input.pattern);+ const scope = [explicit || '.', prefix || '.'];+ if (!GLOB_CHARS_PATTERN.test(input.pattern)) {+ // A single-file lookup names no directory, and looking up the target itself is not a search.+ const lookup = [explicit || '.', input.pattern];+ return [{ texts: [input.pattern], dirs: [], scope, scopeExact: true, operands: [lookup], detail: input.pattern }];+ }+ // An empty literal prefix with no explicit path names only the implicit cwd.+ const dirs = prefix || explicit ? [scope] : [];+ return [{ texts: [input.pattern], dirs, scope, detail: input.pattern }];+ }+ if (search.name === 'Grep') {+ if (typeof input.pattern !== 'string' || !input.pattern) return [];+ const explicit = typeof input.path === 'string' && input.path ? input.path : '';+ const detail = typeof input.glob === 'string' && input.glob ? `${input.pattern} --glob ${input.glob}` : input.pattern;+ const filters = grepToolFilters(input.glob);+ return [{+ texts: stringsOf(input.pattern, ...filters.positives),+ dirs: explicit ? [[explicit]] : [],+ scope: [explicit || '.'],+ detail,+ ...filters+ }];+ }+ if (search.name === 'LS') {+ return stringsOf(input.path).map(dir => ({ texts: [], dirs: [[dir]], scope: [dir], detail: dir }));+ }+ return shellSearchEvidence(input.command, shellDirsTrusted);+}++/**+ * Per segment, whether it reads piped input. Mirrors `quoteAwareSegments`+ * splitting; `||` also marks the next segment, which only ever removes evidence.+ */+function segmentPipeFlags(input) {+ const flags = [];+ let quote = null;+ let escaped = false;+ let hasContent = false;+ let piped = false;+ for (const ch of String(input || '')) {+ if (escaped) {+ escaped = false;+ } else if (ch === '\\') {+ escaped = true;+ hasContent = true;+ } else if (quote) {+ if (ch === quote) quote = null;+ } else if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {+ quote = ch;+ hasContent = true;+ } else if (SHELL_SEGMENT_SEPARATORS.has(ch)) {+ if (hasContent) {+ flags.push(piped);+ piped = false;+ hasContent = false;+ }+ piped = piped || ch === '|';+ } else if (!/\s/.test(ch)) {+ hasContent = true;+ }+ }+ if (hasContent) flags.push(piped);+ return flags;+}++/** Base for relative operands after a directory change; null unless it is a plain literal `cd <dir>`. */+function baseAfterDirectoryChange(base, lead, tokens) {+ if (!['cd', 'chdir', 'set-location', 'sl'].includes(lead) || tokens.length !== 2) return null;+ const dir = tokens[1];+ if (!dir || /^[-$~]/.test(dir) || GLOB_CHARS_PATTERN.test(dir)) return null;+ if (isAbsoluteShellPath(dir)) return [dir];+ return base === null ? null : base.concat(dir);+}++function isAbsoluteShellPath(arg) {+ return path.posix.isAbsolute(arg) || WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN.test(arg);+}++function operandScopePath(arg) {+ if (!GLOB_CHARS_PATTERN.test(arg)) return arg;+ const segments = arg.split(/[\\/]/);+ const literal = segments.slice(0, segments.findIndex(segment => GLOB_CHARS_PATTERN.test(segment)));+ if (literal.length === 0) return '.';+ return literal.join('/') || '/';+}++/** Scopes a shell segment searched; unresolvable operands (variables, `~`, unknown cwd) scope nothing. */+function shellSearchScopes(parsed, base) {+ if (parsed.operands.length === 0) return base === null ? [] : [base];+ const scopes = [];+ for (const operand of parsed.operands) {+ if (!operand || operand === '-' || /^[$~]/.test(operand)) continue;+ const scoped = operandScopePath(operand);+ if (isAbsoluteShellPath(scoped)) scopes.push([scoped]);+ else if (base !== null) scopes.push(base.concat(scoped));+ }+ return scopes;+}++/** Evidence for each search segment of a shell command; ambiguous or oversized commands yield none. */+function shellSearchEvidence(command, dirsTrusted) {+ if (typeof command !== 'string' || !command || command.length > MAX_SEARCH_COMMAND_CHARS) return [];+ if (AMBIGUOUS_SHELL_PATTERN.test(command)) return [];+ const pipeFlags = segmentPipeFlags(command);+ const evidence = [];+ let trusted = dirsTrusted;+ // A cd in any other call of the turn leaves the cwd of this one unknown.+ let base = dirsTrusted ? [] : null;+ quoteAwareSegments(command).forEach((tokens, index) => {+ const lead = commandBasename(tokens[0]);+ if (DIRECTORY_CHANGE_COMMANDS.has(lead)) {+ trusted = false;+ base = baseAfterDirectoryChange(base, lead, tokens);+ return;+ }+ if (!SHELL_SEARCH_COMMANDS.has(lead)) return;+ let kind = lead;+ let args = tokens.slice(1);+ if (lead === 'git') {+ if (!GIT_SEARCH_SUBCOMMANDS.has(tokens[1])) return;+ kind = `git ${tokens[1]}`;+ args = tokens.slice(2);+ }+ const parsed = parseSearchArgs(kind, args);+ // A segment that reads stdin (redirection, pipe, or no operand without recursion) is not a tree search.+ if (parsed.stdin) return;+ if (parsed.operands.length === 0 && (!parsed.recursive || pipeFlags[index] !== false)) return;+ const scopes = shellSearchScopes(parsed, base);+ if (scopes.length === 0) return;+ const filters = shellSearchFilters(kind, args);+ // Exclusion values (and the flags that introduce them) are never a stem source.+ const stemText = tokens.slice(0, tokens.length - args.length).concat(args.filter((_, i) => !filters.dropped.has(i))).join(' ');+ const dirs = trusted ? parsed.dirOperands.map(shellDirCandidate).filter(Boolean).map(dir => [dir]) : [];+ evidence.push({+ texts: [stemText],+ dirs,+ dirsMustExist: true,+ scopes,+ operands: parsed.operands.map(op => [op]),+ detail: tokens.join(' '),+ exclusions: filters.exclusions,+ includes: filters.includes,+ opaque: filters.opaque+ });+ });+ return evidence;+}++function isRecursiveFlag(kind, arg) {+ const lower = arg.toLowerCase();+ if (POWERSHELL_SEARCHES.has(kind)) return (kind === 'get-childitem' || kind === 'gci') && lower.startsWith('-rec');+ if (arg === '--recursive' || arg === '--dereference-recursive') return GREP_FAMILY.has(kind) || kind === 'ls';+ if (!/^-[a-zA-Z]+$/.test(arg)) return false;+ if (GREP_FAMILY.has(kind)) return /[rR]/.test(arg);+ return kind === 'ls' && arg.includes('R');+}++function valueFlagsFor(kind) {+ if (kind === 'ls' || kind === 'git ls-files') return LS_VALUE_FLAGS;+ if (kind === 'tree') return TREE_VALUE_FLAGS;+ if (kind === 'fd') return FD_VALUE_FLAGS;+ return VALUE_FLAGS;+}++/** Arguments a flag consumes; single-dash clusters (`-rne PAT`) are read letter by letter. */+function flagEffect(kind, arg) {+ if (POWERSHELL_SEARCHES.has(kind)) {+ const lower = arg.toLowerCase();+ return { consumes: POWERSHELL_VALUE_FLAGS.has(lower) ? 1 : 0, patternFlag: lower === '-pattern', pathFlag: POWERSHELL_PATH_FLAGS.has(lower) };+ }+ const values = valueFlagsFor(kind);+ const takesValue = flag => values.has(flag) || (kind === 'rg' && (flag === '-r' || flag === '--replace'));+ const isPatternFlag = flag => PATTERN_FLAG_SEARCHES.has(kind) && PATTERN_VALUE_FLAGS.has(flag);+ const name = arg.split('=')[0];+ if (arg.startsWith('--') || kind === 'find' || takesValue(arg)) {+ return { consumes: !arg.includes('=') && takesValue(name) ? 1 : 0, patternFlag: isPatternFlag(name), pathFlag: false };+ }+ for (let i = 1; i < arg.length; i++) {+ const flag = `-${arg[i]}`;+ if (takesValue(flag)) return { consumes: i === arg.length - 1 ? 1 : 0, patternFlag: isPatternFlag(flag), pathFlag: false };+ }+ return { consumes: 0, patternFlag: false, pathFlag: false };+}++/** Path operands of a search command, skipping flag values and the pattern positional. */+function parseSearchArgs(kind, args) {+ const positionals = [];+ const pathValues = [];+ let recursive = RECURSIVE_BY_DEFAULT.has(kind);+ let patternGiven = false;+ let expressionStarted = false;+ let inputRedirect = false;+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {+ const arg = args[i];+ if (/^\d*[<>]/.test(arg)) {+ inputRedirect = /^\d*</.test(arg);+ break;+ }+ if (arg.includes('<')) {+ inputRedirect = true; // a quoted `<` cannot be told from a redirection+ break;+ }+ if (arg.length > 1 && arg.startsWith('-')) {+ expressionStarted = true;+ if (isRecursiveFlag(kind, arg)) recursive = true;+ const effect = flagEffect(kind, arg);+ if (effect.patternFlag) patternGiven = true;+ if (effect.pathFlag && i + 1 < args.length) pathValues.push(args[i + 1]);+ i += effect.consumes;+ continue;+ }+ if (kind === 'find' && (expressionStarted || arg === '(' || arg === '!')) {+ expressionStarted = true;+ continue;+ }+ positionals.push(arg);+ }+ const dirOperands = PATTERN_FIRST_SEARCHES.has(kind) && !patternGiven ? positionals.slice(1) : positionals;+ const operands = dirOperands.concat(pathValues);+ return { operands, dirOperands, recursive, stdin: inputRedirect && operands.length === 0 };+}++function shellDirCandidate(arg) {+ if (!arg || /^[$~]/.test(arg)) return '';+ const dir = arg.replace(/(?:[\\/]\*\*|[\\/]\*|[\\/])+$/, '');+ if (!dir || dir === '.' || GLOB_CHARS_PATTERN.test(dir)) return '';+ return dir;+}++/** A directory change anywhere in the turn makes relative shell paths unreliable. */+function turnChangesDirectory(shellCommands) {+ if (!Array.isArray(shellCommands)) return false;+ return shellCommands.some(command => {+ if (typeof command !== 'string') return false;+ if (command.length > MAX_SEARCH_COMMAND_CHARS) return true;+ return quoteAwareSegments(command).some(tokens => DIRECTORY_CHANGE_COMMANDS.has(commandBasename(tokens[0])));+ });+}++function evidenceInScope(item, ctx) {+ if (item.scopes) {+ const covers = parts => {+ const scope = ctx.resolveDir(...parts);+ return scope === ctx.targetKey || isInsideDir(ctx.targetKey, scope);+ };+ if (!item.scopes.some(covers)) return false;+ }+ if (item.scope) {+ const scope = ctx.resolveDir(...item.scope);+ if (scope === ctx.targetKey || !isInsideDir(ctx.targetKey, scope)) return false;+ if (item.scopeExact && ctx.targetDir !== scope) return false;+ }+ if (item.operands && item.operands.length > 0 && item.operands.every(parts => ctx.resolveDir(...parts) === ctx.targetKey)) {+ return false; // reading the target itself is not a search+ }+ return true;+}++function evidenceNamesDir(item, ctx) {+ return item.dirs.some(+ parts => ctx.resolveDir(...parts) === ctx.targetDir && (!item.dirsMustExist || isDirectoryNow(ctx.resolveNative(...parts)))+ );+}++// --- Search filters ---+// A search that excluded the target never saw it, so exclusions are never a stem+// source and one covering the target blocks credit; unreadable exclusion lists+// block it too. Globs are matched without RegExp and bounded; past the bounds they cover the target.++const MAX_FILTER_GLOB_CHARS = 256;+const MAX_BRACE_ALTERNATIVES = 32;+const MAX_FILTERS_PER_SEARCH = 32;+const FIND_NAME_FLAGS = new Set(['-name', '-iname', '-path', '-ipath', '-wholename', '-iwholename', '-regex', '-iregex']);+const FIND_BASENAME_FLAGS = new Set(['-name', '-iname']);+const OPAQUE_FILTER_FLAGS = new Set(['--exclude-from', '--ignore-file', '--exclude-per-directory']);+const EXCLUDE_LONG_FLAGS = new Set(['--exclude', '--exclude-dir', '--ignore', '--hide']);+const LS_ONLY_EXCLUDE_FLAGS = new Set(['--ignore', '--hide']);+const GIT_EXCLUDE_PATHSPEC = /^:(?:[!^]|\([^)]*\bexclude\b[^)]*\))/;++function splitTopLevelCommas(value) {+ const parts = [];+ let depth = 0;+ let current = '';+ for (const ch of String(value)) {+ if (ch === '{') depth += 1;+ else if (ch === '}' && depth > 0) depth -= 1;+ if (ch === ',' && depth === 0) {+ parts.push(current);+ current = '';+ } else {+ current += ch;+ }+ }+ parts.push(current);+ return parts.map(part => part.trim()).filter(Boolean);+}++function expandBraces(glob) {+ const open = glob.indexOf('{');+ if (open === -1) return [glob];+ let depth = 0;+ for (let i = open; i < glob.length; i++) {+ if (glob[i] === '{') depth += 1;+ else if (glob[i] === '}' && --depth === 0) {+ const head = glob.slice(0, open);+ const tail = glob.slice(i + 1);+ const results = [];+ for (const option of splitTopLevelCommas(glob.slice(open + 1, i)).concat(glob[open + 1] === ',' ? [''] : [])) {+ const expanded = expandBraces(`${head}${option}${tail}`);+ if (!expanded) return null;+ results.push(...expanded);+ if (results.length > MAX_BRACE_ALTERNATIVES) return null;+ }+ return results;+ }+ }+ return [glob]; // unbalanced: `{` is literal+}++function globTokens(glob) {+ const tokens = [];+ for (let i = 0; i < glob.length; i++) {+ const ch = glob[i];+ if (ch === '*' && glob[i + 1] === '*') {+ const dirs = glob[i + 2] === '/';+ tokens.push({ type: dirs ? 'dirs' : 'deep' });+ i += dirs ? 2 : 1;+ } else if (ch === '*') {+ tokens.push({ type: 'star' });+ } else if (ch === '?') {+ tokens.push({ type: 'one' });+ } else if (ch === '[' && glob.indexOf(']', i + 2) !== -1) {+ tokens.push({ type: 'one' }); // any character class: over-approximated as one character+ i = glob.indexOf(']', i + 2);+ } else {+ tokens.push({ type: 'lit', ch });+ }+ }+ return tokens;+}++/** Glob match by dynamic programming, so a hostile glob cannot cause regex backtracking. */+function wildcardMatch(glob, text) {+ const tokens = globTokens(glob);+ const n = text.length;+ let next = new Array(n + 1).fill(false);+ next[n] = true;+ for (let t = tokens.length - 1; t >= 0; t--) {+ const token = tokens[t];+ const row = new Array(n + 1).fill(false);+ let afterSlash = false; // for 'dirs': some k > j with text[k-1] === '/' and next[k]+ for (let j = n; j >= 0; j--) {+ if (token.type === 'lit') row[j] = j < n && text[j] === token.ch && next[j + 1];+ else if (token.type === 'one') row[j] = j < n && text[j] !== '/' && next[j + 1];+ else if (token.type === 'star') row[j] = next[j] || (j < n && text[j] !== '/' && row[j + 1]);+ else if (token.type === 'deep') row[j] = next[j] || (j < n && row[j + 1]);+ else {+ if (j < n && text[j] === '/' && next[j + 1]) afterSlash = true;+ row[j] = next[j] || afterSlash;+ }+ }+ next = row;+ }+ return next[0];+}++function normalizeFilterGlob(glob) {+ return String(glob).toLowerCase().replace(/\\/g, '/').replace(/^(?:\.\/)+/, '').replace(/^\/+/, '').replace(/\/+$/, '');+}++/** Null when the glob is past the length or brace bounds. */+function globMatches(glob, text) {+ if (glob.length > MAX_FILTER_GLOB_CHARS) return null;+ const alternatives = expandBraces(glob);+ if (!alternatives) return null;+ return alternatives.some(alternative => wildcardMatch(alternative, text));+}++function targetSegments(ctx) {+ return ctx.targetKey.toLowerCase().split('/').filter(Boolean);+}++/** An exclusion covers the target when it names the stem or matches the file or any directory above it. */+function exclusionCoversTarget(exclusion, segments, stem) {+ const glob = normalizeFilterGlob(exclusion);+ if (!glob) return true;+ if (stem !== null && stem.test(glob)) return true;+ for (let start = 0; start < segments.length; start++) {+ for (let end = start + 1; end <= segments.length; end++) {+ const matched = globMatches(glob, segments.slice(start, end).join('/'));+ if (matched !== false) return true;+ }+ }+ return false;+}++function filtersAdmitTarget(item, ctx, stem) {+ if (item.opaque) return false;+ const exclusions = Array.isArray(item.exclusions) ? item.exclusions : [];+ if (exclusions.length === 0) return true;+ if (exclusions.length > MAX_FILTERS_PER_SEARCH) return false;+ const segments = targetSegments(ctx);+ return !exclusions.some(exclusion => exclusionCoversTarget(exclusion, segments, stem));+}++/** Basename include globs that all miss the target stop its stem from crediting; oversized globs admit. */+function includesAdmitTarget(item, ctx) {+ const includes = Array.isArray(item.includes) ? item.includes : [];+ if (includes.length === 0) return true;+ const segments = targetSegments(ctx);+ const base = segments[segments.length - 1] || '';+ return includes.some(include => globMatches(normalizeFilterGlob(include).replace(/^(?:\*\*\/)+/, ''), base) !== false);+}++function isBasenameGlob(glob) {+ return !/[\\/]/.test(String(glob).replace(/^(?:\*\*[\\/])+/, ''));+}++function grepToolFilters(glob) {+ const filters = { positives: [], includes: [], exclusions: [], opaque: false };+ if (typeof glob !== 'string' || !glob) return filters;+ for (const part of splitTopLevelCommas(glob)) {+ if (part.startsWith('!')) filters.exclusions.push(part.slice(1));+ else {+ filters.positives.push(part);+ if (isBasenameGlob(part)) filters.includes.push(part);+ }+ }+ return filters;+}++function shellSearchFilters(kind, args) {+ const filters = { exclusions: [], includes: [], opaque: false, dropped: new Set() };+ if (kind === 'find') return findSearchFilters(args, filters);+ if (POWERSHELL_SEARCHES.has(kind)) return powershellSearchFilters(args, filters);+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {+ const arg = args[i];+ if (/^\d*[<>]/.test(arg)) break;+ const consumed = applyShellFilterArg(kind, args, i, filters);+ i += consumed;+ }+ return filters;+}++function applyShellFilterArg(kind, args, i, filters) {+ const arg = args[i];+ const exclude = (value, indexes, separator) => {+ for (const glob of separator ? String(value).split(separator) : [value]) {+ if (glob) filters.exclusions.push(glob);+ }+ indexes.forEach(index => filters.dropped.add(index));+ };+ const include = value => {+ if (isBasenameGlob(value)) filters.includes.push(value);+ };+ if (kind.startsWith('git ') && GIT_EXCLUDE_PATHSPEC.test(arg)) {+ exclude(arg.replace(GIT_EXCLUDE_PATHSPEC, ''), [i]);+ return 0;+ }+ if (arg.startsWith('--')) {+ const eq = arg.indexOf('=');+ const name = eq > 0 ? arg.slice(0, eq) : arg;+ const hasNext = eq <= 0 && i + 1 < args.length;+ const value = eq > 0 ? arg.slice(eq + 1) : hasNext ? args[i + 1] : '';+ const indexes = eq > 0 || !hasNext ? [i] : [i, i + 1];+ const consumed = indexes.length - 1;+ if (OPAQUE_FILTER_FLAGS.has(name)) {+ filters.opaque = true;+ return consumed;+ }+ if (name === '--glob' || name === '--iglob') {+ if (value.startsWith('!')) exclude(value.slice(1), indexes);+ else include(value);+ return consumed;+ }+ if (name === '--include') {+ include(value);+ return consumed;+ }+ // `--ignore`/`--hide` hide names only for ls (rg's `--ignore` is a switch).+ if (EXCLUDE_LONG_FLAGS.has(name) && (kind === 'ls' || !LS_ONLY_EXCLUDE_FLAGS.has(name))) {+ exclude(value, indexes);+ return consumed;+ }+ return 0;+ }+ if (!/^-[A-Za-z]/.test(arg)) return 0;+ const letters = shortFilterLetters(kind);+ const valueFlags = valueFlagsFor(kind);+ for (let k = 1; k < arg.length; k++) {+ const letter = arg[k];+ if (!letters.has(letter)) {+ // Another value flag ends the cluster: the rest (or the next argument) is its value.+ if (valueFlags.has(`-${letter}`)) return k === arg.length - 1 ? 1 : 0;+ continue;+ }+ const attached = arg.slice(k + 1);+ const value = attached || args[i + 1] || '';+ const indexes = attached || i + 1 >= args.length ? [i] : [i, i + 1];+ const consumed = indexes.length - 1;+ applyShortFilter(kind, letter, value, indexes, { filters, exclude, include });+ return consumed;+ }+ return 0;+}++function shortFilterLetters(kind) {+ if (kind === 'rg') return new Set(['g']);+ if (kind === 'fd') return new Set(['E']);+ if (kind === 'ls') return new Set(['I']);+ if (kind === 'tree') return new Set(['I', 'P']);+ if (kind === 'git ls-files') return new Set(['x', 'X']);+ return new Set();+}++function applyShortFilter(kind, letter, value, indexes, { filters, exclude, include }) {+ if (kind === 'rg') {+ if (value.startsWith('!')) exclude(value.slice(1), indexes);+ else include(value);+ } else if (kind === 'tree' && letter === 'P') {+ value.split('|').forEach(include);+ } else if (kind === 'git ls-files' && letter === 'X') {+ filters.opaque = true;+ } else {+ exclude(value, indexes, kind === 'tree' ? '|' : '');+ }+}++/** find: a negated or pruned name test is an exclusion; a plain `-name`/`-iname` is an include. */+function findSearchFilters(args, filters) {+ let negateNext = false;+ let negatedDepth = 0;+ let depth = 0;+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {+ const arg = args[i];+ if (/^\d*[<>]/.test(arg)) break;+ if (arg === '-not' || arg === '!') {+ negateNext = true;+ filters.dropped.add(i);+ continue;+ }+ if (arg === '(') {+ depth += 1;+ if (negateNext && negatedDepth === 0) negatedDepth = depth;+ negateNext = false;+ continue;+ }+ if (arg === ')') {+ if (negatedDepth === depth) negatedDepth = 0;+ depth = Math.max(depth - 1, 0);+ continue;+ }+ if (FIND_NAME_FLAGS.has(arg) && i + 1 < args.length) {+ const value = args[i + 1];+ if (negateNext || negatedDepth > 0 || args[i + 2] === '-prune') {+ filters.exclusions.push(value);+ filters.dropped.add(i);+ filters.dropped.add(i + 1);+ } else if (FIND_BASENAME_FLAGS.has(arg)) {+ filters.includes.push(value);+ }+ i += 1;+ }+ negateNext = false;+ }+ return filters;+}++function powershellSearchFilters(args, filters) {+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length - 1; i++) {+ const name = args[i].toLowerCase();+ if (name === '-exclude') {+ filters.exclusions.push(...splitTopLevelCommas(args[i + 1]));+ filters.dropped.add(i);+ filters.dropped.add(i + 1);+ i += 1;+ } else if (name === '-include' || name === '-filter') {+ splitTopLevelCommas(args[i + 1]).filter(isBasenameGlob).forEach(glob => filters.includes.push(glob));+ i += 1;+ }+ }+ return filters;+}++/**+ * A completed search in the current turn that names the target by stem (or by+ * directory, for a new-file Write). Searches in the pending call's own batch+ * never count: their results were not seen when the edit was decided.+ */+function findCreditingSearch(scan, targetPath, allowDirMatch, data) {+ try {+ if (!scan || !Array.isArray(scan.searches) || scan.searches.length === 0) return null;+ if (typeof targetPath !== 'string' || !targetPath) return null;+ const ctx = dirContext(targetPath, data);+ if (!ctx) return null;+ const stem = stemMatcher(eligibleStem(targetPath));+ const excluded = excludedBatchId(scan, data);+ const shellDirsTrusted = !turnChangesDirectory(scan.shellCommands);+ for (const search of scan.searches) {+ if (typeof search.messageId !== 'string' || !search.messageId || search.messageId === excluded) continue;+ for (const item of searchEvidence(search, shellDirsTrusted)) {+ if (!evidenceInScope(item, ctx) || !filtersAdmitTarget(item, ctx, stem)) continue;+ const byStem = stem !== null && includesAdmitTarget(item, ctx) && item.texts.some(text => stem.test(text.toLowerCase()));+ const byDir = Boolean(allowDirMatch) && evidenceNamesDir(item, ctx);+ if (byStem || byDir) {+ return { name: search.name, detail: item.detail, callsAgo: search.callsAgo };+ }+ }+ }+ return null;+ } catch (_) {+ return null;+ }+}++function creditNote(match, filePath) {+ const chars = Array.from(sanitizePath(match.detail).replace(/\s+/g, ' '));+ const detail = chars.length > CREDIT_DETAIL_MAX_CHARS ? `${chars.slice(0, CREDIT_DETAIL_MAX_CHARS - 3).join('')}...` : chars.join('');+ const calls = `${match.callsAgo} tool call${match.callsAgo === 1 ? '' : 's'} ago`;+ return (+ `[Fact-Forcing Gate] Prior search seen in this turn (${match.name} ${detail}, ${calls}); ` ++ `first-touch check satisfied for ${sanitizePath(filePath)}.`+ );+}++/** Only a positively absent target is new; any other fs error counts as existing. */+function isMissingOnDisk(resolved) {+ try {+ fs.lstatSync(resolved);+ return false;+ } catch (error) {+ return Boolean(error) && error.code === 'ENOENT';+ }+}++function isNewFileTarget(filePath, data) {+ try {+ const target = resolveTargetPath(filePath, data);+ return Boolean(target) && isMissingOnDisk(target.resolved);+ } catch (_) {+ return false;+ }+}++function newFileGateKey(filePath, data, cls) {+ try {+ const dir = collapseGateDir(filePath, data, cls);+ return dir ? dirGateKey(cls, dir) : null;+ } catch (_) {+ return null;+ }+}++function siblingNote(gate) {+ return (+ `[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of ${sanitizePath(gate.first)} (gated earlier at denial #${gate.ordinal} this session); ` ++ 'proceeding without a repeat denial.'+ );+}+// --- Core logic (exported for run-with-flags.js) ---function run(rawInput) {@@ -1859,6 +2952,7 @@ function run(rawInput) {const TOOL_MAP = { edit: 'Edit', write: 'Write', multiedit: 'MultiEdit', bash: 'Bash', powershell: 'PowerShell' };const toolName = TOOL_MAP[rawToolName.toLowerCase()] || rawToolName;const inSubagent = isSubagentInvocation(data);+ const getTurnScan = createTurnScanner(data);if (toolName === 'Edit' || toolName === 'Write') {const filePath = toolInput.file_path || '';@@ -1870,18 +2964,40 @@ function run(rawInput) {return rawInput; // parent session already passed the first-touch file gate}- if (!isChecked(filePath)) {- const { ok, denials } = markCheckedAndCountDenial(filePath);+ const fileKey = canonicalPathKey(filePath, data);+ if (!isChecked([fileKey, filePath])) {+ const isNewFile = toolName === 'Write' && isNewFileTarget(filePath, data);+ const cls = classifyTargetFor(filePath, data);+ // Sensitive targets skip credit, sibling collapse and the cap.+ const sensitive = isSensitiveTargetFor(filePath, data);+ const credit = sensitive ? null : findCreditingSearch(getTurnScan(), filePath, isNewFile, data);+ if (credit) {+ if (!markCheckedAndCountCredit(fileKey, cls)) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ return { additionalContext: creditNote(credit, filePath), exitCode: 0 };+ }+ const turnId = isNewFile && !sensitive ? currentTurnId(getTurnScan()) : null;+ // The 120 s no-turn rule applies only without any transcript; an unusable one never collapses.+ const collapsible = isNewFile && !sensitive && (turnId !== null || !transcriptPathFor(data));+ const gateKey = collapsible ? newFileGateKey(filePath, data, cls) : null;+ const sibling = gateKey ? findSiblingGate(gateKey, turnId) : null;+ if (sibling) {+ if (!markCheckedAndCountSibling(fileKey)) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ return { additionalContext: siblingNote(sibling), exitCode: 0 };+ }+ const dirGate = gateKey ? { key: gateKey, turn: turnId, first: sanitizePath(filePath) } : undefined;+ const cap = sensitive ? Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY : getMaxDenialBudget();+ const { ok, denials } = markCheckedAndCountDenial(fileKey, { cls, dirGate, cap });if (!ok) {return allowWithStateWarning();}- if (denials > getFullDenialBudget()) {- const action = toolName === 'Edit' ? 'edit' : 'creation';- return denyResult(condensedGateMsg(action, filePath, denials), { includeRecoveryHint: false });+ if (denials === null) {+ return rawInput; // session denial cap reached (GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS)}- return denyResult(toolName === 'Edit' ? editGateMsg(filePath) : writeGateMsg(filePath), {- narrowRecoveryHint: EDIT_WRITE_NARROW_RECOVERY_HINT- });+ return firstTouchDenial(filePath, { isWrite: toolName === 'Write', denials, cls, sensitive });}return rawInput; // allow@@ -1893,21 +3009,36 @@ function run(rawInput) {}const edits = toolInput.edits || [];+ const creditNotes = [];for (const edit of edits) {const filePath = edit.file_path || '';- if (filePath && !isClaudeSettingsPath(filePath) && !isExemptPath(filePath, data) && !isChecked(filePath)) {- const { ok, denials } = markCheckedAndCountDenial(filePath);+ if (!filePath || isClaudeSettingsPath(filePath) || isExemptPath(filePath, data)) continue;+ const fileKey = canonicalPathKey(filePath, data);+ if (!isChecked([fileKey, filePath])) {+ const cls = classifyTargetFor(filePath, data);+ const sensitive = isSensitiveTargetFor(filePath, data);+ const credit = sensitive ? null : findCreditingSearch(getTurnScan(), filePath, false, data);+ if (credit) {+ if (!markCheckedAndCountCredit(fileKey, cls)) {+ return allowWithStateWarning();+ }+ creditNotes.push(creditNote(credit, filePath));+ continue;+ }+ const cap = sensitive ? Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY : getMaxDenialBudget();+ const { ok, denials } = markCheckedAndCountDenial(fileKey, { cls, cap });if (!ok) {return allowWithStateWarning();}- if (denials > getFullDenialBudget()) {- return denyResult(condensedGateMsg('edit', filePath, denials), { includeRecoveryHint: false });+ if (denials === null) {+ continue; // session denial cap reached (GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS)}- return denyResult(editGateMsg(filePath), {- narrowRecoveryHint: EDIT_WRITE_NARROW_RECOVERY_HINT- });+ return firstTouchDenial(filePath, { isWrite: false, denials, cls, sensitive });}}+ if (creditNotes.length > 0) {+ return { additionalContext: creditNotes, exitCode: 0 };+ }return rawInput; // allow}@@ -1957,4 +3088,4 @@ function run(rawInput) {return rawInput; // allow}-module.exports = { classifyDestructiveCommand, run };+module.exports = { classifyDestructiveCommand, classifyTarget, classifyTargetFor, findCreditingSearch, run, scanCurrentTurn };diff --git a/scripts/lib/gateguard-target-class.js b/scripts/lib/gateguard-target-class.jsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..f02030a96--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/lib/gateguard-target-class.js@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@+/**+ * GateGuard target identity and classification for first-touch+ * Edit/Write/MultiEdit targets: canonical path keys, target classes and their+ * questions, sensitive-target detection, and sibling-collapse eligibility.+ * Stateless; filesystem access is limited to worktree `.git` checks and+ * realpath/lstat of the target's parent chain.+ */++'use strict';++const fs = require('fs');+const path = require('path');++const WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN = /^[a-z]:[\\/]|^\\\\/i;++/** Canonical checked-state key, so `a.py`, `./a.py` and the absolute path share one gate. */+function canonicalPathKey(filePath, data) {+ try {+ const target = resolveTargetPath(filePath, data);+ if (!target) return filePath;+ const key = target.resolved.replace(/\\/g, '/');+ return target.isWin ? key.toLowerCase() : key;+ } catch (_) {+ return filePath;+ }+}++/**+ * Resolve a target to the file the tool will touch. Relative paths resolve+ * against the tool's `cwd` first; this deliberately differs from+ * `isExemptPath`, whose globs are project-relative.+ */+function resolveTargetPath(filePath, data) {+ const base = (data && data.cwd) || process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR || process.cwd();+ if (typeof base !== 'string' || typeof filePath !== 'string') return null;+ const isWin = WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN.test(base) || WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN.test(filePath);+ const paths = isWin ? path.win32 : path.posix;+ if (!paths.isAbsolute(base)) return null;+ return { resolved: paths.resolve(base, filePath), isWin };+}++// --- Target classes ---++const INSTRUCTION_BASENAMES = new Set([+ 'claude.md',+ 'agents.md',+ 'agent.md',+ 'gemini.md',+ 'skill.md',+ 'copilot-instructions.md',+ '.cursorrules',+ '.windsurfrules'+]);+// Cursor rule files are instructions wherever they live.+const INSTRUCTION_ANYWHERE_EXTS = new Set(['.mdc']);+const INSTRUCTION_DIRS = new Set(['.claude', 'agents', 'commands', 'skills', 'rules', 'hooks', '.cursor', '.codex', '.opencode']);+const INSTRUCTION_EXTS = new Set(['.md', '.mdx', '.txt']);+const TEST_DIRS = new Set(['tests', 'test', '__tests__']);+const TEST_BASENAME_PATTERN = /\.(test|spec)\.|^test_.*\.py$|_test\.(py|go)$/;+const PROSE_EXTS = new Set(['.md', '.mdx', '.txt', '.rst', '.adoc']);+const CONFIG_EXTS = new Set(['.json', '.jsonc', '.yaml', '.yml', '.toml', '.ini']);+const ENV_BASENAME_PATTERN = /^\.env($|\.)/;+// `.env.example.ts` and friends are source files that happen to start with `.env`.+const CODE_EXTS = new Set(['.ts', '.js', '.mjs', '.cjs', '.py', '.go', '.rs', '.java', '.rb']);++/** Classify a path; first match wins: instruction, test, prose, config, code (the fallback). */+function classifyTarget(filePath) {+ try {+ const normalized = String(filePath || '').replace(/\\/g, '/').toLowerCase();+ const segments = normalized.split('/').filter(Boolean);+ const base = segments.pop() || '';+ const ext = path.posix.extname(base);+ if (INSTRUCTION_BASENAMES.has(base) || INSTRUCTION_ANYWHERE_EXTS.has(ext)) return 'instruction';+ if (INSTRUCTION_EXTS.has(ext) && segments.some(segment => INSTRUCTION_DIRS.has(segment))) return 'instruction';+ if (ext === '.md' && base.includes('instructions') && segments.includes('.github')) return 'instruction';+ if (TEST_BASENAME_PATTERN.test(base) || segments.some(segment => TEST_DIRS.has(segment))) return 'test';+ if (PROSE_EXTS.has(ext)) return 'prose';+ if (CONFIG_EXTS.has(ext) || (ENV_BASENAME_PATTERN.test(base) && !CODE_EXTS.has(ext))) return 'config';+ return 'code';+ } catch (_) {+ return 'code';+ }+}++const WORKTREE_PREFIX_PATTERN = /^\.claude\/worktrees\/([^/]+)\//;++/** A Windows-style path has no real location on a POSIX host, and vice versa. */+function isHostPathStyle(isWin) {+ return isWin === (process.platform === 'win32');+}++function foldKey(nativePath, isWin) {+ const key = nativePath.replace(/\\/g, '/');+ return isWin ? key.toLowerCase() : key;+}++/** Project root, resolved the way `isExemptPath` resolves it (CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR first). */+function canonicalProjectRoot(data) {+ const root = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR || (data && data.cwd) || process.cwd();+ if (typeof root !== 'string') return null;+ const isWin = WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN.test(root);+ const paths = isWin ? path.win32 : path.posix;+ if (!paths.isAbsolute(root)) return null;+ const native = paths.resolve(root);+ return { key: foldKey(native, isWin), native, isWin };+}++/** Only a real worktree (its `.git` exists) has its prefix stripped; otherwise the path stays under `.claude`. */+function isRealWorktree(rootNative, isWin, name) {+ if (!isHostPathStyle(isWin)) return false;+ const paths = isWin ? path.win32 : path.posix;+ return fs.existsSync(paths.join(rootNative, '.claude', 'worktrees', name, '.git'));+}++// Windows ignores trailing dots/spaces and treats `name:stream` as `name`.+const STREAM_MARKER = '::$';++/** Normalize segments as Windows resolves them, so `CLAUDE.md.` and `CLAUDE.md::$DATA` name `CLAUDE.md`. */+function normalizeWindowsSegments(classPath, isWin) {+ const segments = classPath.split('/');+ const last = segments.length - 1;+ return segments+ .map((segment, index) => {+ if (!isWin && !segment.includes(STREAM_MARKER)) return segment;+ let name = segment;+ const colon = name.indexOf(':');+ if (index === last && colon > 0) name = name.slice(0, colon);+ name = name.replace(/[. ]+$/, '');+ return name || segment;+ })+ .join('/');+}++/** Project-relative class path for a canonical key, or null when it is outside the root. */+function projectRelativeClassPath(key, root, isWin) {+ const target = isWin ? key.toLowerCase() : key;+ const rootKey = isWin ? root.key.toLowerCase() : root.key;+ const prefix = rootKey.endsWith('/') ? rootKey : `${rootKey}/`;+ if (!target.startsWith(prefix)) return null;+ let relative = key.slice(prefix.length);+ const worktree = relative.match(WORKTREE_PREFIX_PATTERN);+ if (worktree && isRealWorktree(root.native, root.isWin, worktree[1])) relative = relative.slice(worktree[0].length);+ return normalizeWindowsSegments(relative, isWin);+}++/**+ * The path a target is classified by: project-relative, so an ancestor such as+ * `/home/me/tests/proj` never leaks into the class, with a real worktree prefix+ * stripped. Targets outside the root keep their absolute path.+ */+function classPathFor(filePath, data) {+ try {+ const key = canonicalPathKey(filePath, data);+ const root = canonicalProjectRoot(data);+ const isWin = Boolean(root && root.isWin) || WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN.test(key);+ if (!root) return normalizeWindowsSegments(key, isWin);+ const relative = projectRelativeClassPath(key, root, isWin);+ return relative === null ? normalizeWindowsSegments(key, isWin) : relative;+ } catch (_) {+ return filePath;+ }+}++/** Class of a hook target, judged on its project-relative path. */+function classifyTargetFor(filePath, data) {+ return classifyTarget(classPathFor(filePath, data));+}++const SEARCH_THE_TREE = '(search the tree — Glob/Grep, or find/grep via Bash)';+const QUOTE_INSTRUCTION = "Quote the user's current instruction verbatim";++const CLASS_QUESTIONS = {+ instruction: () => [+ 'Name the harness/loader that reads this file (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, OpenCode, …) and when it loads it',+ 'Describe what agent behaviour changes as a result',+ `Confirm no existing instruction, skill, or agent file already covers this ${SEARCH_THE_TREE}`+ ],+ test: () => [+ 'Name what behaviour is under test and which module/function it exercises',+ `Name the existing test file(s) covering this module, or confirm none exist ${SEARCH_THE_TREE}`+ ],+ prose: isWrite =>+ isWrite+ ? [+ `Name any existing doc this supersedes or duplicates ${SEARCH_THE_TREE}`,+ 'State where it will be linked or referenced from',+ 'Explain why a new file rather than editing an existing one'+ ]+ : [+ `List other docs or code that reference the section being changed ${SEARCH_THE_TREE}`,+ 'State what the change corrects or adds'+ ],+ config: () => [+ 'Name which process/tool reads this file and when',+ 'Describe the effect of the change',+ 'Confirm no secrets or credentials are being written in plain text'+ ]+};++const CLASS_CONDENSED_HINTS = {+ instruction: () =>+ "briefly state which harness loads this file, the agent behaviour it changes, that no existing instruction file covers it, and the user's verbatim instruction, then retry.",+ test: () =>+ "briefly state the behaviour and module under test, existing test files for it (or none), and the user's verbatim instruction, then retry.",+ prose: isWrite =>+ isWrite+ ? "briefly state what this supersedes, where it is linked from, and the user's verbatim instruction, then retry."+ : "briefly state what references the changed section, what the change corrects or adds, and the user's verbatim instruction, then retry.",+ config: () =>+ "briefly state which process reads this file, the effect of the change, that no secrets are written in plain text, and the user's verbatim instruction, then retry."+};++// --- Sensitive targets ---+// Secrets, keys, auth/payment code, migrations and CI workflows always draw the+// first-touch denial. Basename and segment rules are exact, never substrings.++const SENSITIVE_EXTS = new Set(['.pem', '.key', '.p12', '.pfx']);+const SENSITIVE_BASENAME_PATTERN = /^(\.env($|\.)|id_rsa|id_ed25519|credentials|secrets\.)/;+const SENSITIVE_SEGMENTS = new Set(['auth', 'authn', 'authz', 'security', 'secrets', 'payment', 'payments', 'billing', 'migrations']);+const SENSITIVE_PREFIX = '.github/workflows/';++/** True for a sensitive class path; any error or non-string input is sensitive. */+function isSensitiveTarget(classPath) {+ try {+ if (typeof classPath !== 'string' || !classPath) return true;+ const normalized = classPath.replace(/\\/g, '/').toLowerCase();+ const segments = normalized.split('/').filter(Boolean);+ const base = segments[segments.length - 1] || '';+ if (SENSITIVE_BASENAME_PATTERN.test(base) || SENSITIVE_EXTS.has(path.posix.extname(base))) return true;+ if (segments.some(segment => SENSITIVE_SEGMENTS.has(segment))) return true;+ // Also matched below an ancestor (unverified worktree, target outside the root): fail safe.+ return `/${segments.join('/')}`.includes(`/${SENSITIVE_PREFIX}`);+ } catch (_) {+ return true;+ }+}++/**+ * Sensitive on the lexical path or on the real (symlink-resolved) location, so+ * `src/tools -> ../auth` cannot launder `src/tools/login.py`. Any error is sensitive.+ */+function isSensitiveTargetFor(filePath, data) {+ try {+ if (typeof filePath !== 'string' || !filePath) return true;+ if (isSensitiveTarget(classPathFor(filePath, data))) return true;+ return isSensitiveRealTarget(filePath, data);+ } catch (_) {+ return true;+ }+}++/** Unresolvable real locations (dangling symlink, ENOTDIR, EACCES, loops) count as sensitive. */+function isSensitiveRealTarget(filePath, data) {+ const target = resolveTargetPath(filePath, data);+ if (!target || !isHostPathStyle(target.isWin)) return false;+ const paths = target.isWin ? path.win32 : path.posix;+ const real = realTargetPath(target.resolved, paths);+ if (!real) return true;+ const realKey = foldKey(real, target.isWin);+ if (realKey === foldKey(target.resolved, target.isWin)) return false;+ const root = canonicalProjectRoot(data);+ if (root && root.isWin === target.isWin) {+ const realRoot = realpathOfNearestAncestor(root.native, paths);+ if (!realRoot) return true;+ const realRootInfo = { ...root, key: foldKey(realRoot, target.isWin), native: realRoot };+ const realClassPath = projectRelativeClassPath(realKey, realRootInfo, target.isWin);+ if (realClassPath !== null) return isSensitiveTarget(realClassPath);+ }+ return isSensitiveTarget(normalizeWindowsSegments(realKey, target.isWin));+}++// --- Sibling collapse eligibility ---++const COLLAPSIBLE_CLASSES = new Set(['code', 'test', 'prose']);+// 8.3 short names (`CLAUDE~1`) can alias any directory, including dot-directories.+const SHORT_NAME_PATTERN = /~\d/;++/** Harness and tooling directories are dot-directories, so any dot segment blocks collapse. */+function isCollapsibleClassPath(classPath, cls) {+ if (!COLLAPSIBLE_CLASSES.has(cls)) return false;+ const segments = String(classPath).toLowerCase().split('/').filter(Boolean);+ if (segments.length === 0) return false;+ return !segments.some(segment => segment.startsWith('.') || SHORT_NAME_PATTERN.test(segment));+}++/** Lexical collapse screen; `collapseGateDir` adds the real-directory screen. */+function isCollapsibleTarget(filePath, data, cls) {+ return isCollapsibleClassPath(classPathFor(filePath, data), cls);+}++/** Realpath of a directory via its nearest existing ancestor; null on any error but a plain missing entry. */+function realpathOfNearestAncestor(nativePath, paths) {+ const realpath = fs.realpathSync.native || fs.realpathSync;+ const missing = [];+ let current = nativePath;+ for (;;) {+ try {+ const real = realpath(current);+ if (!fs.statSync(real).isDirectory()) return null;+ return missing.length > 0 ? paths.join(real, ...missing.reverse()) : real;+ } catch (error) {+ if (!error || error.code !== 'ENOENT' || !isMissingEntry(current)) return null;+ const parent = paths.dirname(current);+ if (parent === current) return null;+ missing.push(paths.basename(current));+ current = parent;+ }+ }+}++/** Real path of a file target, or of its nearest existing ancestor plus the missing tail. */+function realTargetPath(resolved, paths) {+ const realpath = fs.realpathSync.native || fs.realpathSync;+ try {+ return realpath(resolved);+ } catch (error) {+ if (!error || error.code !== 'ENOENT' || !isMissingEntry(resolved)) return null;+ }+ const realDir = realpathOfNearestAncestor(paths.dirname(resolved), paths);+ return realDir ? paths.join(realDir, paths.basename(resolved)) : null;+}++/** True when nothing (not even a dangling symlink) exists at the path. */+function isMissingEntry(nativePath) {+ try {+ fs.lstatSync(nativePath);+ return false;+ } catch (error) {+ return Boolean(error) && error.code === 'ENOENT';+ }+}++/**+ * Real directory a new file's sibling gate is keyed by, or null when it may not+ * collapse. A symlinked directory must keep the class and pass the same screen,+ * so `src/tools -> .claude/hooks` never collapses.+ */+function collapseGateDir(filePath, data, cls) {+ try {+ if (!isCollapsibleTarget(filePath, data, cls)) return null;+ const target = resolveTargetPath(filePath, data);+ if (!target || !isHostPathStyle(target.isWin)) return null;+ const paths = target.isWin ? path.win32 : path.posix;+ const lexicalDir = paths.dirname(target.resolved);+ const realDir = realpathOfNearestAncestor(lexicalDir, paths);+ if (!realDir) return null;+ const realKey = foldKey(realDir, target.isWin);+ if (realKey === foldKey(lexicalDir, target.isWin)) return realKey;+ const root = canonicalProjectRoot(data);+ if (!root || root.isWin !== target.isWin) return null;+ const realRoot = realpathOfNearestAncestor(root.native, paths);+ if (!realRoot) return null;+ const realTargetKey = foldKey(paths.join(realDir, paths.basename(target.resolved)), target.isWin);+ const realClassPath = projectRelativeClassPath(realTargetKey, { ...root, key: foldKey(realRoot, target.isWin), native: realRoot }, target.isWin);+ if (realClassPath === null || classifyTarget(realClassPath) !== cls) return null;+ if (isSensitiveTarget(realClassPath)) return null;+ return isCollapsibleClassPath(realClassPath, cls) ? realKey : null;+ } catch (_) {+ return null;+ }+}++module.exports = {+ WINDOWS_PATH_PATTERN,+ COLLAPSIBLE_CLASSES,+ CLASS_QUESTIONS,+ CLASS_CONDENSED_HINTS,+ QUOTE_INSTRUCTION,+ resolveTargetPath,+ canonicalPathKey,+ classifyTarget,+ classPathFor,+ classifyTargetFor,+ isCollapsibleTarget,+ collapseGateDir,+ isSensitiveTarget,+ isSensitiveTargetFor+};diff --git a/scripts/lib/gateguard-turn-scan.js b/scripts/lib/gateguard-turn-scan.jsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..30764abb6--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/lib/gateguard-turn-scan.js@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@+/**+ * GateGuard current-turn transcript scan: one bounded tail read of a Claude+ * Code JSONL transcript, walked back to the latest human message or+ * compaction. Yields the turn id and the turn's completed, non-error search+ * calls. Shell parsing stays in the hook, which shares it with the+ * destructive-command gate.+ */++'use strict';++const crypto = require('crypto');+const fs = require('fs');+const { readFileTail, DEFAULT_TRANSCRIPT_TAIL_BYTES } = require('./transcript-context');++const TRANSCRIPT_SCAN_MAX_LINES = 2000;+const SEARCH_TOOL_NAMES = new Set(['Glob', 'Grep', 'LS', 'Bash', 'PowerShell']);+const SHELL_TOOL_NAMES = new Set(['Bash', 'PowerShell']);+const TOOL_USE_ERROR_PREFIX = '<tool_use_error>';++function isObject(value) {+ return Boolean(value) && typeof value === 'object';+}++/** Exports never throw: an error here must not escape into the hook's credit or sibling logic. */+function neverThrows(fn, fallback) {+ return (...args) => {+ try {+ return fn(...args);+ } catch (_) {+ return fallback;+ }+ };+}++/** Transcript path from the hook payload or CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH; '' when none. */+function transcriptPathFor(data) {+ const candidate = (isObject(data) && (data.transcript_path || data.transcriptPath)) || process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ return typeof candidate === 'string' ? candidate : '';+}++function pendingToolUseId(data) {+ return isObject(data) && typeof data.tool_use_id === 'string' ? data.tool_use_id : '';+}++function recordContent(record) {+ const message = isObject(record) ? record.message : undefined;+ return isObject(message) ? message.content : undefined;+}++function isSkippedTranscriptRecord(record) {+ return (+ !isObject(record) ||+ Array.isArray(record) ||+ record.isSidechain === true ||+ record.isMeta === true ||+ (record.type !== 'user' && record.type !== 'assistant')+ );+}++/** Compaction discards the earlier turn: its summary (or boundary marker) starts a new one. */+function isCompactionBoundary(record) {+ return (+ Boolean(record) &&+ typeof record === 'object' &&+ record.isSidechain !== true &&+ (record.isCompactSummary === true || (record.type === 'system' && record.subtype === 'compact_boundary'))+ );+}++const MAX_PROMPT_ID_CHARS = 128;++// Claude Code stamps every user record of a turn with the same `promptId`, so it+// identifies the turn even when the boundary has scrolled out of the tail window.+function recordPromptId(record) {+ const id = isObject(record) ? record.promptId : undefined;+ return typeof id === 'string' && id && id.length <= MAX_PROMPT_ID_CHARS ? id : null;+}++function boundaryTurnId(record, line) {+ if (typeof record.uuid === 'string' && record.uuid) return record.uuid;+ return `h:${crypto.createHash('sha256').update(line).digest('hex').slice(0, 16)}`;+}++/**+ * Only a non-empty array of `tool_result` blocks is a tool-result record; any+ * other user record is a turn boundary, which can only shrink the credit window.+ */+function isToolResultRecord(record) {+ const content = recordContent(record);+ return (+ Array.isArray(content) &&+ content.length > 0 &&+ content.every(block => block && typeof block === 'object' && block.type === 'tool_result')+ );+}++function toolResultText(content) {+ if (typeof content === 'string') return content;+ if (!Array.isArray(content)) return '';+ const first = content.find(block => block && typeof block === 'object' && block.type === 'text');+ return first && typeof first.text === 'string' ? first.text : '';+}++function isErrorToolResult(block) {+ if (!isObject(block)) return false;+ if (block.is_error === true || block.is_error === 'true') return true;+ return toolResultText(block.content).trimStart().startsWith(TOOL_USE_ERROR_PREFIX);+}++/**+ * Scan the transcript tail back to the latest human turn. Returns null when the+ * transcript is unavailable, else the turn id, the turn's searches (newest+ * first), batch ids, and shell commands. The tail is bounded to keep the hook fast.+ */+function scanCurrentTurn(transcriptPath, pendingId = '') {+ if (typeof transcriptPath !== 'string' || !transcriptPath) return null;+ let stat;+ try {+ stat = fs.statSync(transcriptPath);+ } catch (_) {+ return null;+ }+ if (!stat.isFile()) return null;+ const tail = readFileTail(transcriptPath, DEFAULT_TRANSCRIPT_TAIL_BYTES);+ if (!tail) return null;++ const lines = tail.text.split('\n');+ const firstLine = Math.max(tail.truncated ? 1 : 0, lines.length - TRANSCRIPT_SCAN_MAX_LINES);+ const okResultIds = new Set();+ const toolUses = [];+ const batchIds = new Map();+ let newestMessageId = null;+ const windowPromptIds = new Set();+ const finish = turnId => ({+ turnId,+ searches: collectTurnSearches(toolUses, okResultIds, pendingId),+ batchIds,+ newestMessageId,+ shellCommands: collectShellCommands(toolUses)+ });++ for (let i = lines.length - 1; i >= firstLine; i--) {+ const line = lines[i].trim();+ if (!line) continue;+ let record;+ try {+ record = JSON.parse(line);+ } catch (_) {+ continue;+ }+ if (isCompactionBoundary(record)) return finish(recordPromptId(record) || boundaryTurnId(record, line));+ if (isObject(record) && record.type === 'user' && record.isSidechain !== true) {+ const id = recordPromptId(record);+ if (id) windowPromptIds.add(id);+ }+ if (isSkippedTranscriptRecord(record)) continue;++ if (record.type === 'user') {+ if (!isToolResultRecord(record)) return finish(recordPromptId(record) || boundaryTurnId(record, line));+ for (const block of recordContent(record)) {+ if (typeof block.tool_use_id === 'string' && !isErrorToolResult(block)) {+ okResultIds.add(block.tool_use_id);+ }+ }+ continue;+ }++ if (!isObject(record.message)) continue;+ const content = recordContent(record);+ const messageId = typeof record.message.id === 'string' && record.message.id ? record.message.id : null;+ if (newestMessageId === null && messageId) newestMessageId = messageId;+ if (!Array.isArray(content)) continue;+ for (let j = content.length - 1; j >= 0; j--) {+ const block = content[j];+ if (!block || typeof block !== 'object' || block.type !== 'tool_use') continue;+ toolUses.push({ block, messageId });+ if (messageId && typeof block.id === 'string') batchIds.set(block.id, messageId);+ }+ }+ // No boundary: a clipped window is the current turn only if its promptIds agree;+ // two or more mean an unrecognised turn start. An unclipped file has no turn.+ if ((tail.truncated || firstLine > 0) && windowPromptIds.size <= 1) {+ return finish(windowPromptIds.size === 1 ? [...windowPromptIds][0] : null);+ }+ return { turnId: null, searches: [], batchIds: new Map(), newestMessageId: null, shellCommands: [] };+}++/** Completed, non-error search calls whose id occurs once, newest first. */+function collectTurnSearches(toolUsesNewestFirst, okResultIds, pendingId) {+ const idCounts = new Map();+ for (const { block } of toolUsesNewestFirst) {+ if (typeof block.id === 'string') idCounts.set(block.id, (idCounts.get(block.id) || 0) + 1);+ }+ const searches = [];+ const priorCalls = toolUsesNewestFirst.filter(({ block }) => !pendingId || block.id !== pendingId);+ priorCalls.forEach(({ block, messageId }, index) => {+ if (typeof block.id !== 'string' || !okResultIds.has(block.id)) return;+ if (idCounts.get(block.id) !== 1) return; // a reused id cannot be tied to one result+ if (!SEARCH_TOOL_NAMES.has(block.name)) return;+ if (!block.input || typeof block.input !== 'object') return;+ searches.push({ name: block.name, input: block.input, callsAgo: index + 1, messageId });+ });+ return searches;+}++function collectShellCommands(toolUses) {+ return toolUses+ .filter(({ block }) => SHELL_TOOL_NAMES.has(block.name) && block.input && typeof block.input === 'object')+ .map(({ block }) => (typeof block.input.command === 'string' ? block.input.command : ''));+}++/** Assistant message whose searches share the pending call's batch (their results were not yet seen). */+function excludedBatchId(scan, data) {+ if (!isObject(scan)) return null;+ const pendingId = pendingToolUseId(data);+ const located = pendingId && scan.batchIds instanceof Map ? scan.batchIds.get(pendingId) : undefined;+ if (located) return located;+ return typeof scan.newestMessageId === 'string' ? scan.newestMessageId : null;+}++/** Lazily scans once per hook invocation, shared by every MultiEdit entry. */+function createTurnScanner(data) {+ let scanned = false;+ let scan = null;+ return () => {+ if (!scanned) {+ scanned = true;+ try {+ scan = scanCurrentTurn(transcriptPathFor(data), pendingToolUseId(data));+ } catch (_) {+ scan = null;+ }+ }+ return scan;+ };+}++function currentTurnId(scan) {+ return scan && typeof scan.turnId === 'string' && scan.turnId ? scan.turnId : null;+}++module.exports = {+ TRANSCRIPT_SCAN_MAX_LINES,+ SEARCH_TOOL_NAMES,+ SHELL_TOOL_NAMES,+ transcriptPathFor: neverThrows(transcriptPathFor, ''),+ pendingToolUseId: neverThrows(pendingToolUseId, ''),+ isCompactionBoundary: neverThrows(isCompactionBoundary, false),+ isToolResultRecord: neverThrows(isToolResultRecord, false),+ isErrorToolResult: neverThrows(isErrorToolResult, false),+ scanCurrentTurn: neverThrows(scanCurrentTurn, null),+ excludedBatchId: neverThrows(excludedBatchId, null),+ createTurnScanner: neverThrows(createTurnScanner, () => null),+ currentTurnId: neverThrows(currentTurnId, null)+};diff --git a/scripts/lib/transcript-context.js b/scripts/lib/transcript-context.jsindex 853a35b2a..b6665a986 100644--- a/scripts/lib/transcript-context.js+++ b/scripts/lib/transcript-context.js@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ module.exports = {DEFAULT_CONTEXT_THRESHOLD_LARGE,DEFAULT_CONTEXT_INTERVAL_TOKENS,DEFAULT_TRANSCRIPT_TAIL_BYTES,+ readFileTail,readLatestContextTokens,resolveContextWindow,resolveContextWindowTokens,diff --git a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.jsindex 3bd3ba797..68c19fe1d 100644--- a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js+++ b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js@@ -145,6 +145,12 @@ function parseOutput(stdout) {}}+// Canonical state keys fold separators and case on Windows-style paths, so lookups go through this.+const WINDOWS_STYLE_PATH = /^[a-z]:[\\/]|^\\\\/i;+function stateKey(p) {+ return WINDOWS_STYLE_PATH.test(p) ? p.replace(/\\/g, '/').toLowerCase() : p;+}+function loadDirectHook(env = {}) {delete require.cache[require.resolve(hookScript)];Object.assign(process.env, {@@ -1808,7 +1814,11 @@ function runTests() {const persisted = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8'));assert.ok(persisted.checked.includes('/src/concurrent.js'), 'concurrent disk entry should be preserved');- assert.ok(persisted.checked.includes('/src/new-edit.js'), 'new in-memory entry should be persisted');+ // Canonical key: '/src/new-edit.js' on POSIX, '<drive>:/src/new-edit.js' when cwd is a Windows path.+ assert.ok(+ persisted.checked.some(k => k === '/src/new-edit.js' || /^[a-z]:\/src\/new-edit\.js$/.test(k)),+ 'new in-memory entry should be persisted'+ );}))passed++;@@ -3435,7 +3445,8 @@ function runTests() {test('consecutive condensed denials are textually different (ordinal advances)', () => {writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 5 });const first = parseOutput(runHook({ tool_name: 'Write', tool_input: { file_path: '/src/damp-a.js', content: 'x' } }).stdout);- const second = parseOutput(runHook({ tool_name: 'Write', tool_input: { file_path: '/src/damp-b.js', content: 'x' } }).stdout);+ // Different directory: a same-dir new-file Write would be a sibling allow, not a denial.+ const second = parseOutput(runHook({ tool_name: 'Write', tool_input: { file_path: '/lib/damp-b.js', content: 'x' } }).stdout);const firstReason = first.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason;const secondReason = second.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason;assert.ok(firstReason.includes('denial #6'), `expected ordinal 6, got: ${firstReason}`);@@ -3480,6 +3491,133 @@ function runTests() {passed++;else failed++;+ clearState();+ if (+ test('allows new paths after the session-wide denial budget', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 3 });+ const result = runHook(+ { tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: '/src/after-budget.js' } },+ { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '3' }+ );+ assert.strictEqual(result.code, 0);+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);+ assert.ok(output, 'should produce valid JSON output');+ assert.ok(!output.hookSpecificOutput, 'paths after the budget should pass through');+ assert.strictEqual(output.tool_name, 'Edit', 'pass-through should preserve input');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('MultiEdit allows new paths after the session-wide denial budget', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 3 });+ const result = runHook(+ { tool_name: 'MultiEdit', tool_input: { edits: [{ file_path: '/src/after-multi-budget.js', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }] } },+ { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '3' }+ );+ assert.strictEqual(result.code, 0);+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);+ assert.ok(output, 'should produce valid JSON output');+ assert.ok(!output.hookSpecificOutput, 'MultiEdit paths after the budget should pass through');+ assert.strictEqual(output.tool_name, 'MultiEdit', 'pass-through should preserve input');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('Write allows new paths after the session-wide denial budget', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 3 });+ const result = runHook(+ { tool_name: 'Write', tool_input: { file_path: '/src/after-write-budget.js', content: 'x' } },+ { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '3' }+ );+ assert.strictEqual(result.code, 0);+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);+ assert.ok(output, 'should produce valid JSON output');+ assert.ok(!output.hookSpecificOutput, 'Write paths after the budget should pass through');+ assert.strictEqual(output.tool_name, 'Write', 'pass-through should preserve input');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('denies at the exact budget and passes through on the next path', () => {+ // Budget 3: the 3rd denial is still a denial; the 4th path is allowed.+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 2 });+ const atLimit = runHook(+ { tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: '/src/at-budget.js' } },+ { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '3' }+ );+ const atLimitOutput = parseOutput(atLimit.stdout);+ assert.ok(atLimitOutput, 'should produce valid JSON output at the limit');+ assert.strictEqual(+ atLimitOutput.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision,+ 'deny',+ 'the denial that reaches the budget should still deny'+ );++ const pastLimit = runHook(+ { tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: '/src/past-budget.js' } },+ { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '3' }+ );+ const pastLimitOutput = parseOutput(pastLimit.stdout);+ assert.ok(pastLimitOutput, 'should produce valid JSON output past the limit');+ assert.ok(!pastLimitOutput.hookSpecificOutput, 'the next path should pass through');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ for (const malformed of ['3.5', '3oops', '0x3', ' 3 oops', '-1', '']) {+ clearState();+ if (+ test(`leaves the gate uncapped for malformed budget ${JSON.stringify(malformed)}`, () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 9 });+ const result = runHook(+ { tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: '/src/malformed-budget.js' } },+ { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: malformed }+ );+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);+ assert.ok(output, 'should produce valid JSON output');+ assert.strictEqual(+ output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision,+ 'deny',+ 'a malformed budget must not silently become a finite cap'+ );+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;+ }++ clearState();+ if (+ test('condensed denial names the session-wide denial cap', () => {+ // Budget above the full-block budget so a condensed denial is still reached.+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 5 });+ const result = runHook(+ { tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: '/src/condensed-budget.js' } },+ { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '10' }+ );+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);+ assert.ok(output, 'should produce valid JSON output');+ const reason = output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason;+ assert.strictEqual(output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny');+ assert.ok(+ reason.includes('GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS'),+ 'condensed denial should name the session-wide denial cap'+ );+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;+clearState();if (test('malformed denial counter in state is treated as zero (full block, no crash)', () => {@@ -4016,6 +4154,2112 @@ function runTests() {passed++;else failed++;+ // --- Canonical checked-path keys ---+ const c1Decision = result => {+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);+ return output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;+ };+ const c1Denials = () => JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8')).fact_force_denials;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('a.py, ./a.py and <root>/a.py share one checked key (one denial)', () => {+ const env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-c1' };+ const edit = file_path => runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } }, env);+ assert.strictEqual(c1Decision(edit('a.py')), 'deny', 'first touch of a.py is denied');+ assert.notStrictEqual(c1Decision(edit('./a.py')), 'deny', './a.py is the same file');+ assert.notStrictEqual(c1Decision(edit('/proj-c1/a.py')), 'deny', 'absolute spelling is the same file');+ assert.strictEqual(c1Denials(), 1, 'exactly one denial counted');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('raw key from an older state file still counts as checked', () => {+ writeState({ checked: ['a.py'], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 1 });+ const result = runHook(+ { tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: 'a.py', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } },+ { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-c1' }+ );+ assert.notStrictEqual(c1Decision(result), 'deny', 'raw legacy key must not be re-denied');+ assert.strictEqual(c1Denials(), 1, 'no new denial counted');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('Windows root folds separators and case into one key', () => {+ const env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: 'C:\\proj' };+ const write = file_path => runHook({ tool_name: 'Write', tool_input: { file_path, content: 'x' } }, env);+ assert.strictEqual(c1Decision(write('src\\a.py')), 'deny', 'first touch is denied');+ assert.notStrictEqual(c1Decision(write('c:/proj/src/a.py')), 'deny', 'forward-slash lowercase spelling is the same file');+ assert.notStrictEqual(c1Decision(write('C:\\PROJ\\src\\A.py')), 'deny', 'case differs only on win32');+ assert.strictEqual(c1Denials(), 1, 'exactly one denial counted');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('MultiEdit entries use the canonical key', () => {+ const env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-c1' };+ assert.strictEqual(+ c1Decision(runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: 'b.py', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } }, env)),+ 'deny'+ );+ const multi = runHook(+ { tool_name: 'MultiEdit', tool_input: { edits: [{ file_path: './b.py', old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }] } },+ env+ );+ assert.notStrictEqual(c1Decision(multi), 'deny', 'MultiEdit on ./b.py matches the checked b.py');+ assert.strictEqual(c1Denials(), 1, 'exactly one denial counted');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ // --- Relative targets resolve against the tool cwd, not the project root ---+ clearState();+ if (+ test('relative target resolves against data.cwd before CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR', () => {+ const env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-f1' };+ const edit = file_path =>+ runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', cwd: '/proj-f1/sub', tool_input: { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } }, env);+ assert.strictEqual(c1Decision(edit('src/a.py')), 'deny', 'first touch of src/a.py (cwd sub) is denied');+ assert.notStrictEqual(c1Decision(edit('/proj-f1/sub/src/a.py')), 'deny', 'absolute spelling of the same file is checked');+ assert.strictEqual(c1Decision(edit('/proj-f1/src/a.py')), 'deny', 'a different file under the project root is gated');+ assert.strictEqual(c1Denials(), 2, 'two distinct files, two denials');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('without data.cwd a relative target still resolves against CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR', () => {+ const env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-f1' };+ const edit = file_path => runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } }, env);+ assert.strictEqual(c1Decision(edit('src/a.py')), 'deny');+ assert.notStrictEqual(c1Decision(edit('/proj-f1/src/a.py')), 'deny', 'project-root fallback unchanged');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ // --- Questions by target class ---+ const C2_ENV = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: '/proj-c2' };+ const QUOTE_LINE = "Quote the user's current instruction verbatim";+ const RETRY_LINE = 'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.';+ const c2Reason = (toolName, file_path, env = {}) => {+ const tool_input = toolName === 'MultiEdit'+ ? { edits: [{ file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }] }+ : { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b', content: 'x' };+ const output = parseOutput(runHook({ tool_name: toolName, tool_input }, { ...C2_ENV, ...env }).stdout);+ assert.ok(output && output.hookSpecificOutput, `${toolName} ${file_path} should be denied`);+ assert.strictEqual(output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny');+ return output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecisionReason;+ };+ const assertNoCodeQuestions = reason => {+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('call this new file'), 'must not ask the code Write questions');+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('import/require'), 'must not ask the code Edit questions');+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('public functions/classes'), 'must not ask the code Edit questions');+ };+ const assertFrame = (reason, verb, file) => {+ assert.ok(reason.startsWith('[Fact-Forcing Gate]\n\n'), 'keeps the gate header');+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`Before ${verb} ${file}, present these facts:`), `header names ${verb} ${file}`);+ assert.ok(reason.includes(QUOTE_LINE), 'list ends with the verbatim-instruction line');+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`If this call was sent in a parallel batch, other edits to ${file}`), 'keeps batch-sibling warning');+ assert.ok(reason.includes(RETRY_LINE), 'keeps the closing retry line');+ assert.ok(reason.includes('GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS'), 'keeps the path-scoped recovery hint');+ };++ clearState();+ if (+ test('first-touch Write of docs/guide.md asks prose questions, not code questions', () => {+ const reason = c2Reason('Write', 'docs/guide.md');+ assertFrame(reason, 'creating', 'docs/guide.md');+ assert.ok(reason.includes('supersedes or duplicates'), 'asks what it supersedes');+ assert.ok(reason.includes('linked or referenced from'), 'asks where it is linked from');+ assert.ok(reason.includes('why a new file rather than editing an existing one'), 'asks why a new file');+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`4. ${QUOTE_LINE}`), 'quote is item 4');+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('first-touch Edit of docs/guide.md asks prose Edit questions', () => {+ const reason = c2Reason('Edit', 'docs/guide.md');+ assertFrame(reason, 'editing', 'docs/guide.md');+ assert.ok(reason.includes('reference the section being changed'), 'asks what references the section');+ assert.ok(reason.includes('corrects or adds'), 'asks what the change corrects or adds');+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`3. ${QUOTE_LINE}`), 'quote is item 3');+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('supersedes'), 'Write-only prose question absent');+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('skills/x/SKILL.md and .claude/agents/a.md get instruction questions', () => {+ for (const file of ['skills/x/SKILL.md', '.claude/agents/a.md', 'CLAUDE.md']) {+ const reason = c2Reason('Write', file);+ assertFrame(reason, 'creating', file);+ assert.ok(reason.includes('harness/loader'), `${file}: asks which harness reads it`);+ assert.ok(reason.includes('agent behaviour changes'), `${file}: asks what behaviour changes`);+ assert.ok(reason.includes('instruction, skill, or agent file already covers'), `${file}: asks for existing coverage`);+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`4. ${QUOTE_LINE}`), `${file}: quote is item 4`);+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);+ }+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('src/a.py Write and Edit keep the code text byte-identical', () => {+ const writeReason = c2Reason('Write', 'src/a.py');+ const expectedWrite = [+ '[Fact-Forcing Gate]',+ '',+ 'Before creating src/a.py, present these facts:',+ '',+ '1. Name the file(s) and line(s) that will call this new file',+ '2. Confirm no existing file serves the same purpose (search the tree — Glob/Grep, or find/grep via Bash)',+ '3. If this file reads/writes data files, show field names, structure, and date format (use redacted or synthetic values, not raw production data)',+ "4. Quote the user's current instruction verbatim",+ '',+ 'If this call was sent in a parallel batch, other edits to src/a.py from that batch may already have been applied. Re-read the file before building on them.',+ '',+ 'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.',+ ''+ ].join('\n');+ assert.ok(writeReason.startsWith(expectedWrite), 'code Write block unchanged');+ const editReason = c2Reason('Edit', 'src/b.py');+ const expectedEdit = [+ '[Fact-Forcing Gate]',+ '',+ 'Before editing src/b.py, present these facts:',+ '',+ '1. List ALL files that import/require this file (search the tree — Glob/Grep, or find/grep via Bash)',+ '2. List the public functions/classes affected by this change',+ '3. If this file reads/writes data files, show field names, structure, and date format (use redacted or synthetic values, not raw production data)',+ "4. Quote the user's current instruction verbatim",+ '',+ 'If this call was sent in a parallel batch, other edits to src/b.py from that batch may already have been applied. Re-read the file before building on them.',+ '',+ 'Present the facts, then retry the same operation.',+ ''+ ].join('\n');+ assert.ok(editReason.startsWith(expectedEdit), 'code Edit block unchanged');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('src/a.test.ts and tests/helpers.js get test questions', () => {+ for (const file of ['src/a.test.ts', 'tests/helpers.js']) {+ const reason = c2Reason('Write', file);+ assertFrame(reason, 'creating', file);+ assert.ok(reason.includes('behaviour is under test'), `${file}: asks what is under test`);+ assert.ok(reason.includes('existing test file(s)'), `${file}: asks for existing test files`);+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`3. ${QUOTE_LINE}`), `${file}: quote is item 3`);+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);+ }+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('config/app.yaml and .env.local get config questions', () => {+ for (const file of ['config/app.yaml', '.env.local']) {+ const reason = c2Reason('Write', file);+ assertFrame(reason, 'creating', file);+ assert.ok(reason.includes('process/tool reads this file'), `${file}: asks what reads it`);+ assert.ok(reason.includes('effect of the change'), `${file}: asks for the effect`);+ assert.ok(reason.includes('no secrets or credentials'), `${file}: asks about secrets`);+ assert.ok(reason.includes(`4. ${QUOTE_LINE}`), `${file}: quote is item 4`);+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);+ }+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('scripts/hooks/x.js is code, not instruction', () => {+ const reason = c2Reason('Write', 'scripts/hooks/x.js');+ assert.ok(reason.includes('call this new file'), 'code Write questions');+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('harness/loader'), 'not instruction questions');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('MultiEdit on a .md entry uses the prose Edit variant', () => {+ const reason = c2Reason('MultiEdit', 'docs/multi.md');+ assertFrame(reason, 'editing', 'docs/multi.md');+ assert.ok(reason.includes('reference the section being changed'), 'prose Edit questions');+ assertNoCodeQuestions(reason);+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('condensed denial for .md after the budget carries the prose hint and ordinal', () => {+ const env = { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_FULL_DENIALS: '0' };+ const writeReason = c2Reason('Write', 'docs/late.md', env);+ assert.ok(!writeReason.includes('\n'), 'condensed denial is one line');+ assert.ok(writeReason.includes('(denial #1 this session) First creation of docs/late.md: '), 'keeps ordinal and target');+ assert.ok(writeReason.includes('briefly state what this supersedes, where it is linked from'), 'prose Write hint');+ assert.ok(!writeReason.includes('importers/callers'), 'no code hint');+ assert.ok(writeReason.includes('parallel batch'), 'keeps batch-sibling warning');+ assert.ok(writeReason.includes('GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS') && writeReason.includes('ECC_GATEGUARD=off'), 'keeps exemption hint');+ const editReason = c2Reason('Edit', 'docs/late-edit.md', env);+ assert.ok(editReason.includes('(denial #2 this session) First edit of docs/late-edit.md: '), 'ordinal advances');+ assert.ok(editReason.includes('what references the changed section'), 'prose Edit hint');+ const codeReason = c2Reason('Edit', 'src/late.js', env);+ assert.ok(codeReason.includes('briefly state importers/callers, affected API, data schemas if any'), 'code hint unchanged');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ clearState();+ if (+ test('class denials still sanitize the path', () => {+ const reason = c2Reason('Write', 'docs/hid\u200bden.md');+ assert.ok(!reason.includes('\u200b'), 'zero-width space stripped');+ assert.ok(reason.includes('supersedes or duplicates'), 'still prose questions');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ // --- Prior-search credit in the current human turn ---+ const c3Root = '/proj-c3';+ // An ambient CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH must not leak into cases that pass no transcript.+ const c3Env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: c3Root, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' };+ const c3TranscriptDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-c3-transcripts-'));+ const c3Outputs = [];+ let c3Seq = 0;+ let c3Uuid = 0;+ const c3NextUuid = () => `uuid-${++c3Uuid}`;+ const c3Human = (text, extra = {}) =>+ ({ type: 'user', uuid: c3NextUuid(), message: { role: 'user', content: text }, ...extra });+ // Real assistant records carry message.id; a search without one is never credited.+ const c3ToolUse = (id, name, input, extra = {}) => ({+ type: 'assistant',+ uuid: c3NextUuid(),+ message: { id: `msg_${id}`, role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id, name, input }] },+ ...extra+ });+ const c3ToolResult = (id, isError = false, extra = {}) => ({+ type: 'user',+ uuid: c3NextUuid(),+ message: { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'tool_result', tool_use_id: id, is_error: isError, content: 'ok' }] },+ ...extra+ });+ const c3Search = (id, name, input) => [c3ToolUse(id, name, input), c3ToolResult(id)];+ // Like Claude Code, a fixture ends with the pending call's own assistant record and runners pass its id.+ const c3PendingIds = new Map();+ const c3WriteTranscript = (records, { pending = true } = {}) => {+ c3Seq += 1;+ const file = path.join(c3TranscriptDir, `t-${c3Seq}.jsonl`);+ const all = records.slice();+ if (pending) {+ const id = `toolu_pending_${c3Seq}`;+ all.push({+ type: 'assistant',+ uuid: c3NextUuid(),+ message: { id: `msg_pending_${c3Seq}`, role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id, name: 'Edit', input: {} }] }+ });+ c3PendingIds.set(file, id);+ }+ const lines = all.map(r => (typeof r === 'string' ? r : JSON.stringify(r)));+ fs.writeFileSync(file, lines.join('\n') + '\n', 'utf8');+ return file;+ };+ const c3Run = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, env = {}) => {+ const payload = { tool_name: toolName, tool_input: toolInput, cwd: c3Root };+ if (transcriptPath !== undefined) payload.transcript_path = transcriptPath;+ if (c3PendingIds.has(transcriptPath)) payload.tool_use_id = c3PendingIds.get(transcriptPath);+ const result = runHook(payload, { ...c3Env, ...env });+ c3Outputs.push(result.stdout);+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);+ const hso = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput : {};+ return { result, decision: hso.permissionDecision, context: hso.additionalContext || '', reason: hso.permissionDecisionReason || '' };+ };+ const c3Edit = (file_path, transcriptPath, env) =>+ c3Run('Edit', { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, transcriptPath, env);+ const c3Write = (file_path, transcriptPath, env) => c3Run('Write', { file_path, content: 'x' }, transcriptPath, env);+ const c3State = () => (fs.existsSync(stateFile) ? JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8')) : {});+ const c3Case = (name, fn) => {+ clearState();+ if (test(name, fn)) passed++;+ else failed++;+ };+ const c3AssertDenied = (out, label) => {+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny`);+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Prior search seen'), `${label}: no credit note`);+ };+ const c3AssertCredited = (out, label) => {+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: must not deny`);+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), `${label}: credit note expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);+ };++ c3Case('Grep stem in this turn credits the first Edit (note, no denial counted)', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('please fix the widget factory'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_g1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory', path: c3Root })+ ]);+ const out = c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);+ c3AssertCredited(out, 'Grep stem');+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('(Grep widget_factory, 1 tool call ago)'), out.context);+ assert.ok(out.context.includes(`first-touch check satisfied for ${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`), out.context);+ const state = c3State();+ assert.ok(!state.fact_force_denials, 'denial count unchanged');+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1, 'credit counted');+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`)), 'canonical key marked checked');+ const again = c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);+ assert.notStrictEqual(again.decision, 'deny');+ assert.strictEqual(again.context, '', 'already checked: plain allow, no second note');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().fact_force_credited, 1, 'no double credit');+ });++ c3Case('Glob directory credits a Write of a new file there', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('add a component'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_gl', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/components/*.tsx', path: c3Root })+ ]);+ c3AssertCredited(c3Write(`${c3Root}/src/components/NewThing.tsx`, t), 'Glob dir');+ assert.ok(!c3State().fact_force_denials);+ });++ c3Case('LS directory credits a Write there', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('add a page'), ...c3Search('toolu_ls', 'LS', { path: `${c3Root}/docs` })]);+ c3AssertCredited(c3Write(`${c3Root}/docs/brand-new-page.md`, t), 'LS dir');+ });++ c3Case('Bash rg stem credits an Edit', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('fix it'), ...c3Search('toolu_b1', 'Bash', { command: 'cd /proj-c3 && rg foo_bar src' })]);+ const out = c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/foo_bar.js`, t);+ c3AssertCredited(out, 'Bash rg');+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('(Bash rg foo_bar src,'), out.context);+ });++ c3Case('PowerShell Get-ChildItem stem credits an Edit', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('fix it'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_p1', 'PowerShell', { command: 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Filter *foo_bar*' })+ ]);+ c3AssertCredited(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/foo_bar.ps1`, t), 'PowerShell gci');+ });++ c3Case('git grep qualifies, git log does not', () => {+ const ok = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_gg', 'Bash', { command: 'git grep -n foo_bar' })]);+ c3AssertCredited(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/foo_bar.js`, ok), 'git grep');+ const no = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_gl2', 'Bash', { command: 'git log -- src/baz_qux.js' })]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/baz_qux.js`, no), 'git log');+ });++ c3Case('stem only in a non-search shell segment does not credit', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_b2', 'Bash', { command: 'echo foo_bar | grep something; ls' })]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/foo_bar.js`, t), 'stem in echo segment');+ });++ c3Case('command substitution in a search command is ambiguous (no credit)', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_b3', 'Bash', { command: 'rg $(echo foo_bar) src' })]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/foo_bar.js`, t), 'substitution');+ });++ c3Case('cd before a search disables directory credit (stem still counts)', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_cd', 'Bash', { command: 'cd /elsewhere && ls docs' })]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Write(`${c3Root}/docs/brand-new-page.md`, t), 'cd then ls dir');+ });++ c3Case('a search in the same assistant batch as the pending call never credits', () => {+ const batch = (id, name, input) => ({+ type: 'assistant',+ uuid: c3NextUuid(),+ message: { id: 'msg_batch', role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id, name, input }] }+ });+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('x'),+ batch('toolu_bg', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),+ batch('toolu_be', 'Edit', { file_path: `${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py` }),+ c3ToolResult('toolu_bg')+ ]);+ const input = { file_path: `${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' };+ const same = runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_use_id: 'toolu_be', cwd: c3Root, transcript_path: t, tool_input: input }, c3Env);+ c3Outputs.push(same.stdout);+ assert.strictEqual(parseOutput(same.stdout).hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', 'same batch denied');+ clearState();+ const later = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('x'),+ batch('toolu_bg2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),+ c3ToolResult('toolu_bg2'),+ { type: 'assistant', uuid: c3NextUuid(), message: { id: 'msg_next', role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id: 'toolu_be2', name: 'Edit', input }] } }+ ]);+ const next = runHook({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_use_id: 'toolu_be2', cwd: c3Root, transcript_path: later, tool_input: input }, c3Env);+ c3Outputs.push(next.stdout);+ assert.ok(next.stdout.includes('Prior search seen'), 'search from an earlier message credits');+ });++ c3Case('no search in the turn -> deny', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('edit it'), ...c3Search('toolu_r0', 'Read', { file_path: `${c3Root}/other.js` })]);+ const out = c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);+ c3AssertDenied(out, 'no search');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().fact_force_denials, 1);+ assert.ok(!c3State().fact_force_credited, 'no credit counted on deny');+ });++ c3Case('search tool_use without a tool_result (same batch) -> deny', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), c3ToolUse('toolu_pending', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'pending search');+ });++ c3Case('search whose tool_result is_error -> deny', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('x'),+ c3ToolUse('toolu_err', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),+ c3ToolResult('toolu_err', true)+ ]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'errored search');+ });++ c3Case('search before the latest human message -> deny', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('first request'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_old', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),+ c3Human('second request')+ ]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'previous turn search');+ });++ c3Case('tool_result user records do not reset the turn', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('x'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_s1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),+ ...c3Search('toolu_s2', 'Read', { file_path: `${c3Root}/a.js` }),+ ...c3Search('toolu_s3', 'Bash', { command: 'npm test' })+ ]);+ const out = c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);+ c3AssertCredited(out, 'tool_results between');+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('3 tool calls ago'), out.context);+ });++ c3Case('isMeta and sidechain user records are not turn boundaries', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('x'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_m1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),+ c3Human('<system-reminder>meta</system-reminder>', { isMeta: true }),+ c3Human('subagent prompt', { isSidechain: true })+ ]);+ c3AssertCredited(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'meta/sidechain boundary');+ });++ c3Case('sidechain search records are ignored', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('x'),+ c3ToolUse('toolu_sc', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }, { isSidechain: true }),+ c3ToolResult('toolu_sc', false, { isSidechain: true })+ ]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'sidechain search');+ });++ c3Case('Read of the target never credits an Edit', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('x'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_rd', 'Read', { file_path: `${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py` })+ ]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'Read target');+ });++ c3Case('directory match does not credit an Edit (stem only)', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_ls2', 'LS', { path: `${c3Root}/src` })]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'LS dir for Edit');+ });++ c3Case('generic stems (index.js) are not credited', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_ix', 'Grep', { pattern: 'index' })]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/index.js`, t), 'generic stem');+ });++ c3Case('stems shorter than 4 characters are not credited', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_ab', 'Grep', { pattern: 'abc' })]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/abc.js`, t), 'short stem');+ });++ c3Case('missing or non-file transcript -> deny', () => {+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, path.join(c3TranscriptDir, 'nope.jsonl')), 'missing file');+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/other_widget.py`, c3TranscriptDir), 'directory path');+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/third_widget.py`), 'no transcript_path');+ });++ c3Case('garbage lines -> deny; garbage around a valid turn is skipped', () => {+ const junk = c3WriteTranscript(['not json', '{"type":', '{"type":"assistant","message":null}', '[1,2]', 'null']);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, junk), 'garbage only');+ const mixed = c3WriteTranscript([+ 'garbage {',+ c3Human('x'),+ '{"broken":',+ ...c3Search('toolu_gm', 'Grep', { pattern: 'other_widget' }),+ '\u0000\u0001'+ ]);+ c3AssertCredited(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/other_widget.py`, mixed), 'garbage around valid turn');+ });++ // A clipped window with no human record in it is entirely the current turn.+ const c3Filler = prefix => {+ const filler = [];+ for (let i = 0; i < 40; i++) {+ const id = `toolu_${prefix}${i}`;+ filler.push(c3ToolUse(id, 'Bash', { command: 'npm test' }));+ filler.push({+ type: 'user',+ message: { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'tool_result', tool_use_id: id, content: 'y'.repeat(10 * 1024) }] }+ });+ }+ return filler;+ };++ c3Case('tail truncated, no boundary in window, search + result inside -> credited (turn id null)', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('long ago'),+ ...c3Filler('fill'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_late', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })+ ]);+ assert.ok(fs.statSync(t).size > 300 * 1024, 'fixture exceeds the tail window');+ const { scanCurrentTurn } = loadDirectHook();+ const scan = scanCurrentTurn(t);+ assert.strictEqual(scan.turnId, null, 'no boundary: no turn id');+ assert.ok(scan.searches.some(s => s.name === 'Grep'), 'search inside the window is collected');+ c3AssertCredited(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'clipped window is the current turn');+ });++ c3Case('tail truncated, search tool_use before the window, result inside -> not credited', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('long ago'),+ c3ToolUse('toolu_early', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }),+ ...c3Filler('fill2'),+ c3ToolResult('toolu_early')+ ]);+ assert.ok(fs.statSync(t).size > 300 * 1024, 'fixture exceeds the tail window');+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'tool_use outside the window');+ });++ c3Case('whole file scanned with no boundary -> no credit', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([...c3Search('toolu_nob', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t), 'no human record at all');+ });++ c3Case('MultiEdit credits per entry; first uncredited entry is denied', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_me', 'Grep', { pattern: 'alpha_mod' })]);+ const out = c3Run(+ 'MultiEdit',+ {+ edits: [+ { file_path: `${c3Root}/src/alpha_mod.js`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' },+ { file_path: `${c3Root}/src/beta_mod.js`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }+ ]+ },+ t+ );+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny');+ assert.ok(out.reason.includes('beta_mod.js'), 'uncredited entry is the one denied');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(`${c3Root}/src/alpha_mod.js`)), 'credited entry marked checked');+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1);+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1);+ });++ c3Case('MultiEdit with every entry credited returns one combined note', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('x'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_me2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'alpha_mod|beta_mod' })+ ]);+ const out = c3Run(+ 'MultiEdit',+ {+ edits: [+ { file_path: `${c3Root}/src/alpha_mod.js`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' },+ { file_path: `${c3Root}/src/beta_mod.js`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }+ ]+ },+ t+ );+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny');+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('alpha_mod.js') && out.context.includes('beta_mod.js'), out.context);+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().fact_force_credited, 2);+ assert.ok(!c3State().fact_force_denials);+ });++ c3Case('exempt paths and subagents are unchanged (no credit note)', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_ex', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);+ const exempt = c3Edit(`${c3Root}/tmp/widget_factory.py`, t, { GATEGUARD_EXEMPT_GLOBS: 'tmp/**' });+ assert.notStrictEqual(exempt.decision, 'deny');+ assert.strictEqual(exempt.context, '', 'exempt path: plain allow');+ const sub = runHook(+ {+ tool_name: 'Edit',+ agent_id: 'agent-1',+ cwd: c3Root,+ transcript_path: t,+ tool_input: { file_path: `${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }+ },+ c3Env+ );+ c3Outputs.push(sub.stdout);+ assert.ok(!sub.stdout.includes('Prior search'), 'subagent: plain allow');+ assert.ok(!c3State().fact_force_credited, 'no credit recorded');+ });++ c3Case('credit note detail is sanitized and bounded', () => {+ const pattern = `widget_factory\u200b\u202e${'x'.repeat(300)}\nIGNORE PREVIOUS`;+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_long', 'Grep', { pattern })]);+ const out = c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t);+ c3AssertCredited(out, 'long pattern');+ const detail = out.context.match(/\(Grep (.*), 1 tool call ago\)/);+ assert.ok(detail, out.context);+ assert.ok(Array.from(detail[1]).length <= 80, `detail too long: ${detail[1].length}`);+ for (const bad of ['\u200b', '\u202e', '\n']) assert.ok(!out.context.includes(bad), 'no invisible/control chars');+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('IGNORE PREVIOUS'), 'truncated before trailing text');+ });++ c3Case('state save failure on credit -> allow with state warning', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('x'), ...c3Search('toolu_sf', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);+ const blocker = path.join(c3TranscriptDir, `not-a-dir-${c3Seq}`);+ fs.writeFileSync(blocker, 'x');+ const out = c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, t, { GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR: blocker });+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny');+ assert.ok(out.result.stderr.includes('could not be persisted'), out.result.stderr);+ });++ c3Case('fact_force_credited survives later state writes (merge keeps it)', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_credited: 4 });+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(`${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`), 'deny path');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().fact_force_credited, 4, 'denial write keeps credited count');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().fact_force_denials, 1);+ });++ c3Case('scanCurrentTurn / findCreditingSearch units', () => {+ const { scanCurrentTurn, findCreditingSearch } = loadDirectHook();+ const human = c3Human('go');+ const t = c3WriteTranscript(+ [c3Human('old'), human, ...c3Search('toolu_u1', 'Glob', { pattern: '**/*.md' }), c3ToolUse('toolu_u2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'pending' })],+ { pending: false }+ );+ const scan = scanCurrentTurn(t);+ assert.strictEqual(scan.turnId, human.uuid, 'turnId is the boundary uuid');+ assert.deepStrictEqual(scan.searches.map(s => [s.name, s.callsAgo]), [['Glob', 2]]);+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(path.join(c3TranscriptDir, 'missing.jsonl')), null);+ const data = { cwd: c3Root };+ // A Glob with no literal prefix and no explicit path names no directory.+ assert.strictEqual(findCreditingSearch(scan, `${c3Root}/new-notes.md`, true, data), null, 'Glob **/*.md gives no dir credit');+ const docsScan = scanCurrentTurn(+ c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('go'), ...c3Search('toolu_u3', 'Glob', { pattern: 'docs/*.md' }), c3ToolUse('toolu_u4', 'Grep', { pattern: 'x' })], {+ pending: false+ })+ );+ assert.ok(findCreditingSearch(docsScan, `${c3Root}/docs/new-notes.md`, true, data), 'Glob literal prefix names the dir');+ assert.strictEqual(findCreditingSearch(docsScan, `${c3Root}/docs/sub/new-notes.md`, true, data), null, 'not a subdirectory');+ assert.strictEqual(findCreditingSearch(scan, `${c3Root}/new-notes.md`, false, data), null, 'Edit needs a stem match');+ assert.strictEqual(findCreditingSearch(null, `${c3Root}/x.md`, true, data), null);+ const winScan = { turnId: null, searches: [{ name: 'LS', input: { path: 'C:\\Proj\\Src' }, callsAgo: 1, messageId: 'msg_w' }] };+ assert.ok(findCreditingSearch(winScan, 'c:/proj/src/new_file.js', true, { cwd: 'C:\\proj' }), 'win32 dir match folds case');+ const posixScan = { turnId: null, searches: [{ name: 'LS', input: { path: '/Proj/Src' }, callsAgo: 1, messageId: 'msg_p' }] };+ assert.strictEqual(findCreditingSearch(posixScan, '/proj/src/new_file.js', true, { cwd: '/proj' }), null, 'posix is case-sensitive');+ });++ c3Case('50 MB transcript is scanned from the tail only (<= 256 KiB read)', () => {+ const big = path.join(c3TranscriptDir, 'big.jsonl');+ const bigSize = 50 * 1024 * 1024;+ const tail = [c3Human('now'), ...c3Search('toolu_big', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })];+ for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) tail.push(...c3Search(`toolu_t${i}`, 'Read', { file_path: `${c3Root}/f${i}.js` }));+ // Sparse 50 MB body (ftruncate) + the real tail: cheap to build, same shape for the hook.+ const fd = fs.openSync(big, 'w');+ try {+ fs.writeSync(fd, JSON.stringify(c3Human('ancient')) + '\n');+ fs.ftruncateSync(fd, bigSize);+ fs.writeSync(fd, '\n' + tail.map(r => JSON.stringify(r)).join('\n') + '\n', bigSize);+ } finally {+ fs.closeSync(fd);+ }+ const savedRoot = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ const savedTranscript = process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ const originalOpenSync = fs.openSync;+ const originalReadSync = fs.readSync;+ const bigFds = new Set();+ let bytesRead = 0;+ let result;+ let ms;+ try {+ assert.ok(fs.statSync(big).size > bigSize, 'fixture is > 50 MB');+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: c3Root, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' });+ const payload = {+ tool_name: 'Edit',+ cwd: c3Root,+ transcript_path: big,+ tool_input: { file_path: `${c3Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }+ };+ fs.openSync = function countingOpenSync(target) {+ const opened = originalOpenSync.apply(fs, arguments);+ if (String(target) === big) bigFds.add(opened);+ return opened;+ };+ fs.readSync = function countingReadSync(readFd) {+ const n = originalReadSync.apply(fs, arguments);+ if (bigFds.has(readFd)) bytesRead += n;+ return n;+ };+ const start = process.hrtime.bigint();+ result = hook.run(payload);+ ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6;+ } finally {+ fs.openSync = originalOpenSync;+ fs.readSync = originalReadSync;+ if (savedRoot === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = savedRoot;+ if (savedTranscript === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH = savedTranscript;+ fs.rmSync(big, { force: true });+ }+ console.log(` (run() on 50 MB transcript: ${bytesRead} bytes read, ${ms.toFixed(1)} ms)`);+ assert.ok(result && String(result.additionalContext || '').includes('Prior search seen'), 'credited from the tail');+ assert.ok(bigFds.size >= 1 && bytesRead > 0, 'transcript was read through fs.readSync');+ assert.ok(bytesRead <= 256 * 1024, `read ${bytesRead} bytes; must stay within the 256 KiB tail`);+ assert.ok(ms < 1000, `wall-clock backstop: run() took ${ms.toFixed(1)} ms`);+ });++ c3Case('no prior-search credit output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {+ assert.ok(c3Outputs.length > 20, 'collected outputs');+ for (const stdout of c3Outputs) {+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);+ }+ });++ // --- Exclusion globs never earn search credit ---+ const r2Target = `${c3Root}/src/widget.py`;+ let r2Seq = 0;+ const r2Turn = (name, input) => {+ r2Seq += 1;+ return c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('fix the widget'), ...c3Search(`toolu_r2_${r2Seq}`, name, input)]);+ };+ const r2Denied = [+ ['Grep glob !widget.py', 'Grep', { pattern: 'TODO', glob: '!widget.py', path: c3Root }],+ ['Grep glob list with an exclusion', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '*.js,!widget.py', path: c3Root }],+ ['Grep path-style exclusion covering the target', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '!src/**', path: c3Root }],+ ['Grep positive basename glob that misses the target', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '*.md', path: c3Root }],+ ["rg -g '!widget.py'", 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!widget.py' TODO ." }],+ ['rg --glob=!widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'rg --glob=!widget.py TODO .' }],+ ['rg --iglob exclusion, other case', 'Bash', { command: "rg --iglob '!WIDGET.py' TODO ." }],+ ['rg -g exclusion of the directory', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!src/' widget ." }],+ ['rg -g positive glob that misses the target', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '*.md' widget ." }],+ ['grep --exclude=widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'grep -r --exclude=widget.py TODO .' }],+ ['grep --exclude-dir of the target dir', 'Bash', { command: 'grep -rn --exclude-dir=src widget .' }],+ ['grep --exclude-from (unknown exclusions)', 'Bash', { command: 'grep -r --exclude-from=skip.txt widget .' }],+ ['grep --include that misses the target', 'Bash', { command: 'grep -r --include=*.md widget .' }],+ ['find -not -name', 'Bash', { command: 'find . -not -name widget.py' }],+ ['find ! -name', 'Bash', { command: 'find . ! -name widget.py -type f' }],+ ['find -path ... -prune', 'Bash', { command: 'find . -path ./src/widget.py -prune -o -print' }],+ ['find -name that misses the target', 'Bash', { command: 'find . -name widget.md' }],+ ['fd -E widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'fd -E widget.py py src' }],+ ['fd --exclude widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'fd --exclude widget.py py .' }],+ ['ls -I widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'ls -I widget.py src' }],+ ["tree -I 'widget*'", 'Bash', { command: "tree -I 'widget*' src" }],+ ['Get-ChildItem -Exclude', 'PowerShell', { command: 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Exclude widget.py' }],+ ['rg brace exclusion', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!*.{py,js}' widget ." }],+ ['rg deep directory exclusion', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!**/src/**' widget ." }],+ ['rg character-class exclusion', 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!w[i]dget.py' TODO ." }],+ ['rg exclusion in a short-flag cluster', 'Bash', { command: "rg -ig'!widget.py' TODO ." }],+ ['find negated group', 'Bash', { command: 'find . ! ( -name widget.py -o -name x.py ) -print' }],+ ['git ls-files -x', 'Bash', { command: 'git ls-files -x widget.py src' }]+ ];+ for (const [label, name, input] of r2Denied) {+ c3Case(`an exclusion never credits the excluded target (${label})`, () => {+ c3AssertDenied(c3Edit(r2Target, r2Turn(name, input)), label);+ assert.ok(!c3State().fact_force_credited, `${label}: nothing credited`);+ });+ }+ const r2Credited = [+ ["rg -g '*.py' widget", 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '*.py' widget ." }],+ ['Grep widget glob *.py', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '*.py', path: c3Root }],+ ["rg -g '!*.md' widget (exclusion does not cover the target)", 'Bash', { command: "rg -g '!*.md' widget ." }],+ ['Grep widget glob *.{py,js} (braces are one glob)', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '*.{py,js}', path: c3Root }],+ ['Grep widget glob !node_modules/**', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget', glob: '!node_modules/**', path: c3Root }],+ ['grep --exclude-dir=node_modules widget', 'Bash', { command: 'grep -r --exclude-dir=node_modules widget .' }],+ ['find -name widget.py', 'Bash', { command: 'find . -name widget.py' }],+ ['Grep TODO glob widget.py (positive glob names the stem)', 'Grep', { pattern: 'TODO', glob: 'widget.py', path: c3Root }]+ ];+ for (const [label, name, input] of r2Credited) {+ c3Case(`control still credits (${label})`, () => {+ c3AssertCredited(c3Edit(r2Target, r2Turn(name, input)), label);+ });+ }++ // --- Same-turn sibling creations and counters ---+ const c4Root = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-c4-proj-')));+ const c4Env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: c4Root, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' };+ const c4Outputs = [];+ const c4Run = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, env = {}) => {+ const payload = { tool_name: toolName, tool_input: toolInput, cwd: c4Root };+ if (transcriptPath !== undefined) payload.transcript_path = transcriptPath;+ if (c3PendingIds.has(transcriptPath)) payload.tool_use_id = c3PendingIds.get(transcriptPath);+ const result = runHook(payload, { ...c4Env, ...env });+ c4Outputs.push(result.stdout);+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);+ const hso = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput : {};+ return { result, decision: hso.permissionDecision, context: hso.additionalContext || '', reason: hso.permissionDecisionReason || '' };+ };+ const c4Write = (file_path, transcriptPath, env) => c4Run('Write', { file_path, content: 'x' }, transcriptPath, env);+ const c4Edit = (file_path, transcriptPath, env) =>+ c4Run('Edit', { file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, transcriptPath, env);+ const c4AssertSibling = (out, label) => {+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: must not deny (${out.result.stdout})`);+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'allow', `${label}: never permissionDecision allow`);+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of '), `${label}: sibling note expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);+ };+ const c4AssertDenied = (out, label) => {+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny, got ${out.result.stdout}`);+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Sibling of'), `${label}: no sibling note`);+ };+ // dir_gates keys are `<class>\u0000<canonicalDir>`.+ const c4GateKey = (dir, cls = 'code') => `${cls}\u0000${stateKey(dir)}`;+ const c4Turn = text => {+ const human = c3Human(text);+ return { human, transcript: c3WriteTranscript([human]) };+ };++ c3Case('checked lookups under a simulated Windows root (both spellings share one key)', () => {+ const winRoot = 'C:\\Users\\RUNNER~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\gateguard-c4-proj-abc';+ const savedRoot = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ const savedTranscript = process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ let first;+ let second;+ try {+ // Fixed synthetic paths: keys need no real disk, and the target is absent on any host.+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: winRoot, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' });+ const write = file_path => hook.run({ tool_name: 'Write', cwd: winRoot, tool_input: { file_path, content: 'x' } });+ first = write(`${winRoot}/src/widgets/w0.js`);+ second = write(`${winRoot}\\src\\widgets\\w1.js`);+ } finally {+ if (savedRoot === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = savedRoot;+ if (savedTranscript === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH = savedTranscript;+ }+ assert.strictEqual(parseOutput(first.stdout).hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny');+ const state = c3State();+ if (process.platform === 'win32') {+ // On Windows the synthetic root resolves through C:\Users, so the second new file collapses.+ assert.ok(second && /Sibling of/.test(String(second.additionalContext || '')), JSON.stringify(second));+ assert.strictEqual(Object.keys(state.dir_gates || {}).length, 1, 'one dir gate for both spellings');+ } else {+ // A Windows path on a POSIX host has no real directory, so both spellings are denied.+ assert.strictEqual(parseOutput(second.stdout).hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', JSON.stringify(second));+ assert.deepStrictEqual(Object.keys(state.dir_gates || {}), [], 'no dir gate for an unresolvable directory');+ }+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(`${winRoot}/src/widgets/w0.js`)), `w0 checked: ${JSON.stringify(state.checked)}`);+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(`${winRoot}\\src\\widgets\\w1.js`)), 'w1 checked (backslash spelling)');+ });++ c3Case('8 new files in one dir in the same turn -> 1 deny + 7 sibling notes', () => {+ const { human, transcript } = c4Turn('scaffold the widgets');+ const first = c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/widgets/w0.js`, transcript);+ c4AssertDenied(first, 'first file');+ for (let i = 1; i < 8; i++) {+ const out = c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/widgets/w${i}.js`, transcript);+ c4AssertSibling(out, `file ${i}`);+ assert.strictEqual(+ out.context,+ `[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of ${c4Root}/src/widgets/w0.js (gated earlier at denial #1 this session); proceeding without a repeat denial.`+ );+ }+ const state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1, 'one denial');+ assert.strictEqual(state.sibling_allows, 7, 'seven sibling allows');+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(`${c4Root}/src/widgets/w7.js`)), 'sibling marked checked (canonical key)');+ const gate = state.dir_gates[c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/widgets`)];+ assert.ok(gate, 'dir gate keyed by canonical dir');+ assert.strictEqual(gate.turn, human.uuid);+ assert.strictEqual(gate.first, `${c4Root}/src/widgets/w0.js`);+ assert.strictEqual(gate.ordinal, 1);+ assert.ok(typeof gate.at === 'number' && gate.at > 0);+ const retry = c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/widgets/w3.js`, transcript);+ assert.strictEqual(retry.decision, undefined);+ assert.strictEqual(retry.context, '', 'already checked: plain allow');+ });++ c3Case('a different directory gets its own denial', () => {+ const { transcript } = c4Turn('x');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/a/one.js`, transcript), 'dir a');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/b/two.js`, transcript), 'dir b');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/a/nested/three.js`, transcript), 'subdirectory is not a sibling');+ c4AssertSibling(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/b/four.js`, transcript), 'dir b sibling');+ });++ c3Case('the next human turn in the same dir is denied again', () => {+ const turn1 = c3Human('first');+ const t1 = c3WriteTranscript([turn1]);+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/w/one.js`, t1), 'turn 1');+ const t2 = c3WriteTranscript([turn1, c3Human('second')]);+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/w/two.js`, t2), 'turn 2');+ c4AssertSibling(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/w/three.js`, t2), 'turn 2 sibling');+ assert.ok(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/w/three.js`, t2).context === '', 'checked');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().dir_gates[c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/w`)].ordinal, 2, 'latest denial ordinal recorded');+ });++ c3Case('a Write over an existing file in the gated dir is still denied (per-file)', () => {+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(c4Root, 'src', 'e'), { recursive: true });+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(c4Root, 'src', 'e', 'existing.js'), 'old');+ const { transcript } = c4Turn('x');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/e/new.js`, transcript), 'new file');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/e/existing.js`, transcript), 'existing file');+ assert.ok(!c3State().sibling_allows, 'no sibling allow');+ });++ c3Case('an existing-file Write denial does not open a dir gate', () => {+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(c4Root, 'src', 'f'), { recursive: true });+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(c4Root, 'src', 'f', 'present.js'), 'old');+ const { transcript } = c4Turn('x');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/f/present.js`, transcript), 'existing file');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/f/brand_new.js`, transcript), 'new file after existing');+ });++ c3Case('fs error resolving the target -> treated as existing (no collapse)', () => {+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(c4Root, 'src'), { recursive: true });+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(c4Root, 'src', 'blocker'), 'not a dir');+ const { transcript } = c4Turn('x');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/blocker/one.js`, transcript), 'ENOTDIR first');+ // Windows reports ENOENT (not ENOTDIR) under a file, so the target reads as new there.+ if (process.platform === 'win32') return;+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/blocker/two.js`, transcript), 'ENOTDIR second');+ assert.ok(!Object.keys(c3State().dir_gates || {}).some(k => k.endsWith(`${c4Root}/src/blocker`)), 'no dir gate recorded');+ });++ c3Case('Edit and MultiEdit in a gated dir are never collapsed', () => {+ const { transcript } = c4Turn('x');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/m/one.js`, transcript), 'write');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Edit(`${c4Root}/src/m/two.js`, transcript), 'edit sibling');+ const multi = c4Run(+ 'MultiEdit',+ { edits: [{ file_path: `${c4Root}/src/m/three.js`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }] },+ transcript+ );+ c4AssertDenied(multi, 'multiedit sibling');+ c4AssertSibling(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/m/four.js`, transcript), 'write sibling still works');+ });++ c3Case('an Edit denial does not open a dir gate', () => {+ const { transcript } = c4Turn('x');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Edit(`${c4Root}/src/n/one.js`, transcript), 'edit');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n/two.js`, transcript), 'write after edit');+ });++ c3Case('instruction-class siblings are each denied', () => {+ const { transcript } = c4Turn('x');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/skills/foo/one.md`, transcript), 'instruction 1');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/skills/foo/two.md`, transcript), 'instruction 2');+ assert.ok(!Object.keys(c3State().dir_gates || {}).some(k => k.endsWith(`${c4Root}/skills/foo`)), 'instruction denial opens no dir gate');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/skills/foo/helper.js`, transcript), 'code file after instruction denials');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/skills/foo/three.md`, transcript), 'instruction after a code dir gate');+ });++ c3Case('no transcript -> sibling within 120 s, denied after', () => {+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/nt/one.js`), 'first');+ c4AssertSibling(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/nt/two.js`), 'within window');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.dir_gates[c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/nt`)].turn, null, 'turn null without transcript');+ state.dir_gates[c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/nt`)].at = Date.now() - 121000;+ writeState(state);+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/nt/three.js`), 'after window');+ });++ c3Case('a turn-scoped gate is not matched without a turn id, and vice versa', () => {+ const { transcript } = c4Turn('x');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/tt/one.js`, transcript), 'turn gate');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/tt/two.js`), 'no-turn call vs turn gate');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/tt/three.js`, transcript), 'turn call vs null-turn gate');+ });++ c3Case('a prior search credits before the sibling rule', () => {+ const human = c3Human('x');+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([human]);+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/cr/one.js`, t), 'first');+ const t2 = c3WriteTranscript([human, ...c3Search('toolu_c4g', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);+ const out = c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/cr/widget_factory.js`, t2);+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), out.result.stdout);+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Sibling of'));+ assert.ok(!c3State().sibling_allows, 'credit is not a sibling allow');+ });++ c3Case('counters record class names for denial, credit and sibling events', () => {+ const human = c3Human('x');+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([human, ...c3Search('toolu_c4c', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' })]);+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/cc/one.js`, t), 'code deny');+ c4AssertSibling(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/cc/two.js`, t), 'code sibling');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/docs/guide_page.md`, t), 'prose deny');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Edit(`${c4Root}/tests/a.test.js`, t), 'test deny');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/skills/x/SKILL.md`, t), 'instruction deny');+ c3AssertCredited(c4Edit(`${c4Root}/lib/widget_factory.js`, t), 'code credit');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.denials_by_class, { code: 1, prose: 1, test: 1, instruction: 1 });+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.credited_by_class, { code: 1 });+ assert.strictEqual(state.sibling_allows, 1);+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 4);+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1);+ const json = JSON.stringify({ d: state.denials_by_class, c: state.credited_by_class });+ assert.ok(!json.includes('/'), 'counters hold class names only, never paths');+ });++ c3Case('a state file without the counter fields loads and gains them', () => {+ writeState({ checked: ['/elsewhere/x.js'], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 2 });+ const { transcript } = c4Turn('x');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/old/one.js`, transcript), 'deny');+ c4AssertSibling(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/old/two.js`, transcript), 'sibling');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes('/elsewhere/x.js'));+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 3);+ assert.strictEqual(state.dir_gates[c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/old`)].ordinal, 3);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.denials_by_class, { code: 1 });+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.credited_by_class, {});+ assert.strictEqual(state.sibling_allows, 1);+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 0);+ });++ c3Case('malformed counter fields are tolerated (treated as empty/zero)', () => {+ writeState({+ checked: [],+ last_active: Date.now(),+ dir_gates: { [c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/bad`)]: 'nope', [c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/bad2`)]: { at: 'x' }, other: [1, 2] },+ denials_by_class: [5],+ credited_by_class: { code: -3, prose: 'x', test: 2 },+ sibling_allows: 'many'+ });+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/bad/one.js`), 'malformed gate ignored');+ c4AssertSibling(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/bad/two.js`), 'fresh gate works');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.deepStrictEqual(Object.keys(state.dir_gates), [c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/bad`)]);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.denials_by_class, { code: 1 });+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.credited_by_class, { test: 2 });+ assert.strictEqual(state.sibling_allows, 1);+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), dir_gates: 'garbage', denials_by_class: null, sibling_allows: -1 });+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/bad3/one.js`), 'garbage dir_gates');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().sibling_allows, 0);+ });++ c3Case('dir_gates is capped at 50 (oldest evicted)', () => {+ const now = Date.now();+ const gates = {};+ for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) gates[c4GateKey(`/cap/d${i}`)] = { turn: null, at: now - 100000 + i, first: `/cap/d${i}/f.js`, ordinal: i + 1 };+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: now, dir_gates: gates });+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/cap/one.js`), 'new gate');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(Object.keys(state.dir_gates).length, 50, 'capped at 50');+ assert.ok(state.dir_gates[c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/cap`)], 'newest kept');+ assert.ok(!state.dir_gates[c4GateKey('/cap/d0')], 'oldest evicted');+ assert.ok(state.dir_gates[c4GateKey('/cap/d1')], 'second-oldest kept');+ });++ c3Case('dir_gate first path is stored sanitized', () => {+ const file_path = `${c4Root}/src/san/evil\u202ename\u200b.js`;+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(file_path), 'deny');+ const gate = c3State().dir_gates[c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/san`)];+ assert.ok(gate && !gate.first.includes('\u202e') && !gate.first.includes('\u200b'), JSON.stringify(gate));+ const out = c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/san/ok.js`);+ c4AssertSibling(out, 'sibling');+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('\u202e'));+ });++ c3Case('merges dir_gates and counters written by another process during save', () => {+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: c4Root, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' });+ const originalMkdirSync = fs.mkdirSync;+ const now = Date.now();+ let injected = false;+ fs.mkdirSync = function patchedMkdirSync(target) {+ const result = originalMkdirSync.apply(fs, arguments);+ if (!injected && path.resolve(String(target)) === path.resolve(stateDir)) {+ injected = true;+ fs.writeFileSync(+ stateFile,+ JSON.stringify({+ checked: ['/src/concurrent.js'],+ last_active: now,+ fact_force_denials: 7,+ dir_gates: {+ [c4GateKey('/other/dir')]: { turn: 'u-other', at: now, first: '/other/dir/a.js', ordinal: 7 },+ [c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/conc`)]: { turn: 'u-old', at: 1, first: 'stale', ordinal: 1 }+ },+ denials_by_class: { code: 5, prose: 2 },+ credited_by_class: { test: 3 },+ sibling_allows: 9+ }),+ 'utf8'+ );+ }+ return result;+ };+ const savedRoot = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ const savedTranscript = process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ try {+ const result = hook.run({ tool_name: 'Write', cwd: c4Root, tool_input: { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/conc/new.js`, content: 'x' } });+ assert.strictEqual(parseOutput(result.stdout).hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny');+ } finally {+ fs.mkdirSync = originalMkdirSync;+ if (savedRoot === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = savedRoot;+ if (savedTranscript === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH = savedTranscript;+ }+ const persisted = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8'));+ assert.ok(persisted.dir_gates[c4GateKey('/other/dir')], 'concurrent dir gate preserved');+ const mine = persisted.dir_gates[c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/conc`)];+ assert.ok(mine && mine.first === `${c4Root}/src/conc/new.js` && mine.turn === null, 'newer in-memory gate wins');+ assert.deepStrictEqual(persisted.denials_by_class, { code: 5, prose: 2 }, 'per-key max(disk, mem)');+ assert.deepStrictEqual(persisted.credited_by_class, { test: 3 });+ assert.strictEqual(persisted.sibling_allows, 9);+ assert.ok(persisted.checked.includes('/src/concurrent.js'));+ });++ c3Case('sibling state save failure -> allow with state warning', () => {+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/sf/one.js`), 'deny');+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: c4Root, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' });+ const originalWriteFileSync = fs.writeFileSync;+ fs.writeFileSync = function patchedWriteFileSync(target) {+ if (String(target).includes('.json.tmp.')) throw Object.assign(new Error('EIO'), { code: 'EIO' });+ return originalWriteFileSync.apply(fs, arguments);+ };+ const savedRoot = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ const savedTranscript = process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ let result;+ try {+ result = hook.run({ tool_name: 'Write', cwd: c4Root, tool_input: { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/sf/two.js`, content: 'x' } });+ } finally {+ fs.writeFileSync = originalWriteFileSync;+ if (savedRoot === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = savedRoot;+ if (savedTranscript === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH = savedTranscript;+ }+ assert.ok(!result.stdout, 'no deny and no sibling note');+ assert.ok(String(result.stderr).includes('could not be persisted'), JSON.stringify(result));+ });++ c3Case('clipped window keeps the promptId turn id; a sibling gate from earlier in the turn still matches', () => {+ const { scanCurrentTurn } = loadDirectHook();+ const pid = 'prompt-heavy';+ const human = c3Human('scaffold', { promptId: pid });+ const early = c3WriteTranscript([human]);+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(early).turnId, pid);+ const gateDir = `${c4Root}/src/heavy`;+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${gateDir}/one.js`, early), 'first file, boundary in window');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().dir_gates[c4GateKey(gateDir)].turn, pid, 'gate recorded under the promptId');+ const filler = c3Filler('pid').map(r => (r.type === 'user' ? { ...r, promptId: pid } : r));+ const late = c3WriteTranscript([human, ...filler]);+ assert.ok(fs.statSync(late).size > 300 * 1024, 'boundary scrolled out of the tail');+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(late).turnId, pid, 'turn id stable after the turn outgrows the tail');+ c4AssertSibling(c4Write(`${gateDir}/two.js`, late), 'sibling after the boundary left the window');+ const next = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('next', { promptId: 'prompt-next' })]);+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${gateDir}/three.js`, next), 'next prompt is a new turn');+ });++ c3Case('a new human turn uses its own promptId even when a late tool_result carries the previous one', () => {+ const t1Human = c3Human('turn one', { promptId: 'P1' });+ const t1 = c3WriteTranscript([t1Human]);+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n3/aaa1.py`, t1), 'turn P1');+ const late = { ...c3ToolResult('toolu_n3late'), promptId: 'P1' };+ const t2 = c3WriteTranscript([t1Human, c3Human('turn two', { promptId: 'P2' }), c3ToolUse('toolu_n3late', 'Bash', { command: 'true' }), late]);+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n3/aaa2.py`, t2), 'turn P2 with a late P1 tool_result');+ c4AssertSibling(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n3/aaa3.py`, t2), 'sibling within turn P2');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().dir_gates[c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/n3`)].turn, 'P2', 'gate recorded under the boundary promptId');+ });++ c3Case('a transcript that yields no turn id never falls back to the no-turn 120 s rule', () => {+ const asDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-n4-dir-'));+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n4a/one.js`, asDir), 'transcript path is a directory (scan null)');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n4a/two.js`, asDir), 'no collapse with a null scan');+ const noBoundary = c3WriteTranscript([c3ToolUse('toolu_n4x', 'Bash', { command: 'true' }), c3ToolResult('toolu_n4x')]);+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n4b/one.js`, noBoundary), 'whole file without a boundary (turn id null)');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n4b/two.js`, noBoundary), 'no collapse without a turn id');+ const missing = path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-n4-missing.jsonl');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n4c/one.js`, missing), 'missing transcript file');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n4c/two.js`, missing), 'no collapse with a missing transcript');+ const malformed = path.join(tmpRoot, `gateguard-n4-mal-${process.pid}.jsonl`);+ fs.writeFileSync(malformed, [c3Human('t1', { promptId: 'M1' }), c3Human('t2', { promptId: 'M2' })].map(r => JSON.stringify(r)).join('\n') + '\n{"type":"assistant"}\n');+ c4AssertDenied(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n4d/one.js`, malformed), 'malformed assistant record');+ c4AssertSibling(c4Write(`${c4Root}/src/n4d/two.js`, malformed), 'malformed record skipped: same turn M2 still collapses');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().dir_gates[c4GateKey(`${c4Root}/src/n4d`)].turn, 'M2');+ fs.rmSync(asDir, { recursive: true, force: true });+ fs.rmSync(malformed, { force: true });+ });++ c3Case('no sibling-collapse output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {+ assert.ok(c4Outputs.length > 20, 'collected outputs');+ for (const stdout of c4Outputs) {+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);+ }+ });++ // --- Prior-search credit: scope and matching rules ---+ const f2Root = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-f2-proj-')));+ // Shell fixtures use forward slashes: bash treats unquoted backslashes as escapes.+ const f2RootSh = f2Root.replace(/\\/g, '/');+ for (const dir of ['src/handlers', 'handlers', 'f']) fs.mkdirSync(path.join(f2Root, dir), { recursive: true });+ for (const file of ['src/payment.py', 'src/auth.py', 'src/payment_service.py', 'top.py']) {+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(f2Root, file), 'x');+ }+ const f2Env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: f2Root, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' };+ const f2Outputs = [];+ let f2Session = 0;+ // Each call gets a fresh session unless the case passes session_id explicitly.+ const f2Run = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, extra = {}) => {+ f2Session += 1;+ const payload = { tool_name: toolName, tool_input: toolInput, cwd: f2Root, transcript_path: transcriptPath, session_id: `f2-${f2Session}` };+ if (c3PendingIds.has(transcriptPath)) payload.tool_use_id = c3PendingIds.get(transcriptPath);+ Object.assign(payload, extra);+ if (payload.tool_use_id === null) delete payload.tool_use_id;+ const result = runHook(payload, f2Env);+ f2Outputs.push(result.stdout);+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);+ const hso = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput : {};+ return { result, decision: hso.permissionDecision, context: hso.additionalContext || '', reason: hso.permissionDecisionReason || '' };+ };+ const f2 = rel => `${f2Root}/${rel}`;+ const f2Edit = (rel, t, extra) => f2Run('Edit', { file_path: f2(rel), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t, extra);+ const f2Write = (rel, t, extra) => f2Run('Write', { file_path: f2(rel), content: 'x' }, t, extra);+ const f2Turn = (...records) => c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('fix'), ...records]);+ const f2Bash = (id, command) => c3Search(id, 'Bash', { command });+ const f2Deny = (out, label) => {+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny, got ${out.result.stdout}`);+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Prior search seen'), `${label}: no credit note`);+ };+ const f2Credit = (out, label) => {+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: must not deny (${out.result.stdout})`);+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), `${label}: credit note expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);+ };+ const f2Msg = (id, messageId, name, input) => ({+ type: 'assistant',+ uuid: c3NextUuid(),+ message: { id: messageId, role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id, name, input }] }+ });+ const f2Result = (id, extra) => ({+ type: 'user',+ uuid: c3NextUuid(),+ message: { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'tool_result', tool_use_id: id, content: 'ok', ...extra }] }+ });++ c3Case('a directory listing does not credit a Write that overwrites an existing file', () => {+ f2Deny(f2Write('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_h1a', 'LS', { path: 'src' }))), 'LS src -> overwrite payment.py');+ f2Deny(f2Write('top.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_h1b', 'grep -rn TODO .'))), 'grep -rn TODO . -> overwrite top.py');+ f2Deny(f2Write('src/handlers/../payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_h1c', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/*.py' }))), 'Glob src/*.py -> overwrite');+ });++ c3Case('shell patterns and flag values are not directories', () => {+ f2Deny(f2Write('handlers/zzzz_new.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_h2a', 'grep -r handlers src'))), 'grep pattern as dir');+ f2Deny(f2Write('f/qqqq_new.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_h2b', 'find . -type f -name x'))), 'find -type value as dir');+ f2Deny(f2Write('handlers/rg_new.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_h2c', 'rg -g handlers TODO src'))), 'rg -g value as dir');+ f2Deny(f2Write('handlers/sls_new.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_h2d', 'PowerShell', { command: 'Select-String handlers src/*.py' }))), 'sls pattern');+ });++ c3Case('bare cwd operands and missing directories give no directory credit', () => {+ f2Deny(f2Write('zzz_new.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_h2e', 'grep -rn TODO .'))), 'grep -rn TODO .');+ f2Deny(f2Write('nothere/new_mod.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_h2f', 'ls nothere'))), 'ls of a missing dir');+ f2Deny(f2Write('top.py/new_mod.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_h2g', 'ls top.py'))), 'ls of a file, not a dir');+ });++ c3Case('Glob with no literal prefix, or no glob characters, names no directory', () => {+ f2Deny(f2Write('brandnew.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_h2h', 'Glob', { pattern: '**/*' }))), 'Glob **/*');+ f2Deny(f2Write('otherzz.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_h2i', 'Glob', { pattern: 'qqq.txt' }))), 'Glob qqq.txt');+ f2Deny(f2Write('src/handlers/brand_new.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_h2j', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/handlers/x.py' }))), 'Glob file lookup');+ });++ c3Case('stems match on word boundaries only', () => {+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/auth.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1a', 'Grep', { pattern: 'author' }))), 'author vs auth');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1b', 'Grep', { pattern: 'TODO', glob: '**/payments/**' }))), 'payments glob');+ f2Credit(f2Edit('src/auth.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1c', 'Grep', { pattern: 'def auth(' }))), 'auth( boundary');+ });++ c3Case('shell segments that only read stdin never credit', () => {+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_m1d', 'echo payment | grep payment'))), 'echo | grep');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_m1e', 'cat README | grep -c payment'))), 'cat | grep -c');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_m1f', 'echo payment | rg payment'))), 'piped rg with no path');+ });++ c3Case('a shell segment that only reads the target is not a search', () => {+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_m1g', 'ls src/payment.py'))), 'ls target');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_m1h', 'grep -n . src/payment.py'))), 'grep . target');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_m1i', 'grep -n payment ./src/payment.py'))), 'grep stem in target only');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1j', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment', path: 'src/payment.py' }))), 'Grep path = target');+ });++ c3Case('Grep/Glob/LS with an explicit path only credit targets inside it', () => {+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1k', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment', path: '/nonexistent/elsewhere' }))), 'Grep elsewhere');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1l', 'Glob', { pattern: 'payment.md', path: '/nonexistent-f2' }))), 'Glob elsewhere');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1m', 'Grep', { pattern: 'TODO', path: 'x', glob: 'src/payments/**' }))), 'D3');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1n', 'Glob', { pattern: 'lib/**/payment*' }))), 'Glob prefix elsewhere');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1o', 'Glob', { pattern: 'payment.md', path: f2Root }))), 'file lookup in an ancestor dir');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1p', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/payment.py' }))), 'lookup of the target itself');+ f2Credit(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_m1q', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/payment.md' }))), 'file lookup beside the target');+ });++ c3Case('same-batch searches are excluded when the pending call cannot be located', () => {+ const edit = f2(`src/payment.py`);+ const sameBatch = c3WriteTranscript(+ [c3Human('fix'), f2Msg('g1', 'msg_B', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' }), f2Msg('e1', 'msg_B', 'Edit', { file_path: edit }), f2Result('g1')],+ { pending: false }+ );+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', sameBatch), 'no tool_use_id: newest message excluded');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', sameBatch, { tool_use_id: 'e1' }), 'tool_use_id located');+ const notYet = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('fix'), f2Msg('g2', 'msg_C', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' }), f2Result('g2')], { pending: false });+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', notYet, { tool_use_id: 'e2' }), 'tool_use_id not in transcript yet');+ const noMsgId = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('fix'),+ { type: 'assistant', uuid: c3NextUuid(), message: { role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id: 'g3', name: 'Grep', input: { pattern: 'payment' } }] } },+ f2Result('g3')+ ]);+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', noMsgId), 'search without message.id');+ const earlier = c3WriteTranscript(+ [c3Human('fix'), f2Msg('g4', 'msg_D', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' }), f2Result('g4'), f2Msg('e4', 'msg_E', 'Edit', { file_path: edit })],+ { pending: false }+ );+ f2Credit(f2Edit('src/payment.py', earlier), 'no tool_use_id: search in an older message still credits');+ });++ c3Case('a boundary without uuid yields a hashed turn id; siblings do not cross turns', () => {+ const { scanCurrentTurn } = loadDirectHook();+ const noUuid = text => ({ type: 'user', message: { role: 'user', content: text } });+ const t1 = c3WriteTranscript([noUuid('turn one')], { pending: false });+ const t2 = c3WriteTranscript([noUuid('turn one'), noUuid('turn TWO new request')], { pending: false });+ const id1 = scanCurrentTurn(t1).turnId;+ const id2 = scanCurrentTurn(t2).turnId;+ assert.ok(/^h:[0-9a-f]{16}$/.test(id1), `hashed turn id, got ${id1}`);+ assert.notStrictEqual(id1, id2, 'different boundary lines, different turn ids');+ const w1 = f2Write('src/l1/hhh1.py', t1, { tool_use_id: null, session_id: 'f2-l1' });+ assert.strictEqual(w1.decision, 'deny', w1.result.stdout);+ const w2 = f2Write('src/l1/hhh2.py', t2, { tool_use_id: null, session_id: 'f2-l1' });+ assert.strictEqual(w2.decision, 'deny', `turn 2 sibling must be denied: ${w2.result.stdout}`);+ });++ c3Case('compaction is a turn boundary', () => {+ const pre = [c3Human('orig task'), ...c3Search('toolu_l2a', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' })];+ const summary = { type: 'user', uuid: c3NextUuid(), isCompactSummary: true, message: { role: 'user', content: 'Summary: ...' } };+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', c3WriteTranscript([...pre, { type: 'system', subtype: 'compact_boundary' }, summary])), 'summary');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', c3WriteTranscript([...pre, { type: 'system', uuid: 'cb-1', subtype: 'compact_boundary' }])), 'boundary only');+ const { scanCurrentTurn } = loadDirectHook();+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(c3WriteTranscript([...pre, summary], { pending: false })).turnId, summary.uuid, 'summary uuid is the turn id');+ });++ c3Case('error results are recognised without a boolean is_error', () => {+ const errored = extra => f2Turn(c3ToolUse('toolu_l3', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' }), f2Result('toolu_l3', extra));+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', errored({ is_error: 'true', content: 'Error: denied' })), 'is_error "true"');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', errored({ content: '<tool_use_error>Permission denied</tool_use_error>' })), 'string content');+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', errored({ content: [{ type: 'text', text: ' <tool_use_error>x</tool_use_error>' }] })), 'text block');+ });++ c3Case('a tool_use id seen more than once in the turn never qualifies', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('x'),+ f2Msg('g', 'msg_1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'unrelated' }),+ f2Result('g'),+ f2Msg('g', 'msg_2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' })+ ]);+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', t), 'duplicate id');+ });++ c3Case('a cd anywhere in the turn disables shell directory credit (stem counts with a known base)', () => {+ const t = f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_l7a', 'cd src'), ...f2Bash('toolu_l7b', 'ls handlers'));+ f2Deny(f2Write('handlers/new_mod.py', t), 'cd then ls handlers');+ const control = f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_l7c', 'ls handlers'));+ f2Credit(f2Write('handlers/new_mod2.py', control), 'control without cd');+ // After a cd in another call, a relative operand's base is unknown, so it scopes nothing.+ const stem = f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_l7d', 'cd src'), ...f2Bash('toolu_l7e', 'rg -n payment ..'));+ f2Deny(f2Edit('src/payment.py', stem), 'relative operand after a cd in another call');+ const absolute = f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_l7f', 'cd src'), ...f2Bash('toolu_l7g', `rg -n payment ${f2RootSh}/src`));+ f2Credit(f2Edit('src/payment.py', absolute), 'stem after cd with an absolute operand');+ });++ c3Case('documented search forms still credit', () => {+ f2Credit(f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_p1', 'rg -n payment src'))), 'rg -n payment src');+ f2Credit(f2Edit('src/payment_service.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_p2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment_service', path: 'src' }))), 'Grep path src');+ f2Credit(f2Write('src/handlers/new_handler.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_p3', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/handlers/*.py' }))), 'Glob dir');+ f2Credit(f2Write('src/handlers/ls_new.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_p4', 'LS', { path: 'src/handlers' }))), 'LS dir');+ f2Credit(f2Write('src/handlers/x_new.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_p5', 'find src/handlers -name "*.py"'))), 'find dir');+ f2Credit(f2Edit('src/auth.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_p6', 'grep -r . -e auth'))), '-e supplies the pattern');+ f2Credit(f2Write('src/handlers/grep_new.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash('toolu_p7', 'grep -rn --include "*.py" TODO src/handlers/'))), 'grep dir');+ });++ c3Case('a shell search only credits targets inside what it searched', () => {+ const edit = (id, command) => f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash(id, command)));+ f2Deny(edit('toolu_n1a', 'grep -rn payment /usr/share/doc'), 'grep -rn outside the project');+ f2Deny(edit('toolu_n1b', 'rg payment docs'), 'rg in another directory');+ f2Deny(edit('toolu_n1c', 'find /etc -name payment'), 'find outside the project');+ f2Deny(edit('toolu_n1d', 'rg payment < /etc/hostname'), 'rg reading stdin via <');+ f2Deny(edit('toolu_n1e', 'rg payment </etc/hostname'), 'rg reading stdin via <file');+ f2Deny(edit('toolu_n1f', 'grep -rn payment 0< /etc/hostname'), 'grep with only an input redirection');+ f2Deny(edit('toolu_n1g', 'rg payment</etc/hostname'), 'redirection glued to the pattern');+ f2Deny(edit('toolu_n1h', 'fd payment /etc'), 'fd outside the project');+ f2Deny(edit('toolu_n1i', 'cd /elsewhere && rg payment src'), 'relative operand after an absolute cd');+ f2Deny(edit('toolu_n1j', 'git grep -n payment -- docs'), 'git grep limited to another directory');+ f2Deny(+ f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...c3Search('toolu_n1k', 'PowerShell', { command: 'Select-String -Path docs/*.md -Pattern payment' }))),+ 'Select-String -Path in another directory'+ );+ });++ c3Case('scoped shell searches still credit (positive controls)', () => {+ const edit = (id, command) => f2Edit('src/payment.py', f2Turn(...f2Bash(id, command)));+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p1', 'rg -n payment src'), 'rg -n payment src');+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p2', 'grep -rn payment .'), 'grep -rn payment . (cwd scope)');+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p3', 'find src -name "payment*"'), 'find src');+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p4', 'rg payment'), 'rg with no operand searches the cwd');+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p5', 'find . -name "payment*"'), 'find .');+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p6', 'rg payment docs src'), 'one of several operands contains the target');+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p7', 'rg -n payment src/payment.py src/auth.py'), 'the target itself among other operands');+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p8', 'rg payment src < /dev/null'), 'operand before an input redirection');+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p9', `cd ${f2RootSh} && rg payment src`), 'relative operand after an absolute cd into the project');+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p10', `grep -rn payment ${f2RootSh}/src`), 'absolute operand');+ f2Credit(edit('toolu_n1p11', 'rg payment src/*.py'), 'glob operand scopes to its literal directory');+ });++ c3Case('no credit-scoping output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {+ assert.ok(f2Outputs.length > 30, 'collected outputs');+ for (const stdout of f2Outputs) {+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);+ }+ });++ // --- Sibling collapse keyed by target class ---+ // The project root sits under an ancestor `tests/` on purpose: `src/a.py` must still be code.+ const f3Base = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'gateguard-f3-')));+ const f3Root = path.join(f3Base, 'tests', 'proj');+ fs.mkdirSync(f3Root, { recursive: true });+ const f3Env = { CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR: f3Root, CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH: '' };+ const f3Outputs = [];+ const f3 = rel => `${f3Root}/${rel}`;+ const f3Run = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath) => {+ const payload = { tool_name: toolName, tool_input: toolInput, cwd: f3Root };+ if (transcriptPath !== undefined) payload.transcript_path = transcriptPath;+ if (c3PendingIds.has(transcriptPath)) payload.tool_use_id = c3PendingIds.get(transcriptPath);+ const result = runHook(payload, f3Env);+ f3Outputs.push(result.stdout);+ const output = parseOutput(result.stdout);+ const hso = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput : {};+ return { result, decision: hso.permissionDecision, context: hso.additionalContext || '', reason: hso.permissionDecisionReason || '' };+ };+ const f3Write = (rel, t) => f3Run('Write', { file_path: f3(rel), content: 'x' }, t);+ const f3Edit = (rel, t) => f3Run('Edit', { file_path: f3(rel), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t);+ const f3Turn = () => c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('scaffold it')]);+ const f3GateKey = (cls, relDir) => `${cls}\u0000${stateKey(`${f3Root}/${relDir}`)}`;+ const f3Deny = (out, label) => {+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny, got ${out.result.stdout}`);+ assert.ok(!out.context.includes('Sibling of'), `${label}: no sibling note`);+ };+ const f3Sibling = (out, label) => {+ assert.notStrictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: must not deny (${out.result.stdout})`);+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of '), `${label}: sibling note expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);+ };++ c3Case('a code denial does not collapse other classes in the same dir', () => {+ const t = f3Turn();+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/newmod.py', t), 'code first');+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/.env.production', t), 'config sibling of code');+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/newmod.test.py', t), 'test sibling of code');+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/README.md', t), 'QA 2c prose sibling of code');+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/settings.yaml', t), 'QA 2c config sibling of code');+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/.env.local', t), 'QA 2c .env sibling of code');+ f3Sibling(f3Write('src/other.py', t), 'code sibling of code still collapses');+ f3Sibling(f3Write('src/other.test.py', t), 'test sibling of test collapses');+ f3Sibling(f3Write('src/CHANGES.md', t), 'prose sibling of prose collapses');+ });++ c3Case('harness, instruction and config paths never collapse', () => {+ const t = f3Turn();+ f3Deny(f3Write('.github/notes.md', t), '.github prose');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.github/more.md', t), '.github prose never collapses');+ const g5 = f3Write('.github/copilot-instructions.md', t);+ f3Deny(g5, 'copilot-instructions');+ assert.ok(g5.reason.includes('harness/loader'), 'copilot-instructions.md is instruction class');+ f3Deny(f3Write('READMEX.md', t), 'root prose');+ f3Deny(f3Write('AGENT.md', t), 'AGENT.md');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.cursorrules', t), '.cursorrules');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.windsurfrules', t), '.windsurfrules');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.mcp.json', t), '.mcp.json');+ f3Sibling(f3Write('NOTES.md', t), 'ordinary prose sibling at root still collapses');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.claude/hooks/a.sh', t), '.claude/hooks');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.claude/hooks/evil.sh', t), '.claude/hooks sibling');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.husky/pre-commit', t), '.husky');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.husky/pre-push', t), '.husky sibling');+ f3Deny(f3Write('config/app.yaml', t), 'config');+ f3Deny(f3Write('config/db.yaml', t), 'config sibling');+ f3Deny(f3Write('lib/.hidden.js', t), 'dotfile');+ f3Deny(f3Write('lib/.other.js', t), 'dotfile sibling');+ const gates = c3State().dir_gates || {};+ for (const key of Object.keys(gates)) {+ assert.ok(!/\.github|\.claude|\.husky|^config|^instruction/.test(key), `no gate recorded for ${JSON.stringify(key)}`);+ }+ });++ c3Case('classification uses the project-relative path (ancestor tests/ dir, worktrees)', () => {+ const t = f3Turn();+ const code = f3Write('src/a.py', t);+ f3Deny(code, 'code');+ assert.ok(code.reason.includes('Name the file(s) and line(s) that will call this new file'), 'code questions');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.denials_by_class, { code: 1 }, 'counter uses the same class as the questions');+ assert.ok(state.dir_gates[f3GateKey('code', 'src')], `gate key uses the same class: ${JSON.stringify(Object.keys(state.dir_gates))}`);+ assert.ok(f3Edit('lib/b.py', t).reason.includes('List ALL files that import/require this file'), 'Edit code questions');+ // The prefix is stripped only for a real worktree (its .git file or dir exists).+ fs.mkdirSync(f3('.claude/worktrees/feat-x'), { recursive: true });+ fs.writeFileSync(f3('.claude/worktrees/feat-x/.git'), 'gitdir: ../../../.git/worktrees/feat-x\n');+ const wt = f3Write('.claude/worktrees/feat-x/docs/guide.md', t);+ f3Deny(wt, 'worktree prose');+ assert.ok(wt.reason.includes('supersedes or duplicates'), `worktree .md is prose: ${wt.reason}`);+ f3Sibling(f3Write('.claude/worktrees/feat-x/docs/guide2.md', t), 'worktree prose sibling');+ const wtHook = f3Write('.claude/worktrees/feat-x/.claude/hooks/x.md', t);+ f3Deny(wtHook, 'worktree harness');+ // 4th denial: condensed form; both forms name the loading harness only for instruction files.+ assert.ok(wtHook.reason.includes('which harness loads this file'), `worktree .claude/hooks/*.md is instruction: ${wtHook.reason}`);+ f3Deny(f3Write('.claude/worktrees/feat-x/.claude/hooks/y.md', t), 'worktree harness sibling');+ });++ c3Case('sibling note wording and class-prefixed gate key', () => {+ const t = f3Turn();+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/w/one.js', t), 'first');+ const out = f3Write('src/w/two.js', t);+ f3Sibling(out, 'sibling');+ assert.strictEqual(+ out.context,+ `[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of ${f3Root}/src/w/one.js (gated earlier at denial #1 this session); proceeding without a repeat denial.`+ );+ const gates = c3State().dir_gates;+ assert.deepStrictEqual(Object.keys(gates), [f3GateKey('code', 'src/w')]);+ });++ c3Case('a future `at` or a zero ordinal is never honored', () => {+ const now = Date.now();+ const gate = (at, ordinal, turn = null) => ({ turn, at, first: '/forged.js', ordinal });+ writeState({+ checked: [],+ last_active: now,+ dir_gates: {+ [f3GateKey('code', 'src/fut')]: gate(now + 3600 * 1000, 1),+ [f3GateKey('code', 'src/zero')]: gate(now - 1000, 0),+ [f3GateKey('code', 'src/ok')]: gate(now - 1000, 1)+ }+ });+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/fut/a.js'), 'future at (no turn)');+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/zero/a.js'), 'ordinal 0');+ f3Sibling(f3Write('src/ok/a.js'), 'control: valid gate still matches');+ const human = c3Human('x');+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([human]);+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: now, dir_gates: { [f3GateKey('code', 'src/futt')]: gate(now + 3600 * 1000, 1, human.uuid) } });+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/futt/a.js', t), 'future at (same turn)');+ });++ c3Case('old-shape dir_gates keys (no class prefix) are ignored and dropped', () => {+ const now = Date.now();+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: now, dir_gates: { [`${f3Root}/src/legacy`]: { turn: null, at: now - 1000, first: 'forged', ordinal: 1 } } });+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/legacy/a.js'), 'old-shape gate ignored');+ const keys = Object.keys(c3State().dir_gates);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(keys, [f3GateKey('code', 'src/legacy')], 'old-shape key dropped, new key recorded');+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: now, dir_gates: { [`bogus\u0000${f3Root}/src/b`]: { turn: null, at: now - 1000, first: 'x', ordinal: 1 } } });+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/b/a.js'), 'unknown class prefix ignored');+ });++ c3Case('prototype keys in state are rejected and never pollute', () => {+ const now = Date.now();+ const legacy = f3GateKey('code', 'src/pp');+ fs.mkdirSync(stateDir, { recursive: true });+ fs.writeFileSync(+ stateFile,+ '{"checked":[],"last_active":' + now + ',"dir_gates":{"__proto__":{"turn":null,"at":1,"first":"x","ordinal":1},' ++ '"constructor":{"turn":null,"at":' + (now - 1000) + ',"first":"x","ordinal":1},' ++ '"prototype":{"turn":null,"at":' + (now - 1000) + ',"first":"x","ordinal":1},' ++ JSON.stringify(legacy) + ':{"turn":null,"at":' + (now - 1000) + ',"first":"forged","ordinal":"NaN"}},' ++ '"denials_by_class":{"__proto__":{"polluted":1},"constructor":5,"prototype":4,"code":7},' ++ '"credited_by_class":{"constructor":2},"sibling_allows":0}',+ 'utf8'+ );+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/pp/a.js'), 'NaN ordinal gate not honored');+ assert.strictEqual({}.polluted, undefined, 'Object.prototype not polluted');+ const raw = fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf8');+ const state = JSON.parse(raw);+ for (const field of ['dir_gates', 'denials_by_class', 'credited_by_class']) {+ for (const bad of ['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype']) {+ assert.ok(!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(state[field], bad), `${field} drops ${bad}`);+ }+ }+ assert.strictEqual(state.denials_by_class.code, 8, 'code counter incremented from 7');+ assert.deepStrictEqual(state.credited_by_class, {});+ });++ c3Case('second writes into dot-directories are denied', () => {+ const t = f3Turn();+ for (const [a, b] of [+ ['.devcontainer/a.sh', '.devcontainer/post-create.sh'],+ ['.githooks/a', '.githooks/pre-commit'],+ ['.kiro/steering/a.md', '.kiro/steering/b.md'],+ ['.clinerules/a.md', '.clinerules/b.md'],+ ['.idea/a.xml', '.idea/run.xml'],+ ['.continue/prompts/a.prompt', '.continue/prompts/b.prompt']+ ]) {+ f3Deny(f3Write(a, t), `${a} first`);+ f3Deny(f3Write(b, t), `${b} second`);+ }+ assert.deepStrictEqual(Object.keys(c3State().dir_gates || {}), [], 'no dir gate recorded for any dot-directory');+ });++ c3Case('a symlinked directory is screened (and keyed) by its real location', () => {+ const t = f3Turn();+ fs.mkdirSync(f3('.claude/hooks'), { recursive: true });+ fs.mkdirSync(f3('src/realdir'), { recursive: true });+ try {+ fs.symlinkSync(f3('.claude/hooks'), f3('src/tools'), 'dir');+ fs.symlinkSync(f3('src/realdir'), f3('src/aliasdir'), 'dir');+ } catch (e) {+ if (process.platform === 'win32' && e.code === 'EPERM') return; // no symlink privilege+ throw e;+ }+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/tools/a.sh', t), 'first write through the symlink');+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/tools/evil.sh', t), 'second write lands in .claude/hooks');+ f3Deny(f3Write('src/realdir/one.js', t), 'real dir first');+ f3Sibling(f3Write('src/aliasdir/two.js', t), 'alias of the same real dir shares its gate');+ assert.deepStrictEqual(Object.keys(c3State().dir_gates), [f3GateKey('code', 'src/realdir')], 'gate keyed by the real directory');+ });++ c3Case('a .claude/worktrees/<name>/ prefix without a .git is not stripped', () => {+ const t = f3Turn();+ fs.mkdirSync(f3('.claude/worktrees/fake/src'), { recursive: true });+ f3Deny(f3Write('.claude/worktrees/fake/src/a.py', t), 'fake worktree first');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.claude/worktrees/fake/src/b.py', t), 'fake worktree sibling');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.claude/worktrees/fake/a.sh', t), 'fake worktree root first');+ f3Deny(f3Write('.claude/worktrees/fake/statusline.sh', t), 'fake worktree root sibling');+ const md = f3Write('.claude/worktrees/fake/docs/g.md', t);+ f3Deny(md, 'fake worktree .md');+ assert.ok(md.reason.includes('which harness loads this file') || md.reason.includes('harness/loader'), `stays instruction: ${md.reason}`);+ });++ c3Case('no class-keyed collapse output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {+ assert.ok(f3Outputs.length > 30, 'collected outputs');+ for (const stdout of f3Outputs) {+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);+ }+ });++ // --- Opt-in session cap on first-touch denials ---+ const capEnvName = 'GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS';+ const capOutputs = [];+ const capRun = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, cap) => {+ const out = c4Run(toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, cap === undefined ? {} : { [capEnvName]: cap });+ capOutputs.push(out.result.stdout);+ return out;+ };+ const capAssertPassThrough = (out, toolName, label) => {+ const output = parseOutput(out.result.stdout);+ assert.ok(output, `${label}: valid JSON`);+ assert.ok(!output.hookSpecificOutput, `${label}: pass-through expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);+ assert.strictEqual(output.tool_name, toolName, `${label}: pass-through preserves input`);+ };+ const capWarning = value =>+ `[Fact-Forcing Gate] ignoring malformed ${capEnvName}=${value}; the denial cap is not active.`;+ // Same-process run with stderr captured; restores the env var that loadDirectHook sets.+ const capInProcess = (fn) => {+ const saved = process.env[capEnvName];+ const originalStderrWrite = process.stderr.write.bind(process.stderr);+ const captured = [];+ process.stderr.write = chunk => {+ const s = typeof chunk === 'string' ? chunk : chunk.toString();+ if (s.includes(capEnvName)) captured.push(s.replace(/\n$/, ''));+ return true;+ };+ try {+ return fn(captured);+ } finally {+ process.stderr.write = originalStderrWrite;+ if (saved === undefined) delete process.env[capEnvName];+ else process.env[capEnvName] = saved;+ }+ };+ const capDirectEdit = (hook, file) =>+ parseOutput(hook.run(JSON.stringify({ tool_name: 'Edit', cwd: c4Root, tool_input: { file_path: `${c4Root}/${file}` } })).stdout);++ for (const malformed of ['3.9', '+3', 'abc', '-1', '3oops', '0x3', ' 3 oops', '99999999999999999999']) {+ c3Case(`malformed cap ${JSON.stringify(malformed)} warns once and leaves the gate uncapped`, () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 9 });+ capInProcess(captured => {+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ ...c4Env, [capEnvName]: malformed });+ const first = capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-malformed-a.py');+ const second = capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-malformed-b.py');+ assert.strictEqual(first.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', 'uncapped: first denied');+ assert.strictEqual(second.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', 'uncapped: second denied');+ // sanitizePath trims, so the shown value has no surrounding whitespace.+ assert.deepStrictEqual(captured, [capWarning(malformed.trim())], 'exactly one warning with the sanitized value');+ });+ assert.ok(!c3State().cap_allows, 'no cap allow recorded');+ });+ }++ c3Case('a different malformed cap warns again; valid, empty and unset values never warn', () => {+ capInProcess(captured => {+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ ...c4Env, [capEnvName]: 'abc' });+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-1.py');+ process.env[capEnvName] = 'xyz';+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-2.py');+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-3.py');+ assert.deepStrictEqual(captured, [capWarning('abc'), capWarning('xyz')]);+ process.env[capEnvName] = '50';+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-4.py');+ process.env[capEnvName] = '';+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-5.py');+ delete process.env[capEnvName];+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-6.py');+ assert.strictEqual(captured.length, 2, `no further warnings: ${JSON.stringify(captured)}`);+ });+ });++ c3Case('the warning value is sanitized and bounded', () => {+ capInProcess(captured => {+ const hook = loadDirectHook({ ...c4Env, [capEnvName]: `3\u202e\u200b${'9'.repeat(200)}x` });+ capDirectEdit(hook, 'src/cap-warn-sanitize.py');+ assert.strictEqual(captured.length, 1, JSON.stringify(captured));+ assert.ok(!/[\u202e\u200b]/.test(captured[0]), 'no invisible characters');+ assert.ok(captured[0].length < 200, `bounded: ${captured[0].length}`);+ });+ });++ c3Case('a malformed cap also warns from the spawned hook (stderr), stdout still denies', () => {+ const out = capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/cap-spawn.py` }, undefined, 'abc');+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny');+ assert.ok(out.result.stderr.includes(capWarning('abc')), out.result.stderr);+ });++ c3Case('surrounding whitespace is trimmed (" 2 " caps at 2, no warning)', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 2 });+ const out = capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/cap-trim.py` }, undefined, ' 2 ');+ capAssertPassThrough(out, 'Edit', 'trimmed cap');+ assert.ok(!out.result.stderr.includes(capEnvName), out.result.stderr);+ });++ c3Case('a cap pass marks the target checked, counts cap_allows, never counts a denial', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 2 });+ const a = `${c4Root}/src/cap-counted-a.py`;+ capAssertPassThrough(capRun('Edit', { file_path: a }, undefined, '2'), 'Edit', 'first past cap');+ let state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 1, 'cap_allows counted');+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 2, 'denials unchanged');+ assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(a)), 'cap-passed target marked checked');+ capAssertPassThrough(capRun('Edit', { file_path: a }, undefined, '2'), 'Edit', 'retry');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().cap_allows, 1, 'a retry of a checked target is not recounted');+ capAssertPassThrough(capRun('Write', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/cap-counted-b.py`, content: 'x' }, undefined, '2'), 'Write', 'second');+ state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 2);+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 2);+ });++ c3Case('cap_allows loads from old or malformed state and survives later writes', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 1, cap_allows: 'garbage' });+ capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/cap-old-a.py` }, undefined, '1');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().cap_allows, 1, 'malformed counter treated as zero');+ writeState({ ...c3State(), cap_allows: 7 });+ capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/cap-old-b.py` }, undefined, '1');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().cap_allows, 8, 'increments the persisted count');+ // An uncapped denial elsewhere rewrites state and must keep cap_allows.+ capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/cap-old-c.py` });+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().cap_allows, 8, 'kept across an unrelated state write');+ });++ c3Case('cap 0 passes the first new path without a denial', () => {+ capAssertPassThrough(capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/cap-zero.py` }, undefined, '0'), 'Edit', 'cap 0');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.ok(!state.fact_force_denials, 'no denial counted');+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 1);+ });++ c3Case('credit and sibling allows run before the cap and do not consume it', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('build the gadget and fix the widget factory'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_cap_g1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory', path: c4Root }),+ ...c3Search('toolu_cap_g2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'gadget_maker', path: c4Root })+ ]);+ const credited = capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/widget_factory.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t, '1');+ assert.ok(credited.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), credited.result.stdout);+ assert.ok(!c3State().fact_force_denials, 'credit consumes no denial');+ const first = capRun('Write', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/capgen/g0.js`, content: 'x' }, t, '1');+ assert.strictEqual(first.decision, 'deny', 'the one denial the cap allows');+ const sibling = capRun('Write', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/capgen/g1.js`, content: 'x' }, t, '1');+ assert.ok(sibling.context.includes('[Fact-Forcing Gate] Sibling of '), `sibling note, not a cap pass: ${sibling.result.stdout}`);+ const creditedAfterCap = capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/gadget_maker.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t, '1');+ assert.ok(creditedAfterCap.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), 'credit still wins once the cap is reached');+ let state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1);+ assert.strictEqual(state.sibling_allows, 1);+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 2);+ assert.ok(!state.cap_allows, 'no cap pass yet');+ const capped = capRun('Edit', { file_path: `${c4Root}/src/unrelated_module.py`, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t, '1');+ capAssertPassThrough(capped, 'Edit', 'uncredited target past the cap');+ state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 1);+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1);+ });++ c3Case('MultiEdit past the cap passes every entry and counts each', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 1 });+ const files = ['src/cap-multi-a.py', 'src/cap-multi-b.py', 'src/cap-multi-c.py'].map(f => `${c4Root}/${f}`);+ const out = capRun('MultiEdit', { edits: files.map(file_path => ({ file_path, old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' })) }, undefined, '1');+ capAssertPassThrough(out, 'MultiEdit', 'MultiEdit past cap');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 3);+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1);+ for (const f of files) assert.ok(state.checked.includes(stateKey(f)), `${f} checked`);+ });++ c3Case('destructive and routine Bash stay gated once the cap is reached', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 5 });+ const env = { ...c4Env, [capEnvName]: '0' };+ const destructive = parseOutput(runBashHook({ tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'rm -rf build' } }, env).stdout);+ assert.strictEqual(destructive.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', 'destructive gate unchanged');+ const routine = parseOutput(runBashHook({ tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'ls' } }, env).stdout);+ assert.strictEqual(routine.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, 'deny', 'routine gate unchanged');+ assert.ok(!c3State().cap_allows, 'Bash never counts a cap pass');+ });++ c3Case('no cap output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {+ assert.ok(capOutputs.length > 10, `collected outputs: ${capOutputs.length}`);+ for (const stdout of capOutputs) {+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);+ }+ });++ // --- Sensitive targets are never auto-passed ---+ const sensLine = 'Sensitive target: prior-search credit, sibling collapse, and the denial cap do not apply.';+ const sensTargets = [+ '.env', '.env.local', 'config/.env.production', 'certs/server.pem', 'certs/server.key', 'certs/client.p12',+ 'certs/client.pfx', 'keys/id_rsa', 'keys/id_rsa.pub', 'keys/id_ed25519', 'config/credentials.json',+ 'config/secrets.yaml', 'src/auth/login_flow.py', 'src/authn/token_check.py', 'src/authz/policy_rules.py',+ 'src/security/hardening.py', 'src/secrets/vault_client.py', 'src/payment/charge_card.py',+ 'src/payments/refund_flow.py', 'src/billing/invoice_maker.py', 'db/migrations/0001_initial.py',+ '.github/workflows/release.yml', 'SRC/Auth/Upper_Case.py'+ ];+ const sensOutputs = [];+ const sensRun = (toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, env = {}) => {+ const out = c4Run(toolName, toolInput, transcriptPath, env);+ sensOutputs.push(out.result.stdout);+ return out;+ };+ const sensAbs = rel => `${c4Root}/${rel}`;+ const sensDir = rel => path.posix.dirname(sensAbs(rel));+ const sensStem = rel => path.posix.basename(rel).replace(/\.[^.]*$/, '') || path.posix.basename(rel);+ const sensAssertDenied = (out, label) => {+ assert.strictEqual(out.decision, 'deny', `${label}: expected deny, got ${out.result.stdout}`);+ assert.ok(!out.context, `${label}: no credit/sibling note`);+ assert.ok(out.reason.includes(sensLine), `${label}: sensitive line expected: ${out.reason}`);+ };+ // Search evidence that credits a Write of a new file in `rel`'s directory, and an Edit of its stem.+ const sensCreditTranscript = (rel, n) => c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('update it'),+ ...c3Search(`toolu_sens_ls_${n}`, 'LS', { path: sensDir(rel) }),+ ...c3Search(`toolu_sens_gr_${n}`, 'Grep', { pattern: sensStem(rel), path: c4Root }),+ ...c3Search(`toolu_sens_ctl_${n}`, 'LS', { path: sensAbs('src/plain') })+ ]);++ c3Case('each sensitive target is denied on first Write despite a qualifying search (control credited)', () => {+ sensTargets.forEach((rel, n) => {+ clearState();+ const t = sensCreditTranscript(rel, n);+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs(rel), content: 'x' }, t), `Write ${rel}`);+ const control = sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs(`src/plain/ctl_${n}.py`), content: 'x' }, t);+ assert.ok(control.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), `control credited for ${rel}: ${control.result.stdout}`);+ const state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 1, `${rel}: the denial counts`);+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1, `${rel}: only the control was credited`);+ });+ });++ c3Case('sensitive Edit and MultiEdit targets are denied despite a stem search', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('fix the billing'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_sens_e1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'invoice_maker|login_flow|plain_helper', path: c4Root })+ ]);+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('src/billing/invoice_maker.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t), 'Edit');+ const multi = sensRun('MultiEdit', {+ edits: [+ { file_path: sensAbs('src/plain/plain_helper.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' },+ { file_path: sensAbs('src/auth/login_flow.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }+ ]+ }, t);+ sensAssertDenied(multi, 'MultiEdit sensitive entry');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1, 'the ordinary entry was credited');+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 2);+ });++ c3Case('a sensitive new file never joins a same-dir sibling gate', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('scaffold keys')]);+ c4AssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/keys/loader.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'ordinary first');+ for (const rel of ['src/keys/server.key', 'src/keys/server.pem', 'src/keys/credentials.py', 'src/keys/secrets.py', 'src/keys/id_rsa_test_fixture.py']) {+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs(rel), content: 'x' }, t), rel);+ }+ c4AssertSibling(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/keys/other.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'ordinary sibling still collapses');+ assert.strictEqual(c3State().sibling_allows, 1);+ });++ c3Case('a sensitive denial opens no sibling gate; sensitive dirs never collapse', () => {+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('scaffold auth')]);+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/vault/api.key'), content: 'x' }, t), 'sensitive first');+ c4AssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/vault/client.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'ordinary after sensitive');+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/auth/a.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'auth first');+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('src/auth/b.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'auth second');+ const gates = Object.keys(c3State().dir_gates || {});+ assert.ok(!gates.some(k => k.endsWith(stateKey(sensAbs('src/auth')))), `no auth gate: ${JSON.stringify(gates)}`);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(gates, [c4GateKey(sensAbs('src/vault'))], 'only the ordinary denial opened a gate');+ });++ c3Case('sensitive targets are denied after the denial cap is reached (and still count)', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 5 });+ const env = { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '1' };+ sensTargets.forEach((rel, n) => {+ const tool = n % 2 ? 'Edit' : 'Write';+ const input = tool === 'Edit' ? { file_path: sensAbs(rel), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' } : { file_path: sensAbs(rel), content: 'x' };+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun(tool, input, undefined, env), `${tool} ${rel} past cap`);+ });+ const multi = sensRun('MultiEdit', { edits: [+ { file_path: sensAbs('src/plain/capped.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' },+ { file_path: sensAbs('src/payments/capped.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }+ ] }, undefined, env);+ sensAssertDenied(multi, 'MultiEdit sensitive entry past cap');+ const control = sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('src/plain/also_capped.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, undefined, env);+ assert.ok(!parseOutput(control.result.stdout).hookSpecificOutput, 'ordinary target passes the cap');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 5 + sensTargets.length + 1, 'every sensitive denial counts');+ assert.strictEqual(state.cap_allows, 2);+ });++ c3Case('the sensitive line also appears in condensed denials; ordinary denials are unchanged', () => {+ writeState({ checked: [], last_active: Date.now(), fact_force_denials: 9 });+ const condensed = sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('src/auth/condensed.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' });+ sensAssertDenied(condensed, 'condensed');+ assert.ok(condensed.reason.includes('(denial #10 this session)'), condensed.reason);+ clearState();+ const full = sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('src/auth/full.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' });+ sensAssertDenied(full, 'full');+ assert.ok(full.reason.includes(`${sensLine}\n\nPresent the facts, then retry the same operation.`), full.reason);+ clearState();+ const ordinary = sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs('src/author.py'), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' });+ assert.strictEqual(ordinary.decision, 'deny');+ assert.ok(!ordinary.reason.includes('Sensitive target'), 'segment-exact: author.py is ordinary');+ for (const rel of ['docs/authoring.md', 'lib/paymentutils.py']) {+ clearState();+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([c3Human('go'), ...c3Search(`toolu_ord_${rel.length}`, 'LS', { path: sensDir(rel) })]);+ const out = sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs(rel), content: 'x' }, t);+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), `${rel} is ordinary and credited: ${out.result.stdout}`);+ }+ });++ // --- A symlinked directory cannot launder a sensitive real location ---+ // r1link/src/tools -> r1link/src/auth (a real directory inside the project).+ const r1Ready = (() => {+ fs.mkdirSync(sensAbs('r1link/src/auth'), { recursive: true });+ fs.writeFileSync(sensAbs('r1link/src/auth/login_flow.py'), 'x');+ fs.mkdirSync(sensAbs('r1link/src/plain'), { recursive: true });+ fs.writeFileSync(sensAbs('r1link/src/plain/plain_login.py'), 'x');+ try {+ fs.symlinkSync(sensAbs('r1link/src/auth'), sensAbs('r1link/src/tools'), 'dir');+ return true;+ } catch (e) {+ if (process.platform === 'win32' && e.code === 'EPERM') return false; // no symlink privilege+ throw e;+ }+ })();+ const r1Edit = (rel, t, env) => sensRun('Edit', { file_path: sensAbs(rel), old_string: 'a', new_string: 'b' }, t, env);+ const r1Credited = (out, label) =>+ assert.ok(out.context.includes('Prior search seen in this turn'), `${label}: credit expected, got ${out.result.stdout}`);++ c3Case('an Edit through a symlink into auth/ is denied despite a crediting search (direct control credited)', () => {+ if (!r1Ready) return;+ const t = c3WriteTranscript([+ c3Human('fix login'),+ ...c3Search('toolu_r1_g1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'login_flow|plain_login|new_login', path: c4Root })+ ]);+ sensAssertDenied(r1Edit('r1link/src/tools/login_flow.py', t), 'Edit via the alias');+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('r1link/src/tools/new_login.py'), content: 'x' }, t), 'Write via the alias');+ r1Credited(r1Edit('r1link/src/plain/plain_login.py', t), 'direct non-sensitive path');+ const state = c3State();+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_credited, 1);+ assert.strictEqual(state.fact_force_denials, 2);+ });++ c3Case('a new file through a symlink into auth/ never joins a same-turn sibling gate', () => {+ if (!r1Ready) return;+ const { human, transcript } = c4Turn('scaffold handlers');+ const gate = { turn: human.uuid, at: Date.now() - 1000, first: 'seeded.py', ordinal: 1 };+ writeState({+ checked: [],+ last_active: Date.now(),+ fact_force_denials: 1,+ dir_gates: {+ [c4GateKey(sensAbs('r1link/src/auth'))]: gate,+ [c4GateKey(sensAbs('r1link/src/tools'))]: gate,+ [c4GateKey(sensAbs('r1link/src/plain'))]: gate+ }+ });+ sensAssertDenied(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('r1link/src/tools/new_handler.py'), content: 'x' }, transcript), 'sibling via alias');+ c4AssertSibling(sensRun('Write', { file_path: sensAbs('r1link/src/plain/new_handler.py'), content: 'x' }, transcript), 'control sibling');+ });++ c3Case('an Edit through a symlink into auth/ is denied past the denial cap (control passes)', () => {+ if (!r1Ready) return;+ const env = { GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS: '0' };+ sensAssertDenied(r1Edit('r1link/src/tools/login_flow.py', undefined, env), 'alias past cap 0');+ const control = r1Edit('r1link/src/plain/plain_login.py', undefined, env);+ assert.ok(!parseOutput(control.result.stdout).hookSpecificOutput, `control passes the cap: ${control.result.stdout}`);+ });++ c3Case('no sensitive output carries permissionDecision "allow"', () => {+ assert.ok(sensOutputs.length > 60, `collected outputs: ${sensOutputs.length}`);+ for (const stdout of sensOutputs) {+ const output = parseOutput(stdout);+ const decision = output && output.hookSpecificOutput ? output.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision : undefined;+ assert.notStrictEqual(decision, 'allow', stdout);+ }+ });++ fs.rmSync(f3Base, { recursive: true, force: true });+ fs.rmSync(f2Root, { recursive: true, force: true });++ fs.rmSync(c4Root, { recursive: true, force: true });++ fs.rmSync(c3TranscriptDir, { recursive: true, force: true });+// Cleanup only the temp directory created by this test file.try {if (fs.existsSync(stateDir)) {diff --git a/tests/lib/gateguard-target-class.test.js b/tests/lib/gateguard-target-class.test.jsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..a2ce107ae--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/lib/gateguard-target-class.test.js@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@+'use strict';+/**+ * Tests for scripts/lib/gateguard-target-class.js: target classification,+ * question tables, sensitive targets and sibling-collapse eligibility.+ *+ * Run with: node tests/lib/gateguard-target-class.test.js+ */++const assert = require('assert');+const fs = require('fs');+const os = require('os');+const path = require('path');++const libPath = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'lib', 'gateguard-target-class.js');+const hookPath = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'hooks', 'gateguard-fact-force.js');+const {+ CLASS_QUESTIONS,+ CLASS_CONDENSED_HINTS,+ COLLAPSIBLE_CLASSES,+ canonicalPathKey,+ classifyTarget,+ classifyTargetFor,+ isCollapsibleTarget,+ collapseGateDir,+ isSensitiveTarget,+ isSensitiveTargetFor+} = require(libPath);++console.log('=== Testing gateguard-target-class.js ===\n');++let passed = 0;+let failed = 0;++function test(desc, fn) {+ try {+ fn();+ console.log(` ✓ ${desc}`);+ passed++;+ } catch (e) {+ console.log(` ✗ ${desc}: ${e.message}`);+ failed++;+ }+}++function withProjectDir(value, fn) {+ const saved = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ try {+ if (value === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = value;+ fn();+ } finally {+ if (saved === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = saved;+ }+}++// ── classifyTarget ──+console.log('classifyTarget:');++test('classifyTarget table (normalized, lowercased, first match wins)', () => {+ assert.strictEqual(typeof classifyTarget, 'function', 'classifyTarget is exported');+ const cases = [+ ['C:\\Repo\\Skills\\Foo\\Notes.MD', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/AGENTS.md', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/commands/plan.md', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/rules/common/x.txt', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/hooks/hooks.json', 'config'],+ ['/repo/skills/x/helper.js', 'code'],+ ['/repo/tests/fixtures/readme.md', 'test'],+ ['/repo/pkg/foo_test.go', 'test'],+ ['/repo/test_x.py', 'test'],+ ['/repo/x_test.py', 'test'],+ ['/repo/src/Button.spec.tsx', 'test'],+ ['/repo/src/__tests__/a.js', 'test'],+ ['/repo/README.md', 'prose'],+ ['/repo/docs/a.rst', 'prose'],+ ['/repo/.github/workflows/ci.yml', 'config'],+ ['/repo/pyproject.toml', 'config'],+ ['/repo/.env', 'config'],+ ['/repo/src/main.go', 'code'],+ ['', 'code']+ ];+ for (const [input, expected] of cases) {+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTarget(input), expected, `${input} -> ${expected}`);+ }+});++test('classifyTarget covers the extended instruction and config rules', () => {+ const cases = [+ ['/repo/.cursor/rules/x.mdc', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/docs/x.mdc', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/.cursorrules', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/.windsurfrules', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/AGENT.md', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/.github/copilot-instructions.md', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/.github/instructions/py.instructions.md', 'instruction'],+ ['/repo/.github/notes.md', 'prose'],+ ['/repo/docs/instructions.md', 'prose'],+ ['/repo/.env', 'config'],+ ['/repo/.env.local', 'config'],+ ['/repo/.env.example.ts', 'code'],+ ['/repo/.env.config.js', 'code'],+ ['/repo/.envrc', 'code'],+ ['/repo/.mcp.json', 'config']+ ];+ for (const [input, expected] of cases) {+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTarget(input), expected, `${input} -> ${expected}`);+ }+});++test('non-string input classifies as code', () => {+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTarget(undefined), 'code');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTarget(null), 'code');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTarget(42), 'code');+});++// ── classifyTargetFor ──+console.log('\nclassifyTargetFor:');++test('classifyTargetFor classifies project-relative paths', () => {+ assert.strictEqual(typeof classifyTargetFor, 'function', 'classifyTargetFor is exported');+ const saved = process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ try {+ process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = '/work/tests/proj';+ const data = { cwd: '/work/tests/proj' };+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('/work/tests/proj/src/a.py', data), 'code');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('src/a.py', data), 'code', 'relative target');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('/work/tests/proj/tests/a.py', data), 'test');+ // No .git in the synthetic worktree, so the prefix stays and the path is under .claude.+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('/work/tests/proj/.claude/worktrees/w1/docs/g.md', data), 'instruction', 'unverified worktree');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('/work/tests/proj/.claude/worktrees/w1/skills/x/SKILL.md', data), 'instruction');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('/work/tests/proj/.claude/agents/a.md', data), 'instruction', 'not a worktree');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('/elsewhere/tests/a.py', data), 'test', 'outside the root: absolute path');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('/work/tests/project2/src/a.py', data), 'test', 'sibling dir is outside the root');+ process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = 'C:\\Work\\Tests\\Proj';+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('src\\a.py', { cwd: 'C:\\Work\\Tests\\Proj' }), 'code', 'win32 relative');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('c:/work/tests/proj/src/a.py', { cwd: 'C:\\Work\\Tests\\Proj' }), 'code', 'win32 case-folded');+ delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('src/a.py', { cwd: '/work/tests/proj' }), 'code', 'cwd fallback root');+ } finally {+ if (saved === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR = saved;+ }+});++// ── canonicalPathKey ──+console.log('\ncanonicalPathKey:');++test('resolves relative targets against the tool cwd and folds Windows keys', () => {+ withProjectDir('/proj', () => {+ assert.strictEqual(canonicalPathKey('src/a.py', { cwd: '/proj/sub' }), '/proj/sub/src/a.py');+ assert.strictEqual(canonicalPathKey('./a.py', { cwd: '/proj' }), '/proj/a.py');+ assert.strictEqual(canonicalPathKey('/abs/A.py', { cwd: '/proj' }), '/abs/A.py', 'posix keeps case');+ });+ withProjectDir(undefined, () => {+ assert.strictEqual(canonicalPathKey('src\\A.py', { cwd: 'C:\\Proj' }), 'c:/proj/src/a.py');+ assert.strictEqual(canonicalPathKey('a.py', { cwd: 'relative/base' }), 'a.py', 'non-absolute base: raw path');+ });+});++// ── isCollapsibleTarget ──+console.log('\nisCollapsibleTarget:');++test('only code/test/prose outside dotfiles and harness dirs may collapse', () => {+ assert.deepStrictEqual([...COLLAPSIBLE_CLASSES].sort(), ['code', 'prose', 'test']);+ withProjectDir('/proj', () => {+ const data = { cwd: '/proj' };+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget('/proj/src/a.js', data, 'code'), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget('/proj/docs/a.md', data, 'prose'), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget('/proj/app.yaml', data, 'config'), false, 'config');+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget('/proj/skills/x/SKILL.md', data, 'instruction'), false, 'instruction');+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget('/proj/src/.hidden.js', data, 'code'), false, 'dotfile');+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget('/proj/.github/scripts/a.js', data, 'code'), false, 'harness dir');+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget('/proj/.husky/pre-commit.js', data, 'code'), false, 'hook dir');+ });+});++test('a new file under any dot-directory never collapses', () => {+ withProjectDir('/proj', () => {+ const data = { cwd: '/proj' };+ for (const rel of [+ '.devcontainer/post-create.sh',+ '.githooks/pre-commit',+ '.kiro/steering/b.md',+ '.clinerules/b.md',+ '.idea/run.xml',+ '.continue/prompts/b.prompt',+ 'src/.generated/a.js',+ '.vscode/tasks.js'+ ]) {+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget(`/proj/${rel}`, data, classifyTargetFor(`/proj/${rel}`, data)), false, rel);+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget(`/proj/${rel}`, data, 'code'), false, `${rel} (as code)`);+ }+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget('/proj/src/gen/a.js', data, 'code'), true, 'control');+ });+});++test('Windows name tricks: trailing dots/spaces, streams and 8.3 short names', () => {+ withProjectDir(undefined, () => {+ const data = { cwd: 'C:\\proj' };+ for (const p of ['C:\\proj\\CLAUDE.md.', 'C:\\proj\\CLAUDE.md ', 'C:\\proj\\CLAUDE.md::$DATA', 'C:\\proj\\CLAUDE.md:x', 'C:\\proj\\CLAUDE.md. .::$DATA']) {+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor(p, data), 'instruction', JSON.stringify(p));+ }+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('C:\\proj\\.claude.\\hooks\\x.md', data), 'instruction', 'trailing dot on a directory');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('C:\\proj\\src\\a.js', data), 'code', 'control');+ const shortName = 'C:\\proj\\CLAUDE~1\\hooks\\x.ps1';+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget(shortName, data, classifyTargetFor(shortName, data)), false, '8.3 short name');+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget('C:\\proj\\src\\x.ps1', data, 'code'), true, 'control');+ });+ withProjectDir('/proj', () => {+ const data = { cwd: '/proj' };+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('/proj/CLAUDE.md::$DATA', data), 'instruction', 'posix segment with ::$');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor('/proj/notes.md.', data), 'code', 'posix trailing dot is a real name');+ });+});++// ── collapseGateDir (real directories) ──+console.log('\ncollapseGateDir:');++function tempProject() {+ const root = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gateguard-collapse-')));+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(root, 'src', 'real'), { recursive: true });+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(root, '.claude', 'hooks'), { recursive: true });+ return root;+}++function trySymlink(target, link) {+ try {+ fs.symlinkSync(target, link, 'dir');+ return true;+ } catch (e) {+ if (process.platform === 'win32' && e.code === 'EPERM') return false;+ throw e;+ }+}++test('the worktree prefix is stripped only for a real worktree (.git present)', () => {+ const root = tempProject();+ try {+ withProjectDir(root, () => {+ const data = { cwd: root };+ const wt = rel => path.join(root, '.claude', 'worktrees', 'w1', rel);+ fs.mkdirSync(wt('docs'), { recursive: true });+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor(wt('docs/g.md'), data), 'instruction', 'no .git: stays under .claude');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor(wt('src/a.py'), data), 'code');+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget(wt('src/a.py'), data, 'code'), false, 'no .git: never collapses');+ fs.writeFileSync(wt('.git'), 'gitdir: ../../../.git/worktrees/w1\n');+ assert.strictEqual(classifyTargetFor(wt('docs/g.md'), data), 'prose', '.git file: worktree');+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget(wt('src/a.py'), data, 'code'), true, '.git file: collapses like the project');+ assert.strictEqual(isCollapsibleTarget(wt('.claude/hooks/x.sh'), data, 'code'), false, 'harness dir inside a worktree');+ });+ } finally {+ fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });+ }+});++test('collapse is screened on the real directory (symlinks, missing parents, fs errors)', () => {+ const root = tempProject();+ try {+ withProjectDir(root, () => {+ const data = { cwd: root };+ const at = rel => path.join(root, rel);+ const key = p => (process.platform === 'win32' ? p.replace(/\\/g, '/').toLowerCase() : p);+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/real/a.js'), data, 'code'), key(at('src/real')), 'plain directory');+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/new/deeper/a.js'), data, 'code'), key(at('src/new/deeper')), 'missing parents');+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('.claude/hooks/a.sh'), data, 'code'), null, 'dot-directory');+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/real/a.js'), data, 'config'), null, 'non-collapsible class');+ fs.writeFileSync(at('src/file'), 'x');+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/file/a.js'), data, 'code'), null, 'parent is a file (ENOTDIR)');+ if (!trySymlink(at('.claude/hooks'), at('src/tools'))) return;+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/tools/evil.sh'), data, 'code'), null, 'symlink into .claude/hooks');+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/tools/sub/evil.sh'), data, 'code'), null, 'missing dir under that symlink');+ trySymlink(at('src/real'), at('src/alias'));+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/alias/b.js'), data, 'code'), key(at('src/real')), 'in-project symlink keys by the real dir');+ trySymlink(at('tests'), at('src/t-alias'));+ fs.mkdirSync(at('tests'), { recursive: true });+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/t-alias/b.js'), data, 'code'), null, 'real location has another class');+ const outside = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gateguard-outside-')));+ try {+ trySymlink(outside, at('src/out'));+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/out/b.js'), data, 'code'), null, 'symlink out of the project');+ } finally {+ fs.rmSync(outside, { recursive: true, force: true });+ }+ trySymlink(at('nowhere'), at('src/dangling'));+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/dangling/b.js'), data, 'code'), null, 'dangling symlink');+ });+ } finally {+ fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });+ }+});++test('a path of the other platform style is never collapsed', () => {+ const other = process.platform === 'win32' ? '/proj' : 'C:\\proj';+ withProjectDir(other, () => {+ const target = process.platform === 'win32' ? '/proj/src/a.js' : 'C:\\proj\\src\\a.js';+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(target, { cwd: other }, 'code'), null);+ });+});++// ── question tables ──+console.log('\nquestion tables:');++test('every non-code class has questions and a condensed hint; code has neither', () => {+ for (const cls of ['instruction', 'test', 'prose', 'config']) {+ for (const isWrite of [true, false]) {+ const questions = CLASS_QUESTIONS[cls](isWrite);+ assert.ok(Array.isArray(questions) && questions.length >= 2, `${cls} questions`);+ assert.ok(CLASS_CONDENSED_HINTS[cls](isWrite).endsWith('then retry.'), `${cls} hint`);+ }+ }+ assert.strictEqual(CLASS_QUESTIONS.code, undefined);+ assert.strictEqual(CLASS_CONDENSED_HINTS.code, undefined);+ assert.notDeepStrictEqual(CLASS_QUESTIONS.prose(true), CLASS_QUESTIONS.prose(false), 'prose Write and Edit differ');+});++// ── isSensitiveTarget ──++test('isSensitiveTarget matches every listed basename, segment and prefix rule', () => {+ const sensitive = [+ '.env', '.env.local', '.env.production.local', 'config/.env', 'config/.env.test',+ 'certs/server.pem', 'certs/server.key', 'certs/client.p12', 'certs/client.pfx',+ 'home/id_rsa', 'home/id_rsa.pub', 'id_ed25519', 'home/id_ed25519.pub',+ 'credentials', 'config/credentials.json', 'aws/credentials', 'config/secrets.yaml', 'secrets.json',+ 'src/auth/login.py', 'src/authn/x.ts', 'src/authz/policy.go', 'lib/security/x.js',+ 'src/secrets/vault.py', 'src/payment/charge.py', 'src/payments/x.py', 'app/billing/invoice.rb',+ 'db/migrations/0001_init.sql', 'auth/readme.md', 'src/auth',+ '.github/workflows/ci.yml', '.github/workflows/sub/x.yaml', './.github/workflows/ci.yml',+ // Below an ancestor (a fake worktree prefix, or an absolute path outside the root).+ '.claude/worktrees/fake/.github/workflows/ci.yml', '/elsewhere/repo/.github/workflows/ci.yml',+ // Case-insensitive, and Windows-style separators.+ 'SRC/Auth/Login.py', '.ENV', 'Certs/Server.PEM', 'src\\billing\\x.py'+ ];+ for (const p of sensitive) assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTarget(p), true, p);+});++test('isSensitiveTarget is segment-exact and basename-exact (no substring matches)', () => {+ const ordinary = [+ 'src/author.py', 'docs/authoring.md', 'lib/paymentutils.py', 'src/authentication/x.py',+ 'src/securityutils/x.py', 'src/billingreport.py', 'src/migration.py', 'src/environment.py',+ 'envoy.yaml', 'src/keyboard.py', 'src/key.py', 'src/secretsmanager.py', 'src/my_credentials.py',+ 'docs/workflows/ci.md', 'github/workflows/ci.yml', '.github/ci.yml', 'src/app.js', 'README.md', 'src/.envrc'+ ];+ for (const p of ordinary) assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTarget(p), false, p);+});++test('isSensitiveTarget fails safe (any error => sensitive)', () => {+ const hostile = { toString() { throw new Error('boom'); } };+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTarget(hostile), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTarget(Symbol('x')), true);+});++test('isSensitiveTargetFor uses the project-relative class path', () => {+ const root = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gateguard-sensitive-')));+ try {+ // The project itself sits under an ancestor named `security`: only project-relative segments count.+ const proj = path.join(root, 'security', 'proj');+ fs.mkdirSync(proj, { recursive: true });+ withProjectDir(proj, () => {+ const data = { cwd: proj };+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(`${proj}/src/app.py`, data), false, 'ancestor segment ignored');+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(`${proj}/src/auth/app.py`, data), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor('src/billing/x.py', data), true, 'relative to cwd');+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(`${proj}/.github/workflows/ci.yml`, data), true);+ // A real worktree mirrors the project: its prefix is stripped before the rules apply.+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(proj, '.claude', 'worktrees', 'w1'), { recursive: true });+ fs.writeFileSync(path.join(proj, '.claude', 'worktrees', 'w1', '.git'), 'gitdir: x\n');+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(`${proj}/.claude/worktrees/w1/.github/workflows/ci.yml`, data), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(`${proj}/.claude/worktrees/w1/src/app.py`, data), false);+ // Windows spellings that name the same file are normalized first.+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(`${proj}/.env.`, data), true);+ });+ } finally {+ fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });+ }+});++test('isSensitiveTargetFor also judges the real (symlink-resolved) path', () => {+ const root = tempProject();+ const outside = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gateguard-r1-outside-')));+ try {+ withProjectDir(root, () => {+ const data = { cwd: root };+ const at = rel => path.join(root, rel);+ fs.mkdirSync(at('src/auth'), { recursive: true });+ fs.writeFileSync(at('src/auth/login.py'), 'x');+ if (!trySymlink(at('src/auth'), at('src/tools'))) return;+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(at('src/tools/login.py'), data), true, 'existing file through a dir symlink');+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(at('src/tools/new_handler.py'), data), true, 'new file through a dir symlink');+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(at('src/tools/deeper/x.py'), data), true, 'missing dir under the symlink');+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor('src/tools/login.py', data), true, 'relative spelling');+ trySymlink(at('src/real'), at('src/alias'));+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(at('src/alias/a.py'), data), false, 'alias of an ordinary dir');+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(at('src/real/a.py'), data), false, 'direct ordinary path');+ fs.mkdirSync(path.join(outside, 'secrets'), { recursive: true });+ trySymlink(path.join(outside, 'secrets'), at('src/ext'));+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(at('src/ext/a.py'), data), true, 'real location outside the project is judged too');+ trySymlink(outside, at('src/ext-plain'));+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(at('src/ext-plain/a.py'), data), false, 'ordinary location outside the project');+ trySymlink(at('nowhere'), at('src/dangling'));+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(at('src/dangling/a.py'), data), true, 'dangling symlink fails closed');+ fs.writeFileSync(at('src/plainfile'), 'x');+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(at('src/plainfile/a.py'), data), true, 'ENOTDIR fails closed');+ try {+ fs.symlinkSync(at('src/auth/login.py'), at('src/real/login_link.py'), 'file');+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(at('src/real/login_link.py'), data), true, 'file symlink into auth/');+ } catch (e) {+ if (!(process.platform === 'win32' && e.code === 'EPERM')) throw e;+ }+ });+ } finally {+ fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });+ fs.rmSync(outside, { recursive: true, force: true });+ }+});++test('collapseGateDir never keys a gate for a sensitive real location', () => {+ const root = tempProject();+ try {+ withProjectDir(root, () => {+ const data = { cwd: root };+ const at = rel => path.join(root, rel);+ fs.mkdirSync(at('src/payments'), { recursive: true });+ if (!trySymlink(at('src/payments'), at('src/tools'))) return;+ assert.strictEqual(collapseGateDir(at('src/tools/a.py'), data, 'code'), null);+ });+ } finally {+ fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });+ }+});++test('isSensitiveTargetFor fails safe on bad input', () => {+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor(undefined, undefined), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isSensitiveTargetFor({ toString() { throw new Error('x'); } }, {}), true);+});++test('the hook re-exports the lib classification functions', () => {+ // The hook prunes stale state files on load: point it at a scratch dir.+ const stateDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gateguard-target-class-'));+ const savedStateDir = process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR;+ process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR = stateDir;+ let hook;+ try {+ hook = require(hookPath);+ } finally {+ if (savedStateDir === undefined) delete process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR;+ else process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR = savedStateDir;+ fs.rmSync(stateDir, { recursive: true, force: true });+ }+ assert.strictEqual(hook.classifyTarget, classifyTarget);+ assert.strictEqual(hook.classifyTargetFor, classifyTargetFor);+});++console.log(`\nResults: Passed: ${passed}, Failed: ${failed}`);+process.exit(failed > 0 ? 1 : 0);diff --git a/tests/lib/gateguard-turn-scan.test.js b/tests/lib/gateguard-turn-scan.test.jsnew file mode 100644index 000000000..2eb9c3c97--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/lib/gateguard-turn-scan.test.js@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@+'use strict';+/**+ * Tests for scripts/lib/gateguard-turn-scan.js: turn boundaries, turn ids,+ * result pairing, error results, duplicate ids and same-batch exclusion.+ *+ * Run with: node tests/lib/gateguard-turn-scan.test.js+ */++const assert = require('assert');+const fs = require('fs');+const os = require('os');+const path = require('path');++const libPath = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'lib', 'gateguard-turn-scan.js');+const hookPath = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'hooks', 'gateguard-fact-force.js');+const {+ isErrorToolResult,+ isToolResultRecord,+ isCompactionBoundary,+ scanCurrentTurn,+ excludedBatchId,+ createTurnScanner,+ currentTurnId,+ transcriptPathFor+} = require(libPath);++console.log('=== Testing gateguard-turn-scan.js ===\n');++let passed = 0;+let failed = 0;++function test(desc, fn) {+ try {+ fn();+ console.log(` ✓ ${desc}`);+ passed++;+ } catch (e) {+ console.log(` ✗ ${desc}: ${e.message}`);+ failed++;+ }+}++// Transcript fixtures in the shape Claude Code writes (one JSON record per line).+const transcriptDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gateguard-turn-scan-'));+let seq = 0;+let uuidSeq = 0;+const nextUuid = () => `uuid-${++uuidSeq}`;+const human = (text, extra = {}) => ({ type: 'user', uuid: nextUuid(), message: { role: 'user', content: text }, ...extra });+const toolUse = (id, name, input, extra = {}) => ({+ type: 'assistant',+ uuid: nextUuid(),+ message: { id: `msg_${id}`, role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id, name, input }] },+ ...extra+});+const toolResult = (id, isError = false, extra = {}) => ({+ type: 'user',+ uuid: nextUuid(),+ message: { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'tool_result', tool_use_id: id, is_error: isError, content: 'ok' }] },+ ...extra+});+const search = (id, name, input) => [toolUse(id, name, input), toolResult(id)];+// Like Claude Code, a fixture ends with the pending call's own assistant record by default.+const writeTranscript = (records, { pending = true } = {}) => {+ seq += 1;+ const file = path.join(transcriptDir, `t-${seq}.jsonl`);+ const all = records.slice();+ if (pending) {+ all.push({+ type: 'assistant',+ uuid: nextUuid(),+ message: { id: `msg_pending_${seq}`, role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'tool_use', id: `toolu_pending_${seq}`, name: 'Edit', input: {} }] }+ });+ }+ const lines = all.map(r => (typeof r === 'string' ? r : JSON.stringify(r)));+ fs.writeFileSync(file, lines.join('\n') + '\n', 'utf8');+ return file;+};+// ~400 KiB of tool traffic: pushes earlier records out of the 256 KiB tail.+const filler = prefix => {+ const records = [];+ for (let i = 0; i < 40; i++) {+ const id = `toolu_${prefix}${i}`;+ records.push(toolUse(id, 'Bash', { command: 'npm test' }));+ records.push({+ type: 'user',+ message: { role: 'user', content: [{ type: 'tool_result', tool_use_id: id, content: 'y'.repeat(10 * 1024) }] }+ });+ }+ return records;+};++// ── turn id ──+console.log('turn id:');++// Every user record of a turn (prompt and tool_results) carries the same promptId.+test('boundary in window with promptId -> turnId is the promptId', () => {+ const t = writeTranscript([+ human('old', { promptId: 'prompt-old' }),+ human('now', { promptId: 'prompt-now' }),+ ...search('toolu_pid1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'widget_factory' }).map(r => (r.type === 'user' ? { ...r, promptId: 'prompt-now' } : r))+ ]);+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(t).turnId, 'prompt-now');+ const overlong = human('x', { promptId: 'p'.repeat(129) });+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(writeTranscript([overlong])).turnId, overlong.uuid, 'overlong promptId ignored');+});++test('records without promptId keep the uuid / hash / null turn id', () => {+ const boundary = human('now');+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(writeTranscript([boundary])).turnId, boundary.uuid);+ const noUuid = writeTranscript([{ type: 'user', message: { role: 'user', content: 'x' } }]);+ assert.ok(/^h:[0-9a-f]{16}$/.test(scanCurrentTurn(noUuid).turnId));+ const clipped = writeTranscript([human('long ago'), ...filler('nopid')]);+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(clipped).turnId, null, 'clipped window without promptId');+});++test('compaction summary and compact_boundary records start a turn', () => {+ const pre = [human('orig task'), ...search('toolu_c1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' })];+ const summary = { type: 'user', uuid: nextUuid(), isCompactSummary: true, message: { role: 'user', content: 'Summary' } };+ const afterSummary = scanCurrentTurn(writeTranscript([...pre, summary], { pending: false }));+ assert.strictEqual(afterSummary.turnId, summary.uuid);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(afterSummary.searches, [], 'searches before compaction do not count');+ const marker = scanCurrentTurn(writeTranscript([...pre, { type: 'system', uuid: 'cb-1', subtype: 'compact_boundary' }], { pending: false }));+ assert.strictEqual(marker.turnId, 'cb-1');+ assert.deepStrictEqual(marker.searches, []);+ assert.strictEqual(isCompactionBoundary({ ...summary, isSidechain: true }), false, 'sidechain summaries are ignored');+});++test('meta and sidechain user records are not boundaries; tool_result records are not either', () => {+ const boundary = human('go');+ const t = writeTranscript(+ [+ boundary,+ ...search('toolu_m1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'alpha' }),+ human('meta note', { isMeta: true }),+ human('side prompt', { isSidechain: true })+ ],+ { pending: false }+ );+ const scan = scanCurrentTurn(t);+ assert.strictEqual(scan.turnId, boundary.uuid);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(scan.searches.map(s => s.name), ['Grep']);+ assert.strictEqual(isToolResultRecord(toolResult('x')), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isToolResultRecord(human('x')), false);+});++// ── which searches qualify ──+console.log('\nsearches:');++test('a search qualifies only with a paired, non-error, unique result', () => {+ const t = writeTranscript(+ [+ human('go'),+ ...search('toolu_ok', 'Grep', { pattern: 'ok' }),+ toolUse('toolu_noresult', 'Grep', { pattern: 'pending' }),+ toolUse('toolu_err', 'Grep', { pattern: 'err' }),+ toolResult('toolu_err', true),+ ...search('toolu_dup', 'Glob', { pattern: 'a/*' }),+ ...search('toolu_dup', 'Glob', { pattern: 'b/*' }),+ ...search('toolu_read', 'Read', { file_path: '/x.js' })+ ],+ { pending: false }+ );+ const scan = scanCurrentTurn(t);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(scan.searches.map(s => s.input.pattern), ['ok']);+});++test('error results are recognised without a boolean is_error', () => {+ assert.strictEqual(isErrorToolResult({ is_error: true }), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isErrorToolResult({ is_error: 'true' }), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isErrorToolResult({ content: ' <tool_use_error>denied</tool_use_error>' }), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isErrorToolResult({ content: [{ type: 'text', text: '<tool_use_error>x' }] }), true);+ assert.strictEqual(isErrorToolResult({ is_error: false, content: 'found 3 files' }), false);+});++test('callsAgo counts back from the newest call, skipping the pending call', () => {+ const t = writeTranscript([human('go'), ...search('toolu_a', 'Grep', { pattern: 'a' }), ...search('toolu_b', 'Bash', { command: 'ls' })]);+ const scan = scanCurrentTurn(t, `toolu_pending_${seq}`);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(scan.searches.map(s => [s.name, s.callsAgo]), [['Bash', 1], ['Grep', 2]]);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(scan.shellCommands, ['ls']);+});++test('no transcript, a directory, or a whole file without a boundary -> no searches', () => {+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(''), null);+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(path.join(transcriptDir, 'missing.jsonl')), null);+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(transcriptDir), null);+ const noBoundary = scanCurrentTurn(writeTranscript(search('toolu_nb', 'Grep', { pattern: 'x' }), { pending: false }));+ assert.deepStrictEqual(noBoundary.searches, []);+ assert.strictEqual(noBoundary.turnId, null);+});++// The turn id is the boundary's own promptId; a clipped window needs agreeing promptIds.+test('boundary in window -> the boundary record\'s own promptId, not a newer record\'s', () => {+ const late = { ...toolResult('toolu_n3a'), promptId: 'P1' };+ const t = writeTranscript([human('one', { promptId: 'P1' }), human('two', { promptId: 'P2' }), toolUse('toolu_n3a', 'Bash', { command: 'true' }), late]);+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(t).turnId, 'P2', 'late tool_result stamped with the previous promptId');+ const noPid = human('two');+ const t2 = writeTranscript([noPid, toolUse('toolu_n3b', 'Bash', { command: 'true' }), { ...toolResult('toolu_n3b'), promptId: 'P9' }]);+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(t2).turnId, noPid.uuid, 'boundary without promptId falls back to its uuid');+});++test('clipped window without a boundary -> promptId only when all user records agree', () => {+ const stamp = (records, pid) => records.map(r => (r.type === 'user' ? { ...r, promptId: pid } : r));+ const agree = writeTranscript([+ human('long ago', { promptId: 'PA' }),+ ...stamp([...filler('agree'), ...search('toolu_agree', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' })], 'PA')+ ]);+ const agreeScan = scanCurrentTurn(agree);+ assert.strictEqual(agreeScan.turnId, 'PA');+ assert.ok(agreeScan.searches.some(s => s.name === 'Grep'), 'agreeing clipped window still credits');+ const mixed = filler('mixed');+ const disagree = writeTranscript([+ human('long ago', { promptId: 'PA' }),+ ...stamp(mixed.slice(0, 60), 'PA'),+ ...stamp([...mixed.slice(60), ...search('toolu_dis', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' })], 'PB')+ ]);+ const disagreeScan = scanCurrentTurn(disagree);+ assert.strictEqual(disagreeScan.turnId, null, 'two promptIds in the window');+ assert.deepStrictEqual(disagreeScan.searches, [], 'unattributable clipped window gives no credit');+ const metaNew = writeTranscript([+ human('long ago', { promptId: 'PA' }),+ ...stamp([...filler('meta'), ...search('toolu_meta', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' })], 'PA'),+ { type: 'user', uuid: nextUuid(), isMeta: true, promptId: 'PN', message: { role: 'user', content: '<command-message>' } }+ ]);+ const metaScan = scanCurrentTurn(metaNew);+ assert.strictEqual(metaScan.turnId, null, 'a meta record from another prompt also disagrees');+ assert.deepStrictEqual(metaScan.searches, [], 'previous-turn search behind an unrecognised turn start is not credited');+ const partial = writeTranscript([human('long ago', { promptId: 'PA' }), ...filler('partial').map((r, i) => (r.type === 'user' && i > 70 ? { ...r, promptId: 'PA' } : r))]);+ assert.strictEqual(scanCurrentTurn(partial).turnId, 'PA', 'records without a promptId do not disagree');+});++// Malformed records and inputs never throw; the record is skipped.+const MALFORMED_RECORDS = [+ '{"type":"assistant"}',+ '{"type":"assistant","message":null}',+ '{"type":"assistant","message":"str"}',+ '{"type":"assistant","message":{"content":"str"}}',+ '{"type":"assistant","message":{"content":[null,5,"x",{"type":"tool_use"}]}}',+ '{"type":"user","message":{"content":[{"type":"tool_result","tool_use_id":"q","content":{"toString":1}}]}}',+ '{"type":"user","message":{"content":[{"type":"tool_result","tool_use_id":"q","content":[null,{"type":"text","text":5}]}]}}',+ 'null',+ '5',+ '"str"',+ '[]'+];+const MALFORMED_INPUTS = [+ undefined,+ null,+ 0,+ 1,+ '',+ 'x',+ [],+ {},+ { message: null },+ { message: 'str' },+ { type: 'assistant' },+ { type: 'user', message: { content: {} } },+ { cwd: 5 },+ { tool_use_id: 5 },+ { batchIds: null, newestMessageId: 5 },+ { searches: null },+ new Proxy({}, {+ get() {+ throw new Error('trap');+ }+ })+];++test('every exported function tolerates malformed inputs without throwing', () => {+ const lib = require(libPath);+ const fns = Object.entries(lib).filter(([, fn]) => typeof fn === 'function');+ assert.ok(fns.length >= 9, `exported functions: ${fns.map(([name]) => name).join(', ')}`);+ for (const [name, fn] of fns) {+ MALFORMED_INPUTS.forEach((a, i) => {+ MALFORMED_INPUTS.forEach((b, j) => {+ try {+ const result = fn(a, b);+ if (typeof result === 'function') result();+ } catch (e) {+ assert.fail(`${name}(MALFORMED_INPUTS[${i}], MALFORMED_INPUTS[${j}]) threw: ${e.message}`);+ }+ });+ });+ }+});++test('scanCurrentTurn skips each malformed record and keeps the rest of the turn', () => {+ for (const bad of MALFORMED_RECORDS) {+ const t = writeTranscript([human('go', { promptId: 'PM' }), ...search('toolu_m1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' }), bad]);+ let scan;+ assert.doesNotThrow(() => {+ scan = scanCurrentTurn(t, `toolu_pending_${seq}`);+ }, bad);+ assert.ok(scan, `${bad}: scan result`);+ assert.strictEqual(scan.turnId, 'PM', `${bad}: turn id`);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(scan.searches.map(s => s.name), ['Grep'], `${bad}: search kept`);+ }+ // A user record without usable content is a turn boundary, which can only shrink the window.+ for (const bad of ['{"type":"user"}', '{"type":"user","message":null}', '{"type":"user","message":{"content":{}}}']) {+ const t = writeTranscript([human('go', { promptId: 'PM' }), ...search('toolu_m2', 'Grep', { pattern: 'payment' }), bad]);+ const scan = scanCurrentTurn(t, `toolu_pending_${seq}`);+ assert.ok(scan && /^h:/.test(scan.turnId), `${bad}: boundary turn id`);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(scan.searches, [], `${bad}: searches before it do not count`);+ }+});++// ── same-batch exclusion ──+console.log('\nsame batch:');++test('excludedBatchId: the pending call message when located, else the newest message', () => {+ const t = writeTranscript([human('go'), ...search('toolu_s1', 'Grep', { pattern: 'a' })]);+ const pendingId = `toolu_pending_${seq}`;+ const scan = scanCurrentTurn(t, pendingId);+ assert.strictEqual(excludedBatchId(scan, { tool_use_id: pendingId }), `msg_pending_${seq}`);+ assert.strictEqual(excludedBatchId(scan, {}), scan.newestMessageId);+ assert.strictEqual(excludedBatchId(scan, { tool_use_id: 'toolu_unknown' }), `msg_pending_${seq}`, 'unknown id: newest message');+});++// ── scanner wrapper ──+console.log('\nscanner:');++test('createTurnScanner reads the transcript once and currentTurnId guards the shape', () => {+ const boundary = human('go');+ const t = writeTranscript([boundary]);+ const saved = process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ try {+ process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH = '';+ const getScan = createTurnScanner({ transcript_path: t });+ const first = getScan();+ fs.writeFileSync(t, JSON.stringify(human('changed')) + '\n', 'utf8');+ assert.strictEqual(getScan(), first, 'cached for the rest of run()');+ assert.strictEqual(currentTurnId(first), boundary.uuid);+ assert.strictEqual(currentTurnId(null), null);+ assert.strictEqual(currentTurnId({ turnId: '' }), null);+ assert.strictEqual(transcriptPathFor({ transcriptPath: '/x.jsonl' }), '/x.jsonl');+ assert.strictEqual(createTurnScanner({})(), null, 'no transcript: null scan');+ } finally {+ if (saved === undefined) delete process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH;+ else process.env.CLAUDE_TRANSCRIPT_PATH = saved;+ }+});++test('the hook re-exports scanCurrentTurn', () => {+ // The hook prunes stale state files on load: point it at a scratch dir.+ const stateDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'gateguard-turn-scan-state-'));+ const savedStateDir = process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR;+ process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR = stateDir;+ try {+ assert.strictEqual(require(hookPath).scanCurrentTurn, scanCurrentTurn);+ } finally {+ if (savedStateDir === undefined) delete process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR;+ else process.env.GATEGUARD_STATE_DIR = savedStateDir;+ fs.rmSync(stateDir, { recursive: true, force: true });+ }+});++fs.rmSync(transcriptDir, { recursive: true, force: true });++console.log(`\nResults: Passed: ${passed}, Failed: ${failed}`);+process.exit(failed > 0 ? 1 : 0);diff --git a/tests/lib/transcript-context.test.js b/tests/lib/transcript-context.test.jsindex b5a3addf6..003d0cc9a 100644--- a/tests/lib/transcript-context.test.js+++ b/tests/lib/transcript-context.test.js@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ const {DEFAULT_CONTEXT_THRESHOLD_STANDARD,DEFAULT_CONTEXT_THRESHOLD_LARGE,DEFAULT_CONTEXT_INTERVAL_TOKENS,+ DEFAULT_TRANSCRIPT_TAIL_BYTES,+ readFileTail,readLatestContextTokens,resolveContextWindowTokens,resolveContextThreshold,@@ -323,6 +325,20 @@ test('returns -1 for non-finite token counts', () => {assert.strictEqual(computeContextBucket(NaN, 160000, 60000), -1);});+// ── readFileTail ──+console.log('\nreadFileTail:');++test('is exported and returns the trailing bytes with a truncation flag', () => {+ assert.strictEqual(typeof readFileTail, 'function');+ assert.strictEqual(DEFAULT_TRANSCRIPT_TAIL_BYTES, 256 * 1024);+ const file = tracked(writeTranscript(['first-line', 'second', 'third']));+ const whole = readFileTail(file, 1024);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(whole, { text: 'first-line\nsecond\nthird\n', truncated: false });+ const tail = readFileTail(file, 6);+ assert.deepStrictEqual(tail, { text: 'third\n', truncated: true });+ assert.strictEqual(readFileTail(path.join(os.tmpdir(), `missing-${process.pid}.jsonl`), 10), null);+});+// ── formatWindowLabel ──console.log('\nformatWindowLabel:');