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The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.

fix(skills): add a session boundary to the buyer example, tighten the ATA check

Notorious D.E.Vf1c3511268a0
diff --git a/docs/ja-JP/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md b/docs/ja-JP/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md
index ea069053d..dccb57688 100644
--- a/docs/ja-JP/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md
+++ b/docs/ja-JP/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md
@@ -139,35 +139,68 @@ const ALLOWED_NETWORKS = new Set([
"solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp", // Solana mainnet
"eip155:8453", // Base
]);
-const MAX_AMOUNT = 10_000n; // atomic units — 6-decimal USDC, so $0.01
+const MAX_AMOUNT = 10_000n; // atomic units — 6-decimal USDC, so $0.01 per call
+const SESSION_CAP = 50_000n; // $0.05 across the whole session
// EVM addresses are case-insensitive, so compare them lowercased. Solana
// addresses are base58 and ARE case-sensitive — never lowercase those, or a
// different account could slip through.
-const normalizeAsset = (a: string) => (a.startsWith("0x") ? a.toLowerCase() : a);
+const normalizeAddress = (a: string) => (a.startsWith("0x") ? a.toLowerCase() : a);
const ALLOWED_ASSETS = new Set(
[
"EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v", // USDC, Solana mainnet
"0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913", // USDC, Base
- ].map(normalizeAsset),
+ ].map(normalizeAddress),
+);
+// Who you are willing to pay. Without this, any 402 an agent happens to hit
+// can name its own recipient.
+const ALLOWED_PAY_TO = new Set(
+ ["7pr7NCaQRz5PEhPy7BAeB3Z72TVkiShhjRyVCN5DA6yC"].map(normalizeAddress),
);
client.registerPolicy((_x402Version, requirements) =>
requirements.filter(r => {
- if (!ALLOWED_NETWORKS.has(r.network)) return false; // wrong chain
- if (!ALLOWED_ASSETS.has(normalizeAsset(r.asset))) return false; // wrong token
+ if (!ALLOWED_NETWORKS.has(r.network)) return false; // wrong chain
+ if (!ALLOWED_ASSETS.has(normalizeAddress(r.asset))) return false; // wrong token
+ if (!ALLOWED_PAY_TO.has(normalizeAddress(r.payTo))) return false; // wrong recipient
try {
const amount = BigInt(r.amount);
- return amount >= 0n && amount <= MAX_AMOUNT; // over budget / negative
+ return amount >= 0n && amount <= MAX_AMOUNT; // over budget / negative
} catch {
- return false; // unparseable amount
+ return false; // unparseable amount
}
}),
);
+// The policy sees one challenge at a time, so it cannot enforce a session
+// total or ask a human anything. Keep the payment-enabled client private and
+// route every paid call through this boundary.
const fetchWithPayment = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);
-const res = await fetchWithPayment("https://api.example.com/data", { method: "GET" });
+// Supply this from your harness — a real prompt, never a stub that returns true.
+declare function confirmWithUser(prompt: string): Promise<boolean>;
+
+let sessionSpent = 0n;
+let sessionApproved = false;
+
+async function payOnce(url: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> {
+ // Reserve the worst case the policy allows. Settlement responses do not
+ // carry an amount, so counting MAX_AMOUNT per call is a deliberate
+ // over-estimate — it can stop early, never late.
+ if (sessionSpent + MAX_AMOUNT > SESSION_CAP) {
+ throw new Error("Session budget exhausted — blocked");
+ }
+ if (!sessionApproved) {
+ sessionApproved = await confirmWithUser(
+ `Allow paid requests up to ${SESSION_CAP} atomic units this session?`,
+ );
+ if (!sessionApproved) throw new Error("User declined — no payment attempted");
+ }
+ sessionSpent += MAX_AMOUNT;
+ return fetchWithPayment(url, init);
+}
+
+const res = await payOnce("https://api.example.com/data", { method: "GET" });
```
ポリシーを登録すると、予算超過の金額、想定外のトークン、未登録のチェーンはすべてフェイルクローズドになる — 候補がすべて除外されるため、`createPaymentPayload` は署名せずに例外を投げる。デブネット USDC は `4zMMC9srt5Ri5X14GAgXhaHii3GnPAEERYPJgZJDncDU`;開発時のみ `ALLOWED_ASSETS` に追加すること。ポリシーは敵対的にテストする — `5000000` アトミック単位を要求するチャレンジ、別のミントを提示するチャレンジ、登録していないチェーンのチャレンジを与え、いずれも署名が生成されないことを確認する。exact-SVM スキームではファシリテーターがトランザクション手数料支払者となるため、買い手のウォレットは USDC のみを保有すればよい — ガス用の SOL は不要。
@@ -193,20 +226,32 @@ const res = await fetchWithPayment("https://api.example.com/data", { method: "GE
| Python(FastAPI、Flask) | PyPI の `x402` |
| Go(Gin、Echo、`net/http`) | `github.com/x402-foundation/x402/go/v2` |
-**Solana のセラー:`payTo` アドレスには先にトークンアカウントが必要。** exact-SVM クライアントは `payTo` から導出した*関連トークンアカウント*(ATA)に送金するが、それを作成はしない。そのアカウントが存在しないと決済はシミュレーション段階で失敗し、402 が `transaction_simulation_failed` を返す — クライアントのバグのように見えるが、実際は受取側アカウントの欠落である。本番投入前に確認すること:
+**Solana のセラー:`payTo` アドレスには先に正規のトークンアカウントが必要。** exact-SVM クライアントは `findAssociatedTokenPda` で `payTo` の*関連トークンアカウント*(ATA)を導出してそこに送金するが、それを作成はしない。その正確なアカウントが存在しないと決済はシミュレーション段階で失敗し、402 が `transaction_simulation_failed` を返す — クライアントのバグのように見えるが、実際は受取側アカウントの欠落である。導出したアドレス自体を確認すること — オーナーのトークンアカウントを走査するのは等価ではない。同じミントの非正規な補助アカウントがあると検査は通るのに、クライアントが対象とする ATA は依然として存在しないからだ:
+
+```typescript
+import { findAssociatedTokenPda, TOKEN_PROGRAM_ADDRESS } from "@solana-program/token";
+
+const [ata] = await findAssociatedTokenPda({
+ mint: "EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v", // USDC mainnet
+ owner: payToAddress,
+ tokenProgram: TOKEN_PROGRAM_ADDRESS, // TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM_ADDRESS for Token-2022 mints
+});
+```
+
+次にそのアドレスが実在することを確認する — `value: null` なら存在せず、そこへの決済は失敗する:
```bash
curl -s https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
- -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"getTokenAccountsByOwner",
- "params":["<PAYTO_ADDRESS>",{"mint":"EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v"},{"encoding":"jsonParsed"}]}' \
- | jq '.result.value | length' # 0 なら USDC アカウントなし — 支払い受付前に作成する
+ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"getAccountInfo",
+ "params":["<DERIVED_ATA>",{"encoding":"base64"}]}' \
+ | jq '.result.value != null'
```
-次のいずれかで作成できる(作成者が少額のレントを負担し、支払者ではない):
+作成方法(作成者が少額のレントを負担し、支払者ではない):
-- そのトークンを `payTo` に一度でも送金する — 送金側の転送でアカウントが作成される。
+- コード上では `@solana-program/token` の `getCreateAssociatedTokenIdempotentInstruction` をオンボーディングフローに追加する — 冪等版なので再実行しても安全で、決定的に動作する唯一の方法。
- spl-token CLI で `spl-token create-account <MINT> --owner <PAYTO_ADDRESS>`。
-- コード上では `@solana-program/token` の `getCreateAssociatedTokenIdempotentInstruction` をプロビジョニングフローに追加する — 冪等版なので再実行しても安全。
+- そのトークンを `payTo` に送金する方法も使えるが、送金側が作成インストラクションを含む場合に限る — ウォレットや `spl-token transfer --fund-recipient` は含める。ATA が無い状態への素の `transferChecked` は、決済と同じように失敗する。
これは新規プロビジョニングされたウォレットやカストディアルウォレットへの支払いで最も問題になりやすい。そうしたウォレットは対象アセットの ATA をまだ持っていないことが多い。
diff --git a/docs/zh-CN/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md b/docs/zh-CN/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md
index dca78ad01..2be21ce7b 100644
--- a/docs/zh-CN/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md
+++ b/docs/zh-CN/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md
@@ -139,35 +139,68 @@ const ALLOWED_NETWORKS = new Set([
"solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp", // Solana mainnet
"eip155:8453", // Base
]);
-const MAX_AMOUNT = 10_000n; // atomic units — 6-decimal USDC, so $0.01
+const MAX_AMOUNT = 10_000n; // atomic units — 6-decimal USDC, so $0.01 per call
+const SESSION_CAP = 50_000n; // $0.05 across the whole session
// EVM addresses are case-insensitive, so compare them lowercased. Solana
// addresses are base58 and ARE case-sensitive — never lowercase those, or a
// different account could slip through.
-const normalizeAsset = (a: string) => (a.startsWith("0x") ? a.toLowerCase() : a);
+const normalizeAddress = (a: string) => (a.startsWith("0x") ? a.toLowerCase() : a);
const ALLOWED_ASSETS = new Set(
[
"EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v", // USDC, Solana mainnet
"0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913", // USDC, Base
- ].map(normalizeAsset),
+ ].map(normalizeAddress),
+);
+// Who you are willing to pay. Without this, any 402 an agent happens to hit
+// can name its own recipient.
+const ALLOWED_PAY_TO = new Set(
+ ["7pr7NCaQRz5PEhPy7BAeB3Z72TVkiShhjRyVCN5DA6yC"].map(normalizeAddress),
);
client.registerPolicy((_x402Version, requirements) =>
requirements.filter(r => {
- if (!ALLOWED_NETWORKS.has(r.network)) return false; // wrong chain
- if (!ALLOWED_ASSETS.has(normalizeAsset(r.asset))) return false; // wrong token
+ if (!ALLOWED_NETWORKS.has(r.network)) return false; // wrong chain
+ if (!ALLOWED_ASSETS.has(normalizeAddress(r.asset))) return false; // wrong token
+ if (!ALLOWED_PAY_TO.has(normalizeAddress(r.payTo))) return false; // wrong recipient
try {
const amount = BigInt(r.amount);
- return amount >= 0n && amount <= MAX_AMOUNT; // over budget / negative
+ return amount >= 0n && amount <= MAX_AMOUNT; // over budget / negative
} catch {
- return false; // unparseable amount
+ return false; // unparseable amount
}
}),
);
+// The policy sees one challenge at a time, so it cannot enforce a session
+// total or ask a human anything. Keep the payment-enabled client private and
+// route every paid call through this boundary.
const fetchWithPayment = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);
-const res = await fetchWithPayment("https://api.example.com/data", { method: "GET" });
+// Supply this from your harness — a real prompt, never a stub that returns true.
+declare function confirmWithUser(prompt: string): Promise<boolean>;
+
+let sessionSpent = 0n;
+let sessionApproved = false;
+
+async function payOnce(url: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> {
+ // Reserve the worst case the policy allows. Settlement responses do not
+ // carry an amount, so counting MAX_AMOUNT per call is a deliberate
+ // over-estimate — it can stop early, never late.
+ if (sessionSpent + MAX_AMOUNT > SESSION_CAP) {
+ throw new Error("Session budget exhausted — blocked");
+ }
+ if (!sessionApproved) {
+ sessionApproved = await confirmWithUser(
+ `Allow paid requests up to ${SESSION_CAP} atomic units this session?`,
+ );
+ if (!sessionApproved) throw new Error("User declined — no payment attempted");
+ }
+ sessionSpent += MAX_AMOUNT;
+ return fetchWithPayment(url, init);
+}
+
+const res = await payOnce("https://api.example.com/data", { method: "GET" });
```
注册该策略后,超预算金额、非预期代币或未注册的链都会故障关闭——所有候选项都被过滤掉,`createPaymentPayload` 会抛出异常而不是签名。开发网 USDC 是 `4zMMC9srt5Ri5X14GAgXhaHii3GnPAEERYPJgZJDncDU`;仅在开发时把它加入 `ALLOWED_ASSETS`。对策略做对抗性测试——分别喂入要求 `5000000` 原子单位的挑战、报价另一种铸币地址的挑战,以及你从未注册的链上的挑战,并断言它们都不会产生签名。在 exact-SVM 方案中,结算器是交易费用支付方,因此买方钱包只需持有 USDC——无需 SOL 支付 gas。
@@ -193,20 +226,32 @@ const res = await fetchWithPayment("https://api.example.com/data", { method: "GE
| Python(FastAPI、Flask) | PyPI 上的 `x402` |
| Go(Gin、Echo、`net/http`) | `github.com/x402-foundation/x402/go/v2` |
-**Solana 卖方:`payTo` 地址需要先有代币账户。** exact-SVM 客户端会转账到它为 `payTo` 推导出的*关联代币账户*(ATA),但不会创建它。如果该账户不存在,结算会在模拟阶段失败——402 返回 `transaction_simulation_failed`,看起来像客户端 bug,实际是收款方账户缺失。上线前请检查:
+**Solana 卖方:`payTo` 地址需要先有其规范代币账户。** exact-SVM 客户端用 `findAssociatedTokenPda` 为 `payTo` 推导*关联代币账户*(ATA)并转账到那里,但不会创建它。如果那个确切账户不存在,结算会在模拟阶段失败,402 返回 `transaction_simulation_failed`,看起来像客户端 bug,实际是收款方账户缺失。要检查推导出的地址本身——扫描该所有者的代币账户并不等价,因为同一铸币地址下的非规范辅助账户会让检查通过,而客户端真正要用的 ATA 仍然不存在:
+
+```typescript
+import { findAssociatedTokenPda, TOKEN_PROGRAM_ADDRESS } from "@solana-program/token";
+
+const [ata] = await findAssociatedTokenPda({
+ mint: "EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v", // USDC mainnet
+ owner: payToAddress,
+ tokenProgram: TOKEN_PROGRAM_ADDRESS, // TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM_ADDRESS for Token-2022 mints
+});
+```
+
+然后确认该确切地址存在——`value: null` 表示不存在,向它结算将会失败:
```bash
curl -s https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
- -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"getTokenAccountsByOwner",
- "params":["<PAYTO_ADDRESS>",{"mint":"EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v"},{"encoding":"jsonParsed"}]}' \
- | jq '.result.value | length' # 0 表示没有 USDC 账户 —— 接受付款前先创建
+ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"getAccountInfo",
+ "params":["<DERIVED_ATA>",{"encoding":"base64"}]}' \
+ | jq '.result.value != null'
```
-以下任一方式都能创建(由创建者支付少量租金,而非付款方):
+创建方式(由创建者支付少量租金,而非付款方):
-- 向 `payTo` 转一次该代币的任意数量——发送方的转账会创建该账户。
+- 在代码中,将 `@solana-program/token` 的 `getCreateAssociatedTokenIdempotentInstruction` 加入你的开通流程——幂等版本可安全重复执行,也是唯一确定性的方式。
- 用 spl-token CLI:`spl-token create-account <MINT> --owner <PAYTO_ADDRESS>`。
-- 在代码中,将 `@solana-program/token` 的 `getCreateAssociatedTokenIdempotentInstruction` 加入你的开通流程——幂等版本可安全重复执行。
+- 向 `payTo` 转账该代币也可以,但仅当发送方包含创建指令时——钱包和 `spl-token transfer --fund-recipient` 会包含;对缺失 ATA 的裸 `transferChecked` 会像结算一样失败。
这个问题在向新开通的钱包或托管钱包付款时最容易出现,这类钱包往往还没有该资产的 ATA。
diff --git a/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md b/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md
index a3fc91859..fbf3fa7e0 100644
--- a/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md
+++ b/skills/agent-payment-x402/SKILL.md
@@ -140,35 +140,68 @@ const ALLOWED_NETWORKS = new Set([
"solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp", // Solana mainnet
"eip155:8453", // Base
]);
-const MAX_AMOUNT = 10_000n; // atomic units — 6-decimal USDC, so $0.01
+const MAX_AMOUNT = 10_000n; // atomic units — 6-decimal USDC, so $0.01 per call
+const SESSION_CAP = 50_000n; // $0.05 across the whole session
// EVM addresses are case-insensitive, so compare them lowercased. Solana
// addresses are base58 and ARE case-sensitive — never lowercase those, or a
// different account could slip through.
-const normalizeAsset = (a: string) => (a.startsWith("0x") ? a.toLowerCase() : a);
+const normalizeAddress = (a: string) => (a.startsWith("0x") ? a.toLowerCase() : a);
const ALLOWED_ASSETS = new Set(
[
"EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v", // USDC, Solana mainnet
"0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913", // USDC, Base
- ].map(normalizeAsset),
+ ].map(normalizeAddress),
+);
+// Who you are willing to pay. Without this, any 402 an agent happens to hit
+// can name its own recipient.
+const ALLOWED_PAY_TO = new Set(
+ ["7pr7NCaQRz5PEhPy7BAeB3Z72TVkiShhjRyVCN5DA6yC"].map(normalizeAddress),
);
client.registerPolicy((_x402Version, requirements) =>
requirements.filter(r => {
- if (!ALLOWED_NETWORKS.has(r.network)) return false; // wrong chain
- if (!ALLOWED_ASSETS.has(normalizeAsset(r.asset))) return false; // wrong token
+ if (!ALLOWED_NETWORKS.has(r.network)) return false; // wrong chain
+ if (!ALLOWED_ASSETS.has(normalizeAddress(r.asset))) return false; // wrong token
+ if (!ALLOWED_PAY_TO.has(normalizeAddress(r.payTo))) return false; // wrong recipient
try {
const amount = BigInt(r.amount);
- return amount >= 0n && amount <= MAX_AMOUNT; // over budget / negative
+ return amount >= 0n && amount <= MAX_AMOUNT; // over budget / negative
} catch {
- return false; // unparseable amount
+ return false; // unparseable amount
}
}),
);
+// The policy sees one challenge at a time, so it cannot enforce a session
+// total or ask a human anything. Keep the payment-enabled client private and
+// route every paid call through this boundary.
const fetchWithPayment = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);
-const res = await fetchWithPayment("https://api.example.com/data", { method: "GET" });
+// Supply this from your harness — a real prompt, never a stub that returns true.
+declare function confirmWithUser(prompt: string): Promise<boolean>;
+
+let sessionSpent = 0n;
+let sessionApproved = false;
+
+async function payOnce(url: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> {
+ // Reserve the worst case the policy allows. Settlement responses do not
+ // carry an amount, so counting MAX_AMOUNT per call is a deliberate
+ // over-estimate — it can stop early, never late.
+ if (sessionSpent + MAX_AMOUNT > SESSION_CAP) {
+ throw new Error("Session budget exhausted — blocked");
+ }
+ if (!sessionApproved) {
+ sessionApproved = await confirmWithUser(
+ `Allow paid requests up to ${SESSION_CAP} atomic units this session?`,
+ );
+ if (!sessionApproved) throw new Error("User declined — no payment attempted");
+ }
+ sessionSpent += MAX_AMOUNT;
+ return fetchWithPayment(url, init);
+}
+
+const res = await payOnce("https://api.example.com/data", { method: "GET" });
```
With the policy registered, an over-budget amount, an unexpected token, or an unregistered chain all fail closed — `createPaymentPayload` throws instead of signing, because every candidate was filtered out. Devnet USDC is `4zMMC9srt5Ri5X14GAgXhaHii3GnPAEERYPJgZJDncDU`; add it to `ALLOWED_ASSETS` only for development. Test the policy adversarially — feed it a challenge demanding `5000000` atomic units, one quoting a different mint, and one on a chain you never registered, and assert that none of them produce a signature. In the exact-SVM scheme the facilitator is the transaction fee payer, so the buyer wallet holds USDC only — no SOL for gas.
@@ -194,20 +227,32 @@ For the hosted option, choose from the [facilitator list](https://docs.x402.org/
| Python (FastAPI, Flask) | `x402` on PyPI |
| Go (Gin, Echo, `net/http`) | `github.com/x402-foundation/x402/go/v2` |
-**Solana sellers: the `payTo` address needs a token account first.** The exact-SVM client transfers to the *associated token account* (ATA) it derives for `payTo` and does not create it. If that account does not exist, settlement fails at simulation — the 402 comes back with `transaction_simulation_failed`, which reads like a client bug but is a missing recipient account. Check before going live:
+**Solana sellers: the `payTo` address needs its canonical token account first.** The exact-SVM client derives the *associated token account* (ATA) for `payTo` with `findAssociatedTokenPda` and transfers there; it never creates it. If that exact account is missing, settlement fails at simulation and the 402 comes back with `transaction_simulation_failed`, which reads like a client bug rather than a missing recipient account. Check the derived address itself — scanning the owner's token accounts is not equivalent, because a non-canonical auxiliary account for the same mint would pass while the ATA the client targets is still absent:
+
+```typescript
+import { findAssociatedTokenPda, TOKEN_PROGRAM_ADDRESS } from "@solana-program/token";
+
+const [ata] = await findAssociatedTokenPda({
+ mint: "EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v", // USDC mainnet
+ owner: payToAddress,
+ tokenProgram: TOKEN_PROGRAM_ADDRESS, // TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM_ADDRESS for Token-2022 mints
+});
+```
+
+Then confirm that exact address exists — `value: null` means it does not, and settlement to it will fail:
```bash
curl -s https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
- -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"getTokenAccountsByOwner",
- "params":["<PAYTO_ADDRESS>",{"mint":"EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v"},{"encoding":"jsonParsed"}]}' \
- | jq '.result.value | length' # 0 means no USDC account — create it before accepting payments
+ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"getAccountInfo",
+ "params":["<DERIVED_ATA>",{"encoding":"base64"}]}' \
+ | jq '.result.value != null'
```
-Any one of these creates it (whoever creates it pays the small rent, not the payer):
+To provision it (whoever creates it pays the small rent, not the payer):
-- Send any amount of that token to `payTo` once — the sender's transfer creates the account.
+- In code, add `getCreateAssociatedTokenIdempotentInstruction` from `@solana-program/token` to your onboarding flow — the idempotent variant is safe to re-run and is the only option that is deterministic.
- `spl-token create-account <MINT> --owner <PAYTO_ADDRESS>` with the spl-token CLI.
-- In code, add `getCreateAssociatedTokenIdempotentInstruction` from `@solana-program/token` to your provisioning flow — the idempotent variant is safe to re-run.
+- A transfer of that token to `payTo` also works, but only when the sender includes the create instruction — wallets and `spl-token transfer --fund-recipient` do; a bare `transferChecked` to a missing ATA fails the same way settlement does.
This bites hardest when payouts go to freshly provisioned or custodial wallets, which often have no ATA for the asset yet.