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The agent harness performance optimization system. Skills, instincts, memory, security, and research-first development for Claude Code, Codex, Opencode, Cursor and beyond.

fix(gateguard): reach SQL clients behind shell flag clusters, su and taskset

L4XBf838085274be
diff --git a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
index b23055b72..aae94c081 100644
--- a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
+++ b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js
@@ -581,6 +581,10 @@ const DD_LAUNCHER_OPTIONS = {
setsid: {
values: new Set(), optional: new Set(),
flags: new Set(['-c', '--ctty', '-f', '--fork', '-w', '--wait'])
+ },
+ taskset: {
+ values: new Set(), optional: new Set(),
+ flags: new Set(['-a', '--all-tasks', '-c', '--cpu-list'])
}
};
@@ -633,8 +637,9 @@ function ddLauncherCommandIndex(argv, index, name) {
}
index += consumesNext ? 2 : 1;
}
- // timeout's duration is data, followed by exactly one executable position.
- return name === 'timeout' ? index + 1 : index;
+ // timeout's duration and taskset's mask or CPU list are data, followed by
+ // exactly one executable position.
+ return name === 'timeout' || name === 'taskset' ? index + 1 : index;
}
/**
@@ -767,6 +772,30 @@ function unwrapLeadWrappers(tokens, allowShellBuiltins = true, allowDdLaunchers
return [];
}
+/**
+ * The command lines `su` may run through the target user's shell: the value of
+ * every `-c`/`--command`, or of a short-option cluster ending in `c` (`-lc`).
+ * `su` runs only the last one, so each is checked rather than guessing which
+ * wins. `su` passes the arguments after `--` to that shell, which runs a `-c`
+ * there too, so the scan does not stop at `--`.
+ *
+ * @param {string[]} argv command argv starting at `su`
+ * @returns {string[]}
+ */
+function suCommandLines(argv) {
+ const commandLines = [];
+ for (let i = 1; i < argv.length; i += 1) {
+ const arg = argv[i];
+ if (arg.startsWith('--command=')) {
+ commandLines.push(arg.slice('--command='.length));
+ } else if ((arg === '--command' || /^-[A-Za-z]*c$/.test(arg)) && i + 1 < argv.length) {
+ commandLines.push(argv[i + 1]);
+ i += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return commandLines;
+}
+
/**
* Detect destructive SQL passed as (possibly quoted) arguments to a known
* SQL client. Operates on dequoted tokens from `quoteAwareSegments`, so
@@ -787,12 +816,15 @@ function isDestructiveSqlClient(tokens) {
* separators, quoted `find -exec`, and `sh -c`/`bash -c` wrappers that evade
* the quote-stripping path (GHSA-4v57-ph3x-gf55).
*
+ * Past the recursion limit the nested command is not visible, so the check
+ * fails closed: a guard that allowed it would be bypassed by one more level.
+ *
* @param {string} raw
* @param {number} [depth] recursion guard for shell -c wrappers
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function isDestructiveQuoteAware(raw, depth = 0) {
- if (depth > 4) return false;
+ if (depth > 4) return true;
// The outer command was preprocessed already; shell -c introduces a new
// program whose literal heredoc data must also stay outside execution.
const executable = depth === 0 ? raw : stripHeredocBodies(raw);
@@ -805,12 +837,19 @@ function isDestructiveQuoteAware(raw, depth = 0) {
if (isDestructiveSqlClient(tokens)) return true;
if (isDestructiveFindExec(tokens)) return true;
const argv = unwrapLeadWrappers(tokens, true, true);
- if (SHELL_WRAPPERS.has(commandBasename(argv[0]))) {
- const ci = argv.indexOf('-c', 1);
+ const base = commandBasename(argv[0]);
+ if (SHELL_WRAPPERS.has(base)) {
+ // `-c`, or a short-option cluster that includes it (`-lc`, `-ec`).
+ const ci = argv.findIndex((arg, i) => i > 0 && /^-[A-Za-z]*c[A-Za-z]*$/.test(arg));
if (ci !== -1 && argv[ci + 1] && isDestructiveQuoteAware(argv[ci + 1], depth + 1)) {
return true;
}
}
+ if (base === 'su') {
+ for (const commandLine of suCommandLines(argv)) {
+ if (isDestructiveQuoteAware(commandLine, depth + 1)) return true;
+ }
+ }
}
}
return false;
diff --git a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
index 3bd3ba797..fc7b6570a 100644
--- a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
+++ b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js
@@ -2195,6 +2195,46 @@ function runTests() {
passed++;
else failed++;
+ if (
+ test('denies destructive SQL through shell flag clusters, su and taskset', () => {
+ expectDestructiveDeny('bash -lc "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'bash -lc psql');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('sh -ec "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'sh -ec psql');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('sudo su postgres -c "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'sudo su -c psql');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('su - postgres -c "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'su - user -c psql');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('su -lc "psql -c \'drop table users\'" postgres', 'su -lc psql');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('su --command="psql -c \'drop table users\'" postgres', 'su --command= psql');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('su postgres -- -c "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'su -c after --');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('su postgres -c "echo ok" -c "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'su runs its last -c');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('su -c "psql -c \'drop table users\'" -c "echo ok" postgres', 'su -c with a later harmless -c');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('taskset -c 0 psql -c "drop table users"', 'taskset -c psql');
+ expectDestructiveDeny('taskset 0x3 psql -c "drop table users"', 'taskset mask psql');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ if (
+ test('denies a command nested past the shell -c recursion limit', () => {
+ // Each level quotes the one inside it. Past the limit the command is not
+ // visible, so the check fails closed instead of allowing it.
+ let command = 'psql -c "drop table users"';
+ for (let level = 0; level < 6; level += 1) command = `sh -c ${JSON.stringify(command)}`;
+ expectDestructiveDeny(command, 'sh -c nested six deep');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
+ if (
+ test('allows harmless commands under shell flag clusters, su and taskset', () => {
+ expectAllow('bash -lc "psql -c \'select count(*) from users\'"', 'bash -lc select');
+ expectAllow('su postgres -c "psql -c \'select 1\'"', 'su -c select');
+ expectAllow('taskset -c 0 git status', 'taskset git status');
+ })
+ )
+ passed++;
+ else failed++;
+
if (
test('allows SQL string literals and non-SQL clients mentioning SQL', () => {
expectAllow('psql -c "SELECT \'drop table\' FROM audit_log"', 'SQL string literal');