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fix(gateguard): reach SQL clients behind shell flag clusters, su and taskset
L4XBf838085274be
diff --git a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.jsindex b23055b72..aae94c081 100644--- a/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js+++ b/scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js@@ -581,6 +581,10 @@ const DD_LAUNCHER_OPTIONS = {setsid: {values: new Set(), optional: new Set(),flags: new Set(['-c', '--ctty', '-f', '--fork', '-w', '--wait'])+ },+ taskset: {+ values: new Set(), optional: new Set(),+ flags: new Set(['-a', '--all-tasks', '-c', '--cpu-list'])}};@@ -633,8 +637,9 @@ function ddLauncherCommandIndex(argv, index, name) {}index += consumesNext ? 2 : 1;}- // timeout's duration is data, followed by exactly one executable position.- return name === 'timeout' ? index + 1 : index;+ // timeout's duration and taskset's mask or CPU list are data, followed by+ // exactly one executable position.+ return name === 'timeout' || name === 'taskset' ? index + 1 : index;}/**@@ -767,6 +772,30 @@ function unwrapLeadWrappers(tokens, allowShellBuiltins = true, allowDdLaunchersreturn [];}+/**+ * The command lines `su` may run through the target user's shell: the value of+ * every `-c`/`--command`, or of a short-option cluster ending in `c` (`-lc`).+ * `su` runs only the last one, so each is checked rather than guessing which+ * wins. `su` passes the arguments after `--` to that shell, which runs a `-c`+ * there too, so the scan does not stop at `--`.+ *+ * @param {string[]} argv command argv starting at `su`+ * @returns {string[]}+ */+function suCommandLines(argv) {+ const commandLines = [];+ for (let i = 1; i < argv.length; i += 1) {+ const arg = argv[i];+ if (arg.startsWith('--command=')) {+ commandLines.push(arg.slice('--command='.length));+ } else if ((arg === '--command' || /^-[A-Za-z]*c$/.test(arg)) && i + 1 < argv.length) {+ commandLines.push(argv[i + 1]);+ i += 1;+ }+ }+ return commandLines;+}+/*** Detect destructive SQL passed as (possibly quoted) arguments to a known* SQL client. Operates on dequoted tokens from `quoteAwareSegments`, so@@ -787,12 +816,15 @@ function isDestructiveSqlClient(tokens) {* separators, quoted `find -exec`, and `sh -c`/`bash -c` wrappers that evade* the quote-stripping path (GHSA-4v57-ph3x-gf55).*+ * Past the recursion limit the nested command is not visible, so the check+ * fails closed: a guard that allowed it would be bypassed by one more level.+ ** @param {string} raw* @param {number} [depth] recursion guard for shell -c wrappers* @returns {boolean}*/function isDestructiveQuoteAware(raw, depth = 0) {- if (depth > 4) return false;+ if (depth > 4) return true;// The outer command was preprocessed already; shell -c introduces a new// program whose literal heredoc data must also stay outside execution.const executable = depth === 0 ? raw : stripHeredocBodies(raw);@@ -805,12 +837,19 @@ function isDestructiveQuoteAware(raw, depth = 0) {if (isDestructiveSqlClient(tokens)) return true;if (isDestructiveFindExec(tokens)) return true;const argv = unwrapLeadWrappers(tokens, true, true);- if (SHELL_WRAPPERS.has(commandBasename(argv[0]))) {- const ci = argv.indexOf('-c', 1);+ const base = commandBasename(argv[0]);+ if (SHELL_WRAPPERS.has(base)) {+ // `-c`, or a short-option cluster that includes it (`-lc`, `-ec`).+ const ci = argv.findIndex((arg, i) => i > 0 && /^-[A-Za-z]*c[A-Za-z]*$/.test(arg));if (ci !== -1 && argv[ci + 1] && isDestructiveQuoteAware(argv[ci + 1], depth + 1)) {return true;}}+ if (base === 'su') {+ for (const commandLine of suCommandLines(argv)) {+ if (isDestructiveQuoteAware(commandLine, depth + 1)) return true;+ }+ }}}return false;diff --git a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.jsindex 3bd3ba797..fc7b6570a 100644--- a/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js+++ b/tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js@@ -2195,6 +2195,46 @@ function runTests() {passed++;else failed++;+ if (+ test('denies destructive SQL through shell flag clusters, su and taskset', () => {+ expectDestructiveDeny('bash -lc "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'bash -lc psql');+ expectDestructiveDeny('sh -ec "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'sh -ec psql');+ expectDestructiveDeny('sudo su postgres -c "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'sudo su -c psql');+ expectDestructiveDeny('su - postgres -c "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'su - user -c psql');+ expectDestructiveDeny('su -lc "psql -c \'drop table users\'" postgres', 'su -lc psql');+ expectDestructiveDeny('su --command="psql -c \'drop table users\'" postgres', 'su --command= psql');+ expectDestructiveDeny('su postgres -- -c "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'su -c after --');+ expectDestructiveDeny('su postgres -c "echo ok" -c "psql -c \'drop table users\'"', 'su runs its last -c');+ expectDestructiveDeny('su -c "psql -c \'drop table users\'" -c "echo ok" postgres', 'su -c with a later harmless -c');+ expectDestructiveDeny('taskset -c 0 psql -c "drop table users"', 'taskset -c psql');+ expectDestructiveDeny('taskset 0x3 psql -c "drop table users"', 'taskset mask psql');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ if (+ test('denies a command nested past the shell -c recursion limit', () => {+ // Each level quotes the one inside it. Past the limit the command is not+ // visible, so the check fails closed instead of allowing it.+ let command = 'psql -c "drop table users"';+ for (let level = 0; level < 6; level += 1) command = `sh -c ${JSON.stringify(command)}`;+ expectDestructiveDeny(command, 'sh -c nested six deep');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;++ if (+ test('allows harmless commands under shell flag clusters, su and taskset', () => {+ expectAllow('bash -lc "psql -c \'select count(*) from users\'"', 'bash -lc select');+ expectAllow('su postgres -c "psql -c \'select 1\'"', 'su -c select');+ expectAllow('taskset -c 0 git status', 'taskset git status');+ })+ )+ passed++;+ else failed++;+if (test('allows SQL string literals and non-SQL clients mentioning SQL', () => {expectAllow('psql -c "SELECT \'drop table\' FROM audit_log"', 'SQL string literal');