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fix: harden telemetry for 100k MAU — memory caps, IP rate limiting, size guards

faber0fcc33f9ebfb
diff --git a/functions/api/telemetry.ts b/functions/api/telemetry.ts
index 8ffc77b..4b532b6 100644
--- a/functions/api/telemetry.ts
+++ b/functions/api/telemetry.ts
@@ -3,21 +3,29 @@
*
* Receives metadata events from the frontend and buffers them in
* Cloudflare KV. When enough batches accumulate (or enough time
- * passes), all pending batches are flushed as a single JSONL commit
- * to HuggingFace. This prevents the 10k+ commit buildup that
+ * passes), pending batches are flushed as JSONL commits to
+ * HuggingFace. This prevents the 10k+ commit buildup that
* happens with per-request commits.
*
* URL: POST /api/telemetry
*
* Setup (Cloudflare Pages Dashboard → Settings → Environment Variables):
- * HF_TOKEN — HuggingFace write token (hf_...)
- * HF_DATASET_REPO — Target dataset repo (e.g. "pliny-the-prompter/g0dm0d3")
+ * HF_TOKEN — HuggingFace write token (hf_...)
+ * HF_DATASET_REPO — Target dataset repo (e.g. "pliny-the-prompter/g0dm0d3")
+ * TELEMETRY_FLUSH_SECRET — Bearer token for authenticated cron flush
*
* KV Binding (Cloudflare Pages Dashboard → Settings → Bindings):
- * TELEMETRY_KV — KV namespace for buffering (optional; falls back to direct commit)
+ * TELEMETRY_KV — KV namespace for buffering
*
- * File layout in the HF repo:
- * telemetry/batch_<timestamp>_<hash>.jsonl
+ * IMPORTANT: TELEMETRY_KV must be bound in production. Without it,
+ * every request falls back to a direct HF commit — which will
+ * recreate the commit-explosion problem at scale.
+ *
+ * Cloudflare-level protections (configure in Dashboard → Security):
+ * - WAF rule: block POST /api/telemetry with Content-Length > 524288
+ * - Rate limiting rule: 20 req/min per IP to /api/telemetry
+ * - Restrict Origin header to godmod3.ai (optional)
+ * - Monthly usage alert on Workers & KV (paid plan required at scale)
*/
interface Env {
@@ -48,22 +56,29 @@ const CORS_HEADERS = {
'Access-Control-Max-Age': '86400',
}
-// KV batching thresholds
-const FLUSH_BATCH_COUNT = 50
-const FLUSH_AGE_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000 // 30 minutes
-
-// ── Rate Limiter (in-memory, per-isolate) ────────────────────────────
+// ── Size & batching limits ──────────────────────────────────────────
+// Workers have 128 MiB memory. Keep individual requests small and
+// cap the total data loaded during a flush.
+const MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 512 * 1024 // 512 KiB per inbound POST
+const MAX_BATCH_EVENTS = 100 // events per request
+const FLUSH_BATCH_COUNT = 50 // keys before triggering flush
+const FLUSH_MAX_KEYS = 50 // max keys consumed per flush cycle
+const FLUSH_MAX_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024 // 5 MiB combined JSONL per HF commit
+const FLUSH_AGE_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000 // 30 minutes
+
+// ── Rate Limiter (dual: session + IP, in-memory per-isolate) ────────
const RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 60_000
-const RATE_LIMIT_MAX = 10
+const RATE_LIMIT_MAX_SESSION = 10 // per session_id
+const RATE_LIMIT_MAX_IP = 20 // per IP — catches session_id rotation
const rateLimitMap = new Map<string, number[]>()
-function isRateLimited(sessionId: string): boolean {
+function isRateLimited(key: string, max: number): boolean {
const now = Date.now()
- let timestamps = rateLimitMap.get(sessionId)
+ let timestamps = rateLimitMap.get(key)
if (!timestamps) {
timestamps = []
- rateLimitMap.set(sessionId, timestamps)
+ rateLimitMap.set(key, timestamps)
}
const cutoff = now - RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS
@@ -71,11 +86,22 @@ function isRateLimited(sessionId: string): boolean {
timestamps.shift()
}
- if (timestamps.length >= RATE_LIMIT_MAX) {
+ if (timestamps.length >= max) {
return true
}
timestamps.push(now)
+
+ // Prevent unbounded memory growth across isolate lifetime
+ if (rateLimitMap.size > 10_000) {
+ const it = rateLimitMap.keys()
+ for (let i = 0; i < 1_000; i++) {
+ const k = it.next()
+ if (k.done) break
+ rateLimitMap.delete(k.value)
+ }
+ }
+
return false
}
@@ -110,9 +136,6 @@ export const onRequestOptions: PagesFunction<Env> = async () => {
}
// GET ?flush=force — authenticated cron trigger for guaranteed flush.
-// Requires Authorization: Bearer <TELEMETRY_FLUSH_SECRET> header.
-// Set TELEMETRY_FLUSH_SECRET in CF Pages env vars, then configure a
-// CF Worker scheduled event or external cron to call this every 30 min.
export const onRequestGet: PagesFunction<Env> = async (context) => {
const { request, env } = context
const url = new URL(request.url)
@@ -143,6 +166,12 @@ export const onRequestGet: PagesFunction<Env> = async (context) => {
export const onRequestPost: PagesFunction<Env> = async (context) => {
const { request, env } = context
+ // ── Early size rejection (before reading body into memory) ────────
+ const contentLength = parseInt(request.headers.get('Content-Length') || '', 10)
+ if (contentLength > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES) {
+ return jsonResponse({ error: 'Request too large', limit: MAX_REQUEST_BYTES }, 413)
+ }
+
if (!env.HF_TOKEN || !env.HF_DATASET_REPO) {
const missing = []
if (!env.HF_TOKEN) missing.push('HF_TOKEN')
@@ -151,9 +180,27 @@ export const onRequestPost: PagesFunction<Env> = async (context) => {
return jsonResponse({ error: `Telemetry not configured (missing: ${missing.join(', ')})` }, 503)
}
+ // ── IP-based rate limiting (catches session_id rotation attacks) ───
+ const clientIP = request.headers.get('CF-Connecting-IP') || request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-For') || 'unknown'
+ if (isRateLimited(`ip:${clientIP}`, RATE_LIMIT_MAX_IP)) {
+ return jsonResponse({ error: 'Rate limit exceeded — try again later' }, 429)
+ }
+
+ // ── Read body with size cap ───────────────────────────────────────
+ let bodyText: string
+ try {
+ bodyText = await request.text()
+ } catch {
+ return jsonResponse({ error: 'Failed to read body' }, 400)
+ }
+
+ if (new TextEncoder().encode(bodyText).byteLength > MAX_REQUEST_BYTES) {
+ return jsonResponse({ error: 'Request too large', limit: MAX_REQUEST_BYTES }, 413)
+ }
+
let payload: TelemetryPayload
try {
- payload = await request.json() as TelemetryPayload
+ payload = JSON.parse(bodyText) as TelemetryPayload
} catch {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Invalid JSON' }, 400)
}
@@ -162,40 +209,33 @@ export const onRequestPost: PagesFunction<Env> = async (context) => {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'No events provided' }, 400)
}
- const MAX_BATCH = 500
- const events = payload.events.slice(0, MAX_BATCH)
+ const events = payload.events.slice(0, MAX_BATCH_EVENTS)
const invalid = events.filter(e => !validateEvent(e))
if (invalid.length > 0) {
return jsonResponse({ error: `${invalid.length} event(s) failed schema validation` }, 400)
}
+ // ── Session-based rate limiting ───────────────────────────────────
const firstEvent = events[0]
const sessionKey = firstEvent.session_id
? firstEvent.session_id
: deriveSessionKey(firstEvent)
- if (isRateLimited(sessionKey)) {
+ if (isRateLimited(`session:${sessionKey}`, RATE_LIMIT_MAX_SESSION)) {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Rate limit exceeded — try again later' }, 429)
}
const sanitized = events.map(stripPII)
const jsonl = sanitized.map(e => JSON.stringify(e)).join('\n')
- // KV values max out at 25 MiB; reject oversized batches cleanly
- const KV_VALUE_LIMIT = 24 * 1024 * 1024 // 24 MiB with margin
- const jsonlBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(jsonl).byteLength
- if (jsonlBytes > KV_VALUE_LIMIT) {
- return jsonResponse({ error: 'Batch too large', bytes: jsonlBytes, limit: KV_VALUE_LIMIT }, 413)
- }
-
// ── KV buffered path (preferred) ──────────────────────────────────
if (env.TELEMETRY_KV) {
const now = Date.now()
const kvKey = `batch:${now}:${shortHash(jsonl)}`
await env.TELEMETRY_KV.put(kvKey, jsonl, {
- expirationTtl: 604800, // 7 days — long enough for any low-volume period
+ expirationTtl: 604800, // 7 days
})
// Check flush conditions
@@ -213,10 +253,6 @@ export const onRequestPost: PagesFunction<Env> = async (context) => {
}
if (shouldFlush) {
- // Flush is idempotent: concurrent flushes may produce duplicate
- // JSONL files on HF, which is harmless (extra telemetry rows).
- // KV is eventually consistent and can't do atomic locks, so we
- // accept rare duplicates rather than pretend we can prevent them.
context.waitUntil(flushKVToHF(env))
}
@@ -229,6 +265,10 @@ export const onRequestPost: PagesFunction<Env> = async (context) => {
}
// ── Direct commit fallback (KV not configured) ────────────────────
+ // WARNING: At scale this creates one HF commit per request.
+ // Bind TELEMETRY_KV in production to avoid commit explosion.
+ console.warn('[Telemetry] TELEMETRY_KV not bound — falling back to direct HF commit')
+
const ts = new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, '-')
const hash = shortHash(jsonl)
const filePath = `telemetry/batch_${ts}_${hash}.jsonl`
@@ -243,48 +283,63 @@ export const onRequestPost: PagesFunction<Env> = async (context) => {
return jsonResponse({ error: 'Failed to publish to HuggingFace' }, 502)
}
-// ── KV Flush: combine all pending batches into one HF commit ────────
+// ── KV Flush: read up to FLUSH_MAX_KEYS, cap at FLUSH_MAX_BYTES ────
async function flushKVToHF(env: Env): Promise<number> {
const kv = env.TELEMETRY_KV!
- const allKeys: { name: string }[] = []
- let cursor: string | undefined
- do {
- const list = await kv.list({ prefix: 'batch:', cursor })
- allKeys.push(...list.keys)
- cursor = list.list_complete ? undefined : list.cursor
- } while (cursor)
+ // Only list up to FLUSH_MAX_KEYS — leave the rest for the next cycle.
+ // This bounds both KV read ops and memory consumption.
+ const list = await kv.list({ prefix: 'batch:', limit: FLUSH_MAX_KEYS })
+ const keys = list.keys
- if (allKeys.length === 0) return 0
+ if (keys.length === 0) return 0
+ // Read values with a cumulative size cap
+ const flushedKeys: { name: string }[] = []
const chunks: string[] = []
- for (const key of allKeys) {
+ let totalBytes = 0
+
+ for (const key of keys) {
const value = await kv.get(key.name)
- if (value) chunks.push(value)
+ if (!value) {
+ flushedKeys.push(key) // empty key — still delete it
+ continue
+ }
+
+ const valueBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(value).byteLength
+ if (totalBytes + valueBytes > FLUSH_MAX_BYTES && chunks.length > 0) {
+ // Would exceed cap — stop here, remaining keys stay for next flush
+ break
+ }
+
+ chunks.push(value)
+ flushedKeys.push(key)
+ totalBytes += valueBytes
}
- if (chunks.length === 0) return 0
+ if (chunks.length === 0) {
+ // Only empty keys found — clean them up
+ if (flushedKeys.length > 0) {
+ await Promise.all(flushedKeys.map(key => kv.delete(key.name)))
+ }
+ return 0
+ }
const combined = chunks.join('\n')
- // Filename is derived entirely from the key set — no timestamp.
- // Concurrent flushes reading identical keys produce the exact same
- // filename, so HF overwrites idempotently (no duplicate rows).
- const keyDigest = await sha256Hex(allKeys.map(k => k.name).sort().join(','))
+ const keyDigest = await sha256Hex(flushedKeys.map(k => k.name).sort().join(','))
const filePath = `telemetry/flush_${keyDigest}.jsonl`
const branch = env.HF_DATASET_BRANCH || 'main'
const ok = await commitToHF(env.HF_TOKEN, env.HF_DATASET_REPO, branch, filePath, combined)
if (ok) {
- // Delete flushed keys. If a concurrent flush already deleted some,
- // the delete is a no-op — KV delete on missing keys is safe.
- await Promise.all(allKeys.map(key => kv.delete(key.name)))
- console.log(`[Telemetry] Flushed ${allKeys.length} batches → ${filePath}`)
- return allKeys.length
+ await Promise.all(flushedKeys.map(key => kv.delete(key.name)))
+ console.log(`[Telemetry] Flushed ${flushedKeys.length} batches (${(totalBytes / 1024).toFixed(0)} KiB) → ${filePath}`)
+ return flushedKeys.length
}
- console.error(`[Telemetry] Flush failed — ${allKeys.length} batches remain in KV`)
+ console.error(`[Telemetry] Flush failed — ${flushedKeys.length} batches remain in KV`)
return 0
}
@@ -299,10 +354,7 @@ async function commitToHF(
): Promise<boolean> {
const url = `${HF_API}/datasets/${repo}/commit/${branch}`
- // btoa() only handles Latin-1; telemetry JSONL can contain Unicode
- const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(content)
- const binStr = Array.from(bytes, b => String.fromCodePoint(b)).join('')
- const contentBase64 = btoa(binStr)
+ const contentBase64 = utf8ToBase64(content)
const ndjson = [
JSON.stringify({ key: 'header', value: { summary: `[telemetry] ${filePath}` } }),
JSON.stringify({ key: 'file', value: { content: contentBase64, path: filePath, encoding: 'base64' } }),
@@ -406,6 +458,21 @@ async function sha256Hex(str: string): Promise<string> {
return [...new Uint8Array(buf)].map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')
}
+// Chunked UTF-8-safe base64: processes 32 KiB at a time to avoid
+// creating a single enormous string via Array.from() on the full input.
+function utf8ToBase64(content: string): string {
+ const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(content)
+ const CHUNK = 32 * 1024 // 32 KiB — 3-byte aligned (32768 % 3 = 0)
+ let binStr = ''
+ for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i += CHUNK) {
+ const slice = bytes.subarray(i, Math.min(i + CHUNK, bytes.length))
+ for (let j = 0; j < slice.length; j++) {
+ binStr += String.fromCharCode(slice[j])
+ }
+ }
+ return btoa(binStr)
+}
+
function jsonResponse(data: unknown, status: number): Response {
return new Response(JSON.stringify(data), {
status,