Make Codex and Claude Code subscriptions go further: a local model router that gives routine agent work to economical models and keeps your strongest model for the hard parts.
Rust ai-agentsai-gatewayclaude-codecodexcoding-agentcost-optimizationdeepseekllm-gatewayllm-routerlocal-firstmodel-routingrusttask-routingtauri
//! Public discovery facts shared by CLI and Desktop; discovery remains Application-owned.
use hiroute_domain::{AgentModelSurfaceV2, CanonicalDigest, NativeReasoningCapabilityV1};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct DiscoveredAgentV1 {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub native_target: Option<hiroute_domain::AgentNativeTargetV1>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub codex_access: Option<CodexAccessViewV1>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub context_id: Option<String>,
pub agent_id: String,
pub profile_id: String,
pub version: String,
pub supported: bool,
pub configuration_state: String,
/// Independently located native entry points. Location is not an executable identity,
/// version, digest, or installation admission gate.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeSet::is_empty")]
pub available_surfaces: BTreeSet<AgentModelSurfaceV2>,
/// Bounded projection of the native client catalog plus independently proven source/account
/// coverage. Large native metadata and all credentials remain behind the daemon boundary.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub native_model_catalog: Option<DiscoveredAgentModelCatalogV1>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub registered_configuration: Option<DiscoveredAgentConfigurationV1>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub discovered_credential: Option<DiscoveredCredentialInputV1>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub permission_hardening: Option<AgentConfigPermissionFindingV1>,
}
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct CodexAccessViewV1 {
pub codex_home: String,
pub slot_id: String,
pub profile_context_id: String,
pub root_context_id: String,
pub selected_mode: String,
pub slot_occupied: bool,
pub target_file: String,
pub profile_name: String,
pub commands: BTreeMap<String, String>,
pub pending_operation: Option<String>,
pub access_revoked: bool,
pub conflict_fields: Vec<String>,
}
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct DiscoveredAgentModelCatalogV1 {
pub metadata_source: AgentModelCatalogMetadataSourceV1,
pub native_default_model: String,
pub models: Vec<DiscoveredAgentModelV1>,
}
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Clone, Copy, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum AgentModelCatalogMetadataSourceV1 {
UserConfigured,
TargetCache,
TargetBundled,
}
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct DiscoveredAgentModelV1 {
pub client_model_id: String,
pub display_name: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
pub source_options: Vec<DiscoveredAgentModelSourceV1>,
}
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct DiscoveredAgentModelSourceV1 {
pub binding_id: String,
pub source_label: String,
/// Opaque account/source identity. It is safe for correlation and contains no credential or
/// human account claim.
pub account_scope_ref: String,
pub account_scope_digest: CanonicalDigest,
pub state: AgentModelSourceCoverageStateV1,
pub reasoning: NativeReasoningCapabilityV1,
}
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Clone, Copy, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum AgentModelSourceCoverageStateV1 {
Ready,
CredentialRequired,
AuthorizationRequired,
Disabled,
ModelUnconfirmed,
}
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct DiscoveredAgentConfigurationV1 {
pub connection_option_id: String,
pub endpoint_profile_id: String,
pub endpoint_profile_revision: u64,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub model_configuration_id: Option<String>,
pub base_url: String,
pub observed_model_id: String,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeMap::is_empty")]
pub provider_model_alias_hints: BTreeMap<String, String>,
pub configuration_revision: u64,
}
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct DiscoveredCredentialInputV1 {
pub source: String,
pub scanner_id: String,
pub scanner_version: String,
pub discovered_source_ref: String,
pub field_selector: String,
pub observed_revision: u64,
/// Opaque descriptor understood only by the protected-input port. It contains no path or
/// Secret and is bound to the exact scanner revision.
pub protected_input_slot: String,
}
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct AgentConfigPermissionFindingV1 {
pub scanner_id: String,
pub scanner_version: String,
pub discovered_source_ref: String,
pub observed_identity: CanonicalDigest,
pub observed_revision: u64,
pub display_path: String,
pub required_mode: u32,
}
#[derive(schemars::JsonSchema, Serialize)]
pub struct AgentDiscoveryListV1 {
pub agents: Vec<DiscoveredAgentV1>,
}