Make Codex and Claude Code subscriptions go further: a local model router that gives routine agent work to economical models and keeps your strongest model for the hard parts.
Rust ai-agentsai-gatewayclaude-codecodexcoding-agentcost-optimizationdeepseekllm-gatewayllm-routerlocal-firstmodel-routingrusttask-routingtauri
//! Two independent random run capabilities. No upstream credential, administrator audience,
//! or child-delegation audience exists here. A prefix is routing syntax, never authorization.
use hiroute_application::delegation::safety::{RunSafetyBinding, RunSafetyProjection};
use hiroute_domain::delegation::{DelegationErrorV1, DelegationRunV1};
use hiroute_domain::{
AgentAccessGrantMaterial, AgentIngressProtocolV1, CanonicalDigest, ProtectedSecret,
};
use std::sync::{
Arc,
atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
pub struct RunCredentialPair {
pub model: ProtectedSecret,
pub self_query: ProtectedSecret,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct RunCredentialFingerprints {
pub model: CanonicalDigest,
pub self_query: CanonicalDigest,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
pub enum RunCredentialAudience {
Model,
SelfQuery,
}
impl RunCredentialPair {
pub fn generate() -> Result<Self, DelegationErrorV1> {
Ok(Self {
model: generate("hr_run_model_")?,
self_query: generate("hr_run_query_")?,
})
}
pub fn fingerprints(&self) -> RunCredentialFingerprints {
RunCredentialFingerprints {
model: CanonicalDigest::of_bytes(self.model.expose()),
self_query: CanonicalDigest::of_bytes(self.self_query.expose()),
}
}
}
fn generate(prefix: &str) -> Result<ProtectedSecret, DelegationErrorV1> {
let mut entropy = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
getrandom::fill(entropy.as_mut()).map_err(|_| DelegationErrorV1::CapabilityUnavailable)?;
let material = AgentAccessGrantMaterial::from_csprng_entropy(*entropy);
let mut bytes = prefix.as_bytes().to_vec();
bytes.extend_from_slice(material.expose());
ProtectedSecret::new(bytes).map_err(|_| DelegationErrorV1::InvalidArguments)
}
/// Internal metadata resolved through a committed run; never deserialized from the Worker
/// or constructed from its claimed task/run headers. Exact Plan pinning remains a separate
/// mandatory admission/Gateway concern, not authority conferred by this record.
pub struct RunCredentialRecord {
pub task_id: String,
pub run_id: String,
pub lease_id: String,
pub safety: RunSafetyBinding,
pub model_alias: String,
pub protocol: AgentIngressProtocolV1,
pub fingerprints: RunCredentialFingerprints,
}
pub struct RunCredentialVerifier {
record: RunCredentialRecord,
safety: Arc<RunSafetyProjection>,
revoked: AtomicBool,
}
impl hiroute_application::delegation::control::DelegationRunDenial for RunCredentialVerifier {
fn deny(
&self,
run: &hiroute_domain::delegation::DelegationRunV1,
) -> Result<(), DelegationErrorV1> {
if self.record.run_id != run.run_id
|| self.record.task_id != run.task_id
|| self.record.lease_id != run.lease_id
|| self.record.safety.workspace != run.workspace_id
|| self.record.safety.daemon_epoch != run.daemon_epoch
{
return Err(DelegationErrorV1::PermissionDenied);
}
self.revoke();
Ok(())
}
}
impl RunCredentialVerifier {
/// Caller activates only after accepted runtime commit, before launching the Worker.
pub fn new(
record: RunCredentialRecord,
safety: Arc<RunSafetyProjection>,
) -> Result<Self, DelegationErrorV1> {
if [
&record.task_id,
&record.run_id,
&record.lease_id,
&record.model_alias,
]
.iter()
.any(|value| value.is_empty() || value.len() > 256 || value.chars().any(char::is_control))
|| record.fingerprints.model == record.fingerprints.self_query
{
return Err(DelegationErrorV1::InvalidArguments);
}
Ok(Self {
record,
safety,
revoked: AtomicBool::new(false),
})
}
pub fn authenticate(
self: &Arc<Self>,
secret: &[u8],
audience: RunCredentialAudience,
now_ms: u64,
) -> Result<VerifiedRunCredential, DelegationErrorV1> {
if secret.is_empty() || secret.len() > 256 {
return Err(DelegationErrorV1::PermissionDenied);
}
let expected = match audience {
RunCredentialAudience::Model => &self.record.fingerprints.model,
RunCredentialAudience::SelfQuery => &self.record.fingerprints.self_query,
};
if &CanonicalDigest::of_bytes(secret) != expected {
return Err(DelegationErrorV1::PermissionDenied);
}
self.check(now_ms)?;
Ok(VerifiedRunCredential {
verifier: self.clone(),
audience,
})
}
/// Irreversible for this lease, including already authenticated requests. Persist the
/// terminal/cancel intent before ACP/process side effects; recovery denies the old epoch.
pub fn revoke(&self) {
self.revoked.store(true, Ordering::Release);
}
/// Internal composition check for the persistent journal. It does not authenticate a
/// secret or expose the record; it prevents a lifecycle owner from accidentally revoking a
/// verifier belonging to another accepted lease.
pub(crate) fn protects_run(&self, run: &DelegationRunV1) -> bool {
self.record.task_id == run.task_id
&& self.record.run_id == run.run_id
&& self.record.lease_id == run.lease_id
&& self.record.safety.workspace == run.workspace_id
&& self.record.safety.daemon_epoch == run.daemon_epoch
&& self.record.safety.permit_id == run.permit_id
&& self.record.safety.permit_generation == run.permit_generation
&& self.record.safety.expires_at_ms == run.deadline_ms
}
pub(crate) fn model_fingerprint(&self) -> CanonicalDigest {
self.record.fingerprints.model.clone()
}
fn check(&self, now_ms: u64) -> Result<(), DelegationErrorV1> {
if self.revoked.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return Err(DelegationErrorV1::PermissionDenied);
}
self.safety.check(&self.record.safety, now_ms)
}
}
/// Carries verified task/run identity, but intentionally no Serialize/Deserialize or public
/// constructor. Every use rechecks the shared current projection and this run's terminal bit.
pub struct VerifiedRunCredential {
verifier: Arc<RunCredentialVerifier>,
audience: RunCredentialAudience,
}
impl VerifiedRunCredential {
pub fn check_model(
&self,
model: &str,
protocol: AgentIngressProtocolV1,
now_ms: u64,
) -> Result<(), DelegationErrorV1> {
if self.audience != RunCredentialAudience::Model
|| model != self.verifier.record.model_alias
|| protocol != self.verifier.record.protocol
{
return Err(DelegationErrorV1::PermissionDenied);
}
self.verifier.check(now_ms)
}
pub fn check_self_query(
&self,
task: &str,
run: &str,
now_ms: u64,
) -> Result<(), DelegationErrorV1> {
if self.audience != RunCredentialAudience::SelfQuery
|| task != self.task_id()
|| run != self.run_id()
{
return Err(DelegationErrorV1::PermissionDenied);
}
self.verifier.check(now_ms)
}
pub fn task_id(&self) -> &str {
&self.verifier.record.task_id
}
pub fn run_id(&self) -> &str {
&self.verifier.record.run_id
}
pub fn lease_id(&self) -> &str {
&self.verifier.record.lease_id
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;