Self-hosted monitoring for homelabs: host and container metrics and uptime checks from all your machines in one dashboard, with an optional AI agent that diagnoses incidents and suggests fixes.
Python ai-agentsaiopsdashboarddockerfastapihomelabincident-managementllmmonitoringopenaireactroot-cause-analysisself-hosteduptime-monitoring
fix(availability): refuse URL credentials and hide check query strings from non-admins
karloks2005d9d38b8d18e1
diff --git a/src/backend/availability.py b/src/backend/availability.pyindex 2a88f72..fe42096 100644--- a/src/backend/availability.py+++ b/src/backend/availability.py@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import reimport statisticsfrom collections import defaultdictfrom datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone-from urllib.parse import urlsplit+from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplitfrom .alerts import raise_alert, resolve_alertsfrom .models import Check, CheckResult, CheckRollup, IncidentAlert, Server@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ def validate(raw: dict, server_ids: set[int]) -> dict:parts = urlsplit(target)if parts.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parts.hostname or len(target) > 2048 or any(char.isspace() for char in target):raise ValueError("The URL must start with http:// or https:// and name a host.")+ if parts.username or parts.password:+ raise ValueError("Put no user name or password in the URL; everyone who can sign in can read a check's address.")codes = raw.get("accepted_codes") or ["200-299"]if not isinstance(codes, list) or not 1 <= len(codes) <= 10 or not all(isinstance(code, str) and _CODES.fullmatch(code) for code in codes):raise ValueError("Accepted status codes are like 200-299 or 301, at most 10.")@@ -426,7 +428,7 @@ def evaluate(db, check: Check, now: datetime | None = None, alerting: bool = Trufailing = [names.get(server, f"server {server}") for server, state in server_states(db, check, now).items() if state == "down"]why = (latest.detail if latest and latest.detail else "No answer") + f" from {', '.join(failing) or 'its servers'}"raise_alert(db, servers[0], rule_key(check), check.severity, f"{check.name} is down"[:255],- f"{why}. Failed {check.retries + 1} checks in a row. {check.target}"[:1000])+ f"{why}. Failed {check.retries + 1} checks in a row. {redacted_target(check.target)}"[:1000])elif servers:resolve_alerts(db, servers[0], [rule_key(check)], now)return new@@ -471,14 +473,28 @@ def _uptime(db, check: Check, since: datetime, now: datetime) -> float | None:return round(100 * (total - down) / total, 2) if total else None-def summary(db, check: Check, names: dict[int, str], now: datetime | None = None) -> dict:+def redacted_target(target: str) -> str:+ """A check's address with the secret-bearing parts removed, for anyone who can't edit it: credentials in the+ URL and the query string (which can carry tokens) go; scheme, host, port and path stay. The collector still+ gets the full target. Non-URL targets (host:port, a name) have no secret part and pass through unchanged."""+ parts = urlsplit(target)+ if parts.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parts.hostname:+ return target+ host = f"[{parts.hostname}]" if ":" in parts.hostname else parts.hostname+ if parts.port:+ host = f"{host}:{parts.port}"+ cleaned = urlunsplit((parts.scheme, host, parts.path, "", ""))+ return f"{cleaned}?\u2026" if parts.query else cleaned+++def summary(db, check: Check, names: dict[int, str], now: datetime | None = None, redact: bool = False) -> dict:now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)recent = slots(check, _results(db, check, now - timedelta(seconds=check.interval_seconds * (STRIP + 2) + 3600)))[-STRIP:]latest = db.query(CheckResult).filter(CheckResult.check_id == check.id).order_by(CheckResult.time.desc()).first()cert = db.query(CheckResult.cert_days).filter(CheckResult.check_id == check.id, CheckResult.cert_days.isnot(None)).order_by(CheckResult.time.desc()).limit(1).scalar()options = options_of(check)return {- "id": check.id, "name": check.name, "type": check.type, "target": check.target, "tags": [tag for tag in check.tags.split(",") if tag],+ "id": check.id, "name": check.name, "type": check.type, "target": redacted_target(check.target) if redact else check.target, "tags": [tag for tag in check.tags.split(",") if tag],"keyword": options.get("keyword"), "options": options, "rule": check.rule, "severity": check.severity, "paused": check.paused, "state": check.state,"state_since": _utc(check.state_since).isoformat() if check.state_since else None, "interval_seconds": check.interval_seconds, "retries": check.retries,"retry_interval_seconds": check.retry_interval_seconds, "timeout_seconds": check.timeout_seconds,@@ -492,10 +508,10 @@ def summary(db, check: Check, names: dict[int, str], now: datetime | None = None}-def overview(db, now: datetime | None = None) -> dict:+def overview(db, now: datetime | None = None, redact: bool = False) -> dict:now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)names = dict(db.query(Server.id, Server.hostname).all())- checks = [summary(db, check, names, now) for check in db.query(Check).order_by(Check.name)]+ checks = [summary(db, check, names, now, redact=redact) for check in db.query(Check).order_by(Check.name)]month = [check["uptime_30d"] for check in checks if check["uptime_30d"] is not None and not check["paused"]]return {"checks": checks,diff --git a/src/backend/main.py b/src/backend/main.pyindex bd33ed1..317b288 100644--- a/src/backend/main.py+++ b/src/backend/main.py@@ -1946,7 +1946,9 @@ def _check_or_404(db, check_id: int) -> Check:@app.get("/availability")def get_availability(session_id: Annotated[str | None, Cookie(alias=SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)] = None, db=Depends(get_db)):user = _current_user(session_id, db)- return {**availability.overview(db), "can_edit": _is_admin(db, user["id"])}+ is_admin = _is_admin(db, user["id"])+ # Non-admins can't edit checks, so they get targets with credentials and query strings (possible secrets) removed.+ return {**availability.overview(db, redact=not is_admin), "can_edit": is_admin}def _save_check(db, check: Check, payload: dict) -> dict:diff --git a/src/collector/collector.py b/src/collector/collector.pyindex ecf05b9..ec15205 100644--- a/src/collector/collector.py+++ b/src/collector/collector.py@@ -1292,6 +1292,8 @@ def validate_check(raw: Any) -> dict[str, Any] | None:parts = urllib.parse.urlsplit(target)if parts.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parts.hostname or len(target) > 2048 or any(char.isspace() or not char.isprintable() for char in target):return None+ if parts.username or parts.password:+ return Nonecodes = raw.get("accepted_codes")if not isinstance(codes, list) or not 1 <= len(codes) <= 10 or not all(isinstance(code, str) and _CHECK_CODES.fullmatch(code) for code in codes):return Nonediff --git a/tests/collectors/test_collector_checks.py b/tests/collectors/test_collector_checks.pyindex 1f0a821..bdbbbd9 100644--- a/tests/collectors/test_collector_checks.py+++ b/tests/collectors/test_collector_checks.py@@ -266,3 +266,9 @@ def test_run_check_dispatches_by_type(monkeypatch):monkeypatch.setattr(collector, "run_tls", lambda c: {"ok": True, "response_ms": 1, "code": None, "detail": None, "cert_days": 40})out = collector.run_check({"id": 7, "type": "tls", "host": "h", "port": 443, "timeout": 5, "warn_days": 14})assert out["check_id"] == 7 and out["ok"] is True and out["cert_days"] == 40+++def test_validate_check_rejects_credentials_in_a_url():+ base = {"id": 1, "interval": 60, "retry_interval": 20, "timeout": 10, "accepted_codes": ["200-299"]}+ assert collector.validate_check({**base, "type": "http", "target": "https://user:pass@host/"}) is None+ assert collector.validate_check({**base, "type": "http", "target": "https://host/?token=x"}) is not Nonediff --git a/tests/monitoring/test_availability.py b/tests/monitoring/test_availability.pyindex 5921692..2c011a9 100644--- a/tests/monitoring/test_availability.py+++ b/tests/monitoring/test_availability.py@@ -494,3 +494,31 @@ def test_a_tls_check_sends_its_warn_days_to_the_collector(app):spec = next(c for c in report(app, 1, []).json()["checks"] if c["type"] == "tls")assert spec["target"] == "mail.example.com:993" and spec["warn_days"] == 21 and "upside_down" not in spec+++# --- a check's address may hold a secret; non-admins and incidents don't see it --------------------++def test_credentials_in_a_check_url_are_refused(app):+ assert app.post("/availability/checks", json={**NEW_CHECK, "target": "https://user:[email protected]/"}).status_code == 400+++def test_a_non_admin_sees_the_target_without_its_query_or_credentials(app):+ create(app, name="Stock", target="https://stock.home.lan/api/?token=secret")++ full = app.get("/availability").json()["checks"]+ app.user.update(id=2, role="member")+ redacted = app.get("/availability").json()["checks"]++ assert next(c for c in full if c["name"] == "Stock")["target"] == "https://stock.home.lan/api/?token=secret"+ shown = next(c for c in redacted if c["name"] == "Stock")["target"]+ assert shown == "https://stock.home.lan/api/?…" and "secret" not in shown+++def test_the_incident_description_does_not_leak_the_query_string(app):+ check = create(app, server_ids=[1], target="https://stock.home.lan/api/?token=secret")+ age(app, check["id"])++ report(app, 1, runs(check["id"], [False, False, False]))++ alert = incident(app, check["id"])+ assert alert is not None and "secret" not in alert.description and "stock.home.lan/api/" in alert.description