Understand any codebase instantly. System intelligence for codebases, built for humans and AI.
TypeScript aiai-memoryclaude-codeclicode-analysiscode-mappingcode-memorycodebase-understandingcodexdeveloper-toolsllmopenclawpersistent-memoryprogram-analysissoftware-architecturesystem-intelligencesystem-mapping
ci(security): REL-07 CI security tooling sweep (gitleaks history scan, harden-runner, compass token scrub) (#833)
Ian Hock1f705e1a119d
diff --git a/.github/dependabot.yml b/.github/dependabot.ymlindex ad9753c9..dd5fbecd 100644--- a/.github/dependabot.yml+++ b/.github/dependabot.yml@@ -74,3 +74,23 @@ updates:dependency-type: developmentproduction-dependencies:dependency-type: production++ - package-ecosystem: npm+ directory: /docs-site+ schedule:+ interval: weekly+ open-pull-requests-limit: 5+ groups:+ dev-dependencies:+ dependency-type: development+ production-dependencies:+ dependency-type: production++ # docker-compose.standalone.yml (shipped in the release tarball, backs+ # `ix docker start`). Only arangodb:3.12.11 gets bumps; memory-layer is+ # `:latest`. Bump PRs are exercised by ci.yml's e2e job and by release.yml's+ # PR dry-run, whose paths include that file.+ - package-ecosystem: docker-compose+ directory: /+ schedule:+ interval: weeklydiff --git a/.github/workflows/actions-lint.yml b/.github/workflows/actions-lint.ymlindex 3bb5a032..ae3ef685 100644--- a/.github/workflows/actions-lint.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/actions-lint.yml@@ -30,5 +30,5 @@ jobs:env:GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}run: |- pipx install zizmor+ pipx install zizmor==1.30.1zizmor --min-severity=medium .github/workflows/diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.ymlindex 0bd90cc0..d26567c2 100644--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ jobs:name: Lint & Typecheckruns-on: ubuntu-lateststeps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1with:persist-credentials: false@@ -89,8 +92,8 @@ jobs:# Pinned by version and checksum, like every action here is pinned by SHA,# because this runs a downloaded binary. Dependabot's github-actions# ecosystem updates `uses:` refs and not `run:` downloads, so the bump is- # manual — same as the `pipx install zizmor` next door, which pins nothing- # at all.+ # manual — same as the pinned `pipx install zizmor==...` in+ # actions-lint.yml.- name: Workflows are wired up (actionlint)env:ACTIONLINT_VERSION: 1.7.7@@ -160,6 +163,10 @@ jobs:run:shell: bashsteps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ if: runner.os == 'Linux'+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1with:persist-credentials: false@@ -240,6 +247,9 @@ jobs:name: E2E (real backend)runs-on: ubuntu-lateststeps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1with:persist-credentials: false@@ -364,6 +374,9 @@ jobs:name: API-reference parityruns-on: ubuntu-lateststeps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1with:persist-credentials: false@@ -395,6 +408,7 @@ jobs:name: Harness install smokeruns-on: ubuntu-latestcontainer: node:22-bookworm+ # No harden-runner: it runs on the host and does not support container jobs.steps:- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1with:@@ -606,6 +620,9 @@ jobs:name: Dead-link checkruns-on: ubuntu-lateststeps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1with:persist-credentials: false@@ -627,6 +644,9 @@ jobs:run:working-directory: docs-sitesteps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1with:persist-credentials: false@@ -653,6 +673,9 @@ jobs:name: Flag-reference parityruns-on: ubuntu-lateststeps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1with:persist-credentials: false@@ -677,6 +700,9 @@ jobs:needs: [static, test, e2e, api-parity, doc-parity, links, docs-site, harness-install-smoke, harness-install-smoke-windows]runs-on: ubuntu-lateststeps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- name: Verify all required jobs succeededrun: |echo "static=${{ needs.static.result }}"diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.ymlindex 3721105f..fbc286de 100644--- a/.github/workflows/release.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml@@ -69,8 +69,11 @@ jobs:# system-compass's package.json version is not maintained against the# ix-compass-dist release series (it read 0.2.0 while dist was on v0.3.0),# so the commit is the only reliable identity the bundle has.- sha: ${{ steps.build-compass.outputs.sha }}+ sha: ${{ steps.fetch-compass.outputs.sha }}steps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- name: Set up Node.jsuses: actions/setup-node@949feb2413d6458794dcd2491c4babbbce0c15c1 # v7.1.0with:@@ -80,12 +83,15 @@ jobs:# the explicit ::error:: guard below, so an expired COMPASS_TOKEN produced# a fully green release that shipped an empty compass/ directory and a# broken `ix view` for every user. A compass failure must fail the release.- - name: Build System Compass- id: build-compass+ # The token lives only in this step. It is used as a one-off fetch URL+ # rather than a remote, so it is never written to system-compass/.git/config+ # where the build's npm install scripts could read it. It fetches the+ # default branch's HEAD, as the earlier `git clone` did.+ - name: Fetch System Compass+ id: fetch-compassenv:COMPASS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.COMPASS_TOKEN }}run: |- mkdir -p compass-distif [ -z "$COMPASS_TOKEN" ]; thenecho "::error::COMPASS_TOKEN is not set. It is required to build System Compass from the private ix-infrastructure/system-compass repo. Add a fine-grained PAT with Contents:read on that repo as the COMPASS_TOKEN secret."exit 1@@ -96,23 +102,37 @@ jobs:# output, or an App token minted in-job, the automatic mask silently# stops applying. This line does not care about the source.echo "::add-mask::$COMPASS_TOKEN"- # Do not pipe this clone through a redaction filter. This job runs on+ # Do not pipe this fetch through a redaction filter. This job runs on# the runner's default `bash -e {0}`, which has no `pipefail`, so the# pipeline would exit with the filter's status (0) and the guard below- # could never fire — the failure would surface as a confusing `cd:- # system-compass: No such file or directory` two lines down instead of- # the message telling you to rotate the token. Git withholds the+ # could never fire — the failure would surface as a confusing `git+ # checkout` error about a missing FETCH_HEAD instead of the message+ # telling you to rotate the token. Git withholds the# credential from its own error output regardless, and the mask above# covers the value if anything else ever echoes it.- git clone "https://x-access-token:${COMPASS_TOKEN}@github.com/ix-infrastructure/system-compass.git" 2>&1 \+ git init -q system-compass+ git -C system-compass fetch -q --depth 1 "https://x-access-token:${COMPASS_TOKEN}@github.com/ix-infrastructure/system-compass.git" HEAD 2>&1 \|| {- echo "::error::Could not clone ix-infrastructure/system-compass. COMPASS_TOKEN is set but was rejected — it is most likely expired or lacks Contents:read on that repo. Rotate it and re-run."+ echo "::error::Could not fetch ix-infrastructure/system-compass. COMPASS_TOKEN is set but was rejected — it is most likely expired or lacks Contents:read on that repo. Rotate it and re-run."exit 1}+ git -C system-compass checkout -q --detach FETCH_HEAD+ # The token must not have been persisted anywhere under .git (config,+ # FETCH_HEAD, logs) where the next step's npm install scripts could+ # read it.+ if grep -rqF -e "$COMPASS_TOKEN" -e x-access-token system-compass/.git; then+ echo "::error::COMPASS_TOKEN was written under system-compass/.git"+ exit 1+ fi+ # Record the source commit so the stamp written in the package job can+ # identify this bundle (see the job's `outputs`).+ echo "sha=$(git -C system-compass rev-parse --short HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"++ # No token in this step's environment: npm install scripts run here.+ - name: Build System Compass+ run: |+ mkdir -p compass-distcd system-compass- # Capture the source commit before building, so the stamp written in- # the package job can identify this bundle (see the job's `outputs`).- echo "sha=$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"npm ci --legacy-peer-depsnpm run buildif [ ! -f dist/index.html ]; then@@ -164,6 +184,10 @@ jobs:run:shell: bashsteps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ if: runner.os == 'Linux'+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- name: Checkoutuses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1with:@@ -468,6 +492,9 @@ jobs:id-token: write # keyless signing for provenance attestationattestations: write # record the build provenance attestationsteps:+ - uses: step-security/harden-runner@e14015d583714f6e62063499dc959a02595150a1 # v2.21.1+ with:+ egress-policy: audit- name: Checkout# Credentials are intentionally persisted here: the Homebrew step pushes a# branch and opens a PR with this token (see .github/zizmor.yml).diff --git a/.github/workflows/secret-scan.yml b/.github/workflows/secret-scan.ymlindex c422510f..bb0ae9a1 100644--- a/.github/workflows/secret-scan.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/secret-scan.yml@@ -30,9 +30,22 @@ jobs:- name: Install gitleaksenv:GITLEAKS_VERSION: "8.30.1"+ GITLEAKS_SHA256: 551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb+ # Pinned by version and checksum because this runs a downloaded binary.+ # Dependabot does not bump `run:` downloads, so the version and checksum+ # are updated by hand (checksums are in the release's+ # gitleaks_<version>_checksums.txt).run: |- curl -sSL "https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz" \- | tar -xz -C /usr/local/bin gitleaks- gitleaks version+ set -euo pipefail+ cd "$RUNNER_TEMP"+ TARBALL="gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz"+ curl -fsSL --retry 3 --retry-delay 2 --retry-all-errors -o "$TARBALL" \+ "https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/${TARBALL}"+ echo "${GITLEAKS_SHA256} ${TARBALL}" | sha256sum --check --strict -+ tar -xzf "$TARBALL" gitleaks+ ./gitleaks version- name: Scan repository- run: gitleaks dir . --redact --verbose --exit-code 1+ # `git` scans the commit history that fetch-depth: 0 checked out;+ # `dir` would only scan the working tree.+ run: |+ "$RUNNER_TEMP/gitleaks" git . --redact --verbose --exit-code 1diff --git a/.github/workflows/security.yml b/.github/workflows/security.ymlindex 1bed54f3..8a84f0a6 100644--- a/.github/workflows/security.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/security.yml@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ on:pull_request:branches: [main]-# Least privilege at the top; the scanning job elevates to upload SARIF.+# Least privilege. Nothing here uploads SARIF (findings fail the job instead),+# so no job needs security-events: write.permissions:contents: read@@ -14,9 +15,6 @@ jobs:trivy-repo:name: Trivy (repo)runs-on: ubuntu-latest- permissions:- contents: read- security-events: write # upload SARIF to code scanningsteps:- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1with:@@ -28,6 +26,8 @@ jobs:scan-ref: .severity: CRITICAL,HIGHexit-code: 1- scanners: vuln,misconfig+ # vuln only: the misconfig scan runs once, in config-security.yml+ # (trivy-misconfig).+ scanners: vuln# Docker image scanning is handled in the private Ix-memory repo