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TypeScript aianthropicartifactsawsazurechatgptchatgpt-cloneclaudeclonedeepseekgeminigooglegpt-5librechatmcpo1openairesponses-apivisionwebui
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import { TWO_FACTOR_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED_CODE } from 'librechat-data-provider';
import type { ISession, OIDCTokens } from '@librechat/data-schemas';
import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
import type { TokenIssuance, TwoFactorAccount } from './twoFactor';
import {
generateTwoFactorSetupToken,
isTokenRetired,
recheckMintedCredential,
withdrawMintedSession,
isTwoFactorEnrollmentRequired,
TOKEN_RETIREMENT_FIELDS,
} from './twoFactor';
import { clearSessionHintCookie } from '~/oauth/csrf';
const EXPIRED_REFRESH_MESSAGE = 'Refresh token expired or not found for this user';
type UserIdentifier = string | { toString(): string };
type RefreshUser = Pick<
TwoFactorAccount,
| '_id'
| 'provider'
| 'tenantId'
| 'orgId'
| 'storageRegion'
| 'twoFactorEnabled'
| 'twoFactorEnrolledAt'
| 'credentialsChangedAt'
>;
type RefreshSession = Pick<ISession, 'expiration'> & { _id: UserIdentifier };
type SessionDeletionResult = { deletedCount?: number };
type AuthResponseSource = TwoFactorAccount & { __v?: number; federatedTokens?: OIDCTokens };
interface LocalRefreshDependencies {
userProjection: string;
getUserById: (userId: string, projection: string) => Promise<RefreshUser | null>;
findSession: (
query: { userId: string; refreshToken: string },
options: { lean: false },
) => Promise<RefreshSession | null>;
setAuthTokens: (
userId: string,
res: Response,
session: RefreshSession | null,
req: Request,
) => Promise<string>;
deleteSession: (query: { sessionId: string }) => Promise<SessionDeletionResult>;
deleteAllUserSessions: (query: { userId: string }) => Promise<SessionDeletionResult>;
clearCloudFrontCookies: (
res: Response,
scope: { userId: string; tenantId?: string; storageRegion?: string },
) => void;
generateTwoFactorSetupToken?: typeof generateTwoFactorSetupToken;
isTwoFactorEnrollmentRequired?: typeof isTwoFactorEnrollmentRequired;
warn: (message: string) => void;
error: (message: string, cause: unknown) => void;
}
/**
* Preserve the refresh response contract. The shared allowlist excludes `openidId`, which existing
* OpenID refresh clients receive and the controller tests assert, so switching sanitizers here
* would silently change the response shape.
*/
export function sanitizeUserForAuthResponse<T extends object>(
user: T | null | undefined,
): Partial<T> {
const hydrated = user as (T & { toObject?: () => AuthResponseSource }) | null | undefined;
const source = (typeof hydrated?.toObject === 'function' ? hydrated.toObject() : hydrated) ?? {};
const {
password: _password,
__v: _version,
totpSecret: _totpSecret,
backupCodes: _backupCodes,
pendingTotpSecret: _pendingTotpSecret,
pendingBackupCodes: _pendingBackupCodes,
twoFactorAcknowledgementNonceHash: _acknowledgementHash,
twoFactorFinalizationNonceHash: _finalizationHash,
federatedTokens: _federatedTokens,
...safeUser
} = source as AuthResponseSource;
return safeUser as Partial<T>;
}
/** Handles only the local refresh branch after OpenID ownership has been resolved. */
export function createLocalRefreshHandler(deps: LocalRefreshDependencies) {
const requiresEnrollment = deps.isTwoFactorEnrollmentRequired ?? isTwoFactorEnrollmentRequired;
const mintSetupToken = deps.generateTwoFactorSetupToken ?? generateTwoFactorSetupToken;
/**
* The session lookup resolves before the response credential is minted. Recovery may land in
* between, deleting the old session while the newly minted token postdates credentialsChangedAt.
* Read the cutoff after minting so that race withdraws the resurrected session.
*/
const isCredentialRetired = async (userId: string, credential: TokenIssuance) => {
const current = await deps.getUserById(userId, TOKEN_RETIREMENT_FIELDS);
return isTokenRetired(credential, current);
};
const revokeSession = (res: Response, user: RefreshUser, userId: string) =>
withdrawMintedSession(res, user, userId, deps);
const withdrawSession = async (res: Response, user: RefreshUser, userId: string) => {
deps.warn(
`[refreshController] Password was reset while the refresh was in flight: userId=${userId}`,
);
await revokeSession(res, user, userId);
return res.status(401).send(EXPIRED_REFRESH_MESSAGE);
};
return async (
req: Request,
res: Response,
refreshToken: string | undefined,
): Promise<Response | void> => {
if (!refreshToken) {
clearSessionHintCookie(res);
return res.status(200).send('Refresh token not provided');
}
try {
const payload = jwt.verify(refreshToken, process.env.JWT_REFRESH_SECRET ?? '');
if (typeof payload === 'string' || typeof payload.id !== 'string') {
throw new Error('Invalid refresh token payload');
}
const userId = payload.id;
const user = await deps.getUserById(userId, deps.userProjection);
if (!user) {
clearSessionHintCookie(res);
return res.status(401).redirect('/login');
}
const credential: TokenIssuance = {
issuedAt: payload.iat,
issuedAtMs: typeof payload.issuedAtMs === 'number' ? payload.issuedAtMs : undefined,
};
/**
* Enrollment stamps its cutoff before session revocation. Dating the incoming credential
* closes that gap even if revocation fails, and also covers password recovery.
*/
if (isTokenRetired(credential, user)) {
deps.warn(
`[refreshController] Refresh token predates enrollment or password reset: userId=${userId}`,
);
res.clearCookie('refreshToken');
clearSessionHintCookie(res);
return res.status(401).send(EXPIRED_REFRESH_MESSAGE);
}
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'CI') {
const token = await deps.setAuthTokens(userId, res, null, req);
return res.status(200).send({ token, user: sanitizeUserForAuthResponse(user) });
}
const session = await deps.findSession({ userId, refreshToken }, { lean: false });
if (session && session.expiration > new Date()) {
if (requiresEnrollment(user)) {
await deps.deleteSession({ sessionId: session._id.toString() });
res.clearCookie('refreshToken');
clearSessionHintCookie(res);
deps.clearCloudFrontCookies(res, {
userId,
tenantId: user.tenantId ?? user.orgId,
storageRegion: user.storageRegion,
});
/** The setup token outranks the refresh credential that bought it. */
const tempToken = mintSetupToken(userId, process.env.JWT_SECRET ?? '');
if (await isCredentialRetired(userId, credential)) {
return withdrawSession(res, user, userId);
}
return res.status(200).send({
code: TWO_FACTOR_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED_CODE,
twoFAPending: true,
twoFASetupRequired: true,
tempToken,
});
}
const token = await deps.setAuthTokens(userId, res, session, req);
const retired = await recheckMintedCredential(
() => isCredentialRetired(userId, credential),
() => revokeSession(res, user, userId),
);
if (retired) {
return withdrawSession(res, user, userId);
}
return res.status(200).send({ token, user: sanitizeUserForAuthResponse(user) });
}
clearSessionHintCookie(res);
if (req.query?.retry) {
return res.status(403).send('No session found');
}
if (typeof payload.exp === 'number' && payload.exp < Date.now() / 1000) {
return res.status(403).redirect('/login');
}
return res.status(401).send(EXPIRED_REFRESH_MESSAGE);
} catch (error) {
deps.error('[refreshController] Invalid refresh token:', error);
clearSessionHintCookie(res);
return res.status(403).send('Invalid refresh token');
}
};
}