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TypeScript aianthropicartifactsawsazurechatgptchatgpt-cloneclaudeclonedeepseekgeminigooglegpt-5librechatmcpo1openairesponses-apivisionwebui
import { normalizeMCPAppCspDeclaration, resolveMCPAppCspLimits } from 'librechat-data-provider';
import type { MCPAppCspDeclaration, MCPAppCspLimits } from 'librechat-data-provider';
/** Replaced on the way out so the proxy can refuse to build a frame it has no response policy for. */
const CSP_APPLIED_PLACEHOLDER = '/*__CSP_APPLIED__*/';
const CSP_APPLIED_MARKER = 'window.__MCP_SANDBOX_CSP_APPLIED = true;';
const VIEW_CSP_PLACEHOLDER = '/*__VIEW_CSP__*/';
/** The operator setting accepts only explicit HTTP(S) origins, never raw CSP syntax. */
const FRAME_ANCESTOR_RE = /^https?:\/\/[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.-]*(?::\d{1,5})?$/;
export interface SandboxResponse {
headers: Record<string, string | string[]>;
body: string;
}
const toDomainList = (value?: string[]): string => value?.join(' ') ?? '';
const buildCspPolicy = (csp: MCPAppCspDeclaration, proxyLoader: boolean): string => {
const resourceDomains = toDomainList(csp.resourceDomains);
const connectDomains = toDomainList(csp.connectDomains) || "'none'";
const frameDomains = toDomainList(csp.frameDomains);
const scriptSrc = "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' " + resourceDomains;
return [
"default-src 'none'",
scriptSrc.trim(),
("style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' " + resourceDomains).trim(),
'connect-src ' + connectDomains,
// form-action does not fall back to default-src, so with allow-forms a form could post to
// any origin; bound it to the declared egress allowlist ('none' when none is declared).
'form-action ' + connectDomains,
("img-src 'self' data: " + resourceDomains).trim(),
("media-src 'self' data: " + resourceDomains).trim(),
("font-src 'self' " + resourceDomains).trim(),
proxyLoader
? ('frame-src blob: ' + frameDomains).trim()
: 'frame-src ' + (frameDomains || "'none'"),
("worker-src 'self' " + resourceDomains).trim(),
"object-src 'none'",
'base-uri ' + (toDomainList(csp.baseUriDomains) || "'self'"),
].join('; ');
};
const serializeInlineScriptString = (value: string): string =>
JSON.stringify(value).replace(/[<>&\u2028\u2029]/g, (character) => {
const code = character.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(4, '0');
return `\\u${code}`;
});
/** An unparseable, oversized, or repeated `csp` param yields the restrictive default policy. */
const parseCspParam = (
raw: string | string[] | undefined,
limits: MCPAppCspLimits,
): MCPAppCspDeclaration => {
if (typeof raw !== 'string' || raw.length === 0 || raw.length > limits.maxSerializedLength) {
return {};
}
try {
const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(raw);
return normalizeMCPAppCspDeclaration(parsed, limits);
} catch {
return {};
}
};
/**
* The MCP Apps spec requires the Host and Sandbox to have different origins for web hosts. The
* dedicated sandbox origin is unusable until the operator lists its allowed host origin(s).
*/
const buildFrameAncestors = (raw?: string): string => {
// Only accept scheme://host[:port] tokens. A raw value is interpolated into the CSP header, so
// an unvalidated token containing ";" would inject an unrelated directive.
return (raw ?? '')
.trim()
.split(/[\s,]+/)
.filter((token) => FRAME_ANCESTOR_RE.test(token))
.join(' ');
};
/**
* Builds the proxy response policy and the separate View policy from one normalized declaration.
* The proxy refuses to build an app frame unless this route substituted both trusted markers.
*/
export function buildSandboxResponse({
sandboxHtml,
frameAncestors,
csp,
limits: rawLimits,
}: {
sandboxHtml: string;
frameAncestors?: string;
csp?: string | string[];
limits?: Partial<MCPAppCspLimits>;
}): SandboxResponse {
const ancestors = buildFrameAncestors(frameAncestors);
const limits = resolveMCPAppCspLimits(rawLimits);
const declaration = parseCspParam(csp, limits);
const proxyPolicy = buildCspPolicy(declaration, true);
const viewPolicy = buildCspPolicy(declaration, false);
const headers: Record<string, string | string[]> = {
'Content-Type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
// Required, not merely hygienic: the per-resource policy below varies per request.
'Cache-Control': 'no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate',
'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
'Referrer-Policy': 'same-origin',
'Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy': ancestors ? 'cross-origin' : 'same-origin',
};
if (!ancestors) {
headers['X-Frame-Options'] = 'DENY';
}
const ancestorsPolicy = ancestors ? `frame-ancestors ${ancestors}` : "frame-ancestors 'none'";
// frame-ancestors stays its own policy: CSP3 excludes it from the meta-element path, and
// multiple policies intersect, so the resource policy cannot loosen it.
headers['Content-Security-Policy'] = [ancestorsPolicy, proxyPolicy];
return {
headers,
body: sandboxHtml
.replace(CSP_APPLIED_PLACEHOLDER, CSP_APPLIED_MARKER)
.replace(
VIEW_CSP_PLACEHOLDER,
`window.__MCP_VIEW_CSP = ${serializeInlineScriptString(viewPolicy)};`,
),
};
}