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TypeScript aianthropicartifactsawsazurechatgptchatgpt-cloneclaudeclonedeepseekgeminigooglegpt-5librechatmcpo1openairesponses-apivisionwebui
import { logger, ResourceCapabilityMap } from '@librechat/data-schemas';
import {
ResourceType,
Permissions,
PermissionBits,
PermissionTypes,
} from 'librechat-data-provider';
import type { SystemCapability } from '@librechat/data-schemas';
import type { Types } from 'mongoose';
import type { ScheduleUserContext } from './types';
type AgentAccess = 'ok' | 'missing' | 'forbidden';
export interface AgentFireAccessDeps {
/** Resolves an agent's internal `_id` by its custom id, or null when it doesn't exist. */
findAgentObjectId: (agentId: string) => Promise<{ _id: Types.ObjectId } | null>;
/** Loads a role's permission map by name. */
getRoleByName: (
role?: string,
) => Promise<{ permissions?: Record<string, Record<string, boolean | undefined>> } | null>;
/** Whether the user's role grants a system capability (the manage:agents bypass). */
hasCapability: (user: ScheduleUserContext, capability: SystemCapability) => Promise<boolean>;
/** Resource ACL check for a specific permission bit. */
checkPermission: (params: {
userId: string;
role?: string;
resourceType: ResourceType;
resourceId: Types.ObjectId;
requiredPermission: PermissionBits;
}) => Promise<boolean>;
}
/**
* Resolves a user's live access to a schedule's target agent, mirroring the loopback
* chat route's authorization EXACTLY so the create/update precheck and the fire-time
* precheck accept a schedule iff the actual fire would be accepted:
* 1) role-level AGENTS:USE (checkAccess on the route; admins do NOT bypass)
* 2) resource VIEW with the manage:agents capability bypass
* The two prechecks must never diverge — a create-time VIEW-only check would let a
* role without AGENTS:USE schedule runs that every fire then rejects, burning failures.
*/
export function createResolveAgentFireAccess(deps: AgentFireAccessDeps) {
return async function resolveAgentFireAccess(
agentId: string,
user: ScheduleUserContext,
): Promise<AgentAccess> {
const agent = await deps.findAgentObjectId(agentId);
if (agent == null) {
return 'missing';
}
// Mirror the chat route's checkAccess, which reads the role's AGENTS:USE directly
// and does NOT special-case admins: an admin whose role has AGENTS:USE disabled is
// rejected there, so the precheck must reject too — otherwise every fire 403s.
const role = await deps.getRoleByName(user.role);
if (role?.permissions?.[PermissionTypes.AGENTS]?.[Permissions.USE] !== true) {
return 'forbidden';
}
const capability = ResourceCapabilityMap[ResourceType.AGENT];
try {
if (capability != null && (await deps.hasCapability(user, capability))) {
return 'ok';
}
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(
`[schedules] agent capability check failed, denying bypass: ${(err as Error).message}`,
);
}
const allowed = await deps.checkPermission({
userId: user.id,
role: user.role,
resourceType: ResourceType.AGENT,
resourceId: agent._id,
requiredPermission: PermissionBits.VIEW,
});
return allowed ? 'ok' : 'forbidden';
};
}