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🔒 fix: Prevent Role Grants on Shared Links (#14137)

Danny Avila47a8749428b6
diff --git a/packages/api/src/acl/accessControlService.ts b/packages/api/src/acl/accessControlService.ts
index 361bb70098..fbd41f0210 100644
--- a/packages/api/src/acl/accessControlService.ts
+++ b/packages/api/src/acl/accessControlService.ts
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ export class AccessControlService {
requiredPermission,
}: {
userId: string;
- role?: string;
+ role?: string | null;
resourceType: ResourceType;
resourceId: string | Types.ObjectId;
requiredPermission: number;
diff --git a/packages/api/src/shared-links/access.test.ts b/packages/api/src/shared-links/access.test.ts
index f76284227e..a1176e5137 100644
--- a/packages/api/src/shared-links/access.test.ts
+++ b/packages/api/src/shared-links/access.test.ts
@@ -6,7 +6,13 @@ jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
import mongoose, { Types, Model } from 'mongoose';
import { MongoMemoryServer } from 'mongodb-memory-server';
import { createModels, createMethods, tenantStorage } from '@librechat/data-schemas';
-import { ResourceType, PrincipalType, AccessRoleIds } from 'librechat-data-provider';
+import {
+ ResourceType,
+ PrincipalType,
+ PrincipalModel,
+ AccessRoleIds,
+ PermissionBits,
+} from 'librechat-data-provider';
import type { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
import type { IAclEntry, ISharedLink } from '@librechat/data-schemas';
import { AccessControlService } from '~/acl/accessControlService';
@@ -105,6 +111,33 @@ async function grantUserViewer(resourceId: Types.ObjectId, uid: Types.ObjectId)
});
}
+/**
+ * Inserts a ROLE VIEW grant directly (bypassing the role-name lookup, which is
+ * tenant-scoped and would miss the globally seeded roles under a tenant context).
+ * Inherits the caller's tenant context so the entry is tenant-scoped on save.
+ */
+async function grantRoleViewer(resourceId: Types.ObjectId, role: string) {
+ await new AclEntry({
+ principalType: PrincipalType.ROLE,
+ principalModel: PrincipalModel.ROLE,
+ principalId: role,
+ resourceType: ResourceType.SHARED_LINK,
+ resourceId,
+ permBits: PermissionBits.VIEW,
+ grantedBy: userId,
+ }).save();
+}
+
+/** Mirrors getUserPrincipals: a ROLE principal is only added when a role is supplied. */
+function mockPrincipalsWithRole(viewer: Types.ObjectId) {
+ mockGetUserPrincipals.mockImplementation(({ role }: { role?: string | null }) =>
+ Promise.resolve([
+ { principalType: PrincipalType.USER, principalId: viewer },
+ ...(role ? [{ principalType: PrincipalType.ROLE, principalId: role }] : []),
+ ]),
+ );
+}
+
describe('canAccessSharedLink', () => {
describe('input validation', () => {
test('returns 400 when shareId is missing', async () => {
@@ -241,6 +274,98 @@ describe('canAccessSharedLink', () => {
});
describe('cross-tenant lookup', () => {
+ test('does not let a cross-tenant viewer role satisfy a ROLE ACL from another tenant', async () => {
+ // Share owned by tenant-a, granted VIEW to role USER. A tenant-b viewer whose
+ // own role is also USER must not inherit that grant: role principals are just
+ // name strings, so the middleware suppresses the viewer's role for cross-tenant
+ // views. getUserPrincipals is called with role: null, so no ROLE principal is
+ // built and the tenant-a ROLE:USER grant never matches → 403.
+ const link = await tenantStorage.run({ tenantId: 'tenant-a' }, async () => {
+ const tenantLink = await createTestLink();
+ await grantRoleViewer(tenantLink._id, 'USER');
+ return tenantLink;
+ });
+ const viewer = new Types.ObjectId();
+ mockPrincipalsWithRole(viewer);
+
+ const req = createReq({
+ params: { shareId: link.shareId },
+ user: { id: viewer.toString(), _id: viewer, role: 'USER', tenantId: 'tenant-b' },
+ });
+ const res = createRes();
+ const next = jest.fn();
+ await tenantStorage.run({ tenantId: 'tenant-b' }, () =>
+ canAccessSharedLink(req, res, next as unknown as NextFunction),
+ );
+
+ expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ expect(res._status).toBe(403);
+ expect(mockGetUserPrincipals).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+ userId: viewer.toString(),
+ role: null,
+ });
+ });
+
+ test('still honors a ROLE ACL for a same-tenant viewer with that role', async () => {
+ // Same-tenant view: the viewer's role is trusted, so the tenant-a ROLE:USER
+ // grant matches and access is allowed. Confirms the cross-tenant fix does not
+ // break legitimate role-based sharing within a tenant.
+ const link = await tenantStorage.run({ tenantId: 'tenant-a' }, async () => {
+ const tenantLink = await createTestLink();
+ await grantRoleViewer(tenantLink._id, 'USER');
+ return tenantLink;
+ });
+ const viewer = new Types.ObjectId();
+ mockPrincipalsWithRole(viewer);
+
+ const req = createReq({
+ params: { shareId: link.shareId },
+ user: { id: viewer.toString(), _id: viewer, role: 'USER', tenantId: 'tenant-a' },
+ });
+ const res = createRes();
+ const next = jest.fn();
+ await tenantStorage.run({ tenantId: 'tenant-a' }, () =>
+ canAccessSharedLink(req, res, next as unknown as NextFunction),
+ );
+
+ expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+ expect((req as unknown as Record<string, unknown>).shareResourceId).toBe(link._id.toString());
+ expect(mockGetUserPrincipals).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+ userId: viewer.toString(),
+ role: 'USER',
+ });
+ });
+
+ test('honors a same-tenant ROLE grant when no ALS tenant context is set (cookie-auth file request)', async () => {
+ // Share file routes (<img>/download) authenticate via optionalShareFileAuth,
+ // which sets req.user from the refresh cookie but establishes no tenant ALS
+ // context, so getTenantId() is undefined here. The comparison must use the
+ // authenticated user's own tenantId, else a same-tenant viewer is wrongly denied
+ // their ROLE grant. No tenantStorage.run wrapper mirrors the file route.
+ const link = await tenantStorage.run({ tenantId: 'tenant-a' }, async () => {
+ const tenantLink = await createTestLink();
+ await grantRoleViewer(tenantLink._id, 'USER');
+ return tenantLink;
+ });
+ const viewer = new Types.ObjectId();
+ mockPrincipalsWithRole(viewer);
+
+ const req = createReq({
+ params: { shareId: link.shareId },
+ user: { id: viewer.toString(), _id: viewer, role: 'USER', tenantId: 'tenant-a' },
+ });
+ const res = createRes();
+ const next = jest.fn();
+ await canAccessSharedLink(req, res, next as unknown as NextFunction);
+
+ expect(next).toHaveBeenCalled();
+ expect((req as unknown as Record<string, unknown>).shareResourceId).toBe(link._id.toString());
+ expect(mockGetUserPrincipals).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+ userId: viewer.toString(),
+ role: 'USER',
+ });
+ });
+
test('resolves a share owned by another tenant via system fallback, then enforces the ACL', async () => {
// Share created under tenant-a; an authenticated viewer from tenant-b would
// miss the tenant-scoped lookup and previously get a 404 before access could
diff --git a/packages/api/src/shared-links/access.ts b/packages/api/src/shared-links/access.ts
index 5e1d23a32f..1743abba31 100644
--- a/packages/api/src/shared-links/access.ts
+++ b/packages/api/src/shared-links/access.ts
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ export function createSharedLinkAccessMiddleware(deps: SharedLinkAccessDeps) {
return;
}
+ const viewerTenantId = getTenantId();
const SharedLink = mg.models.SharedLink as Model<RawSharedLink>;
const findShare = async () =>
(await SharedLink.findOne({
@@ -68,8 +69,8 @@ export function createSharedLinkAccessMiddleware(deps: SharedLinkAccessDeps) {
// different tenant — still resolves. Access remains gated by the ACL check
// below, which runs under the share's own tenant, so this only broadens the
// lookup, never the authorization.
- let rawShare = getTenantId() ? await findShare() : await runAsSystem(findShare);
- if (!rawShare && getTenantId()) {
+ let rawShare = viewerTenantId ? await findShare() : await runAsSystem(findShare);
+ if (!rawShare && viewerTenantId) {
rawShare = await runAsSystem(findShare);
}
@@ -136,7 +137,10 @@ export function createSharedLinkAccessMiddleware(deps: SharedLinkAccessDeps) {
const hasAccess = await aclService.checkPermission({
userId,
- role: user.role,
+ // Trust the viewer's role only for a same-tenant view, comparing the share
+ // tenant to the user's own tenantId (the ALS context is absent on cookie-auth
+ // file requests). null suppresses the ROLE principal for cross-tenant views.
+ role: rawShare.tenantId === user.tenantId ? user.role : null,
resourceType: ResourceType.SHARED_LINK,
resourceId,
requiredPermission: PermissionBits.VIEW,