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🧽 test: Restore the Admin Allowlist Override This Spec Leaks Into the Shard (#15543)
Danny Avila5f187d3a6c47
diff --git a/e2e/specs/mock/mcp-allowlist-override.spec.ts b/e2e/specs/mock/mcp-allowlist-override.spec.tsindex 281c1aebd0..e094b8bf5f 100644--- a/e2e/specs/mock/mcp-allowlist-override.spec.ts+++ b/e2e/specs/mock/mcp-allowlist-override.spec.ts@@ -52,26 +52,87 @@ test.describe('MCP admin-panel allowlist override', () => {expect(userId).toBeTruthy();const headers = { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` };+ let installed = false;- // Baseline: the fixture's origin is not in the YAML allowlist, so reinit fails.- const before = await reinitialize(request, headers);- expect(before.status).toBe(200);- expect(before.success).toBe(false);+ /**+ * The override is per-USER and this is the shared primary user, so it must+ * not outlive the test: the list holds only this fixture's origin and+ * allowlist matching is port-inclusive, so every other MCP fixture would be+ * blocked for the rest of the shard (`e2e-oauth` fails inspection and an+ * agent expecting its tools 503s with AGENT_EXPECTED_MCP_TOOLS_UNAVAILABLE).+ * The baseline assertion sits inside the cleanup scope on purpose: if an+ * interrupted earlier attempt left the override behind, the baseline is+ * what fails, and the `finally` is the only thing that can un-poison the+ * shard for the retry and for every spec after it.+ */+ try {+ // Baseline: the fixture's origin is not in the YAML allowlist, so reinit fails.+ const before = await reinitialize(request, headers);+ expect(before.status).toBe(200);+ expect(before.success).toBe(false);- // Admin-panel override: allow the fixture's origin for this user.- const put = await request.put(`/api/admin/config/user/${userId}`, {- headers,- data: { overrides: { mcpSettings: { allowedDomains: [FIXTURE_ORIGIN] } } },- });- expect(put.ok()).toBeTruthy();+ // Admin-panel override: allow the fixture's origin for this user.+ const put = await request.put(`/api/admin/config/user/${userId}`, {+ headers,+ data: { overrides: { mcpSettings: { allowedDomains: [FIXTURE_ORIGIN] } } },+ });+ expect(put.ok()).toBeTruthy();+ installed = true;- // The override is honored on reinit: the server now connects. invalidateConfigCaches- // runs asynchronously after the PUT, so poll until the merged allowlist lands.- await expect- .poll(async () => (await reinitialize(request, headers)).success, {- timeout: 30000,- intervals: [1000, 2000, 3000],- })- .toBe(true);+ // The override is honored on reinit: the server now connects. The handler+ // invalidates config caches asynchronously after responding, so poll until+ // the merged allowlist has actually landed.+ await expect+ .poll(async () => (await reinitialize(request, headers)).success, {+ timeout: 30000,+ intervals: [1000, 2000, 3000],+ })+ .toBe(true);+ } finally {+ /**+ * Always run, whether or not this attempt installed anything: a leaked+ * override from an earlier interrupted attempt is exactly the state the+ * cleanup exists to remove. A 404 means there was nothing to delete, which+ * is only a failure if this attempt had installed the override — and an+ * assertion here must never mask the error that prevented installing it.+ */+ const del = await request.delete(`/api/admin/config/user/${userId}`, { headers });+ if (installed || del.status() !== 404) {+ expect(del.ok()).toBeTruthy();+ }+ /**+ * Confirm the override document is gone, retrying anything that is not a+ * definitive answer (only 200-without-the-override and 404 are). The cache+ * that gates the next spec — the merged app config that agent tool loading+ * consults per request — is in-memory in these shards and is cleared by the+ * mutation's (asynchronous) invalidation; the downstream victim,+ * `mcp-oauth-resume`, passes with this cleanup in place. `reinitialize` is+ * deliberately NOT used as the "reverted" signal: a server that has already+ * connected keeps re-initializing successfully long after the override is+ * removed (observed for more than 90 seconds in CI, past the 60-second+ * merged-config TTL), because its allow decision is not on the path that+ * poisoned the shard.+ */+ await expect+ .poll(+ async () => {+ const res = await request.get(`/api/admin/config/user/${userId}`, { headers });+ if (res.status() === 404) {+ return 'cleared';+ }+ if (res.status() !== 200) {+ return `retry:${res.status()}`;+ }+ const body = (await res.json()) as {+ config?: { overrides?: { mcpSettings?: { allowedDomains?: string[] } } };+ };+ return body.config?.overrides?.mcpSettings?.allowedDomains == null+ ? 'cleared'+ : 'override still present';+ },+ { timeout: 30000, intervals: [500, 1000, 2000] },+ )+ .toBe('cleared');+ }});});