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🛡️ fix: Validate Avatar URL Before Fetch (#12928)
Danny Avilac7f38d96213a
diff --git a/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.js b/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.jsindex 9ce11c04ec..640aed293f 100644--- a/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.js+++ b/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.js@@ -3,8 +3,74 @@ const fs = require('fs').promises;const fetch = require('node-fetch');const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');const { EImageOutputType } = require('librechat-data-provider');+const { createSSRFSafeAgents } = require('@librechat/api');const { resizeAndConvert } = require('./resize');+const ALLOWED_AVATAR_PROTOCOLS = new Set(['http:', 'https:']);+/**+ * Cap response size to bound memory exposure if a malicious or compromised+ * `picture` URL serves a multi-GB payload. Avatars are at most a few hundred+ * KB in practice; 10 MB is well past any legitimate use.+ */+const MAX_AVATAR_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024;++/**+ * Fetches an image URL with SSRF protection: rejects non-http(s) schemes,+ * blocks resolution to private/loopback/link-local IPs at TCP connect time,+ * refuses to follow redirects to prevent post-validation rebinding, and caps+ * the response body so a hostile payload cannot exhaust memory before+ * `sharp()` rejects it.+ *+ * Per-call agent construction is intentional: avatar fetches are infrequent+ * (once per social login per user) and pooling adds complexity without a+ * measurable benefit on this path. If this ever becomes a hot path, hoist+ * the agents to module scope.+ */+async function fetchAvatarBuffer(input) {+ let parsed;+ try {+ parsed = new URL(input);+ } catch {+ throw new Error('Invalid avatar URL');+ }+ if (!ALLOWED_AVATAR_PROTOCOLS.has(parsed.protocol)) {+ throw new Error(`Refusing to fetch avatar over ${parsed.protocol}`);+ }++ const { httpAgent, httpsAgent } = createSSRFSafeAgents();+ /**+ * `node-fetch` v2's `timeout` is the total request budget (request initiation+ * through full body receipt), not a TCP-connect-only timeout. That is the+ * stronger of the two for this path — bounds total slow-loris exposure.+ */+ const response = await fetch(parsed.href, {+ agent: (urlObj) => (urlObj.protocol === 'https:' ? httpsAgent : httpAgent),+ redirect: 'error',+ timeout: 5000,+ size: MAX_AVATAR_BYTES,+ });++ if (!response.ok) {+ throw new Error(`Failed to fetch image from URL. Status: ${response.status}`);+ }++ const contentLength = parseInt(response.headers.get('content-length') ?? '0', 10);+ if (contentLength > MAX_AVATAR_BYTES) {+ throw new Error(`Avatar response too large: ${contentLength} bytes`);+ }++ /**+ * Re-check after read in case the server lied about Content-Length or+ * omitted it. `node-fetch` v2 honors the `size` option above and throws on+ * overflow, but Defense-in-depth: assert on the actual buffer length.+ */+ const buffer = await response.buffer();+ if (buffer.length > MAX_AVATAR_BYTES) {+ throw new Error(`Avatar response too large: ${buffer.length} bytes`);+ }+ return buffer;+}+/*** Uploads an avatar image for a user. This function can handle various types of input (URL, Buffer, or File object),* processes the image to a square format, converts it to target format, and returns the resized buffer.@@ -29,12 +95,7 @@ async function resizeAvatar({ userId, input, desiredFormat = EImageOutputType.PNlet imageBuffer;if (typeof input === 'string') {- const response = await fetch(input);-- if (!response.ok) {- throw new Error(`Failed to fetch image from URL. Status: ${response.status}`);- }- imageBuffer = await response.buffer();+ imageBuffer = await fetchAvatarBuffer(input);} else if (input instanceof Buffer) {imageBuffer = input;} else if (typeof input === 'object' && input instanceof File) {diff --git a/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.spec.js b/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.spec.jsnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..cc3e0b1ad1--- /dev/null+++ b/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.spec.js@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@+/**+ * Tests for the SSRF-safe avatar fetcher in `avatar.js`.+ *+ * The function is the sole line of defense against SSRF when a social+ * login surfaces a user-controllable `picture` URL. We assert each+ * rejection branch (protocol, status, redirect, size, agent) and the+ * happy path so that a future refactor of the fetch / agent / URL+ * handling cannot silently break the protection.+ */+jest.mock('node-fetch');+jest.mock('@librechat/api', () => ({+ createSSRFSafeAgents: jest.fn(() => ({+ httpAgent: { __kind: 'http' },+ httpsAgent: { __kind: 'https' },+ })),+}));+jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({+ logger: { info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() },+}));+jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({+ EImageOutputType: { PNG: 'png' },+}));+jest.mock('./resize', () => ({+ resizeAndConvert: jest.fn(async ({ inputBuffer }) => ({ buffer: inputBuffer })),+}));+jest.mock('sharp', () => {+ const sharpFn = jest.fn();+ return sharpFn;+});++const fetch = require('node-fetch');+const { createSSRFSafeAgents } = require('@librechat/api');+const sharp = require('sharp');+const { resizeAvatar } = require('./avatar');++function makeResponse({ ok = true, status = 200, body = Buffer.from(''), contentLength } = {}) {+ return {+ ok,+ status,+ headers: {+ get: (name) => {+ if (name.toLowerCase() === 'content-length') {+ return contentLength != null ? String(contentLength) : null;+ }+ return null;+ },+ },+ buffer: jest.fn(async () => body),+ };+}++function makeSharpStub(format = 'png', width = 100, height = 100) {+ const chain = {+ metadata: jest.fn(async () => ({ format, width, height })),+ extract: jest.fn(() => chain),+ resize: jest.fn(() => chain),+ gif: jest.fn(() => chain),+ toBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('squared')),+ };+ return chain;+}++const callResize = (input) => resizeAvatar({ userId: 'u1', input });++describe('resizeAvatar — fetchAvatarBuffer', () => {+ beforeEach(() => {+ jest.clearAllMocks();+ sharp.mockImplementation(() => makeSharpStub());+ });++ describe('rejects unsafe inputs before any network call', () => {+ it('rejects a malformed URL string', async () => {+ await expect(callResize('not-a-url')).rejects.toThrow('Invalid avatar URL');+ expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });++ it('rejects file:// URLs', async () => {+ await expect(callResize('file:///etc/passwd')).rejects.toThrow(/Refusing to fetch.*file:/);+ expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });++ it('rejects data: URLs', async () => {+ await expect(callResize('')).rejects.toThrow(+ /Refusing to fetch.*data:/,+ );+ expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });++ it('rejects javascript: URLs', async () => {+ await expect(callResize('javascript:void(0)')).rejects.toThrow(+ /Refusing to fetch.*javascript:/,+ );+ expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });+ });++ describe('happy path', () => {+ it('returns a processed buffer for a valid https URL', async () => {+ fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ body: Buffer.from('rawimg') }));+ const result = await callResize('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png');+ expect(fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);+ // `parsed.href` canonicalizes the input — assert we did not pass the raw string.+ expect(fetch.mock.calls[0][0]).toBe('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png');+ const opts = fetch.mock.calls[0][1];+ expect(opts.redirect).toBe('error');+ expect(opts.timeout).toBe(5000);+ expect(opts.size).toBe(10 * 1024 * 1024);+ expect(typeof opts.agent).toBe('function');+ expect(result).toEqual(Buffer.from('squared'));+ });++ it('passes an SSRF-safe agent factory routing https→httpsAgent and http→httpAgent', async () => {+ fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ body: Buffer.from('rawimg') }));+ await callResize('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png');+ const agentFn = fetch.mock.calls[0][1].agent;+ expect(agentFn(new URL('https://anything'))).toEqual({ __kind: 'https' });+ expect(agentFn(new URL('http://anything'))).toEqual({ __kind: 'http' });+ expect(createSSRFSafeAgents).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);+ });+ });++ describe('rejects unsafe responses', () => {+ it('rejects non-2xx HTTP status', async () => {+ fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ ok: false, status: 500 }));+ await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png')).rejects.toThrow(+ /Status:\s*500/,+ );+ });++ it('rejects an oversized Content-Length header before reading the body', async () => {+ const oversize = 11 * 1024 * 1024;+ const resp = makeResponse({ contentLength: oversize });+ fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(resp);+ await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/big.png')).rejects.toThrow(+ /Avatar response too large.*11534336/,+ );+ // We must not even read the body once the header has already disqualified it.+ expect(resp.buffer).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });++ it('rejects a body whose actual size exceeds the cap (lying / missing Content-Length)', async () => {+ const oversize = Buffer.alloc(11 * 1024 * 1024);+ // No content-length header — server lies or omits.+ fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ body: oversize }));+ await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/lies.png')).rejects.toThrow(+ /Avatar response too large.*11534336/,+ );+ });+ });++ describe('propagates fetch-layer errors', () => {+ it('surfaces SSRF rejection thrown by the agent (ESSRF)', async () => {+ const ssrfError = Object.assign(new Error('SSRF protection: 127.0.0.1 blocked'), {+ code: 'ESSRF',+ });+ fetch.mockRejectedValueOnce(ssrfError);+ await expect(callResize('http://internal.attacker.example/img.png')).rejects.toThrow(+ /SSRF protection/,+ );+ });++ it('surfaces redirect rejection from `redirect: error`', async () => {+ const redirectError = Object.assign(new Error('redirect mode is set to error'), {+ type: 'no-redirect',+ });+ fetch.mockRejectedValueOnce(redirectError);+ await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/redirected.png')).rejects.toThrow(+ /redirect mode/,+ );+ });++ it('surfaces a `size` overflow thrown by node-fetch', async () => {+ const sizeError = Object.assign(new Error('content size at 11534336 over limit: 10485760'), {+ type: 'max-size',+ });+ fetch.mockRejectedValueOnce(sizeError);+ await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/large.png')).rejects.toThrow(/over limit/);+ });+ });++ describe('non-string inputs bypass the fetcher', () => {+ it('accepts a Buffer input directly without calling fetch', async () => {+ const buf = Buffer.from('inline');+ const result = await callResize(buf);+ expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ expect(result).toEqual(Buffer.from('squared'));+ });+ });+});