Skip to content

Enhanced ChatGPT Clone: Features Agents, MCP, Skills, DeepSeek, Anthropic, AWS, OpenAI, Responses API, Azure, Groq, o1, GPT-5, Mistral, OpenRouter, Vertex AI, Gemini, Artifacts, AI model switching, message search, Code Interpreter, langchain, DALL-E-3, OpenAPI Actions, Functions, Secure Multi-User Auth, Presets, open-source for self-hosting. Active

🛡️ fix: Validate Avatar URL Before Fetch (#12928)

Danny Avilac7f38d96213a
diff --git a/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.js b/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.js
index 9ce11c04ec..640aed293f 100644
--- a/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.js
+++ b/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.js
@@ -3,8 +3,74 @@ const fs = require('fs').promises;
const fetch = require('node-fetch');
const { logger } = require('@librechat/data-schemas');
const { EImageOutputType } = require('librechat-data-provider');
+const { createSSRFSafeAgents } = require('@librechat/api');
const { resizeAndConvert } = require('./resize');
+const ALLOWED_AVATAR_PROTOCOLS = new Set(['http:', 'https:']);
+/**
+ * Cap response size to bound memory exposure if a malicious or compromised
+ * `picture` URL serves a multi-GB payload. Avatars are at most a few hundred
+ * KB in practice; 10 MB is well past any legitimate use.
+ */
+const MAX_AVATAR_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/**
+ * Fetches an image URL with SSRF protection: rejects non-http(s) schemes,
+ * blocks resolution to private/loopback/link-local IPs at TCP connect time,
+ * refuses to follow redirects to prevent post-validation rebinding, and caps
+ * the response body so a hostile payload cannot exhaust memory before
+ * `sharp()` rejects it.
+ *
+ * Per-call agent construction is intentional: avatar fetches are infrequent
+ * (once per social login per user) and pooling adds complexity without a
+ * measurable benefit on this path. If this ever becomes a hot path, hoist
+ * the agents to module scope.
+ */
+async function fetchAvatarBuffer(input) {
+ let parsed;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(input);
+ } catch {
+ throw new Error('Invalid avatar URL');
+ }
+ if (!ALLOWED_AVATAR_PROTOCOLS.has(parsed.protocol)) {
+ throw new Error(`Refusing to fetch avatar over ${parsed.protocol}`);
+ }
+
+ const { httpAgent, httpsAgent } = createSSRFSafeAgents();
+ /**
+ * `node-fetch` v2's `timeout` is the total request budget (request initiation
+ * through full body receipt), not a TCP-connect-only timeout. That is the
+ * stronger of the two for this path — bounds total slow-loris exposure.
+ */
+ const response = await fetch(parsed.href, {
+ agent: (urlObj) => (urlObj.protocol === 'https:' ? httpsAgent : httpAgent),
+ redirect: 'error',
+ timeout: 5000,
+ size: MAX_AVATAR_BYTES,
+ });
+
+ if (!response.ok) {
+ throw new Error(`Failed to fetch image from URL. Status: ${response.status}`);
+ }
+
+ const contentLength = parseInt(response.headers.get('content-length') ?? '0', 10);
+ if (contentLength > MAX_AVATAR_BYTES) {
+ throw new Error(`Avatar response too large: ${contentLength} bytes`);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Re-check after read in case the server lied about Content-Length or
+ * omitted it. `node-fetch` v2 honors the `size` option above and throws on
+ * overflow, but Defense-in-depth: assert on the actual buffer length.
+ */
+ const buffer = await response.buffer();
+ if (buffer.length > MAX_AVATAR_BYTES) {
+ throw new Error(`Avatar response too large: ${buffer.length} bytes`);
+ }
+ return buffer;
+}
+
/**
* Uploads an avatar image for a user. This function can handle various types of input (URL, Buffer, or File object),
* processes the image to a square format, converts it to target format, and returns the resized buffer.
@@ -29,12 +95,7 @@ async function resizeAvatar({ userId, input, desiredFormat = EImageOutputType.PN
let imageBuffer;
if (typeof input === 'string') {
- const response = await fetch(input);
-
- if (!response.ok) {
- throw new Error(`Failed to fetch image from URL. Status: ${response.status}`);
- }
- imageBuffer = await response.buffer();
+ imageBuffer = await fetchAvatarBuffer(input);
} else if (input instanceof Buffer) {
imageBuffer = input;
} else if (typeof input === 'object' && input instanceof File) {
diff --git a/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.spec.js b/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.spec.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cc3e0b1ad1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/api/server/services/Files/images/avatar.spec.js
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for the SSRF-safe avatar fetcher in `avatar.js`.
+ *
+ * The function is the sole line of defense against SSRF when a social
+ * login surfaces a user-controllable `picture` URL. We assert each
+ * rejection branch (protocol, status, redirect, size, agent) and the
+ * happy path so that a future refactor of the fetch / agent / URL
+ * handling cannot silently break the protection.
+ */
+jest.mock('node-fetch');
+jest.mock('@librechat/api', () => ({
+ createSSRFSafeAgents: jest.fn(() => ({
+ httpAgent: { __kind: 'http' },
+ httpsAgent: { __kind: 'https' },
+ })),
+}));
+jest.mock('@librechat/data-schemas', () => ({
+ logger: { info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() },
+}));
+jest.mock('librechat-data-provider', () => ({
+ EImageOutputType: { PNG: 'png' },
+}));
+jest.mock('./resize', () => ({
+ resizeAndConvert: jest.fn(async ({ inputBuffer }) => ({ buffer: inputBuffer })),
+}));
+jest.mock('sharp', () => {
+ const sharpFn = jest.fn();
+ return sharpFn;
+});
+
+const fetch = require('node-fetch');
+const { createSSRFSafeAgents } = require('@librechat/api');
+const sharp = require('sharp');
+const { resizeAvatar } = require('./avatar');
+
+function makeResponse({ ok = true, status = 200, body = Buffer.from(''), contentLength } = {}) {
+ return {
+ ok,
+ status,
+ headers: {
+ get: (name) => {
+ if (name.toLowerCase() === 'content-length') {
+ return contentLength != null ? String(contentLength) : null;
+ }
+ return null;
+ },
+ },
+ buffer: jest.fn(async () => body),
+ };
+}
+
+function makeSharpStub(format = 'png', width = 100, height = 100) {
+ const chain = {
+ metadata: jest.fn(async () => ({ format, width, height })),
+ extract: jest.fn(() => chain),
+ resize: jest.fn(() => chain),
+ gif: jest.fn(() => chain),
+ toBuffer: jest.fn(async () => Buffer.from('squared')),
+ };
+ return chain;
+}
+
+const callResize = (input) => resizeAvatar({ userId: 'u1', input });
+
+describe('resizeAvatar — fetchAvatarBuffer', () => {
+ beforeEach(() => {
+ jest.clearAllMocks();
+ sharp.mockImplementation(() => makeSharpStub());
+ });
+
+ describe('rejects unsafe inputs before any network call', () => {
+ it('rejects a malformed URL string', async () => {
+ await expect(callResize('not-a-url')).rejects.toThrow('Invalid avatar URL');
+ expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ });
+
+ it('rejects file:// URLs', async () => {
+ await expect(callResize('file:///etc/passwd')).rejects.toThrow(/Refusing to fetch.*file:/);
+ expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ });
+
+ it('rejects data: URLs', async () => {
+ await expect(callResize('')).rejects.toThrow(
+ /Refusing to fetch.*data:/,
+ );
+ expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ });
+
+ it('rejects javascript: URLs', async () => {
+ await expect(callResize('javascript:void(0)')).rejects.toThrow(
+ /Refusing to fetch.*javascript:/,
+ );
+ expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ });
+ });
+
+ describe('happy path', () => {
+ it('returns a processed buffer for a valid https URL', async () => {
+ fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ body: Buffer.from('rawimg') }));
+ const result = await callResize('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png');
+ expect(fetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+ // `parsed.href` canonicalizes the input — assert we did not pass the raw string.
+ expect(fetch.mock.calls[0][0]).toBe('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png');
+ const opts = fetch.mock.calls[0][1];
+ expect(opts.redirect).toBe('error');
+ expect(opts.timeout).toBe(5000);
+ expect(opts.size).toBe(10 * 1024 * 1024);
+ expect(typeof opts.agent).toBe('function');
+ expect(result).toEqual(Buffer.from('squared'));
+ });
+
+ it('passes an SSRF-safe agent factory routing https→httpsAgent and http→httpAgent', async () => {
+ fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ body: Buffer.from('rawimg') }));
+ await callResize('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png');
+ const agentFn = fetch.mock.calls[0][1].agent;
+ expect(agentFn(new URL('https://anything'))).toEqual({ __kind: 'https' });
+ expect(agentFn(new URL('http://anything'))).toEqual({ __kind: 'http' });
+ expect(createSSRFSafeAgents).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+ });
+ });
+
+ describe('rejects unsafe responses', () => {
+ it('rejects non-2xx HTTP status', async () => {
+ fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ ok: false, status: 500 }));
+ await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/avatar.png')).rejects.toThrow(
+ /Status:\s*500/,
+ );
+ });
+
+ it('rejects an oversized Content-Length header before reading the body', async () => {
+ const oversize = 11 * 1024 * 1024;
+ const resp = makeResponse({ contentLength: oversize });
+ fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(resp);
+ await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/big.png')).rejects.toThrow(
+ /Avatar response too large.*11534336/,
+ );
+ // We must not even read the body once the header has already disqualified it.
+ expect(resp.buffer).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ });
+
+ it('rejects a body whose actual size exceeds the cap (lying / missing Content-Length)', async () => {
+ const oversize = Buffer.alloc(11 * 1024 * 1024);
+ // No content-length header — server lies or omits.
+ fetch.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ body: oversize }));
+ await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/lies.png')).rejects.toThrow(
+ /Avatar response too large.*11534336/,
+ );
+ });
+ });
+
+ describe('propagates fetch-layer errors', () => {
+ it('surfaces SSRF rejection thrown by the agent (ESSRF)', async () => {
+ const ssrfError = Object.assign(new Error('SSRF protection: 127.0.0.1 blocked'), {
+ code: 'ESSRF',
+ });
+ fetch.mockRejectedValueOnce(ssrfError);
+ await expect(callResize('http://internal.attacker.example/img.png')).rejects.toThrow(
+ /SSRF protection/,
+ );
+ });
+
+ it('surfaces redirect rejection from `redirect: error`', async () => {
+ const redirectError = Object.assign(new Error('redirect mode is set to error'), {
+ type: 'no-redirect',
+ });
+ fetch.mockRejectedValueOnce(redirectError);
+ await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/redirected.png')).rejects.toThrow(
+ /redirect mode/,
+ );
+ });
+
+ it('surfaces a `size` overflow thrown by node-fetch', async () => {
+ const sizeError = Object.assign(new Error('content size at 11534336 over limit: 10485760'), {
+ type: 'max-size',
+ });
+ fetch.mockRejectedValueOnce(sizeError);
+ await expect(callResize('https://cdn.example.com/large.png')).rejects.toThrow(/over limit/);
+ });
+ });
+
+ describe('non-string inputs bypass the fetcher', () => {
+ it('accepts a Buffer input directly without calling fetch', async () => {
+ const buf = Buffer.from('inline');
+ const result = await callResize(buf);
+ expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+ expect(result).toEqual(Buffer.from('squared'));
+ });
+ });
+});