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fix(security): SSRF 校验补齐 IPv6 方括号与 IPv4-mapped 形式,堵住内网绕过

bestZweiedb0240639df
diff --git a/src/lib/ssrf.test.ts b/src/lib/ssrf.test.ts
index 0d277ef..98d4165 100644
--- a/src/lib/ssrf.test.ts
+++ b/src/lib/ssrf.test.ts
@@ -16,6 +16,22 @@ describe('isPrivateIP', () => {
['fd00::1', true],
['8.8.8.8', false],
['1.2.3.4', false],
+ // URL.hostname 对 IPv6 会带方括号
+ ['[::1]', true],
+ ['[fe80::1]', true],
+ ['[fd00::1]', true],
+ ['[fc00::1]', true],
+ // IPv4-mapped IPv6:十六进制形式与点分形式
+ ['[::ffff:c0a8:164]', true], // ::ffff:192.168.1.100
+ ['::ffff:192.168.1.100', true],
+ ['[::ffff:7f00:1]', true], // ::ffff:127.0.0.1
+ ['::ffff:127.0.0.1', true],
+ ['[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]', true], // ::ffff:169.254.169.254
+ ['[::ffff:a00:1]', true], // ::ffff:10.0.0.1
+ ['[::ffff:808:808]', false], // ::ffff:8.8.8.8 公网
+ ['::ffff:8.8.8.8', false],
+ ['[::ffff:c0a8:164', true], // 单边括号(异常输入)仍要拦
+ ['[2606:4700::1111]', false], // 公网 IPv6 不应被误杀
])('%s → %s', (ip, expected) => {
expect(isPrivateIP(ip)).toBe(expected);
});
@@ -34,6 +50,18 @@ describe('isValidProxyUrl', () => {
expect(isValidProxyUrl('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data')).toBe(false);
});
+ it('拦截带方括号的 IPv6 与 IPv4-mapped 写法', () => {
+ expect(isValidProxyUrl('http://[::1]:8080/x')).toBe(false);
+ expect(isValidProxyUrl('http://[::ffff:192.168.1.100]:8080/list.m3u')).toBe(false);
+ expect(isValidProxyUrl('http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/x')).toBe(false);
+ expect(isValidProxyUrl('http://[fe80::1]/x')).toBe(false);
+ expect(isValidProxyUrl('http://[fd00::1]/x')).toBe(false);
+ });
+
+ it('不误杀公网 IPv6', () => {
+ expect(isValidProxyUrl('http://[2606:4700::1111]/x')).toBe(true);
+ });
+
it('拦截非 http 协议', () => {
expect(isValidProxyUrl('file:///etc/passwd')).toBe(false);
expect(isValidProxyUrl('ftp://x.com/a')).toBe(false);
diff --git a/src/lib/ssrf.ts b/src/lib/ssrf.ts
index 90e07cd..9c00d1f 100644
--- a/src/lib/ssrf.ts
+++ b/src/lib/ssrf.ts
@@ -1,14 +1,36 @@
import dns from 'node:dns/promises';
+/** 去掉 URL.hostname 对 IPv6 附加的方括号("[::1]" → "::1") */
+function stripBrackets(host: string): string {
+ return host.trim().replace(/^\[+|\]+$/g, '');
+}
+
+/**
+ * IPv4-mapped / IPv4-compatible IPv6 还原为点分十进制,命中不到时返回 null。
+ * "::ffff:192.168.1.100" 与 "::ffff:c0a8:164" 都会归一化成 "192.168.1.100",
+ * 否则这类地址会绕过下面的私网规则被当成公网放行。
+ */
+function toIPv4(ip: string): string | null {
+ const v = ip.replace(/^0:0:0:0:0:/i, '::'); // 全写形式
+ const dotted = /^::(?:ffff:)?(\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})$/i.exec(v);
+ if (dotted) return dotted[1];
+ const hex = /^::(?:ffff:)?([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i.exec(v);
+ if (!hex) return null;
+ const n = (((parseInt(hex[1], 16) << 16) | parseInt(hex[2], 16)) >>> 0);
+ return [(n >>> 24) & 255, (n >>> 16) & 255, (n >>> 8) & 255, n & 255].join('.');
+}
+
/** 判断 IP 是否为私有/回环/链路本地/保留地址(SSRF 防护) */
export function isPrivateIP(ip: string): boolean {
- if (/^(127\.|0\.0\.0\.0$|::1$|fe80:|fc|fd)/i.test(ip)) return true;
- if (ip.startsWith('10.')) return true;
- if (ip.startsWith('192.168.')) return true;
- if (/^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\./.test(ip)) return true;
- if (ip.startsWith('169.254.')) return true; // 链路本地(含云元数据 169.254.169.254)
- if (ip.startsWith('100.64.')) return true; // CGNAT
- if (ip.startsWith('192.0.0.')) return true; // 协议分配块
+ let v = stripBrackets(ip.trim());
+ v = toIPv4(v) ?? v;
+ if (/^(127\.|0\.0\.0\.0$|::1$|::$|fe80:|fc|fd)/i.test(v)) return true;
+ if (v.startsWith('10.')) return true;
+ if (v.startsWith('192.168.')) return true;
+ if (/^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\./.test(v)) return true;
+ if (v.startsWith('169.254.')) return true; // 链路本地(含云元数据 169.254.169.254)
+ if (v.startsWith('100.64.')) return true; // CGNAT
+ if (v.startsWith('192.0.0.')) return true; // 协议分配块
return false;
}
@@ -19,8 +41,8 @@ export function isValidProxyUrl(urlString: string): boolean {
try {
const parsed = new URL(urlString);
if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') return false;
- if (BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES.has(parsed.hostname)) return false;
- const host = parsed.hostname;
+ const host = stripBrackets(parsed.hostname); // "[::1]" 也要能被黑名单命中
+ if (BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES.has(host)) return false;
if (/^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$/.test(host) || host.includes(':')) {
if (isPrivateIP(host)) return false;
}
@@ -33,7 +55,7 @@ export function isValidProxyUrl(urlString: string): boolean {
/** DNS 解析后校验目标主机名是否解析到内网/保留地址 */
export async function isBlockedByDNS(urlString: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
- const { hostname } = new URL(urlString);
+ const hostname = stripBrackets(new URL(urlString).hostname);
if (/^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$/.test(hostname) || hostname.includes(':')) {
return isPrivateIP(hostname);
}