Self-hosted workflows for coding-agent delivery. Orchestrate CodeBuddy, Codex and Claude Code with scripts and human approval gates. Includes Local workflows for coding assistants.
JavaScript agent-orchestrationagentic-workflowai-agentsai-codingclaude-codecode-reviewcodebuddycodexcoding-agentscursordeveloper-toolshuman-on-the-loopllmmcpmulti-agentsdlcself-hostedsopworkflow-automationworkflow-engine
package httpapi
import (
"crypto/subtle"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"agentflow/internal/auth"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
const authCookieName = "agentflow_user"
// authSessionTTL 是浏览器会话的最长有效期。Cookie 的 MaxAge 与 requestUser 对
// AuthTime 的校验必须共用同一个时长:一旦两者脱节,就会出现 Cookie 一直被续期、
// 而 AuthTime 早已过期的"半失效"状态——/api/auth/current 报告已登录,受保护接口
// 却一律 401,用户既进不去也无法自动重新登录。
const authSessionTTL = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
// authSessionExpired 判断已签名的浏览器会话是否超过 authSessionTTL。
// AuthTime 为零值(历史 Cookie、网关透传身份)时视为未过期,避免误伤。
func authSessionExpired(user *auth.User) bool {
return user != nil && !user.AuthTime.IsZero() && time.Since(user.AuthTime) > authSessionTTL
}
type authHandlers struct {
*deps
}
func trustGatewayIdentityHeaders() bool {
enabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENTFLOW_TRUST_IDENTITY_HEADERS")))
return err == nil && enabled
}
// gatewayIdentitySecretHeader carries AGENTFLOW_IDENTITY_HEADER_SECRET from
// the authenticating gateway.
const gatewayIdentitySecretHeader = "X-AgentFlow-Gateway-Secret"
// gatewayLoginName trusts identity headers only from the authenticating
// gateway. Loopback alone does not prove that: a reverse proxy on the same
// host also connects from loopback and may pass client headers through. With
// a configured secret the gateway must present it; without one, any forwarded
// request is refused, as authLocal does.
func gatewayLoginName(r *http.Request) string {
if !trustGatewayIdentityHeaders() || !isLoopbackAddr(r.RemoteAddr) {
return ""
}
if secret := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENTFLOW_IDENTITY_HEADER_SECRET")); secret != "" {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get(gatewayIdentitySecretHeader))), []byte(secret)) != 1 {
return ""
}
} else if r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For") != "" || r.Header.Get("Forwarded") != "" || r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP") != "" {
return ""
}
login := strings.TrimSpace(getHeaderCaseInsensitive(r, "Staffname"))
if login == "" {
login = strings.TrimSpace(getHeaderCaseInsensitive(r, "x-staff-name"))
}
return login
}
func secureRequest(r *http.Request) bool {
if r.TLS != nil || strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")), "https") {
return true
}
enabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENTFLOW_SECURE_COOKIES")))
return err == nil && enabled
}
// Local acceptance login is opt-in and restricted to direct loopback requests.
func (h *authHandlers) authLocal(c *gin.Context) {
login := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("AGENTFLOW_LOCAL_LOGIN_USER"))
enabled := login != "" && isLoopbackAddr(c.Request.RemoteAddr) && c.GetHeader("X-Forwarded-For") == "" && c.GetHeader("Forwarded") == ""
if c.Request.Method == http.MethodGet {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"enabled": enabled})
return
}
origin, err := url.Parse(c.GetHeader("Origin"))
if !enabled || err != nil || origin.Host != c.Request.Host || (origin.Scheme != "http" && origin.Scheme != "https") {
c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{"error": "本地验收登录未启用或请求来源不允许"})
return
}
u, ok := h.repo.UserByLoginName(login)
if !ok {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "本地验收用户不存在"})
return
}
user := &auth.User{ID: u.ID, StaffID: u.StaffID, LoginName: u.LoginName, ChineseName: u.ChineseName, DeptID: u.DeptID, DeptName: u.DeptName, AuthTime: time.Now().UTC(), AvatarURL: auth.AvatarURL(u.LoginName, 100)}
token, err := h.getAuthClient().SignUser(user)
if err != nil {
respond(c, err)
return
}
h.setAuthCookie(c.Writer, c.Request, token)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"user": h.annotateUser(user)})
}
func getHeaderCaseInsensitive(r *http.Request, key string) string {
if v := r.Header.Get(key); v != "" {
return v
}
keyLower := strings.ToLower(key)
for k, vals := range r.Header {
if strings.ToLower(k) == keyLower && len(vals) > 0 {
return vals[0]
}
}
return ""
}
// getReturnURL 计算 SSO 登录完成后的回跳地址。return_url / Referer 均由客户端
// 控制,只接受指向本站(请求 Host 或 AppDomain 及其子域)的 http(s) 地址,
// 否则回落到站点根路径,防止登录后被带到外部钓鱼站点(Open Redirect)。
func (h *authHandlers) getReturnURL(r *http.Request) string {
proto := "http"
if r.TLS != nil || strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"), "https") {
proto = "https"
}
host := r.Host
if host == "" {
host = h.getAuthClient().Config().AppDomain
}
origin := fmt.Sprintf("%s://%s", proto, host)
for _, raw := range []string{r.URL.Query().Get("return_url"), r.Header.Get("Referer")} {
if safe, ok := h.safeReturnURL(r, origin, raw); ok {
return safe
}
}
return origin + "/"
}
func (h *authHandlers) safeReturnURL(r *http.Request, origin, raw string) (string, bool) {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" || strings.ContainsAny(raw, "\\\r\n\t") {
return "", false
}
// 站内相对路径:必须以单个 "/" 开头,"//host" 是协议相对的外部地址。
if strings.HasPrefix(raw, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(raw, "//") {
raw = origin + raw
}
u, err := url.Parse(raw)
if err != nil || u.User != nil || u.Opaque != "" || (u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https") {
return "", false
}
if !h.allowedReturnHost(r, u.Hostname()) {
return "", false
}
return u.String(), true
}
func (h *authHandlers) allowedReturnHost(r *http.Request, host string) bool {
host = bareHostname(host)
if host == "" {
return false
}
if reqHost := bareHostname(r.Host); reqHost != "" && host == reqHost {
return true
}
appDomain := strings.TrimPrefix(bareHostname(h.getAuthClient().Config().AppDomain), ".")
return appDomain != "" && (host == appDomain || strings.HasSuffix(host, "."+appDomain))
}
func bareHostname(hostport string) string {
hostport = strings.TrimSpace(hostport)
if hn, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostport); err == nil {
hostport = hn
}
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.Trim(hostport, "[]"), "."))
}
// syncAuthUserRecord reconciles an authenticated user with the users table:
// an existing row supplies ID and non-empty profile fields (StaffID only when
// the caller has none); a missing row is persisted and its ID read back.
// source ("gateway" / "cookie") only labels the persist-failure log line.
func (h *authHandlers) syncAuthUserRecord(user *auth.User, source string) {
if h.repo == nil {
return
}
if existing, ok := h.repo.UserByLoginName(user.LoginName); ok {
user.ID = existing.ID
if existing.ChineseName != "" {
user.ChineseName = existing.ChineseName
}
if existing.DeptName != "" {
user.DeptName = existing.DeptName
}
if existing.DeptID > 0 {
user.DeptID = existing.DeptID
}
if existing.StaffID > 0 && user.StaffID == 0 {
user.StaffID = existing.StaffID
}
return
}
// 数据库未查到该用户,但请求已经合法登录,执行写表补齐
if putErr := h.repo.PutUser(user.ToDomain()); putErr != nil {
log.Printf("[auth] persist %s user %s failed: %v", source, user.LoginName, putErr)
} else if saved, ok := h.repo.UserByLoginName(user.LoginName); ok {
user.ID = saved.ID
}
}
func (h *authHandlers) authCurrent(c *gin.Context) {
r := c.Request
// 1. 优先检查认证网关透传的员工身份 Header
staffName := gatewayLoginName(r)
if staffName != "" {
staffID, _ := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(getHeaderCaseInsensitive(r, "Staffid")))
if staffID == 0 {
staffID, _ = strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(getHeaderCaseInsensitive(r, "x-staff-id")))
}
user := &auth.User{
StaffID: staffID,
LoginName: staffName,
ChineseName: staffName,
IsGuest: false,
AuthTime: time.Now().UTC(),
}
h.syncAuthUserRecord(user, "gateway")
user.AvatarURL = auth.AvatarURL(user.LoginName, 100)
if token, signErr := h.getAuthClient().SignUser(user); signErr == nil && token != "" {
h.setAuthCookie(c.Writer, c.Request, token)
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"user": h.annotateUser(user), "authRequired": authRequired(), "appDomain": h.getAuthClient().Config().AppDomain})
return
}
// 2. 检查业务 Cookie (agentflow_user)
cookie, err := r.Cookie(authCookieName)
if err == nil && cookie != nil && cookie.Value != "" {
user, parseErr := h.getAuthClient().ParseSignedUser(cookie.Value)
if parseErr == nil && user != nil && !user.IsGuest {
// 会话超过 authSessionTTL:清掉过期 Cookie 并落到下面的访客分支。
// 否则这里会用原始 AuthTime 重新签发一个"看起来仍然登录"的 Cookie,
// 而受保护接口按同一时长判定 401,用户将永久卡在启动失败页面上。
if authSessionExpired(user) {
h.clearAuthCookie(c.Writer, r)
} else {
if user.LoginName != "" {
h.syncAuthUserRecord(user, "cookie")
user.AvatarURL = auth.AvatarURL(user.LoginName, 100)
}
if token, signErr := h.getAuthClient().SignUser(user); signErr == nil && token != "" {
h.setAuthCookie(c.Writer, c.Request, token)
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"user": h.annotateUser(user), "authRequired": authRequired(), "appDomain": h.getAuthClient().Config().AppDomain})
return
}
}
}
// Preview-only: this process is explicitly opted in, auth is off, and a
// local acceptance user is configured. Sign that user in so the IP preview
// does not sit on the guest session and nag the assistant.
if user, ok := h.previewLocalAuthUser(); ok {
if token, signErr := h.getAuthClient().SignUser(user); signErr == nil && token != "" {
h.setAuthCookie(c.Writer, c.Request, token)
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"user": h.annotateUser(user), "authRequired": false, "appDomain": h.getAuthClient().Config().AppDomain})
return
}
// 3. 兜底为访客身份,附带登录跳转链接 loginUrl
returnURL := h.getReturnURL(r)
loginURL := h.getAuthClient().LoginURL(returnURL)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"user": auth.FallbackGuestUser(),
"loginUrl": loginURL,
"authRequired": authRequired(),
"appDomain": h.getAuthClient().Config().AppDomain,
})
}
func (h *authHandlers) authExchange(c *gin.Context) {
r := c.Request
code := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("code"))
if code == "" && r.Method == http.MethodPost {
var req struct {
Code string `json:"code"`
}
if decodeOptional(c, &req) {
code = strings.TrimSpace(req.Code)
}
}
if code == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "code is required"})
return
}
user, err := h.getAuthClient().ExchangeCode(r.Context(), code)
if err != nil || user == nil {
user = auth.FallbackGuestUser()
}
// 当兑换到合法员工身份时,持久化至数据库 users 表
if user != nil && !user.IsGuest && user.LoginName != "" && h.repo != nil {
if putErr := h.repo.PutUser(user.ToDomain()); putErr != nil {
log.Printf("[auth] persist user %s failed: %v", user.LoginName, putErr)
} else if saved, ok := h.repo.UserByLoginName(user.LoginName); ok {
user.ID = saved.ID
}
}
if user != nil && !user.IsGuest && user.LoginName != "" {
user.AvatarURL = auth.AvatarURL(user.LoginName, 100)
}
token, signErr := h.getAuthClient().SignUser(user)
if signErr == nil && token != "" {
h.setAuthCookie(c.Writer, c.Request, token)
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"user": h.annotateUser(user), "authRequired": authRequired(), "appDomain": h.getAuthClient().Config().AppDomain})
}
func (h *authHandlers) authLogout(c *gin.Context) {
h.clearAuthCookie(c.Writer, c.Request)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"user": auth.FallbackGuestUser()})
}
func (h *authHandlers) setAuthCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, signedToken string) {
cookie := &http.Cookie{
Name: authCookieName,
Value: signedToken,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
Secure: secureRequest(r),
MaxAge: int(authSessionTTL.Seconds()),
}
host := r.Host
if h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host); err == nil {
host = h
}
appDomain := h.getAuthClient().Config().AppDomain
if appDomain != "" && (host == appDomain || strings.HasSuffix(host, "."+appDomain)) {
cookie.Domain = appDomain
}
http.SetCookie(w, cookie)
}
func (h *authHandlers) clearAuthCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
cookie := &http.Cookie{
Name: authCookieName,
Value: "",
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
Secure: secureRequest(r),
MaxAge: -1,
Expires: time.Unix(0, 0),
}
host := r.Host
if h, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host); err == nil {
host = h
}
appDomain := h.getAuthClient().Config().AppDomain
if appDomain != "" && (host == appDomain || strings.HasSuffix(host, "."+appDomain)) {
cookie.Domain = appDomain
}
http.SetCookie(w, cookie)
}
func (h *authHandlers) authPhoto(c *gin.Context) {
username := strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("username"))
specStr := strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("spec"))
if username == "" {
username = strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("username"))
}
if specStr == "" {
specStr = strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("spec"))
}
if username == "" {
// 未显式指定用户名时,尝试拉取当前登录用户的头像
if curUser, ok := h.requestUser(c.Request, false); ok && curUser != nil && !curUser.IsGuest && curUser.LoginName != "" {
username = curUser.LoginName
}
}
if username == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "username is required"})
return
}
spec := 100
if specStr != "" {
if s, err := strconv.Atoi(specStr); err == nil && s > 0 {
spec = s
}
}
if h.getAuthClient().Config().AuthHost == "" {
name, err := auth.SanitizeUsername(username)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "invalid username"})
return
}
c.Header("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=86400")
c.Data(http.StatusOK, "image/svg+xml", initialsAvatar(name))
return
}
data, contentType, err := h.getAuthClient().FetchPhoto(c.Request.Context(), username, spec)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, auth.ErrPhotoNotFound) {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "photo not found"})
return
}
if errors.Is(err, auth.ErrInvalidUsername) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "invalid username"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusBadGateway, map[string]string{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
c.Header("Content-Type", contentType)
c.Header("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=86400")
c.Data(http.StatusOK, contentType, data)
}