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// This file is dual-licensed.  Choose whichever licence you want from
// the two licences listed below.
//
// The first licence is a regular 2-clause BSD licence.  The second licence
// is the CC-0 from Creative Commons. It is intended to release Monocypher
// to the public domain.  The BSD licence serves as a fallback option.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause OR CC0-1.0
//
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Copyright (c) 2017-2020, Loup Vaillant and Richard Walmsley
// All rights reserved.
//
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
// modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
// met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
//    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
//    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
//    documentation and/or other materials provided with the
//    distribution.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
// "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
// LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
// A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
// HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
// LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
// DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
// THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
// (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
// OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
//
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Written in 2017-2020 by Loup Vaillant and Richard Walmsley
//
// To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all copyright
// and related neighboring rights to this software to the public domain
// worldwide.  This software is distributed without any warranty.
//
// You should have received a copy of the CC0 Public Domain Dedication along
// with this software.  If not, see
// <https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/>

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "monocypher.h"
#include "monocypher-ed25519.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "vectors.h"

#define VECTORS(n) ASSERT_OK(vector_test(n, #n, nb_##n##_vectors, n##_vectors))

////////////
/// Wipe ///
////////////
static void test_wipe(void)
{
	printf("\tcrypto_wipe\n");
	u8 zeroes[50] = {0};
	FOR (i, 0, 50) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(buf, 50);
		crypto_wipe(buf, i);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(zeroes, buf, i);
	}
}

////////////////////////////////
/// Constant time comparison ///
////////////////////////////////
static void p_verify(unsigned size, int (*compare)(const u8*, const u8*))
{
	printf("\tcrypto_verify%u\n", size);
	u8 a[64]; // size <= 64
	u8 b[64]; // size <= 64
	FOR (i, 0, 2) {
		FOR (j, 0, 2) {
			// Set every byte to the chosen value, then compare
			FOR (k, 0, size) {
				a[k] = (u8)i;
				b[k] = (u8)j;
			}
			int cmp = compare(a, b);
			if (i == j) { ASSERT(cmp == 0); }
			else        { ASSERT(cmp != 0); }
			// Set only two bytes to the chosen value, then compare
			FOR (k, 0, size / 2) {
				FOR (l, 0, size) {
					a[l] = 0;
					b[l] = 0;
				}
				a[k] = (u8)i; a[k + size/2 - 1] = (u8)i;
				b[k] = (u8)j; b[k + size/2 - 1] = (u8)j;
				cmp = compare(a, b);
				if (i == j) { ASSERT(cmp == 0); }
				else        { ASSERT(cmp != 0); }
			}
		}
	}
}

static void test_verify(void)
{
	p_verify(16, crypto_verify16);
	p_verify(32, crypto_verify32);
	p_verify(64, crypto_verify64);
}

////////////////
/// Chacha20 ///
////////////////
#define CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE 64

static void chacha20(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector key       = next_input(reader);
	vector nonce     = next_input(reader);
	vector plain     = next_input(reader);
	u64    ctr       = load64_le(next_input(reader).buf);
	vector out       = next_output(reader);
	u64    nb_blocks = plain.size / 64 + (plain.size % 64 != 0);
	u64    new_ctr   = crypto_chacha20_djb(out.buf, plain.buf, plain.size,
	                                       key.buf, nonce.buf, ctr);
	ASSERT(new_ctr - ctr == nb_blocks);
}

static void ietf_chacha20(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector key       = next_input(reader);
	vector nonce     = next_input(reader);
	vector plain     = next_input(reader);
	u32    ctr       = load32_le(next_input(reader).buf);
	vector out       = next_output(reader);
	u32    nb_blocks = (u32)(plain.size / 64 + (plain.size % 64 != 0));
	u32    new_ctr   = crypto_chacha20_ietf(out.buf, plain.buf, plain.size,
	                                        key.buf, nonce.buf, ctr);
	ASSERT(new_ctr - ctr == nb_blocks);
}

static void xchacha20(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector key       = next_input(reader);
	vector nonce     = next_input(reader);
	vector plain     = next_input(reader);
	u64    ctr       = load64_le(next_input(reader).buf);
	vector out       = next_output(reader);
	u64    nb_blocks = plain.size / 64 + (plain.size % 64 != 0);
	u64    new_ctr   = crypto_chacha20_x(out.buf, plain.buf, plain.size,
	                                     key.buf, nonce.buf, ctr);
	ASSERT(new_ctr - ctr == nb_blocks);
}

static void hchacha20(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector key   = next_input(reader);
	vector nonce = next_input(reader);
	vector out   = next_output(reader);
	crypto_chacha20_h(out.buf, key.buf, nonce.buf);
}

static void test_chacha20(void)
{
	VECTORS(chacha20);
	printf("\tChacha20 (ctr)\n");
	{
		RANDOM_INPUT(key  ,  32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(nonce,  24);
		RANDOM_INPUT(plain, 128);
		u8 out_full[128];
		u8 out1     [64];
		u8 out2     [64];
		crypto_chacha20_djb(out_full, plain     , 128, key, nonce, 0);
		crypto_chacha20_djb(out1    , plain +  0,  64, key, nonce, 0);
		crypto_chacha20_djb(out2    , plain + 64,  64, key, nonce, 1);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(out_full     , out1, 64);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(out_full + 64, out2, 64);
	}

	printf("\tChacha20 (nullptr == zeroes)\n");
#define INPUT_SIZE (CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 2 + 1)
	FOR (i, 0, INPUT_SIZE) {
		u8 output_normal[INPUT_SIZE];
		u8 output_stream[INPUT_SIZE];
		u8 zeroes       [INPUT_SIZE] = {0};
		RANDOM_INPUT(key  , 32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(nonce, 8);
		crypto_chacha20_djb(output_normal, zeroes, i, key, nonce, 0);
		crypto_chacha20_djb(output_stream, 0     , i, key, nonce, 0);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(output_normal, output_stream, i);
	}

	printf("\tChacha20 (output == input)\n");
	{
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) // total input size
		u8  output[INPUT_SIZE];
		RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
		RANDOM_INPUT(key  , 32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(nonce, 8);
		crypto_chacha20_djb(output, input, INPUT_SIZE, key, nonce, 0);
		crypto_chacha20_djb(input , input, INPUT_SIZE, key, nonce, 0);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(output, input, INPUT_SIZE);
	}

	VECTORS(ietf_chacha20);
	printf("\tietf Chacha20 (ctr)\n");
	{
		RANDOM_INPUT(key  ,  32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(nonce,  24);
		RANDOM_INPUT(plain, 128);
		u8 out_full[128];
		u8 out1     [64];
		u8 out2     [64];
		crypto_chacha20_ietf(out_full, plain     , 128, key, nonce, 0);
		crypto_chacha20_ietf(out1    , plain +  0,  64, key, nonce, 0);
		crypto_chacha20_ietf(out2    , plain + 64,  64, key, nonce, 1);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(out_full     , out1, 64);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(out_full + 64, out2, 64);
	}

	VECTORS(xchacha20);
	printf("\tXChacha20 (ctr)\n");
	{
		RANDOM_INPUT(key  ,  32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(nonce,  24);
		RANDOM_INPUT(plain, 128);
		u8 out_full[128];
		u8 out1     [64];
		u8 out2     [64];
		crypto_chacha20_x(out_full, plain     , 128, key, nonce, 0);
		crypto_chacha20_x(out1    , plain +  0,  64, key, nonce, 0);
		crypto_chacha20_x(out2    , plain + 64,  64, key, nonce, 1);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(out_full     , out1, 64);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(out_full + 64, out2, 64);
	}

	VECTORS(hchacha20);
	printf("\tHChacha20 (overlap)\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 100) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(buffer, 80);
		size_t out_idx = rand64() % 48;
		size_t key_idx = rand64() % 48;
		size_t in_idx  = rand64() % 64;
		u8 key[32]; FOR (j, 0, 32) { key[j] = buffer[j + key_idx]; }
		u8 in [16]; FOR (j, 0, 16) { in [j] = buffer[j +  in_idx]; }

		// Run with and without overlap, then compare
		u8 out[32];
		crypto_chacha20_h(out, key, in);
		crypto_chacha20_h(buffer + out_idx, buffer + key_idx, buffer + in_idx);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(out, buffer + out_idx, 32);
	}
}

/////////////////
/// Poly 1305 ///
/////////////////
#define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE 16

static void poly1305(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector key = next_input(reader);
	vector msg = next_input(reader);
	vector out = next_output(reader);
	crypto_poly1305(out.buf, msg.buf, msg.size, key.buf);
}

static void test_poly1305(void)
{
	VECTORS(poly1305);

	printf("\tPoly1305 (incremental)\n");
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE * 4) // total input size
	FOR (i, 0, INPUT_SIZE) {
		// outputs
		u8 mac_chunk[16];
		u8 mac_whole[16];
		// inputs
		RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
		RANDOM_INPUT(key  , 32);

		// Authenticate bit by bit
		crypto_poly1305_ctx ctx;
		crypto_poly1305_init(&ctx, key);
		crypto_poly1305_update(&ctx, input    , i);
		crypto_poly1305_update(&ctx, input + i, INPUT_SIZE - i);
		crypto_poly1305_final(&ctx, mac_chunk);

		// Authenticate all at once
		crypto_poly1305(mac_whole, input, INPUT_SIZE, key);

		// Compare the results
		ASSERT_EQUAL(mac_chunk, mac_whole, 16);
	}

	printf("\tPoly1305 (overlapping i/o)\n");
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE + (2 * 16)) // total input size
	FOR (i, 0, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE + 16) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
		RANDOM_INPUT(key  , 32);
		u8 mac  [16];
		crypto_poly1305(mac    , input + 16, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, key);
		crypto_poly1305(input+i, input + 16, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, key);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(mac, input + i, 16);
	}
}

////////////////////////////////
/// Authenticated encryption ///
////////////////////////////////
static void aead_ietf(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector key   = next_input(reader);
	vector nonce = next_input(reader);
	vector ad    = next_input(reader);
	vector text  = next_input(reader);
	vector out   = next_output(reader);
	crypto_aead_lock(out.buf + 16, out.buf, key.buf, nonce.buf,
	                 ad.buf, ad.size, text.buf, text.size);
}

static void aead_8439(vector_reader *reader)
{
    vector key   = next_input(reader);
    vector nonce = next_input(reader);
    vector ad    = next_input(reader);
    vector text  = next_input(reader);
    vector out   = next_output(reader);
    crypto_aead_ctx ctx;
    crypto_aead_init_ietf(&ctx, key.buf, nonce.buf);
    crypto_aead_write(&ctx, out.buf + 16, out.buf, ad.buf, ad.size,
                      text.buf, text.size);
}

static void test_aead(void)
{
	VECTORS(aead_ietf);
	VECTORS(aead_8439);

	printf("\taead (roundtrip)\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 1000) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(key      , 32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(nonce    , 24);
		RANDOM_INPUT(ad       ,  4);
		RANDOM_INPUT(plaintext,  8);
		u8 box[24];
		u8 out[8];
		// AEAD roundtrip
		crypto_aead_lock(box+16, box, key, nonce, ad, 4, plaintext, 8);
		ASSERT_OK(crypto_aead_unlock(out, box, key, nonce, ad, 4, box+16, 8));
		ASSERT_EQUAL(plaintext, out, 8);
		box[0]++;
		ASSERT_KO(crypto_aead_unlock(out, box, key, nonce, ad, 4, box+16, 8));
	}

	printf("\taead incr (roundtrip)\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 50) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(key      , 32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(nonce    , 24);
		crypto_aead_ctx ctx_xa;
		crypto_aead_ctx ctx_xb;
		crypto_aead_ctx ctx_da;
		crypto_aead_ctx ctx_db;
		crypto_aead_ctx ctx_ia;
		crypto_aead_ctx ctx_ib;
		crypto_aead_init_x   (&ctx_xa, key, nonce);
		crypto_aead_init_x   (&ctx_xb, key, nonce);
		crypto_aead_init_djb (&ctx_da, key, nonce);
		crypto_aead_init_djb (&ctx_db, key, nonce);
		crypto_aead_init_ietf(&ctx_ia, key, nonce);
		crypto_aead_init_ietf(&ctx_ib, key, nonce);

		FOR (j, 0, 10) {
			RANDOM_INPUT(ad,  4); // additional data
			RANDOM_INPUT(pt,  8); // plaintext
			u8 mac[16];
			u8 ct [ 8];
			u8 pt2[ 8];
			// AEAD roundtrip (happy path)
			crypto_aead_write         (&ctx_xa, ct , mac, ad, 4, pt, 8);
			ASSERT_OK(crypto_aead_read(&ctx_xb, pt2, mac, ad, 4, ct, 8));
			ASSERT_EQUAL(pt, pt2, 8);
			ASSERT_EQUAL(&ctx_xa, &ctx_xb, sizeof(crypto_aead_ctx));

			crypto_aead_write         (&ctx_da, ct , mac, ad, 4, pt, 8);
			ASSERT_OK(crypto_aead_read(&ctx_db, pt2, mac, ad, 4, ct, 8));
			ASSERT_EQUAL(pt, pt2, 8);

			crypto_aead_write         (&ctx_ia, ct , mac, ad, 4, pt, 8);
			ASSERT_OK(crypto_aead_read(&ctx_ib, pt2, mac, ad, 4, ct, 8));
			ASSERT_EQUAL(pt, pt2, 8);
		}
	}
	printf("\n");
}

///////////////
/// Blake2b ///
///////////////
#define BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE 128

static void blake2b(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector msg = next_input(reader);
	vector key = next_input(reader);
	vector out = next_output(reader);
	crypto_blake2b_keyed(out.buf, out.size,
	                     key.buf, key.size,
	                     msg.buf, msg.size);
}

static void test_blake2b(void)
{
	VECTORS(blake2b);

	printf("\tBLAKE2b (zero_input)\n");
	{
		RANDOM_INPUT(key, 32);
		u8 hash_chunk[64];
		u8 hash_whole[64];
		crypto_blake2b_ctx ctx;

		// With key
		memset(&ctx, 0x5c, sizeof(ctx));
		crypto_blake2b_keyed_init(&ctx, 64, key, 32);
		crypto_blake2b_final     (&ctx, hash_chunk);
		crypto_blake2b_keyed(hash_whole, 64, key, 32, 0, 0);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(hash_chunk, hash_whole, 64);

		// Without key
		memset(&ctx, 0x5c, sizeof(ctx));
		crypto_blake2b_init (&ctx, 64);
		crypto_blake2b_final(&ctx, hash_chunk);
		crypto_blake2b(hash_whole, 64, 0, 0);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(hash_chunk, hash_whole, 64);
	}

	printf("\tBLAKE2b (incremental)\n");
	// Note: I figured we didn't need to test keyed mode, or different
	// hash sizes, a second time.  This test sticks to the simplified
	// interface.
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE * 3) // total input size
	{
		RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);

		// hash at once
		u8 hash_whole[64];
		crypto_blake2b(hash_whole, 64, input, INPUT_SIZE);

		FOR (j, 0, INPUT_SIZE) {
			FOR (i, 0, j+1) {
				// Hash bit by bit
				u8 *mid_input = j - i == 0 ? NULL : input + i; // NULL update
				u8 hash_chunk[64];
				crypto_blake2b_ctx ctx;
				crypto_blake2b_init  (&ctx, 64);
				crypto_blake2b_update(&ctx, input    , i);
				crypto_blake2b_update(&ctx, mid_input, j - i);
				crypto_blake2b_update(&ctx, input + j, INPUT_SIZE - j);
				crypto_blake2b_final (&ctx, hash_chunk);

				// Compare the results (must be the same)
				ASSERT_EQUAL(hash_chunk, hash_whole, 64);
			}
		}
	}

	printf("\tBLAKE2b (overlapping i/o)\n");
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE + (2 * 64)) // total input size
	FOR (i, 0, BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE + 64) {
		u8 hash [64];
		RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
		crypto_blake2b(hash   , 64, input + 64, BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE);
		crypto_blake2b(input+i, 64, input + 64, BLAKE2B_BLOCK_SIZE);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(hash, input + i, 64);
	}
}

///////////////
/// SHA 512 ///
///////////////
#define SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE 128

static void sha512(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector in  = next_input(reader);
	vector out = next_output(reader);
	crypto_sha512(out.buf, in.buf, in.size);
}

static void sha512_hmac(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector key = next_input(reader);
	vector msg = next_input(reader);
	vector out = next_output(reader);
	crypto_sha512_hmac(out.buf, key.buf, key.size, msg.buf, msg.size);
}

static void sha512_hkdf(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector ikm  = next_input(reader);
	vector salt = next_input(reader);
	vector info = next_input(reader);
	vector okm  = next_output(reader);
	crypto_sha512_hkdf(okm .buf, okm .size,
	                   ikm .buf, ikm .size,
	                   salt.buf, salt.size,
	                   info.buf, info.size);
}

static void test_sha512(void)
{
	VECTORS(sha512);
	VECTORS(sha512_hmac);
	VECTORS(sha512_hkdf);

	printf("\tSHA-512 (incremental)\n");
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 - 32) // total input size
	{
		RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);

		// hash at once
		u8 hash_whole[64];
		crypto_sha512(hash_whole, input, INPUT_SIZE);

		FOR (j, 0, INPUT_SIZE) {
			FOR (i, 0, j+1) {
				// Hash bit by bit
				u8 *mid_input = j - i == 0 ? NULL : input + i; // NULL update
				u8 hash_chunk[64];
				crypto_sha512_ctx ctx;
				crypto_sha512_init  (&ctx);
				crypto_sha512_update(&ctx, input    , i);
				crypto_sha512_update(&ctx, mid_input, j - i);
				crypto_sha512_update(&ctx, input + j, INPUT_SIZE - j);
				crypto_sha512_final (&ctx, hash_chunk);

				// Compare the results (must be the same)
				ASSERT_EQUAL(hash_chunk, hash_whole, 64);
			}
		}
	}

	printf("\tSHA-512 (overlapping i/o)\n");
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE + (2 * 64)) // total input size
	FOR (i, 0, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE + 64) {
		u8 hash [64];
		RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
		crypto_sha512(hash   , input + 64, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE);
		crypto_sha512(input+i, input + 64, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(hash, input + i, 64);
	}

	printf("\tHMAC SHA-512 (incremental)\n");
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE * 4 - 32) // total input size
	FOR (i, 0, INPUT_SIZE) {
		// outputs
		u8 hash_chunk[64];
		u8 hash_whole[64];
		// inputs
		RANDOM_INPUT(key  , 32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);

		// Authenticate bit by bit
		crypto_sha512_hmac_ctx ctx;
		crypto_sha512_hmac_init(&ctx, key, 32);
		crypto_sha512_hmac_update(&ctx, input    , i);
		crypto_sha512_hmac_update(&ctx, input + i, INPUT_SIZE - i);
		crypto_sha512_hmac_final(&ctx, hash_chunk);

		// Authenticate all at once
		crypto_sha512_hmac(hash_whole, key, 32, input, INPUT_SIZE);

		// Compare the results (must be the same)
		ASSERT_EQUAL(hash_chunk, hash_whole, 64);
	}

	printf("\tHMAC SHA-512 (overlapping i/o)\n");
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE + (2 * 64)) // total input size
	FOR (i, 0, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE + 64) {
		u8 hash [64];
		RANDOM_INPUT(key  , 32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
		crypto_sha512_hmac(hash   , key, 32, input + 64, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE);
		crypto_sha512_hmac(input+i, key, 32, input + 64, SHA_512_BLOCK_SIZE);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(hash, input + i, 64);
	}
}


//////////////
/// Argon2 ///
//////////////
static void argon2(vector_reader *reader)
{
	crypto_argon2_config config;
	config.algorithm = load32_le(next_input(reader).buf);
	config.nb_blocks = load32_le(next_input(reader).buf);
	config.nb_passes = load32_le(next_input(reader).buf);
	config.nb_lanes  = load32_le(next_input(reader).buf);

	vector pass      = next_input(reader);
	vector salt      = next_input(reader);
	vector key       = next_input(reader);
	vector ad        = next_input(reader);
	vector out       = next_output(reader);
	void  *work_area = alloc((size_t)config.nb_blocks * 1024);

	crypto_argon2_inputs inputs;
	inputs.pass      = pass.buf;
	inputs.salt      = salt.buf;
	inputs.pass_size = (u32)pass.size;
	inputs.salt_size = (u32)salt.size;

	crypto_argon2_extras extras;
	extras.key       = key.buf;
	extras.ad        = ad.buf;
	extras.key_size  = (u32)key.size;
	extras.ad_size   = (u32)ad.size;

	crypto_argon2(out.buf, (u32)out.size, work_area, config, inputs, extras);
	free(work_area);
}

static void test_argon2(void)
{
	VECTORS(argon2);

	printf("\tArgon2 (overlapping i/o)\n");
	u8 *work_area       = (u8*)alloc(8 * 1024);
	u8 *clean_work_area = (u8*)alloc(8 * 1024);
	FOR (i, 0, 10) {
		p_random(work_area, 8 * 1024);
		u32 hash_offset = rand64() % 64;
		u32 pass_offset = rand64() % 64;
		u32 salt_offset = rand64() % 64;
		u32 key_offset  = rand64() % 64;
		u32 ad_offset   = rand64() % 64;
		u8  hash1[32];
		u8 *hash2 = work_area + hash_offset;
		u8  pass[16];  FOR (j, 0, 16) { pass[j] = work_area[j + pass_offset]; }
		u8  salt[16];  FOR (j, 0, 16) { salt[j] = work_area[j + salt_offset]; }
		u8  key [32];  FOR (j, 0, 32) { key [j] = work_area[j +  key_offset]; }
		u8  ad  [32];  FOR (j, 0, 32) { ad  [j] = work_area[j +   ad_offset]; }

		crypto_argon2_config config;
		config.algorithm = CRYPTO_ARGON2_I;
		config.nb_blocks = 8;
		config.nb_passes = 1;
		config.nb_lanes  = 1;

		crypto_argon2_inputs inputs;
		inputs.pass      = pass;
		inputs.salt      = salt;
		inputs.pass_size = sizeof(pass);
		inputs.salt_size = sizeof(salt);

		crypto_argon2_extras extras;
		extras.key       = key;
		extras.ad        = ad;
		extras.key_size  = sizeof(key);
		extras.ad_size   = sizeof(ad);

		crypto_argon2(hash1, 32, clean_work_area, config, inputs, extras);

		// with overlap
		inputs.pass = work_area + pass_offset;
		inputs.salt = work_area + salt_offset;
		extras.key  = work_area + key_offset;
		extras.ad   = work_area + ad_offset;
		crypto_argon2(hash2, 32, work_area, config, inputs, extras);

		ASSERT_EQUAL(hash1, hash2, 32);
	}
	free(work_area);
	free(clean_work_area);
}

//////////////
/// X25519 ///
//////////////
static void x25519(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector scalar = next_input(reader);
	vector point  = next_input(reader);
	vector out    = next_output(reader);
	crypto_x25519(out.buf, scalar.buf, point.buf);
}

static void x25519_pk(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector in  = next_input(reader);
	vector out = next_output(reader);
	crypto_x25519_public_key(out.buf, in.buf);
}

static void iterate_x25519(u8 k[32], u8 u[32])
{
	u8 tmp[32];
	crypto_x25519(tmp , k, u);
	memcpy(u, k  , 32);
	memcpy(k, tmp, 32);
}

static void test_x25519(void)
{
	VECTORS(x25519);
	VECTORS(x25519_pk);

	{
		printf("\tx25519 1\n");
		u8 _1   [32] = {
			0x42, 0x2c, 0x8e, 0x7a, 0x62, 0x27, 0xd7, 0xbc,
			0xa1, 0x35, 0x0b, 0x3e, 0x2b, 0xb7, 0x27, 0x9f,
			0x78, 0x97, 0xb8, 0x7b, 0xb6, 0x85, 0x4b, 0x78,
			0x3c, 0x60, 0xe8, 0x03, 0x11, 0xae, 0x30, 0x79
		};
		u8 k[32] = {9};
		u8 u[32] = {9};
		crypto_x25519_public_key(k, u);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(k, _1, 32);

		printf("\tx25519 1K\n");
		u8 _1k  [32] = {
			0x68, 0x4c, 0xf5, 0x9b, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x09, 0x55,
			0x28, 0x00, 0xef, 0x56, 0x6f, 0x2f, 0x4d, 0x3c,
			0x1c, 0x38, 0x87, 0xc4, 0x93, 0x60, 0xe3, 0x87,
			0x5f, 0x2e, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x53, 0x2c, 0x51
		};
		FOR (i, 1, 1000) { iterate_x25519(k, u); }
		ASSERT_EQUAL(k, _1k, 32);

		// too long; didn't run
		//printf("\tx25519 1M\n");
		//u8 _1M[32] = {
		//	0x7c, 0x39, 0x11, 0xe0, 0xab, 0x25, 0x86, 0xfd,
		//	0x86, 0x44, 0x97, 0x29, 0x7e, 0x57, 0x5e, 0x6f,
		//	0x3b, 0xc6, 0x01, 0xc0, 0x88, 0x3c, 0x30, 0xdf,
		//	0x5f, 0x4d, 0xd2, 0xd2, 0x4f, 0x66, 0x54, 0x24
		//};
		//FOR (i, 1000, 1000000) { iterate_x25519(k, u); }
		//ASSERT_EQUAL(k, _1M, 32);
	}

	printf("\tx25519 (overlapping i/o)\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 62) {
		u8 overlapping[94];
		u8 separate[32];
		RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 32);
		memcpy(overlapping + 31, sk, 32);
		crypto_x25519(overlapping + i, overlapping + 31, pk);
		crypto_x25519(separate, sk, pk);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(separate, overlapping + i, 32);
	}

	printf("\tx25519_inverse\n");
	{
		RANDOM_INPUT(b, 32);
		u8 base[32];  // random point (cofactor is cleared).
		crypto_x25519_public_key(base, b);
		// check round trip
		FOR (i, 0, 50) {
			RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
			u8 pk   [32];
			u8 blind[32];
			crypto_x25519(pk, sk, base);
			crypto_x25519_inverse(blind, sk, pk);
			ASSERT_EQUAL(blind, base, 32);
		}

		// check cofactor clearing
		// (Multiplying by a low order point yields zero
		u8 low_order[4][32] = {
			{0}, {1},
			{0x5f, 0x9c, 0x95, 0xbc, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x24,
			 0xb1, 0xd0, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x9c, 0x83, 0xef, 0x5b,
			 0x04, 0x44, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0x58, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0x86,
			 0xd8, 0x22, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x9f, 0x11, 0x57,},
			{0xe0, 0xeb, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xae,
			 0x16, 0x56, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x6a,
			 0xda, 0x09, 0x8d, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x32, 0xb1, 0xfd,
			 0x86, 0x62, 0x05, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x49, 0xb8, 0x00,},
		};
		u8 zero[32] = {0};
		FOR (i, 0, 32) {
			u8 blind[32];
			RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
			crypto_x25519_inverse(blind, sk, low_order[i%4]);
			ASSERT_EQUAL(blind, zero, 32);
		}
	}

	printf("\tx25519 inverse (overlapping i/o)\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 62) {
		u8 overlapping[94];
		u8 separate[32];
		RANDOM_INPUT(sk, 32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 32);
		memcpy(overlapping + 31, sk, 32);
		crypto_x25519_inverse(overlapping + i, overlapping + 31, pk);
		crypto_x25519_inverse(separate, sk, pk);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(separate, overlapping + i, 32);
	}
}

///////////////////
/// EdDSA utils ///
///////////////////

// Adds X time L to the input
static void add_xl(u8 out[32], u8 in[32], unsigned factor)
{
	static const u8 L[32] = {
		0xed, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58,
		0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14,
		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10,
	};
	ASSERT(factor <= 8);
	unsigned acc = 0;
	FOR(i, 0, 32) {
		acc   += in[i] + L[i] * factor;
		out[i] = acc & 0xff;
		acc  >>= 8;
		}
	ASSERT(acc == 0); // No carry is remaining
}

static void test_edDSA_utils(void)
{
	printf("\tEdDSA (scalarbase)\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 50) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(scalar, 32);
		u8 scalar_plus[32];
		u8 point      [32];
		u8 point_plus [32];

		// Equivalent (yet different) scalars
		scalar[31] &= 0xf;  // trim the scalar below 252 bits
		add_xl(scalar_plus, scalar, 8); // 8*L == curve order
		ASSERT_DIFFERENT(scalar, scalar_plus, 32);

		// Bit-for-bit identical points
		crypto_eddsa_scalarbase(point     , scalar);
		crypto_eddsa_scalarbase(point_plus, scalar_plus);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(point, point_plus, 32);
	}
}

/////////////
/// EdDSA ///
/////////////
static void edDSA(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector secret_k = next_input(reader);
	vector public_k = next_input(reader);
	vector msg      = next_input(reader);
	vector out      = next_output(reader);
	u8 fat_secret_key[64];
	memcpy(fat_secret_key     , secret_k.buf, 32);
	memcpy(fat_secret_key + 32, public_k.buf, 32);
	crypto_eddsa_sign(out.buf, fat_secret_key, msg.buf, msg.size);
}

static void edDSA_pk(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector in  = next_input(reader);
	vector out = next_output(reader);
	u8 seed      [32];
	u8 secret_key[64];
	u8 public_key[32];
	memcpy(seed, in.buf, 32);
	crypto_eddsa_key_pair(secret_key, public_key, seed);
	memcpy(out.buf, public_key, 32);

	u8 zeroes[32] = {0};
	ASSERT_EQUAL(seed           , zeroes    , 32);
	ASSERT_EQUAL(secret_key     , in.buf    , 32);
	ASSERT_EQUAL(secret_key + 32, public_key, 32);
}

static void test_edDSA(void)
{
	VECTORS(edDSA);
	VECTORS(edDSA_pk);

	printf("\tEdDSA (roundtrip)\n");
#define MESSAGE_SIZE 30
	FOR (i, 0, MESSAGE_SIZE) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(message, MESSAGE_SIZE);
		RANDOM_INPUT(seed, 32);
		u8 sk       [64];
		u8 pk       [32];
		u8 signature[64];
		crypto_eddsa_key_pair(sk, pk, seed);
		crypto_eddsa_sign(signature, sk, message, i);
		ASSERT_OK(crypto_eddsa_check(signature, pk, message, i));

		// reject forgeries
		u8 zero   [64] = {0};
		ASSERT_KO(crypto_eddsa_check(zero , pk, message, i));
		FOR (j, 0, 64) {
			u8 forgery[64];
			memcpy(forgery, signature, 64);
			forgery[j] = signature[j] + 1;
			ASSERT_KO(crypto_eddsa_check(forgery, pk, message, i));
		}
	}

	printf("\tEdDSA (random)\n");
	{
		// Verifies that random signatures are all invalid.  Uses random
		// public keys to see what happens outside of the curve (it should
		// yield an invalid signature).
		FOR (i, 0, 100) {
			RANDOM_INPUT(message, MESSAGE_SIZE);
			RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 32);
			RANDOM_INPUT(signature , 64);
			ASSERT_KO(crypto_eddsa_check(signature, pk, message, MESSAGE_SIZE));
		}
		// Testing S == L (for code coverage)
		RANDOM_INPUT(message, MESSAGE_SIZE);
		RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 32);
		static const u8 signature[64] = {
			0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
			0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
			0xed, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58,
			0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14,
			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10,
		};
		ASSERT_KO(crypto_eddsa_check(signature, pk, message, MESSAGE_SIZE));
	}

	printf("\tEdDSA (overlap)\n");
	FOR(i, 0, MESSAGE_SIZE + 64) {
#undef INPUT_SIZE
#define INPUT_SIZE (MESSAGE_SIZE + (2 * 64)) // total input size
		RANDOM_INPUT(input, INPUT_SIZE);
		RANDOM_INPUT(seed, 32);
		u8 sk       [64];
		u8 pk       [32];
		u8 signature[64];
		crypto_eddsa_key_pair(sk, pk, seed);
		crypto_eddsa_sign(signature, sk, input + 64, MESSAGE_SIZE);
		crypto_eddsa_sign(input+i  , sk, input + 64, MESSAGE_SIZE);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(signature, input + i, 64);
	}
}

///////////////
/// Ed25519 ///
///////////////
static void ed_25519(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector secret_k = next_input(reader);
	vector public_k = next_input(reader);
	vector msg      = next_input(reader);
	vector out      = next_output(reader);
	u8 fat_secret_key[64];
	memcpy(fat_secret_key     , secret_k.buf, 32);
	memcpy(fat_secret_key + 32, public_k.buf, 32);
	crypto_ed25519_sign(out.buf, fat_secret_key, msg.buf, msg.size);
}

static void ed_25519_pk(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector in  = next_input(reader);
	vector out = next_output(reader);
	u8 seed      [32];
	u8 secret_key[64];
	u8 public_key[32];
	memcpy(seed, in.buf, 32);
	crypto_ed25519_key_pair(secret_key, public_key, seed);
	memcpy(out.buf, public_key, 32);

	u8 zeroes[32] = {0};
	ASSERT_EQUAL(seed           , zeroes    , 32);
	ASSERT_EQUAL(secret_key     , in.buf    , 32);
	ASSERT_EQUAL(secret_key + 32, public_key, 32);
}

static void ed_25519_check(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector public_k = next_input(reader);
	vector msg      = next_input(reader);
	vector sig      = next_input(reader);
	vector out      = next_output(reader);
	out.buf[0] = (u8)crypto_ed25519_check(sig.buf, public_k.buf,
	                                      msg.buf, msg.size);
}

static void ed_25519ph(vector_reader *reader)
{
    vector sk  = next_input(reader);
    vector pk  = next_input(reader);
    vector msg = next_input(reader);
    vector out = next_output(reader);

    // Test that we generate the correct public key
    uint8_t secret_key[64];
    uint8_t public_key[32];
    crypto_ed25519_key_pair(secret_key, public_key, sk.buf);
    ASSERT_EQUAL(public_key, pk.buf, 32);
    ASSERT_EQUAL(public_key, secret_key + 32, 32);

    // Generate output signature for comparison
    uint8_t digest[64];
    crypto_sha512(digest, msg.buf, msg.size);
    crypto_ed25519_ph_sign(out.buf, secret_key, digest);

    // Test that the correct signature is accepted
    ASSERT_OK(crypto_ed25519_ph_check(out.buf, pk.buf, digest));

    // Test that corrupted signatures are rejected
    for (size_t i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
        uint8_t corrupt_signature[64];
        memcpy(corrupt_signature, out.buf, 64);
        corrupt_signature[i] ^= 1; // corrupt one bit
        ASSERT_KO(crypto_ed25519_ph_check(corrupt_signature, pk.buf, digest));
    }
}

static void test_ed25519(void)
{
	VECTORS(ed_25519);
	VECTORS(ed_25519_pk);
	VECTORS(ed_25519_check);
	VECTORS(ed_25519ph);
}

/////////////////
/// Elligator ///
/////////////////
static void elligator_dir(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector in  = next_input(reader);
	vector out = next_output(reader);
	crypto_elligator_map(out.buf, in.buf);
}

static void elligator_inv(vector_reader *reader)
{
	vector point   = next_input(reader);
	u8     tweak   = next_input(reader).buf[0];
	u8     failure = next_input(reader).buf[0];
	vector out     = next_output(reader);
	int    check   = crypto_elligator_rev(out.buf, point.buf, tweak);
	ASSERT((u8)check == failure);
}

static void test_elligator(void)
{
	VECTORS(elligator_dir);

	printf("\telligator direct (msb)\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 20) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(r, 32);
		u8 r1[32];  memcpy(r1, r, 32);  r1[31] = (r[31] & 0x3f) | 0x00;
		u8 r2[32];  memcpy(r2, r, 32);  r2[31] = (r[31] & 0x3f) | 0x40;
		u8 r3[32];  memcpy(r3, r, 32);  r3[31] = (r[31] & 0x3f) | 0x80;
		u8 r4[32];  memcpy(r4, r, 32);  r4[31] = (r[31] & 0x3f) | 0xc0;
		u8 u [32];  crypto_elligator_map(u , r );
		u8 u1[32];  crypto_elligator_map(u1, r1);
		u8 u2[32];  crypto_elligator_map(u2, r2);
		u8 u3[32];  crypto_elligator_map(u3, r3);
		u8 u4[32];  crypto_elligator_map(u4, r4);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(u, u1, 32);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(u, u2, 32);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(u, u3, 32);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(u, u4, 32);
	}

	printf("\telligator direct (overlapping i/o)\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 62) {
		u8 overlapping[94];
		u8 separate[32];
		RANDOM_INPUT(r, 32);
		memcpy(overlapping + 31, r, 32);
		crypto_elligator_map(overlapping + i, overlapping + 31);
		crypto_elligator_map(separate, r);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(separate, overlapping + i, 32);
	}

	VECTORS(elligator_inv);

	printf("\telligator inverse (overlapping i/o)\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 62) {
		u8 overlapping[94];
		u8 separate[32];
		RANDOM_INPUT(pk, 33);
		u8 tweak = pk[32];
		memcpy(overlapping + 31, pk, 32);
		int a = crypto_elligator_rev(overlapping+i, overlapping+31, tweak);
		int b = crypto_elligator_rev(separate, pk, tweak);
		ASSERT(a == b);
		if (a == 0) {
			// The buffers are the same only if written to to begin with
			ASSERT_EQUAL(separate, overlapping + i, 32);
		}
	}

	printf("\telligator x25519\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 64) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(sk1, 32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(sk2, 32);
		u8 skc [32];  memcpy(skc, sk1, 32);  skc[0] &= 248;
		u8 pks [32];  crypto_x25519_dirty_small(pks , sk1);
		u8 pksc[32];  crypto_x25519_dirty_small(pksc, skc);
		u8 pkf [32];  crypto_x25519_dirty_fast (pkf , sk1);
		u8 pkfc[32];  crypto_x25519_dirty_fast (pkfc, skc);
		u8 pk1 [32];  crypto_x25519_public_key (pk1 , sk1);

		// Both dirty functions behave the same
		ASSERT_EQUAL(pks, pkf, 32);

		// Dirty functions behave cleanly if we clear the 3 lsb first
		ASSERT_EQUAL(pksc, pk1, 32);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(pkfc, pk1, 32);

		// Dirty functions behave the same as the clean one if the lsb
		// are 0, differently if it is not
		if ((sk1[0] & 7) == 0) { ASSERT_EQUAL    (pk1, pkf, 32); }
		else                   { ASSERT_DIFFERENT(pk1, pkf, 32); }

		// Maximise tweak diversity.
		// We want to set the bits 1 (sign) and 6-7 (padding)
		u8 tweak = (u8)((i & 1) + (i << 5));
		u8 r[32];
		if (crypto_elligator_rev(r, pkf, tweak)) {
			i--;      // Cancel tweak increment
			continue; // retry untill success
		}
		// Verify that the tweak's msb are copied to the representative
		ASSERT((tweak >> 6) == (r[31] >> 6));

		// Round trip
		u8 pkr[32];  crypto_elligator_map(pkr, r);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(pkr, pkf, 32);

		// Dirty and safe keys are compatible
		u8 e1 [32];  crypto_x25519(e1, sk2, pk1);
		u8 e2 [32];  crypto_x25519(e2, sk2, pkr);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(e1, e2, 32);
	}

	printf("\telligator key pair\n");
	FOR(i, 0, 32) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(seed, 32);
		RANDOM_INPUT(sk2 , 32);
		u8 r  [32];
		u8 sk1[32];  crypto_elligator_key_pair(r, sk1, seed);
		u8 pkr[32];  crypto_elligator_map(pkr, r);
		u8 pk1[32];  crypto_x25519_public_key(pk1, sk1);
		u8 e1 [32];  crypto_x25519(e1, sk2, pk1);
		u8 e2 [32];  crypto_x25519(e2, sk2, pkr);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(e1, e2, 32);
	}

	printf("\telligator key pair (overlapping i/o)\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 94) {
		u8 over[158];
		u8 sep [ 64];
		RANDOM_INPUT(s1, 32);
		u8 *s2 = over + 63;
		memcpy(s2, s1, 32);
		crypto_elligator_key_pair(sep     , sep      + 32, s1);
		crypto_elligator_key_pair(over + i, over + i + 32, s2);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(sep, over + i, 64);
	}
}

////////////////////////
/// X25519 <-> EdDSA ///
////////////////////////
static void test_conversions(void)
{
	printf("\tX25519 <-> EdDSA\n");
	FOR (i, 0, 32) {
		RANDOM_INPUT(e_seed, 32);
		u8 secret   [64];
		u8 e_public1[32]; crypto_eddsa_key_pair(secret, e_public1, e_seed);
		u8 x_private[64]; crypto_blake2b(x_private, 64, secret, 32);
		u8 x_public1[32]; crypto_eddsa_to_x25519  (x_public1, e_public1);
		u8 x_public2[32]; crypto_x25519_public_key(x_public2, x_private);
		ASSERT_EQUAL(x_public1, x_public2, 32);

		u8 e_public2[32]; crypto_x25519_to_eddsa  (e_public2, x_public1);
		ASSERT((e_public2[31] & 0x80) == 0); // x coordinate always positive

		e_public1[31] &= 0x7f;               // y coordinate back to original
		ASSERT_EQUAL(e_public1, e_public2, 32);
	}
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	if (argc > 1) {
		sscanf(argv[1], "%" PRIu64 "", &random_state);
	}
	printf("\nRandom seed = %" PRIu64 "\n\n", random_state);

	printf("Wipe: \n");
	test_wipe();

	printf("Comparisons:\n");
	test_verify();

	printf("Encryption:\n");
	test_chacha20();
	test_aead();

	printf("Hashes:\n");
	test_poly1305();
	test_blake2b();
	test_sha512();
	test_argon2();

	printf("X25519:\n");
	test_x25519();

	printf("EdDSA:\n");
	test_edDSA_utils();
	test_edDSA();
	test_ed25519();

	printf("Elligator:\n");
	test_elligator();

	printf("Curve25519 conversions:\n");
	test_conversions();

	printf("\nAll tests OK!\n");
	return 0;
}