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fix(doclib): enforce private credential ACLs on macOS

myhlolifd4e4133e963
diff --git a/docs/next/decisions/0035-doclib-persistent-token.md b/docs/next/decisions/0035-doclib-persistent-token.md
index a08cc2dc..45852c6c 100644
--- a/docs/next/decisions/0035-doclib-persistent-token.md
+++ b/docs/next/decisions/0035-doclib-persistent-token.md
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ TCP loopback 仅限制连接来源机器。读取正文、导出到指定路径
- 全部 Doclib HTTP 接口使用 Bearer 认证,UDS/TCP 一致;状态、shutdown、OpenAPI 不例外。
在业务路由执行前拒绝缺失、重复或错误的 Authorization,不提供匿名降级。
- 配置正文写入前限制临时文件权限,再原子替换。POSIX 使用 `0600`,Windows 使用仅授权当前账户
- 与 SYSTEM 的受保护 DACL,并读回验证;父目录不能让其他普通账户替换文件。无法落实权限时失败。
+ 与 SYSTEM 的受保护 DACL;macOS 同时清除扩展 ACL,并在创建时禁止继承 ACL。设置后读回验证,
+ 父目录的权限位及平台 ACL 不能让其他普通账户替换文件。无法落实权限时失败。
- CLI/SDK 默认发现重新读取当前配置中的 token;显式地址必须同时提供显式 token。
endpoint 升为 version 3,不存 token;`server_id` 继续每次启动变化。旧 version 1/2 仅保留诊断读取,
SDK 返回 `doclib_upgrade_required`,升级前须先用旧 CLI 停止旧服务。
diff --git a/docs/next/sdk/doclib-client.md b/docs/next/sdk/doclib-client.md
index 346fe8b2..fa6ddc28 100644
--- a/docs/next/sdk/doclib-client.md
+++ b/docs/next/sdk/doclib-client.md
@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@ finally:
凭证,轮换后应重新构造。首次升级到认证版本前,应先用旧版本 CLI 停止旧服务。
凭证授予当前文档库的完整访问权限,共用凭证的程序属于同一个可信范围。配置文件使用 POSIX `0600`
-或 Windows 受保护 DACL,普通其他账户不可读取;父目录也不能允许其他普通账户替换文件。权限设置或
-验证失败时拒绝启动。建议继续使用 loopback,不将本机文档库直接暴露给不可信网络。
+或 Windows 受保护 DACL;macOS 还会清除文件的扩展 ACL,并在创建临时文件时禁止继承 ACL。
+父目录的权限位及平台 ACL 都不能允许其他普通账户替换文件。权限设置或验证失败时拒绝启动。
+建议继续使用 loopback,不将本机文档库直接暴露给不可信网络。
## Parse 方法
diff --git a/mineru/utils/_private_file_macos.py b/mineru/utils/_private_file_macos.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b9a991ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mineru/utils/_private_file_macos.py
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+"""使用 macOS 原生 ACL 接口保护凭证,避免仅检查 BSD 权限位遗漏额外授权。"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ctypes
+import errno
+import os
+import stat
+from pathlib import Path
+
+_ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED = 0x100
+_ACL_EXTENDED_ALLOW = 1
+_ACL_EXTENDED_DENY = 2
+_ACL_ENTRY_ONLY_INHERIT = 1 << 8
+_ACL_FLAG_NO_INHERIT = 1 << 17
+# 目录只允许列举、搜索、读取属性/扩展属性/安全信息及同步;其他或未知权限均按可写处理。
+_READ_ONLY_PERMISSIONS = (1 << 1) | (1 << 3) | (1 << 7) | (1 << 9) | (1 << 11) | (1 << 20)
+
+
+def _load_security_library() -> ctypes.CDLL:
+ """按需加载系统 ACL API,并显式声明指针宽度,避免 arm64 上地址截断。"""
+ library = ctypes.CDLL("/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib", use_errno=True)
+ pointer = ctypes.c_void_p
+ library.acl_init.argtypes = [ctypes.c_int]
+ library.acl_init.restype = pointer
+ library.acl_free.argtypes = [pointer]
+ library.acl_free.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ library.acl_get_fd_np.argtypes = [ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_int]
+ library.acl_get_fd_np.restype = pointer
+ library.acl_get_entry.argtypes = [pointer, ctypes.c_int, ctypes.POINTER(pointer)]
+ library.acl_get_entry.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ library.acl_get_tag_type.argtypes = [pointer, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_int)]
+ library.acl_get_tag_type.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ library.acl_get_permset_mask_np.argtypes = [pointer, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_uint64)]
+ library.acl_get_permset_mask_np.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ library.acl_get_flagset_np.argtypes = [pointer, ctypes.POINTER(pointer)]
+ library.acl_get_flagset_np.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ library.acl_get_flag_np.argtypes = [pointer, ctypes.c_uint]
+ library.acl_get_flag_np.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ library.acl_add_flag_np.argtypes = [pointer, ctypes.c_uint]
+ library.acl_add_flag_np.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ library.acl_get_qualifier.argtypes = [pointer]
+ library.acl_get_qualifier.restype = pointer
+ library.mbr_uid_to_uuid.argtypes = [ctypes.c_uint, pointer]
+ library.mbr_uid_to_uuid.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ library.filesec_init.argtypes = []
+ library.filesec_init.restype = pointer
+ library.filesec_free.argtypes = [pointer]
+ library.filesec_free.restype = None
+ library.filesec_set_property.argtypes = [pointer, ctypes.c_int, pointer]
+ library.filesec_set_property.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ library.openx_np.argtypes = [ctypes.c_char_p, ctypes.c_int, pointer]
+ library.openx_np.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ library.fchmodx_np.argtypes = [ctypes.c_int, pointer]
+ library.fchmodx_np.restype = ctypes.c_int
+ return library
+
+
+def _checked(result: int | None) -> int:
+ """保留原生错误码,权限或文件系统能力不足时不得静默降级。"""
+ if result is None or result == -1:
+ code = ctypes.get_errno()
+ raise OSError(code, os.strerror(code))
+ return result
+
+
+def _check_acl(library: ctypes.CDLL, fd: int, *, directory: bool) -> None:
+ """校验已打开对象的 ACL;目录拒绝不可信写权限,凭证文件必须没有扩展授权。"""
+ acl = library.acl_get_fd_np(fd, _ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED)
+ # Darwin 对有效 fd 上不存在的扩展 ACL 返回 ENOENT;其他错误不能视为没有 ACL。
+ if acl is None and ctypes.get_errno() == errno.ENOENT:
+ return
+ _checked(acl)
+ try:
+ entry = ctypes.c_void_p()
+ entry_id = 0 # ACL_FIRST_ENTRY;Darwin 的 ACL_NEXT_ENTRY 为 -1。
+ trusted: set[bytes] = set()
+ while True:
+ result = library.acl_get_entry(acl, entry_id, ctypes.byref(entry))
+ # Darwin 用 -1/EINVAL 表示迭代结束,与 Linux 的返回约定不同。
+ if result == -1 and ctypes.get_errno() == errno.EINVAL:
+ break
+ _checked(result)
+ entry_id = -1
+ if not directory:
+ raise PermissionError("The filesystem cannot enforce private credential configuration ACLs.")
+ tag, flags, permissions = ctypes.c_int(), ctypes.c_void_p(), ctypes.c_uint64()
+ _checked(library.acl_get_tag_type(entry, ctypes.byref(tag)))
+ _checked(library.acl_get_flagset_np(entry, ctypes.byref(flags)))
+ inherit_only = _checked(library.acl_get_flag_np(flags, _ACL_ENTRY_ONLY_INHERIT))
+ if tag.value == _ACL_EXTENDED_DENY or inherit_only:
+ continue
+ _checked(library.acl_get_permset_mask_np(entry, ctypes.byref(permissions)))
+ if tag.value == _ACL_EXTENDED_ALLOW and not permissions.value & ~_READ_ONLY_PERMISSIONS:
+ continue
+ if not trusted:
+ for uid in {os.getuid(), 0}:
+ identifier = ctypes.create_string_buffer(16)
+ code = library.mbr_uid_to_uuid(uid, identifier)
+ if code:
+ raise OSError(code, os.strerror(code))
+ trusted.add(identifier.raw)
+ qualifier = _checked(library.acl_get_qualifier(entry))
+ try:
+ if tag.value != _ACL_EXTENDED_ALLOW or ctypes.string_at(qualifier, 16) not in trusted:
+ raise PermissionError("Credential configuration directory must not be writable by other users.")
+ finally:
+ library.acl_free(qualifier)
+ finally:
+ library.acl_free(acl)
+
+
+def _check_file_owner(fd: int) -> None:
+ """用实际文件描述符复核类型、硬链接数量和所有者,避免只信任路径预检。"""
+ info = os.fstat(fd)
+ if not stat.S_ISREG(info.st_mode) or info.st_nlink != 1:
+ raise PermissionError("Credential configuration must be a regular file without links.")
+ if info.st_uid != os.getuid():
+ raise PermissionError("Credential configuration must be owned by the current user.")
+
+
+def protect_macos_file(path: Path, *, create: bool = False) -> int | None:
+ """原子设置 0600 和禁止继承的空 ACL;创建文件时从首个可见时刻即保持私密。"""
+ library = _load_security_library()
+ parent_fd = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_CLOEXEC)
+ acl, descriptor = None, None
+ fd = None
+ created = False
+ transferred = False
+ try:
+ parent = os.fstat(parent_fd)
+ if parent.st_uid not in {os.getuid(), 0}:
+ raise PermissionError("Credential configuration directory must have a trusted owner.")
+ if parent.st_mode & 0o022:
+ raise PermissionError("Credential configuration directory must not be writable by other users.")
+ _check_acl(library, parent_fd, directory=True)
+ acl = _checked(library.acl_init(0))
+ flags = ctypes.c_void_p()
+ _checked(library.acl_get_flagset_np(acl, ctypes.byref(flags)))
+ _checked(library.acl_add_flag_np(flags, _ACL_FLAG_NO_INHERIT))
+ descriptor = _checked(library.filesec_init())
+ mode, acl_pointer = ctypes.c_ushort(0o600), ctypes.c_void_p(acl)
+ # FILESEC_MODE=4、FILESEC_ACL=5;属性值分别为 mode_t 和 acl_t 的地址。
+ _checked(library.filesec_set_property(descriptor, 4, ctypes.byref(mode)))
+ _checked(library.filesec_set_property(descriptor, 5, ctypes.byref(acl_pointer)))
+ if create:
+ fd = _checked(
+ library.openx_np(
+ os.fsencode(path), os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_RDWR | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_CLOEXEC, descriptor
+ )
+ )
+ created = True
+ else:
+ fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK | os.O_CLOEXEC)
+ _check_file_owner(fd)
+ # 创建时已禁止 ACL 继承;此处也补回被严格 umask 去掉的所有者读写位。
+ _checked(library.fchmodx_np(fd, descriptor))
+ if stat.S_IMODE(os.fstat(fd).st_mode) != 0o600:
+ raise PermissionError("The filesystem cannot enforce private credential configuration permissions.")
+ _check_acl(library, fd, directory=False)
+ if create:
+ transferred = True
+ return fd
+ return None
+ finally:
+ if fd is not None and not transferred:
+ os.close(fd)
+ if created and not transferred:
+ path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+ if descriptor is not None:
+ library.filesec_free(descriptor)
+ if acl is not None:
+ library.acl_free(acl)
+ os.close(parent_fd)
+
+
+__all__ = ["protect_macos_file"]
diff --git a/mineru/utils/private_file.py b/mineru/utils/private_file.py
index 2847ad02..226bf344 100644
--- a/mineru/utils/private_file.py
+++ b/mineru/utils/private_file.py
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
-"""为本机凭证配置提供 POSIX 权限和 Windows DACL 保护。"""
+"""为本机凭证配置提供 POSIX 权限、macOS ACL 和 Windows DACL 保护。"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import secrets
import stat
+import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
@@ -18,6 +19,11 @@ def protect_private_file(path: str | Path) -> None:
if os.name == "nt":
_protect_windows_file(path)
return
+ if sys.platform == "darwin":
+ from ._private_file_macos import protect_macos_file
+
+ protect_macos_file(path)
+ return
if info.st_uid != os.getuid():
raise PermissionError("Credential configuration must be owned by the current user.")
parent = path.parent.stat()
@@ -32,7 +38,7 @@ def protect_private_file(path: str | Path) -> None:
def create_private_tempfile(directory: str) -> tuple[int, str]:
"""从创建时就限制凭证临时文件权限,防止先打开的其他账户句柄读取后写入的正文。"""
- if os.name != "nt":
+ if os.name != "nt" and sys.platform != "darwin":
fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".config.", suffix=".tmp", dir=directory)
try:
protect_private_file(path)
@@ -44,7 +50,12 @@ def create_private_tempfile(directory: str) -> tuple[int, str]:
for _ in range(10):
path = Path(directory).absolute() / f".config.{secrets.token_hex(12)}.tmp"
try:
- fd = _protect_windows_file(path, create=True)
+ if sys.platform == "darwin":
+ from ._private_file_macos import protect_macos_file
+
+ fd = protect_macos_file(path, create=True)
+ else:
+ fd = _protect_windows_file(path, create=True)
except FileExistsError:
continue
assert fd is not None
diff --git a/tests/unittest/test_private_file_macos.py b/tests/unittest/test_private_file_macos.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cf7c831c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unittest/test_private_file_macos.py
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+"""在真实 macOS 文件系统上验证 BSD 权限之外的扩展 ACL 和创建时保护。"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ctypes
+import errno
+import os
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+import yaml
+
+from mineru import config as configuration
+from mineru.config import load_doclib_server_config, update_config_file
+from mineru.utils import _private_file_macos as macos
+from mineru.utils.private_file import create_private_tempfile, protect_private_file
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform != "darwin", reason="Requires real macOS ACL support")
+
+
+def _add_acl(path: Path, entry: str) -> None:
+ """用系统 chmod 构造真实 ACL,独立于被测的 ctypes 实现。"""
+ subprocess.run(["/bin/chmod", "+a", entry, str(path)], check=True, capture_output=True)
+
+
+def _acl_entries(path: Path) -> list[str]:
+ """通过系统 ls 读取真实 ACL,避免验证复用生产代码导致同源误判。"""
+ result = subprocess.run(["/bin/ls", "-lde", str(path)], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
+ return result.stdout.splitlines()[1:]
+
+
+def test_existing_public_acl_is_removed_and_protection_is_idempotent(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ """0600 不能屏蔽 Everyone ACL;保护后必须清除额外授权并保留正文。"""
+ path = tmp_path / "配置.yaml"
+ path.write_text("fake credential", encoding="utf-8")
+ path.chmod(0o600)
+ _add_acl(path, "everyone allow read,write,append,delete,writesecurity,chown")
+ assert _acl_entries(path)
+ for _ in range(2):
+ protect_private_file(path)
+ assert stat.S_IMODE(path.stat().st_mode) == 0o600
+ assert _acl_entries(path) == []
+ assert path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "fake credential"
+
+
[email protected]("create", [False, True])
+ "permission",
+ ["add_file", "add_subdirectory", "delete_child", "delete", "writeattr", "writeextattr", "writesecurity", "chown"],
+)
+def test_unsafe_directory_acl_is_rejected(tmp_path: Path, permission: str, create: bool) -> None:
+ """即使目录为 0700,额外授予其他账户的写入或接管权限也必须拒绝。"""
+ path = tmp_path / "config.yaml"
+ path.write_text("unchanged", encoding="utf-8")
+ tmp_path.chmod(0o700)
+ _add_acl(tmp_path, f"everyone allow {permission}")
+ before = _acl_entries(tmp_path)
+ with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="directory must not be writable"):
+ if create:
+ create_private_tempfile(str(tmp_path))
+ else:
+ protect_private_file(path)
+ assert _acl_entries(tmp_path) == before
+ assert path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "unchanged"
+ assert not list(tmp_path.glob(".config.*.tmp"))
+
+
+ "entry",
+ [
+ "everyone allow list,search,readattr,readextattr,readsecurity",
+ "everyone deny delete",
+ "everyone allow read,write,file_inherit,only_inherit",
+ "user:root allow add_file,delete_child,writesecurity",
+ "current-user",
+ ],
+)
+def test_safe_directory_acls_are_preserved(tmp_path: Path, entry: str) -> None:
+ """只读、拒绝、仅继承和可信用户权限不能像 Windows 的 OWNER RIGHTS 一样被误拒。"""
+ if entry == "current-user":
+ import pwd
+
+ entry = f"user:{pwd.getpwuid(os.getuid()).pw_name} allow add_file,delete_child,writesecurity"
+ _add_acl(tmp_path, entry)
+ before = _acl_entries(tmp_path)
+ fd, filename = create_private_tempfile(str(tmp_path))
+ try:
+ path = Path(filename)
+ assert not os.get_inheritable(fd)
+ assert _acl_entries(path) == []
+ os.write(fd, b"private content")
+ protect_private_file(path)
+ assert path.read_bytes() == b"private content"
+ assert _acl_entries(path) == []
+ assert _acl_entries(tmp_path) == before
+ finally:
+ os.close(fd)
+
+
+def test_tempfile_has_no_inherited_acl_at_creation(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+ """在原生创建调用刚返回时检查 ACL,防止先公开创建再清理的句柄抢占窗口。"""
+ _add_acl(tmp_path, "everyone allow read,write,file_inherit,only_inherit")
+ library = macos._load_security_library()
+ native_open = library.openx_np
+ observed: list[list[str]] = []
+
+ def observed_open(path: bytes, flags: int, descriptor: int) -> int:
+ """记录 openx_np 返回瞬间的实际 ACL,而不是只检查函数最终结果。"""
+ fd = native_open(path, flags, descriptor)
+ if fd >= 0:
+ observed.append(_acl_entries(Path(os.fsdecode(path))))
+ return fd
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(library, "openx_np", observed_open)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(macos, "_load_security_library", lambda: library)
+ fd, filename = create_private_tempfile(str(tmp_path))
+ try:
+ assert observed == [[]]
+ assert not os.get_inheritable(fd)
+ assert Path(filename).read_bytes() == b""
+ assert stat.S_IMODE(os.fstat(fd).st_mode) == 0o600
+ finally:
+ os.close(fd)
+
+
+def test_first_start_restart_and_atomic_update_keep_private_acl(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+ """新 home 继承只读 ACL 后仍能启动,重启和原子更新始终保持同一私密凭证。"""
+ _add_acl(tmp_path, "everyone allow read,file_inherit,directory_inherit,only_inherit")
+ home = tmp_path / "新配置目录"
+ monkeypatch.setenv("MINERU_HOME", str(home))
+ monkeypatch.delenv("MINERU_CONFIG", raising=False)
+ monkeypatch.delenv("MINERU_DOCLIB_AUTH_TOKEN", raising=False)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(configuration, "_loaded_config", None)
+ first = load_doclib_server_config()
+ token = first.config.doclib.auth.token.get_secret_value()
+ path = home / "config.yaml"
+ assert _acl_entries(home)
+ assert _acl_entries(path) == []
+ assert stat.S_IMODE(path.stat().st_mode) == 0o600
+ assert load_doclib_server_config().config.doclib.auth.token.get_secret_value() == token
+ update_config_file({"log": {"level": "debug"}})
+ assert _acl_entries(path) == []
+ assert stat.S_IMODE(path.stat().st_mode) == 0o600
+ raw = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+ assert raw["doclib"]["auth"]["token"] == token
+ assert raw["log"]["level"] == "debug"
+ assert not list(home.glob(".config.*.tmp"))
+
+
+def test_strict_umask_does_not_prevent_private_tempfile_creation(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+ """严格 umask 只会减少创建时权限,返回前应补回所有者读写位。"""
+ previous = os.umask(0o777)
+ try:
+ fd, filename = create_private_tempfile(str(tmp_path))
+ finally:
+ os.umask(previous)
+ try:
+ assert stat.S_IMODE(os.fstat(fd).st_mode) == 0o600
+ assert _acl_entries(Path(filename)) == []
+ os.write(fd, b"private content")
+ assert Path(filename).read_bytes() == b"private content"
+ finally:
+ os.close(fd)
+
+
[email protected]("failure", ["read_acl", "create", "set_acl", "verify"])
+def test_native_failures_do_not_leave_credential_tempfiles(
+ tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, failure: str
+) -> None:
+ """ACL 读取、原子创建或读回验证失败时直接报错,并清理已创建的文件和句柄。"""
+ library = macos._load_security_library()
+ native_get_acl, native_open, native_chmod = library.acl_get_fd_np, library.openx_np, library.fchmodx_np
+ created_fds: list[int] = []
+
+ def failing_acl(fd: int, acl_type: int) -> int | None:
+ """模拟文件系统拒绝读取父目录 ACL 或刚创建文件的 ACL。"""
+ if failure == "read_acl" or fd in created_fds:
+ ctypes.set_errno(errno.EACCES)
+ return None
+ return native_get_acl(fd, acl_type)
+
+ def tracked_open(path: bytes, flags: int, descriptor: int) -> int:
+ """记录真实句柄或模拟不支持原子 ACL 创建的文件系统。"""
+ if failure == "create":
+ ctypes.set_errno(errno.ENOTSUP)
+ return -1
+ fd = native_open(path, flags, descriptor)
+ if fd >= 0:
+ created_fds.append(fd)
+ return fd
+
+ def failing_chmod(fd: int, descriptor: int) -> int:
+ """模拟无法落实最终权限的文件系统,检查返回句柄前的失败清理。"""
+ if failure == "set_acl":
+ ctypes.set_errno(errno.EACCES)
+ return -1
+ return native_chmod(fd, descriptor)
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(library, "acl_get_fd_np", failing_acl)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(library, "openx_np", tracked_open)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(library, "fchmodx_np", failing_chmod)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(macos, "_load_security_library", lambda: library)
+ with pytest.raises(OSError):
+ create_private_tempfile(str(tmp_path))
+ assert not list(tmp_path.glob(".config.*.tmp"))
+ for fd in created_fds:
+ with pytest.raises(OSError, match="Bad file descriptor"):
+ os.fstat(fd)
+
+
[email protected]("link", ["hard", "symbolic"])
+def test_linked_credentials_are_rejected(tmp_path: Path, link: str) -> None:
+ """ACL 保护不能绕过已有的符号链接和硬链接拒绝规则。"""
+ original, path = tmp_path / "original", tmp_path / "config.yaml"
+ original.write_text("unchanged", encoding="utf-8")
+ if link == "hard":
+ path.hardlink_to(original)
+ else:
+ path.symlink_to(original)
+ with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="regular file without links"):
+ protect_private_file(path)
+ assert original.read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "unchanged"