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ODS V3 Pre-Release: Public testing and refinement ahead of the official V3 launch. Turn your PC, Mac, or Linux box into a private AI server.

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Signed source release pipeline

This pipeline prepares release candidates. It does not publish them or change an existing tag. The verified installer preview requires the first eligible candidate before it can install anything. The public README retains the existing development-main channel until qualification. The historical v3.0.0 tag is not retroactively signed by this change.

Maintainer sequence

  1. Finish review and CI on main, including the release validation receipt.
  2. Create a new annotated, signed version tag at the reviewed commit, using the maintainer's existing signing key. GitHub must report that exact tag object's signature as verified with reason valid. A lightweight tag or an unsigned annotation is rejected. Do not move a published tag to satisfy this requirement.
  3. Push that tag. release-provenance.yml runs only on version tags in Osmantic/ODS. A manual rerun must also select the tag, not a branch.
  4. Review the generated draft release and verify its files. The job never updates an existing release and never publishes automatically. A failed upload or incomplete draft needs maintainer inspection; a rerun does not overwrite its assets.
  5. After installation, update and rollback validation, a maintainer can publish the candidate with GitHub release immutability enabled. Protect release tags before advertising a stable installation channel. The verified consumer requires the release API's immutable: true field.

The package gate compares the local tag object with the live GitHub ref, checks GitHub's signature-verification result for that exact object, and requires the tag to point directly to the workflow source commit reachable from origin/main. The gate uses GitHub as its signature verifier; it does not maintain a second local GPG trust store. Repository write permissions, tag protection and review of the release workflow remain part of the trust boundary.

Artifacts

File Purpose
ODS-<tag>-source.tar.gz / .zip Committed source only, including installer entrypoints; untracked and working-tree changes are excluded.
source.spdx.json Syft SPDX 2.3 dependency inventory of the archived source tree.
release-manifest.json Repository, full commit, signed tag object, file sizes and SHA-256 digests.
SHA256SUMS Digests of both source archives, the SBOM and the manifest.
provenance.sigstore.jsonl GitHub OIDC attestation bundle covering the archives, inventory, manifest and checksum file.

The source SBOM is not an audit of the OS packages in every pulled image, downloaded model weight, or optional binary fetched later by an installer. Those dependencies need their own digest/lock and provenance checks.

Archives preserve reviewed repository attributes and executable file modes. The build host's core.autocrlf setting cannot silently change source bytes. The packager rejects symlinks, non-regular entries, traversal paths and paths that collide on case-insensitive systems instead of producing incompatible Windows/macOS packages. Supporting such entries later requires a reviewed packaging policy rather than silently dereferencing them.

Verify before extraction or execution

Use a current GitHub CLI obtained from its official distribution. Download the release files to a new empty directory, then verify the selected archive using the bundle, expected repository, release workflow, tag ref and full commit:

gh attestation verify ODS-vX.Y.Z-source.zip \
  --bundle provenance.sigstore.jsonl \
  --repo Osmantic/ODS \
  --signer-workflow Osmantic/ODS/.github/workflows/release-provenance.yml \
  --source-ref refs/tags/vX.Y.Z \
  --source-digest FULL_REVIEWED_COMMIT_SHA \
  --deny-self-hosted-runners

Replace the version and full commit with the reviewed candidate's identity. Verify release-manifest.json, source.spdx.json and SHA256SUMS the same way before trusting their contents. A matching checksum alone only establishes file integrity; it does not authenticate who produced the checksum file.

The preview commands and installers/verified-release.{sh,ps1} select the latest non-draft, non-prerelease immutable release, obtain its verified annotated tag identity, and authenticate the archive before extraction or installer execution. Metadata and assets use public HTTPS; gh attestation verify --bundle does not require a GitHub account. GitHub CLI must be installed from its official source. The POSIX path also needs curl, unzip and Python 3 for JSON parsing. Windows uses native PowerShell JSON/HTTP support. Both retain the verified temporary source for installer resume; they do not delete any existing runtime on verification failure. Development installation is a separate, explicit choice.

The producer and consumer have offline gate/archive contracts in PR CI. End-to-end OIDC signing and release-asset verification require the first new signed candidate; they cannot be honestly reported as validated by mocked API responses. Until that candidate and the automated consumer are verified, the stable bootstrap transition remains an open remediation item. No fallback to an unverified archive should be introduced to make that transition appear successful.

The implementation team owns qualification and testing. Maintainer merge approval does not imply artifact publication approval or require the maintainer to reproduce development tests. The producer and runtime security fixes may be merged before qualification because neither activates this preview in the public quickstart. Promoting it is a separate reviewed change after the actual release and installer evidence exists.