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/** Pure credential signatures shared by guardrails and public error sanitization. */
export interface CredentialPattern {
  name: string;
  regex: RegExp;
  replacement: string;
}

export const CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS: CredentialPattern[] = [
  { name: "openai_proj", regex: /sk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:openai]" },
  { name: "openai", regex: /\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{48}\b/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:openai]" },
  {
    name: "anthropic",
    regex: /sk-ant-api[0-9]?-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:anthropic]",
  },
  {
    name: "anthropic_alt",
    regex: /sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:anthropic]",
  },
  // GHSA-r4q7-7f24-m29p: Groq (`gsk_` + 52) and xAI (`xai-` + 80) had no entry, so both
  // the opt-in guardrail and the public error sanitizer echoed them verbatim. Lower bound
  // only, for the same reason as `google` below — an error body that over-redacts a
  // look-alike costs nothing; one that under-redacts leaks a credential.
  { name: "groq", regex: /\bgsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:groq]" },
  { name: "xai", regex: /\bxai-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:xai]" },
  // Same family: house access tokens (`oma_live_` + base64url, 43 chars in
  // production) had no entry either. `{20,}` spares the short placeholders
  // quoted in setup guides (`oma_live_xxx`) and short test fixtures.
  { name: "oma_live", regex: /\boma_live_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:oma]" },
  // {20,} rather than the exact {35} of a standard 39-char Google API key. #12506 added
  // this pattern with the exact length; #12620 landed the anti-drift test that asserts
  // /\bAIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/ must not survive. Anything shorter or longer than 39 was
  // therefore passing straight through into error bodies. In an error message
  // over-redacting a string that merely starts with AIza costs nothing; under-redacting
  // one leaks a credential, so the loose bound is the correct side to err on.
  { name: "google", regex: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:google]" },
  { name: "huggingface", regex: /hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{34}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:hf]" },
  { name: "replicate", regex: /r8_[A-Za-z0-9]{37}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:replicate]" },
  { name: "github", regex: /gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:github]" },
  { name: "slack", regex: /xox[bpoa]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:slack]" },
  { name: "linear", regex: /lin_api_[A-Za-z0-9]{40}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:linear]" },
  { name: "notion", regex: /secret_[A-Za-z0-9]{43}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:notion]" },
  { name: "npm", regex: /npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:npm]" },
  {
    name: "postman",
    regex: /PMAK-[a-f0-9]{8}-[a-f0-9]{32}/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:postman]",
  },
  {
    name: "discord",
    regex: /\b[MN][A-Za-z0-9]{23}\.[A-Za-z0-9]{6}\.[A-Za-z0-9]{27}\b/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:discord]",
  },
  {
    name: "stripe",
    regex: /(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:stripe]",
  },
  {
    name: "square",
    regex: /sq0(?:atp-[0-9A-Za-z_-]{22}|csp-[0-9A-Za-z_-]{43})/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:square]",
  },
  { name: "aws_access_key", regex: /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:aws]" },
  { name: "twilio", regex: /\bSK[0-9a-fA-F]{32}\b/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:twilio]" },
  {
    name: "sendgrid",
    regex: /SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:sendgrid]",
  },
  { name: "mailgun", regex: /key-[a-f0-9]{32}/g, replacement: "[REDACTED:mailgun]" },
  {
    name: "private_key",
    regex:
      /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:private_key]",
  },
  {
    name: "jwt",
    regex: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\b/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:jwt]",
  },
  {
    name: "connection_string",
    regex: /(?:mongodb(?:\+srv)?|postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|redis|amqp):\/\/[^:/@\s"']+:[^:/@\s"']+@/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:connection_string]",
  },
  {
    name: "auth_header",
    regex:
      /((?:["\x27]?(?:Authorization|x-api-key|api-key|apikey)["\x27]?\s*[:=]\s*["\x27]?)(?:(?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\s+)?)[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{10,}/gi,
    replacement: "$1[REDACTED:auth_header]",
  },
  // GHSA-r4q7-7f24-m29p: generic `sk-` fallback for every OpenAI-compatible provider whose
  // key is not exactly 48 chars (DeepSeek 32-hex, Moonshot/Kimi 47-49, Together, …). The
  // guardrail is catalog-only, so all of those passed through it untouched. MUST stay the
  // LAST entry: both consumers iterate in order and replace as they go, so `openai_proj`,
  // `openai` and `anthropic*` have already stamped their specific label before this one
  // runs — it only ever sees the `sk-` shapes nothing else claimed. The lookbehind
  // (mirroring STRONG_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN in errorSanitization.ts) keeps `risk-…`-style words
  // from matching.
  {
    name: "openai_compatible",
    regex: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9])sk-[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{20,}/g,
    replacement: "[REDACTED:openai_compatible]",
  },
];