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TypeScript a2aai-agentsai-gatewayanthropicclaudeclaude-codeclinecodexcopilotcursordeepseekfree-aigeminikimillm-gatewaymcpopenaiopenai-proxyqwentoken-saver
import { CORS_HEADERS, handleCorsOptions } from "@/shared/utils/cors";
import { createFile, listFiles, formatFileResponse, countFiles } from "@/lib/db/files";
import { NextResponse } from "next/server";
import {
getApiKeyRequestScope,
resolveListScope,
resolveEffectiveApiKeyId,
} from "@/app/api/v1/_helpers/apiKeyScope";
import { enforceApiKeyPolicy } from "@/shared/utils/apiKeyPolicy";
import { buildErrorBody } from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/error";
export async function OPTIONS() {
return handleCorsOptions();
}
const DEFAULT_LIST_LIMIT = 20;
const MAX_LIST_LIMIT = 10000;
export function parseFilesListQuery(searchParams: URLSearchParams):
| {
ok: true;
limit: number;
after: string | undefined;
order: "asc" | "desc";
purpose: string | undefined;
}
| { ok: false; response: Response } {
const rawLimit = searchParams.get("limit");
let limit = DEFAULT_LIST_LIMIT;
if (rawLimit !== null) {
if (!/^\d+$/.test(rawLimit)) {
return {
ok: false,
response: NextResponse.json(
{ error: { message: "limit must be a positive integer", type: "invalid_request_error" } },
{ status: 400, headers: CORS_HEADERS }
),
};
}
limit = Number.parseInt(rawLimit, 10);
if (limit < 1 || limit > MAX_LIST_LIMIT) {
return {
ok: false,
response: NextResponse.json(
{
error: {
message: `limit must be between 1 and ${MAX_LIST_LIMIT}`,
type: "invalid_request_error",
},
},
{ status: 400, headers: CORS_HEADERS }
),
};
}
}
const orderParam = searchParams.get("order");
const order = orderParam === "asc" ? "asc" : "desc";
return {
ok: true,
limit,
after: searchParams.get("after") || undefined,
order,
purpose: searchParams.get("purpose") || undefined,
};
}
export async function POST(request: Request) {
const scope = await getApiKeyRequestScope(request);
if (scope.rejection) return scope.rejection;
// Fail closed on an unresolvable OR invalid credential — the same 401 fold
// `getApiKeyRequestScope` already applies (`apiKeyId: null` for a
// revoked/expired/banned/deactivated/unresolvable key, #13881) — so the
// per-key policy check below never has to special-case that status itself.
if (scope.apiKey && !scope.apiKeyId) {
return NextResponse.json(buildErrorBody(401, "Invalid API key"), {
status: 401,
headers: CORS_HEADERS,
});
}
// per-key operator policy (endpoint allowlist, schedule, usage cap, rate
// limit) — LEDGER-2 of the omni-code-sec 2026-09-21 run / #14481. Called
// UNCONDITIONALLY, exactly like batches/delete-completed/route.ts: a bare
// `x-api-key`/`x-goog-api-key` credential (no anthropic-version, non-Claude
// UA) is accepted by the CLIENT_API auth layer but ignored by
// getApiKeyRequestScope's extractApiKey() (scope.apiKeyId stays null for
// it) — enforceApiKeyPolicy resolves it independently via
// extractUngatedClientApiKey() (GHSA-2phc-xp22-9f56), so gating this call
// on scope.apiKeyId let that transport skip the endpoint allowlist,
// schedule, usage cap, rate limit and key quota entirely (round-2 PoC
// against e543b64). A keyless caller (session/anonymous) is a no-op here.
const policy = await enforceApiKeyPolicy(request, null);
if (policy.rejection) return policy.rejection;
// A key resolved only via the ungated x-api-key/x-goog-api-key transport
// never sets scope.apiKeyId (see the comment above) — fall back to the id
// enforceApiKeyPolicy() independently resolved, so the upload is not
// attributed to nobody (LEDGER-27, omni-code-sec round 3).
const apiKeyId = resolveEffectiveApiKeyId(scope, policy.apiKeyInfo);
try {
const formData = await request.formData();
const file = formData.get("file") as File;
const purpose = formData.get("purpose") as string;
const expiresAfterAnchor = formData.get("expires_after[anchor]") as string;
const expiresAfterSeconds = formData.get("expires_after[seconds]") as string;
if (!file || !purpose) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: { message: "Missing file or purpose", type: "invalid_request_error" } },
{ status: 400, headers: CORS_HEADERS }
);
}
const MAX_FILE_BYTES = 512 * 1024 * 1024; // 512 MB
if (file.size > MAX_FILE_BYTES) {
return NextResponse.json(
{
error: {
message: "File exceeds maximum allowed size of 512 MB",
type: "invalid_request_error",
},
},
{ status: 400, headers: CORS_HEADERS }
);
}
const bytes = file.size;
const filename = file.name;
const mimeType = file.type;
const content = Buffer.from(await file.arrayBuffer());
let expiresAt: number | undefined;
if (expiresAfterAnchor === "created_at" && expiresAfterSeconds) {
const seconds = Number.parseInt(expiresAfterSeconds);
if (!Number.isNaN(seconds)) {
expiresAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + seconds;
}
}
const record = createFile({
bytes,
filename,
purpose,
content,
mimeType,
apiKeyId,
expiresAt,
});
return NextResponse.json(formatFileResponse(record), { headers: CORS_HEADERS });
} catch (error) {
console.error("[FILES] Upload failed:", error);
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: { message: "Upload failed", type: "server_error" } },
{ status: 500, headers: CORS_HEADERS }
);
}
}
export async function GET(request: Request) {
const scope = await getApiKeyRequestScope(request);
if (scope.rejection) return scope.rejection;
// Fail closed on an unresolvable OR invalid credential — the same 401 fold
// `getApiKeyRequestScope` already applies (`apiKeyId: null` for a
// revoked/expired/banned/deactivated/unresolvable key, #13881) — so the
// per-key policy check below never has to special-case that status itself.
if (scope.apiKey && !scope.apiKeyId) {
return NextResponse.json(buildErrorBody(401, "Invalid API key"), {
status: 401,
headers: CORS_HEADERS,
});
}
// per-key operator policy (endpoint allowlist, schedule, usage cap, rate
// limit) — LEDGER-2 of the omni-code-sec 2026-09-21 run / #14481. Called
// UNCONDITIONALLY, exactly like batches/delete-completed/route.ts: a bare
// `x-api-key`/`x-goog-api-key` credential (no anthropic-version, non-Claude
// UA) is accepted by the CLIENT_API auth layer but ignored by
// getApiKeyRequestScope's extractApiKey() (scope.apiKeyId stays null for
// it) — enforceApiKeyPolicy resolves it independently via
// extractUngatedClientApiKey() (GHSA-2phc-xp22-9f56), so gating this call
// on scope.apiKeyId let that transport skip the endpoint allowlist,
// schedule, usage cap, rate limit and key quota entirely (round-2 PoC
// against e543b64). A keyless caller (session/anonymous) is a no-op here.
const policy = await enforceApiKeyPolicy(request, null);
if (policy.rejection) return policy.rejection;
// Key → own files only; dashboard session without a key → instance-wide;
// anonymous / unresolvable bearer → 401. `listFiles`/`countFiles` read an
// absent owner as "every tenant", so the widening must be an explicit
// decision here, never a fallback (GHSA-m3hp-hq9g-fpmv).
const listScope = resolveListScope(scope, policy);
if (listScope.mode === "rejected") return listScope.response;
const ownerFilter = listScope.mode === "api_key" ? listScope.apiKeyId : undefined;
const { searchParams } = new URL(request.url);
const parsed = parseFilesListQuery(searchParams);
if (!parsed.ok) return parsed.response;
const { limit, after, order, purpose } = parsed;
// We fetch limit + 1 to check if there are more items
const files = listFiles({
apiKeyId: ownerFilter,
purpose,
limit: limit + 1,
after,
order,
});
const hasMore = files.length > limit;
const data = files.slice(0, limit);
const totalCount = countFiles({ apiKeyId: ownerFilter, purpose });
return NextResponse.json(
{
object: "list",
data: data.map((f) => formatFileResponse(f)),
first_id: data.length > 0 ? data[0].id : null,
last_id: data.length > 0 ? data.at(-1).id : null,
has_more: hasMore,
total_count: totalCount,
},
{ headers: CORS_HEADERS }
);
}