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TypeScript a2aai-agentsai-gatewayanthropicclaudeclaude-codeclinecodexcopilotcursordeepseekfree-aigeminikimillm-gatewaymcpopenaiopenai-proxyqwentoken-saver
/**
* Declared providerSpecificData fields that contain credentials and must use the
* same at-rest encryption as top-level connection tokens (#16836).
*
* Do not blanket-encrypt the JSON object: workspace/identity fields are queried
* by SQLite and must remain readable. Unknown fields remain unchanged.
*
* This is the ONE list for every consumer: encryptConnectionFields /
* decryptConnectionFields (src/lib/db/encryption.ts), the lazy connection views,
* the first-use sweep of legacy plaintext rows (./migrations.ts), the provider API
* response sanitizer (src/lib/providers/requestDefaults.ts — strips these fields,
* masks `extraApiKeys` like `apiKey`) and the compliance audit summary
* (src/lib/compliance/providerAudit.ts). A field added here is covered on every side;
* tests/unit/provider-specific-data-secrets-drift.test.ts iterates the list.
*/
export const PROVIDER_SPECIFIC_SECRET_FIELDS = [
"consoleApiKey",
"alibabaConsoleCookie",
"alibabaConsoleSecToken",
"xiaomiMimoConsoleCookie",
// Console-only quota cookies/tokens live alongside the inference API key;
// none are SQLite identity fields. Keeping them plaintext on disk exposes
// the cloud-console account to anyone who can read the database.
"qwenCloudCookie",
"qwenCloudSecToken",
"volcConsoleCookie",
"volcCsrfToken",
// Ollama Cloud's optional quota-scraping session credentials are the same
// class of browser cookie as the Qwen/Volcengine console credentials above.
// Only encrypt credential fields; workspace/identity JSON stays queryable.
"ollamaUsageCookie",
"ollamaCloudUsageCookie",
"ollamaCloudCookie",
"usageCookie",
// Some connectors store a second credential or session token inside the
// metadata object. These fields are already redacted from dashboard/audit
// responses, but without declaring them here their SQLite values leak in
// plaintext. Keep non-secret IDs (workspaceId/chatgptUserId) queryable.
"accessToken",
"refreshToken",
"idToken",
"apiKey",
"secretAccessKey",
"awsSecretAccessKey",
"sessionToken",
"awsSessionToken",
"openCodeGoAuthCookie",
"opencodeGoAuthCookie",
"authCookie",
// The key-rotation pool: a LIST of full upstream API keys. Every entry is
// enveloped (see mapProviderSpecificDataSecrets); the dashboard shows and
// edits the list, so the API returns it masked exactly like `apiKey`.
"extraApiKeys",
// Short-lived provider sub-tokens that refresh / mint flows write back into
// the metadata object (open-sse/executors/ghe-copilot.ts,
// open-sse/services/tokenRefresh/providers/museCode.ts + kiro.ts,
// open-sse/executors/lmarena.ts).
"copilotToken",
"dcaToken",
"clientSecret",
"recaptchaV3Token",
// Web-session providers keep the browser session under these keys
// (src/shared/providers/webSessionCredentials.ts → storageKeys). Identity and
// display fields of those providers (uuid, uid, sid, deviceId, userId, email,
// projectId, space ids, …) are not credentials and stay queryable.
"cookie",
"cookies",
"storageState",
"origins",
"token",
"token_v2",
"userToken",
"access_token",
"refresh_token",
"jwt",
"sso",
"sso-rw",
"session",
"session-token",
"sessionCookie",
"sessionKey",
"sessionid",
"__Secure-next-auth.session-token",
"__Secure-authjs.session-token",
"__Secure-better-auth.session_token",
"__Secure-1PSID",
"__Secure-1PSIDTS",
"__client",
"__session",
"__vercel_session",
"app-config-uuid",
"hy_token",
"hf-chat",
"p-b",
"kimi-auth",
"duckai",
"chatglm_session",
"manus_session",
"ecto_1_sess",
"abra_sess",
"convex-session-id",
"convexSessionId",
"nt_session",
"si_ses_id",
"ttwid",
"arena-auth-prod-v1",
"arena-auth-prod-v1.0",
"arena-auth-prod-v1.1",
"maxaiAccessToken",
"ucCookies",
"ucClientCookie",
"clientCookie",
] as const;
/**
* Not credentials at rest, but never echoed to a client or written to an audit record:
* the transient ChatGPT Web (Codex) handles, the system-managed Codex fingerprint seed
* (mirrors sub2api stripping `codex_fingerprint_seed`) and the runtime-only Codex
* identity carriers (in-memory per request, never persisted). The server-side
* partial-update merge keeps them alive without the client round-tripping them.
*/
export const PROVIDER_SPECIFIC_RESPONSE_ONLY_FIELDS = [
"runtimeKey",
"validationId",
"codexFingerprintSeed",
"codexClientIdentity",
"codexOriginalIdentityHeaders",
"codexTurnStateEcho",
] as const;
export type ProviderSpecificSecretField = (typeof PROVIDER_SPECIFIC_SECRET_FIELDS)[number];
type SecretTransform = (
secret: string,
field: ProviderSpecificSecretField
) => string | null | undefined;
/**
* Apply `transform` to one declared value: a string, or each string entry of a list
* (the `extraApiKeys` pool). Returns the input itself when nothing changed, so callers
* can skip the copy. A list entry that transforms to null/undefined is DROPPED — an
* undecryptable token must never be forwarded upstream as if it were a key — while
* non-string / empty entries and non-string, non-list values pass through untouched.
*/
function mapSecretValue(
value: unknown,
field: ProviderSpecificSecretField,
transform: SecretTransform
): unknown {
if (typeof value === "string") return value ? transform(value, field) : value;
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return value;
let changed = false;
const next: unknown[] = [];
for (const entry of value) {
if (typeof entry !== "string" || !entry) {
next.push(entry);
continue;
}
const mapped = transform(entry, field);
if (mapped !== entry) changed = true;
if (mapped === null || mapped === undefined) continue;
next.push(mapped);
}
return changed ? next : value;
}
/** Return a fresh object only if a recognized secret field actually changes. */
export function mapProviderSpecificDataSecrets(data: unknown, transform: SecretTransform): unknown {
if (!data || typeof data !== "object" || Array.isArray(data)) return data;
const original = data as Record<string, unknown>;
let updated: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
for (const field of PROVIDER_SPECIFIC_SECRET_FIELDS) {
const secret = original[field];
const value = mapSecretValue(secret, field, transform);
if (value !== secret) {
updated ??= { ...original };
updated[field] = value;
}
}
return updated ?? data;
}