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TypeScript a2aai-agentsai-gatewayanthropicclaudeclaude-codeclinecodexcopilotcursordeepseekfree-aigeminikimillm-gatewaymcpopenaiopenai-proxyqwentoken-saver
import { timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
import { getLegacyCliTokenSync, getMachineTokenSync } from "../../lib/machineToken";
import type { PolicyContext } from "./context";
import { CLI_TOKEN_HEADER, PEER_IP_HEADER, VIA_PROXY_HEADER } from "./headers";
import { resolveStampedPeer, resolveStampedViaProxy } from "./peerStamp";
import { isLoopbackHost, isPrivateLanHost } from "./routeGuard";
/**
* Peer-locality + local-CLI-token helpers shared by the route policies.
*
* Extracted from `policies/management.ts` because the PUBLIC policy
* needs the very same CLI-token verdict: `runAuthzPipeline` strips
* CLI_TOKEN_HEADER from the forwarded headers for EVERY route class, so a route
* handler can only learn that a local CLI authenticated from the subject stamp
* the policy produced. Without this, a PUBLIC-classified route that still calls
* `requireManagementAuth()` (e.g. GET /api/monitoring/health) can never see the
* local CLI as a management principal.
*/
export function requestPeerAddress(ctx: PolicyContext): string | null {
// The Next proxy runtime exposes no socket/.ip, so the only trustworthy
// locality signal is the token-stamped PEER_IP_HEADER our custom server writes
// from the real TCP peer (scripts/dev/peer-stamp.mjs). We NEVER read the Host
// header here — it is client-controlled and spoofable. Absent/forged stamp →
// null → isLoopbackRequest/isPrivateLanRequest return false → fail closed.
const stamped = resolveStampedPeer(
ctx.request.headers?.get?.(PEER_IP_HEADER) ?? null,
process.env.OMNIROUTE_PEER_STAMP_TOKEN
);
if (stamped) return stamped;
// Non-proxy callers (tests / direct Node) may carry a real socket peer.
return ctx.request.ip ?? ctx.request.socket?.remoteAddress ?? null;
}
/**
* True when the inbound TCP request carried forwarding headers
* (`x-forwarded-for` / `x-real-ip`), as stamped by the custom Node server. When
* set, the socket peer is the reverse-proxy hop, not the end-user — so a
* loopback / private-LAN socket must NOT be trusted as local (Hard Rules #15 +
* #17, port of decolua/9router da667836). Token-validated; an attacker who
* knows the header name but not the per-process token cannot influence it.
*/
export function isViaProxyRequest(ctx: PolicyContext): boolean {
return resolveStampedViaProxy(
ctx.request.headers?.get?.(VIA_PROXY_HEADER) ?? null,
process.env.OMNIROUTE_PEER_STAMP_TOKEN
);
}
export function isLoopbackRequest(ctx: PolicyContext): boolean {
if (isViaProxyRequest(ctx)) return false;
const peerAddress = requestPeerAddress(ctx);
return peerAddress ? isLoopbackHost(peerAddress) : false;
}
// Owner-authorized (2026-05-30): allow LOCAL_ONLY *paths* from a trusted private
// LAN, based on the real socket peer IP (not spoofable). Does NOT relax the
// CLI-token gate, which stays strictly loopback. Also falls back to "not LAN"
// when a reverse-proxy hop is detected (the apparent LAN IP would be the proxy,
// not the end-user — see isViaProxyRequest above).
export function isPrivateLanRequest(ctx: PolicyContext): boolean {
if (isViaProxyRequest(ctx)) return false;
const peerAddress = requestPeerAddress(ctx);
return peerAddress ? isPrivateLanHost(peerAddress) : false;
}
/** Strictly-loopback machine-token check (constant-time). */
export function hasValidLoopbackCliToken(ctx: PolicyContext): boolean {
if (process.env.OMNIROUTE_DISABLE_CLI_TOKEN === "true") return false;
if (!isLoopbackRequest(ctx)) return false;
const headers = ctx.request.headers;
const provided = headers.get(CLI_TOKEN_HEADER);
if (!provided) return false;
const expectedTokens = [getMachineTokenSync(), getLegacyCliTokenSync()].filter(Boolean);
return expectedTokens.some((expected) => {
if (provided.length !== expected.length) return false;
return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(provided), Buffer.from(expected));
});
}
/** The subject a validated local CLI request is stamped with. */
export const LOCAL_CLI_SUBJECT = Object.freeze({
kind: "management_key" as const,
id: "cli",
label: "local-cli-token",
});