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TypeScript a2aai-agentsai-gatewayanthropicclaudeclaude-codeclinecodexcopilotcursordeepseekfree-aigeminikimillm-gatewaymcpopenaiopenai-proxyqwentoken-saver
/**
* User-supplied upstream extra headers: names we never forward (Host / hop-by-hop / framing).
* Changing this list requires syncing: `sanitizeUpstreamHeadersMap` (models.ts), Zod
* `upstreamHeaderNameSchema` / record refine (schemas.ts), and `upstream-headers-sanitize` tests.
*
* The forwarding/IP set (x-forwarded-for, x-real-ip, cf-connecting-ip, forwarded, via, …)
* is forbidden so the client-origin IP can never be disclosed (or spoofed) to the upstream
* provider through an operator-set custom upstream header. This mirrors the established
* scrubbers/denylists already used by the Antigravity (`antigravityHeaderScrub.ts`) and
* Cursor CLI (`cursorCliProxy.ts`) paths, extended here to cover every provider.
*/
const FORBIDDEN = new Set(
[
"host",
"connection",
"content-length",
"keep-alive",
"proxy-connection",
// The two RFC 7230 §6.1 hop-by-hop names this list was missing. They belong
// to the connection between the client and OmniRoute (or its upstream
// proxy), never to the request OmniRoute makes to the model provider —
// forwarding `proxy-authorization` hands that proxy credential to the
// provider. `src/lib/services/reverseProxy.ts` (HOP_BY_HOP),
// `src/mitm/sanitizeHeaders.ts`, `src/mitm/inspector/httpProxyServer.ts`,
// `src/mitm/tproxy/tlsCapture.ts` and `src/app/api/openapi/try/route.ts`
// all already strip them; this list, the canonical one, did not.
"proxy-authenticate",
"proxy-authorization",
"transfer-encoding",
"te",
"trailer",
"upgrade",
// Origin-IP disclosure: never send the client's forwarding headers upstream.
"x-forwarded-for",
"x-forwarded-host",
"x-forwarded-proto",
"x-forwarded-port",
"x-forwarded-server",
"x-real-ip",
"cf-connecting-ip",
"true-client-ip",
"client-ip",
"forwarded",
"via",
].map((s) => s.toLowerCase())
);
export function isForbiddenUpstreamHeaderName(name: string): boolean {
return FORBIDDEN.has(String(name).trim().toLowerCase());
}
/**
* Auth headers that must come from the connection's credentials, never from
* operator-set per-provider custom headers. Kept here as the single source of
* truth so the Zod `customHeadersSchema` (schemas.ts) and the executor's
* apply-loop (open-sse/executors/default.ts) cannot drift apart.
*/
const FORBIDDEN_AUTH = new Set(
["authorization", "x-api-key", "x-goog-api-key", "api-key", "cookie"].map((s) => s.toLowerCase())
);
/**
* Forbidden for operator-supplied custom headers: the hop-by-hop/framing set
* PLUS auth headers (owned by the credential layer). Use this in both the
* validation schema and the executor so there is one canonical denylist.
*/
export function isForbiddenCustomHeaderName(name: string): boolean {
const n = String(name).trim().toLowerCase();
return isForbiddenUpstreamHeaderName(n) || FORBIDDEN_AUTH.has(n);
}