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TypeScript a2aai-agentsai-gatewayanthropicclaudeclaude-codeclinecodexcopilotcursordeepseekfree-aigeminikimillm-gatewaymcpopenaiopenai-proxyqwentoken-saver
import { getFeatureFlagOverride } from "@/lib/db/featureFlags";
import { parseEnvBoolean } from "@/shared/utils/envBoolean";
import { resolveFeatureFlag } from "@/shared/utils/featureFlags";
import {
OutboundUrlGuardError,
PROVIDER_URL_BLOCKED_MESSAGE,
isCloudMetadataHost,
isPrivateHost,
parseOutboundUrl,
type OutboundUrlGuardMode,
} from "./outboundUrlGuard";
// #7682: this module is the DB/feature-flag-backed half of the outbound URL guard, split out
// of `./outboundUrlGuard.ts` so the CLI (`omniroute setup-opencode`, loaded via tsx with no
// tsconfig.json in a global npm install) never has to resolve the `@/` alias. Only Next.js /
// webpack-bundled server code (never the CLI) should import from here.
const TRUE_ENV_VALUES = new Set(["1", "true", "yes", "on"]);
export const PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS_ENV = "OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS";
// #5066: scoped to provider validation/use. Allows local/private provider endpoints
// (127.0.0.1, localhost, LAN) so local-first OpenAI-compatible providers validate, while
// cloud-metadata endpoints stay blocked. Defaults ON (OmniRoute is local-first); operators
// who only use public providers can disable it to restore strict SSRF blocking.
export const LOCAL_PROVIDER_URLS_ENV = "OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_LOCAL_PROVIDER_URLS";
const SSRF_GUARD_FLAG = "OUTBOUND_SSRF_GUARD_ENABLED";
function isTrueValue(raw: unknown): boolean {
if (typeof raw !== "string") return false;
return TRUE_ENV_VALUES.has(raw.trim().toLowerCase());
}
export function arePrivateProviderUrlsAllowed() {
// 1) DB override takes precedence — it represents an explicit user toggle in
// the dashboard ("Allow Private Provider URLs"). This is critical for the
// Electron build (#2575) where the server is spawned with the env value
// captured at boot, so subsequent UI toggles only land in the DB and the
// env-first ordering would otherwise mask them. That holds for a toggle OFF
// too: an override of "false" must not be re-enabled by the env opt-in below.
let dbValue: string | undefined;
try {
dbValue = getFeatureFlagOverride(PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS_ENV);
} catch {
// DB not initialized yet — fall through to env-only check.
}
if (dbValue !== undefined && dbValue !== "") {
if (isTrueValue(dbValue)) return true;
} else if (isTrueValue(process.env[PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS_ENV])) {
// 2) Explicit env opt-in (for headless/Docker users who set it before boot).
return true;
}
// 3) Legacy escape hatch — disabling the outbound guard implies allowing
// private URLs. "SSRF Guard" is a toggle on the Feature Flags page, so a
// DB override set there comes first, then env, as in step 1.
let legacyValue: string | undefined;
try {
legacyValue = getFeatureFlagOverride(SSRF_GUARD_FLAG);
} catch {
// DB not initialized yet — fall through to env-only check.
}
if (legacyValue === undefined || legacyValue === "") {
legacyValue = process.env[SSRF_GUARD_FLAG];
}
if (!parseEnvBoolean(legacyValue, true)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Guard mode for the provider OUTBOUND path (search-provider connection validation, image
* generation, remote image fetch, model discovery — anything that does not go through the
* chat validation path). Precedence — mirrors `getProviderValidationGuard()` (#9123):
* 1. explicit full opt-in (`arePrivateProviderUrlsAllowed`) → "none" (no checks; power users).
* 2. local-first default (`areLocalProviderUrlsAllowed`) → "block-metadata" (allow LAN, block IMDS).
* 3. otherwise → "public-only" (strict).
*/
export function getProviderOutboundGuard(): OutboundUrlGuardMode {
if (arePrivateProviderUrlsAllowed()) return "none";
if (areLocalProviderUrlsAllowed()) return "block-metadata";
return "public-only";
}
/**
* #5066: whether provider endpoints on local/private addresses are permitted. Defaults ON
* (OmniRoute is local-first — local OpenAI-compatible providers should validate out of the
* box). Disable via the `OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_LOCAL_PROVIDER_URLS` flag (DB toggle or env) to
* restore strict public-only SSRF blocking. Cloud-metadata stays blocked regardless.
*/
export function areLocalProviderUrlsAllowed(): boolean {
try {
const dbValue = resolveFeatureFlag(LOCAL_PROVIDER_URLS_ENV);
if (dbValue !== undefined && dbValue !== "") return isTrueValue(dbValue);
} catch {
// DB not initialized yet — fall through to env / default.
}
const envValue = process.env[LOCAL_PROVIDER_URLS_ENV];
if (typeof envValue === "string" && envValue !== "") return isTrueValue(envValue);
// Default ON.
return true;
}
/**
* Guard mode for the provider VALIDATION/use path (not webhooks or remote images). Precedence:
* 1. explicit full opt-in (`arePrivateProviderUrlsAllowed`) → "none" (no checks; power users).
* 2. local-first default (`areLocalProviderUrlsAllowed`) → "block-metadata" (allow LAN, block IMDS).
* 3. otherwise → "public-only" (strict).
*/
export function getProviderValidationGuard(): OutboundUrlGuardMode {
if (arePrivateProviderUrlsAllowed()) return "none";
if (areLocalProviderUrlsAllowed()) return "block-metadata";
return "public-only";
}
/**
* Webhook variant of `parseAndValidatePublicUrl`. Webhooks legitimately point at
* internal services (n8n, Home Assistant, a LAN box) in Docker/self-hosted deployments,
* so the private-host block is gated behind the same explicit opt-in used for private
* provider URLs (`OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS`, default OFF). Protocol and
* embedded-credential checks in `parseOutboundUrl` remain unconditional. (#3269)
*/
export function parseAndValidateWebhookUrl(input: string | URL) {
const url = parseOutboundUrl(input);
// Cloud-metadata / link-local endpoints are NEVER a valid webhook target — block them
// even when the private opt-in is enabled (SSRF→IAM-credential pivot). (#3269)
if (isCloudMetadataHost(url.hostname)) {
throw new OutboundUrlGuardError(PROVIDER_URL_BLOCKED_MESSAGE, {
code: "OUTBOUND_URL_GUARD_BLOCKED",
url: url.toString(),
hostname: url.hostname || null,
});
}
if (!arePrivateProviderUrlsAllowed() && isPrivateHost(url.hostname)) {
throw new OutboundUrlGuardError(PROVIDER_URL_BLOCKED_MESSAGE, {
code: "OUTBOUND_URL_GUARD_BLOCKED",
url: url.toString(),
hostname: url.hostname || null,
});
}
return url;
}