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TypeScript a2aai-agentsai-gatewayanthropicclaudeclaude-codeclinecodexcopilotcursordeepseekfree-aigeminikimillm-gatewaymcpopenaiopenai-proxyqwentoken-saver
import test from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import {
containsSensitiveErrorCredential,
redactSensitiveErrorText,
sanitizeErrorMessage,
sanitizeUpstreamDetails,
} from "../../open-sse/utils/errorSanitization.ts";
test("sanitizeErrorMessage removes bearer credentials and image data URLs", () => {
const raw =
"upstream echoed Authorization: Bearer eyJ.secret.token and data:image/png;charset=utf-8;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAE=";
const safe = sanitizeErrorMessage(raw);
assert.doesNotMatch(safe, /eyJ\.secret\.token/);
assert.doesNotMatch(safe, /iVBORw0KGgo/);
assert.match(safe, /\[REDACTED\]/);
// Authorization labels are fail-closed: once a credential label is seen,
// the sanitizer may discard the remaining untrusted tail instead of
// preserving a marker for each later secret.
assert.equal(safe, "upstream echoed Authorization: [REDACTED]");
});
test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts common JSON credential fields", () => {
const safe = sanitizeErrorMessage(
'{"api_key":"sk-sensitive","access_token":"oauth-sensitive","cookie":"session=sensitive; secondary=also-sensitive","authorization":"Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz"}'
);
assert.doesNotMatch(
safe,
/sk-sensitive|oauth-sensitive|session=sensitive|also-sensitive|dXNlcjpwYXNz/
);
assert.match(safe, /\[REDACTED\]/);
});
test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts URL credentials while preserving safe URLs", () => {
const safeUrl = "https://example.com/docs/error?lang=en#recovery";
const projected = sanitizeErrorMessage(
"proxy failed https://svc-user:[email protected]/v1 " +
"then https://storage.example/blob?X-Amz-Credential=AKIAOPAQUE%2Fscope&" +
"X-Amz-Signature=signature-secret&X-Amz-Expires=60 " +
"and https://account.blob.core.windows.net/c?sv=2025-01-05&sig=sas-secret&se=soon " +
"then https://vertex.example/predict?key=vertex-key-secret&mode=express " +
"plus https://gateway.example/v1?api_key=query-api-secret&token=query-token-secret " +
`see ${safeUrl}`
);
assert.doesNotMatch(
projected,
/svc-user|p4ss-opaque|AKIAOPAQUE|signature-secret|sas-secret|vertex-key-secret|query-api-secret|query-token-secret/i
);
assert.match(projected, /\[REDACTED\]/);
assert.match(projected, /X-Amz-Expires=60/);
assert.match(projected, /sv=2025-01-05/);
assert.match(projected, /se=soon/);
assert.match(projected, new RegExp(safeUrl.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&")));
});
test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts credentials hidden behind serialized whitespace", () => {
const inputs = [
String.raw`api_key\t=opaque-tab-secret-9382746`,
String.raw`api_key\u0009=opaque-unicode-tab-9382746`,
String.raw`Bearer\topaque-bearer-secret-9382746`,
String.raw`api_key\\t=opaque-double-tab-secret-9382746`,
];
for (const input of inputs) {
const projected = sanitizeErrorMessage(input);
assert.doesNotMatch(projected, /opaque-(?:tab|unicode-tab|bearer|double-tab)-secret/i);
assert.match(projected, /\[REDACTED\]/);
}
});
test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts CLI credential flag values", () => {
const inputs = [
"spawn failed: helper --api-key opaque-cli-key-9382746 --mode check",
'spawn failed: helper --token "opaque cli token 9382746" --mode check',
"spawn failed: helper --password 'opaque-cli-password-9382746' --mode check",
];
for (const input of inputs) {
const projected = sanitizeErrorMessage(input);
assert.doesNotMatch(projected, /opaque(?: cli|-cli)/i);
assert.match(projected, /\[REDACTED\]/);
}
});
test("sanitizeErrorMessage covers the canonical credential pattern catalog", () => {
const credentials = [
`AIza${"A".repeat(35)}`,
`hf_${"A".repeat(34)}`,
`r8_${"A".repeat(37)}`,
`gho_${"A".repeat(36)}`,
`ghu_${"A".repeat(36)}`,
`ghs_${"A".repeat(36)}`,
`ghr_${"A".repeat(36)}`,
`lin_api_${"A".repeat(40)}`,
`secret_${"A".repeat(43)}`,
`npm_${"A".repeat(36)}`,
`PMAK-1234abcd-${"a".repeat(32)}`,
`rk_live_${"A".repeat(24)}`,
`sq0atp-${"A".repeat(22)}`,
`SK${"a".repeat(32)}`,
`SG.${"A".repeat(22)}.${"B".repeat(43)}`,
`key-${"a".repeat(32)}`,
`M${"A".repeat(23)}.${"B".repeat(6)}.${"C".repeat(27)}`,
"postgresql://db-user:[email protected]/app",
// GHSA-r4q7-7f24-m29p — Groq and xAI keys had no catalog entry and no
// STRONG_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN fallback, so they reached error bodies verbatim.
`gsk_${"A".repeat(52)}`,
`xai-${"A".repeat(80)}`,
// House access tokens (`oma_live_` + 43 base64url chars) had no catalog
// entry either and reached error bodies verbatim.
`oma_live_${"A".repeat(43)}`,
];
for (const credential of credentials) {
const projected = sanitizeErrorMessage(`upstream echoed ${credential}`);
assert.equal(projected.includes(credential), false, credential.slice(0, 16));
assert.match(projected, /\[REDACTED(?::[^\]]+)?\]/);
}
});
// House access tokens (`oma_live_` + base64url) had no catalog entry and no
// strong-token fallback, so they reached error bodies verbatim. The sanitizer
// stamps the generic `[REDACTED]` label (catalog names are dropped on this
// path); the guardrail keeps the specific `[REDACTED:oma]` label.
const OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN = `oma_live_${"A".repeat(43)}`;
test("sanitizeErrorMessage masks house tokens on every detection path", () => {
for (const input of [
`upstream echoed ${OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN}`,
`request failed for key ${OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN} on model foo`,
]) {
const viaMessage = sanitizeErrorMessage(input);
assert.equal(viaMessage.includes(OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN), false, input);
assert.match(viaMessage, /\[REDACTED/);
const viaText = redactSensitiveErrorText(input);
assert.equal(viaText.includes(OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN), false, input);
assert.match(viaText, /\[REDACTED/);
assert.equal(containsSensitiveErrorCredential(input), true, input);
}
});
test("sanitizeErrorMessage leaves neighboring verdicts and short look-alikes untouched", () => {
// Neighboring `sk-ant-` label unchanged (gate criterion).
const neighbor = `upstream echoed sk-ant-${"A".repeat(40)}`;
assert.match(sanitizeErrorMessage(neighbor), /\[REDACTED/);
// Short look-alikes and a bare prefix stay intact on every detection path.
for (const benign of [
"upstream error without any credential",
"see oma_live_xxx in the setup guide",
`rejected oma_live_${"A".repeat(8)} retry`,
"oma_live_not_a_real_token",
`rejected oma_live_${"A".repeat(19)} retry`,
]) {
assert.equal(sanitizeErrorMessage(benign), benign, benign);
assert.equal(redactSensitiveErrorText(benign), benign, benign);
assert.equal(containsSensitiveErrorCredential(benign), false, benign);
}
// Lower bound: a 20-char suffix is masked on every detection path.
const bound = `rejected oma_live_${"A".repeat(20)} retry`;
assert.equal(sanitizeErrorMessage(bound).includes(`oma_live_${"A".repeat(20)}`), false);
assert.match(sanitizeErrorMessage(bound), /\[REDACTED/);
assert.equal(containsSensitiveErrorCredential(bound), true);
});
test("sanitizeErrorMessage handles glued prefixes, casing, encoding and off-charset tails", () => {
// A letter or digit glued in front makes it part of a larger word: intact.
for (const prefix of ["x", "9"]) {
const input = `failed ${prefix}${OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN} end`;
assert.equal(sanitizeErrorMessage(input), input, input);
assert.equal(containsSensitiveErrorCredential(input), false, input);
}
// A dash or space keeps the token standalone: masked.
for (const prefix of ["-", " "]) {
const input = `failed${prefix}${OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN} end`;
assert.equal(sanitizeErrorMessage(input).includes(OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN), false, input);
assert.match(sanitizeErrorMessage(input), /\[REDACTED/);
}
// An underscore glued in front hides it from the word-boundary catalog but
// the strong-token fallback still catches it on sanitizer paths.
const glued = `failed_${OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN} end`;
assert.equal(sanitizeErrorMessage(glued).includes(OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN), false, glued);
assert.equal(containsSensitiveErrorCredential(glued), true, glued);
// Uppercased prefix: the strong-token fallback is case-insensitive, so the
// sanitizer still masks it (the catalog-only guardrail does not).
const upper = `failed OMA_LIVE_${"A".repeat(43)} end`;
assert.match(sanitizeErrorMessage(upper), /\[REDACTED/);
assert.equal(containsSensitiveErrorCredential(upper), true, upper);
// Double-escaped token: escape normalization decodes it before the catalog
// pass, so it is masked.
const doubled = `failed oma_live_\\u0041${"A".repeat(42)} end`;
assert.match(sanitizeErrorMessage(doubled), /\[REDACTED/);
// Off-charset tail (`.` is outside base64url): matched up to the dot, like
// the neighboring loose-bound patterns.
const dotted = sanitizeErrorMessage(`failed ${OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN}.suffix end`);
assert.equal(dotted.includes(OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN), false, dotted);
// Bare prefix without a suffix stays intact.
assert.equal(sanitizeErrorMessage("saw oma_live_ in logs"), "saw oma_live_ in logs");
});
test("upstream bodies echoing house tokens are refused passthrough", () => {
assert.equal(
containsSensitiveErrorCredential(`{"message":"bad key ${OMA_SANITIZER_TOKEN}}"}`),
true
);
});
test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts credentials that cross the public length boundary", () => {
const credential = `hf_${"A".repeat(34)}`;
const projected = sanitizeErrorMessage(`${"x".repeat(4088)}${credential}`);
const escapedPrefixProjected = sanitizeErrorMessage(
`${String.raw`\t`}${"x".repeat(4088)}${credential}`
);
for (const output of [projected, escapedPrefixProjected]) {
assert.equal(output.includes("hf_"), false);
assert.equal(output.includes(credential), false);
assert.match(output, /\[REDACTED(?::[^\]]+)?\]$/);
assert.ok(output.length <= 4096);
}
});
test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts closed and unterminated PGP private-key armor", () => {
const closed = sanitizeErrorMessage(
"provider returned -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----\n" +
"Version: test\n\npgp-private-material\n" +
"-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK----- after"
);
const unterminated = sanitizeErrorMessage(
"provider returned -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----\npgp-unterminated-material"
);
// Public exception messages fail closed at the first physical line; the
// post-block suffix is intentionally not recovered from a multiline secret.
assert.equal(closed, "provider returned [REDACTED]");
assert.equal(unterminated, "provider returned [REDACTED]");
assert.doesNotMatch(
`${closed} ${unterminated}`,
/pgp-private-material|pgp-unterminated-material/
);
});
test("sanitizeUpstreamDetails drops credential headers and redacts data URLs", () => {
const safe = sanitizeUpstreamDetails({
authorization: "Bearer sensitive",
cookie: "session=sensitive; refresh=also-sensitive",
"set-cookie": "session=sensitive",
error: "failed for ",
}) as Record<string, unknown>;
assert.equal("authorization" in safe, false);
assert.equal("cookie" in safe, false);
assert.equal("set-cookie" in safe, false);
assert.equal(safe.error, "failed for [REDACTED_DATA_URL]");
});