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fix(security): address code-review findings — timing-safe token, OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT, tray PNG, preservePatterns defaults, missing docs

diegosouzapw55659d92be26
diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.example
index 2021c41ecb..939e5ecc6a 100644
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -111,6 +111,12 @@ NODE_ENV=production
# Default: endpoint-proxy-salt | Change per-deployment for isolation.
MACHINE_ID_SALT=endpoint-proxy-salt
+# Salt for deriving CLI machine-ID auth tokens (HMAC-SHA256).
+# Used by: src/lib/machineToken.ts — rotates the local CLI auth token without
+# touching code. Set to a new value to invalidate existing CLI tokens.
+# Default: omniroute-cli-auth-v1
+# OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT=omniroute-cli-auth-v1
+
# Set true when running behind HTTPS (reverse proxy with TLS termination).
# Used by: src/lib/auth — sets the Secure flag on session cookies.
# Default: false | MUST be true in any non-localhost deployment.
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index 46b087aa5d..7ab969ef4a 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -413,3 +413,4 @@ git push -u origin feat/your-feature
12. Never return raw `err.stack` / `err.message` in HTTP / SSE / executor responses — always route through `buildErrorBody()` or `sanitizeErrorMessage()` (`open-sse/utils/error.ts`). See `docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md`.
13. Never string-interpolate external paths or runtime values into shell scripts passed to `exec()`/`spawn()` — pass via the `env` option instead. Reference: `src/mitm/cert/install.ts::updateNssDatabases`.
14. Never dismiss a CodeQL / Secret-Scanning alert without (a) first checking the pattern docs above to see if the helper applies, and (b) recording the technical justification in the dismissal comment. Precedent: `js/stack-trace-exposure` raised on callsites that already route through `sanitizeErrorMessage()` is a known CodeQL limitation (custom sanitizers not recognized) — dismiss as `false positive` referencing `docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md`.
+15. Never expose routes that spawn child processes (`/api/mcp/`, `/api/cli-tools/runtime/`) without `isLocalOnlyPath()` classification in `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts`. Loopback enforcement happens unconditionally before any auth check — leaked JWT via tunnel cannot trigger process spawning. See `docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md`.
diff --git a/bin/cli/tray/tray.ps1 b/bin/cli/tray/tray.ps1
index 35815dc00d..bd90f2903b 100644
--- a/bin/cli/tray/tray.ps1
+++ b/bin/cli/tray/tray.ps1
@@ -11,7 +11,19 @@ $ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
$OutputEncoding = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8
$script:notifyIcon = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.NotifyIcon
-$script:notifyIcon.Icon = New-Object System.Drawing.Icon($IconPath)
+if ($IconPath -and (Test-Path $IconPath)) {
+ if ($IconPath.ToLower().EndsWith('.ico')) {
+ $script:notifyIcon.Icon = New-Object System.Drawing.Icon($IconPath)
+ } else {
+ # Accepts .png and other bitmap formats via GDI+ handle conversion
+ $bitmap = New-Object System.Drawing.Bitmap($IconPath)
+ $handle = $bitmap.GetHicon()
+ $script:notifyIcon.Icon = [System.Drawing.Icon]::FromHandle($handle)
+ $bitmap.Dispose()
+ }
+} else {
+ $script:notifyIcon.Icon = [System.Drawing.SystemIcons]::Application
+}
$script:notifyIcon.Text = $Tooltip
$script:notifyIcon.Visible = $true
diff --git a/bin/cli/tray/tray.ts b/bin/cli/tray/tray.ts
index c904bc17d2..f9e3c642e1 100644
--- a/bin/cli/tray/tray.ts
+++ b/bin/cli/tray/tray.ts
@@ -29,9 +29,13 @@ const FALLBACK_ICON_BASE64 =
export function getIconPath(): string {
const isWin = process.platform === "win32";
- const iconFile = isWin ? "icon.ico" : "icon.png";
- const iconPath = join(__dirname, iconFile);
- return existsSync(iconPath) ? iconPath : "";
+ // On Windows prefer .ico but fall back to .png (tray.ps1 handles both via GDI+)
+ const candidates = isWin ? ["icon.ico", "icon.png"] : ["icon.png"];
+ for (const iconFile of candidates) {
+ const iconPath = join(__dirname, iconFile);
+ if (existsSync(iconPath)) return iconPath;
+ }
+ return "";
}
export function getIconBase64(): string {
diff --git a/docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md b/docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
index b64fdee1f5..839c04c3e9 100644
--- a/docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
+++ b/docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
@@ -148,17 +148,18 @@ OmniRoute uses **SQLite** (via `better-sqlite3`) for all persistence. These vari
## 4. Security & Authentication
-| Variable | Default | Source File | Description |
-| --------------------------------------- | --------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
-| `MACHINE_ID_SALT` | `endpoint-proxy-salt` | `src/lib/auth` | Salt combined with hardware identifiers for machine fingerprinting. Change per-deployment for isolation. |
-| `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` | `false` | `src/lib/auth` | Sets the `Secure` flag on session cookies. **Must be `true`** when running behind HTTPS. |
-| `REQUIRE_API_KEY` | `false` | API middleware | When `true`, all `/v1/*` proxy requests must include a valid API key. |
-| `ALLOW_API_KEY_REVEAL` | `false` | Dashboard providers page | Allows revealing full API key values in the Dashboard UI. Security risk on shared instances. |
-| `NO_LOG_API_KEY_IDS` | _(empty)_ | `src/lib/compliance/index.ts` | Comma-separated API key IDs that bypass request logging (GDPR compliance). |
-| `MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES` | `10485760` (10 MB) | `src/shared/middleware/bodySizeGuard.ts` | Maximum allowed request body size. Rejects payloads exceeding this limit. |
-| `CORS_ORIGIN` | `*` | Next.js middleware | CORS `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` value. Restrict for production. |
-| `OUTBOUND_SSRF_GUARD_ENABLED` | `true` | `src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard.ts` | Block provider calls targeting private/loopback/link-local IP ranges. Disable only in isolated test envs. |
-| `OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS` | `false` | `src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard.ts` | Allow provider URLs pointing to private/local networks (localhost, 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, etc.). **REQUIRED for self-hosted providers** (LM Studio, Ollama, vLLM, Llamafile, Triton, SearXNG). When `false`, the dashboard rejects validation of local URLs. |
+| Variable | Default | Source File | Description |
+| --------------------------------------- | ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| `MACHINE_ID_SALT` | `endpoint-proxy-salt` | `src/lib/auth` | Salt combined with hardware identifiers for machine fingerprinting. Change per-deployment for isolation. |
+| `OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT` | `omniroute-cli-auth-v1` | `src/lib/machineToken.ts` | HMAC salt for deriving the local CLI auth token. Changing this value rotates all CLI tokens on the machine. See `docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md`. |
+| `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` | `false` | `src/lib/auth` | Sets the `Secure` flag on session cookies. **Must be `true`** when running behind HTTPS. |
+| `REQUIRE_API_KEY` | `false` | API middleware | When `true`, all `/v1/*` proxy requests must include a valid API key. |
+| `ALLOW_API_KEY_REVEAL` | `false` | Dashboard providers page | Allows revealing full API key values in the Dashboard UI. Security risk on shared instances. |
+| `NO_LOG_API_KEY_IDS` | _(empty)_ | `src/lib/compliance/index.ts` | Comma-separated API key IDs that bypass request logging (GDPR compliance). |
+| `MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES` | `10485760` (10 MB) | `src/shared/middleware/bodySizeGuard.ts` | Maximum allowed request body size. Rejects payloads exceeding this limit. |
+| `CORS_ORIGIN` | `*` | Next.js middleware | CORS `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` value. Restrict for production. |
+| `OUTBOUND_SSRF_GUARD_ENABLED` | `true` | `src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard.ts` | Block provider calls targeting private/loopback/link-local IP ranges. Disable only in isolated test envs. |
+| `OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS` | `false` | `src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard.ts` | Allow provider URLs pointing to private/local networks (localhost, 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, etc.). **REQUIRED for self-hosted providers** (LM Studio, Ollama, vLLM, Llamafile, Triton, SearXNG). When `false`, the dashboard rejects validation of local URLs. |
### Hardening Checklist
diff --git a/docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md b/docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a5ac77440
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# CLI Machine-ID Token
+
+## Overview
+
+OmniRoute CLI commands authenticate against the local management API using a
+`HMAC-SHA256(machine-id, salt)` token sent via the `x-omniroute-cli-token`
+request header.
+
+This allows CLI subcommands (`omniroute status`, `omniroute providers`, etc.)
+to call management endpoints without requiring the user to supply a JWT or
+password on every invocation.
+
+## How it works
+
+1. `getMachineTokenSync()` reads the hardware machine ID via `node-machine-id`
+ (falls back to an empty string on failure, disabling CLI auth).
+2. It computes `HMAC-SHA256(machine_id, salt)` and returns the full 64-char
+ hex digest — a deterministic, non-reversible token tied to this machine.
+3. The CLI sends the token as `x-omniroute-cli-token` on every request to
+ `http://localhost:<port>/api/...`.
+4. The server (`src/server/authz/policies/management.ts`) recomputes the
+ expected token with the same salt and compares via `timingSafeEqual` to
+ prevent timing-based extraction.
+
+## Security properties
+
+| Property | Detail |
+| -------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Loopback-only** | Accepted only when `Host` is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `::1`. |
+| **Constant-time compare** | `crypto.timingSafeEqual` prevents timing attacks. |
+| **Non-reversible** | HMAC output cannot recover the machine-id. |
+| **No `always`-protected bypass** | `isAlwaysProtectedPath()` is evaluated before the CLI token check. `/api/shutdown` and `/api/settings/database` always require JWT. |
+| **Non-exportable** | Token is never written to disk or logged. |
+
+## Salt rotation
+
+Set `OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT` to rotate the derived token without code changes.
+After rotation, all CLI processes on this machine will use the new token
+automatically. Useful after a process-list leak that may have exposed the
+previous derived value.
+
+```bash
+# Persistent rotation (add to shell profile)
+export OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT="my-secret-salt-2026"
+
+# Verify new token is in use
+omniroute status
+```
+
+Default salt: `omniroute-cli-auth-v1`
+
+## Files
+
+| File | Purpose |
+| ----------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- |
+| `src/lib/machineToken.ts` | Token derivation (`getMachineTokenSync`) |
+| `src/server/authz/headers.ts` | `CLI_TOKEN_HEADER` constant |
+| `src/server/authz/policies/management.ts` | Server-side verification |
+| `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts` | Loopback host check (`isLoopbackHost`) |
+
+## See also
+
+- `docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md` — route protection tiers
+- `docs/architecture/AUTHZ_GUIDE.md` — full authorization pipeline
diff --git a/docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md b/docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..382b55eb08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Route Guard Tiers
+
+## Overview
+
+All OmniRoute management API routes are classified into one of three protection
+tiers. Classification is static, defined in `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts`,
+and evaluated unconditionally on every request before any auth logic runs.
+
+## Tiers
+
+### Tier 1 — LOCAL_ONLY
+
+**Enforced by:** `isLocalOnlyPath(path)` → loopback host check
+**Bypass:** None — not overridable by JWT, CLI token, or `requireLogin=false`
+
+These routes spawn child processes or execute runtime code. Exposing them to
+non-loopback traffic would allow an attacker who obtained a valid JWT (e.g.,
+via a Cloudflared/Ngrok tunnel) to trigger process spawning — a known CVE
+class (GHSA-fhh6-4qxv-rpqj).
+
+| Prefix | Reason |
+| ------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |
+| `/api/mcp/` | MCP server — spawns stdio bridges and SSE handlers |
+| `/api/cli-tools/runtime/` | CLI tool runtime — executes plugin code |
+
+**Response on violation:** `403 LOCAL_ONLY`
+
+### Tier 2 — ALWAYS_PROTECTED
+
+**Enforced by:** `isAlwaysProtectedPath(path)` → skip `requireLogin=false` bypass
+**Bypass:** None when `requireLogin=false`; JWT always required
+
+These routes are destructive or irreversible. Allowing them in a "no-password"
+install would mean anyone on the same LAN could wipe the database or kill the
+server process.
+
+| Path | Reason |
+| ------------------------ | --------------------------------- |
+| `/api/shutdown` | Terminates the server process |
+| `/api/settings/database` | Database export, import, and wipe |
+
+**Response on violation:** `401 Authentication required`
+
+### Tier 3 — MANAGEMENT (default)
+
+All other management routes. Auth required unless `requireLogin=false` is
+configured. CLI tokens can authenticate these routes (loopback + valid HMAC).
+
+## Evaluation order
+
+```
+managementPolicy.evaluate(ctx)
+ 1. isLocalOnlyPath(path)?
+ → not loopback → reject 403 LOCAL_ONLY
+ 2. isInternalModelSyncRequest(ctx)?
+ → allow (system)
+ 3. hasValidCliToken(headers)?
+ → allow (cli) [loopback + timingSafeEqual HMAC check]
+ 4. isAlwaysProtectedPath(path) or requireLogin=true?
+ → isDashboardSessionAuthenticated?
+ → allow (dashboard_session)
+ → reject 401/403
+ 5. requireLogin=false?
+ → allow (anonymous)
+```
+
+## Adding a new spawn-capable route
+
+1. Add the path prefix to `LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES` in
+ `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts`
+2. Add a test in `tests/unit/authz/routeGuard.test.ts` asserting that
+ `isLocalOnlyPath()` returns true for the new prefix
+3. **Never skip this step** — see Hard Rule #15 in `CLAUDE.md`
+
+## Files
+
+| File | Purpose |
+| ----------------------------------------- | ------------------------------ |
+| `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts` | Constants and helper functions |
+| `src/server/authz/policies/management.ts` | Evaluation logic |
+| `tests/unit/authz/routeGuard.test.ts` | Unit tests |
+
+## See also
+
+- `docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md` — CLI machine-ID token
+- `docs/architecture/AUTHZ_GUIDE.md` — full authorization pipeline
diff --git a/open-sse/services/compression/types.ts b/open-sse/services/compression/types.ts
index e5bdee7b47..aea6a54a44 100644
--- a/open-sse/services/compression/types.ts
+++ b/open-sse/services/compression/types.ts
@@ -171,7 +171,16 @@ export const DEFAULT_CAVEMAN_CONFIG: CavemanConfig = {
compressRoles: ["user"],
skipRules: [],
minMessageLength: 50,
- preservePatterns: [],
+ // Protect code blocks, inline code, file paths, URLs, and error/stack lines
+ // from caveman compression so signal-carrying content is never mangled.
+ preservePatterns: [
+ "```[\\s\\S]*?```",
+ "`[^`\\n]+`",
+ "\\b(https?://\\S+)",
+ "(?:^|\\s)(\\.{0,2}/[\\w./\\-]+)",
+ "^\\s*(Error|TypeError|RangeError|SyntaxError|ReferenceError):",
+ "^\\s+at\\s",
+ ],
intensity: "full",
};
diff --git a/src/lib/machineToken.ts b/src/lib/machineToken.ts
index 5ea3c76f01..af91785bed 100644
--- a/src/lib/machineToken.ts
+++ b/src/lib/machineToken.ts
@@ -3,23 +3,31 @@ import nodeMachineId from "node-machine-id";
const { machineIdSync } = nodeMachineId;
-const DEFAULT_SALT = "omniroute-cli-auth";
+const BUILTIN_DEFAULT_SALT = "omniroute-cli-auth-v1";
+
+function getActiveSalt(): string {
+ return process.env.OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT || BUILTIN_DEFAULT_SALT;
+}
function deriveToken(rawId: string, salt: string): string {
- return createHmac("sha256", rawId).update(salt).digest("hex").slice(0, 32);
+ return createHmac("sha256", rawId).update(salt).digest("hex");
}
let cached: string | null = null;
+let cachedSalt: string | null = null;
-export function getMachineTokenSync(salt = DEFAULT_SALT): string {
+export function getMachineTokenSync(salt?: string): string {
+ const activeSalt = salt ?? getActiveSalt();
try {
// machineIdSync(true) returns the original unhashed hardware ID.
const rawId = machineIdSync(true);
- if (salt === DEFAULT_SALT) {
- cached ??= deriveToken(rawId, salt);
- return cached;
+ if (activeSalt === cachedSalt && cached !== null) return cached;
+ const token = deriveToken(rawId, activeSalt);
+ if (!salt) {
+ cached = token;
+ cachedSalt = activeSalt;
}
- return deriveToken(rawId, salt);
+ return token;
} catch {
return "";
}
diff --git a/src/server/authz/policies/management.ts b/src/server/authz/policies/management.ts
index 63892b88b3..0388a198ad 100644
--- a/src/server/authz/policies/management.ts
+++ b/src/server/authz/policies/management.ts
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
import { isModelSyncInternalRequest } from "../../../shared/services/modelSyncScheduler";
import { isAuthRequired, isDashboardSessionAuthenticated } from "../../../shared/utils/apiAuth";
import { getMachineTokenSync } from "../../../lib/machineToken";
@@ -17,7 +18,8 @@ function hasValidCliToken(headers: Headers): boolean {
const provided = headers.get(CLI_TOKEN_HEADER);
if (!provided) return false;
const expected = getMachineTokenSync();
- return expected !== "" && provided === expected;
+ if (expected === "" || provided.length !== expected.length) return false;
+ return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(provided), Buffer.from(expected));
}
function hasBearerToken(headers: Headers): boolean {
diff --git a/tests/unit/lib/machineToken.test.ts b/tests/unit/lib/machineToken.test.ts
index 4921456b91..addd7dc7ae 100644
--- a/tests/unit/lib/machineToken.test.ts
+++ b/tests/unit/lib/machineToken.test.ts
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ import { test } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { getMachineTokenSync } from "../../../src/lib/machineToken.ts";
-test("getMachineTokenSync returns a 32-character hex string", () => {
+test("getMachineTokenSync returns a 64-character hex string (full SHA-256)", () => {
const token = getMachineTokenSync();
- assert.match(token, /^[0-9a-f]{32}$/, "token must be 32 lowercase hex chars");
+ assert.match(token, /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/, "token must be 64 lowercase hex chars (HMAC-SHA256)");
});
test("getMachineTokenSync is deterministic", () => {
@@ -20,3 +20,12 @@ test("getMachineTokenSync produces different values for different salts", () =>
test("getMachineTokenSync with empty string salt does not throw", () => {
assert.doesNotThrow(() => getMachineTokenSync(""));
});
+
+test("getMachineTokenSync respects OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT env var", () => {
+ const before = getMachineTokenSync();
+ process.env.OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT = "__test_salt__";
+ const withEnv = getMachineTokenSync();
+ delete process.env.OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT;
+ assert.notEqual(before, withEnv, "env salt must produce a different token");
+ assert.match(withEnv, /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/, "env-derived token must still be 64-char hex");
+});