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TypeScript a2aai-agentsai-gatewayanthropicclaudeclaude-codeclinecodexcopilotcursordeepseekfree-aigeminikimillm-gatewaymcpopenaiopenai-proxyqwentoken-saver
fix(security): address code-review findings — timing-safe token, OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT, tray PNG, preservePatterns defaults, missing docs
diegosouzapw55659d92be26
diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.exampleindex 2021c41ecb..939e5ecc6a 100644--- a/.env.example+++ b/.env.example@@ -111,6 +111,12 @@ NODE_ENV=production# Default: endpoint-proxy-salt | Change per-deployment for isolation.MACHINE_ID_SALT=endpoint-proxy-salt+# Salt for deriving CLI machine-ID auth tokens (HMAC-SHA256).+# Used by: src/lib/machineToken.ts — rotates the local CLI auth token without+# touching code. Set to a new value to invalidate existing CLI tokens.+# Default: omniroute-cli-auth-v1+# OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT=omniroute-cli-auth-v1+# Set true when running behind HTTPS (reverse proxy with TLS termination).# Used by: src/lib/auth — sets the Secure flag on session cookies.# Default: false | MUST be true in any non-localhost deployment.diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.mdindex 46b087aa5d..7ab969ef4a 100644--- a/CLAUDE.md+++ b/CLAUDE.md@@ -413,3 +413,4 @@ git push -u origin feat/your-feature12. Never return raw `err.stack` / `err.message` in HTTP / SSE / executor responses — always route through `buildErrorBody()` or `sanitizeErrorMessage()` (`open-sse/utils/error.ts`). See `docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md`.13. Never string-interpolate external paths or runtime values into shell scripts passed to `exec()`/`spawn()` — pass via the `env` option instead. Reference: `src/mitm/cert/install.ts::updateNssDatabases`.14. Never dismiss a CodeQL / Secret-Scanning alert without (a) first checking the pattern docs above to see if the helper applies, and (b) recording the technical justification in the dismissal comment. Precedent: `js/stack-trace-exposure` raised on callsites that already route through `sanitizeErrorMessage()` is a known CodeQL limitation (custom sanitizers not recognized) — dismiss as `false positive` referencing `docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md`.+15. Never expose routes that spawn child processes (`/api/mcp/`, `/api/cli-tools/runtime/`) without `isLocalOnlyPath()` classification in `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts`. Loopback enforcement happens unconditionally before any auth check — leaked JWT via tunnel cannot trigger process spawning. See `docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md`.diff --git a/bin/cli/tray/tray.ps1 b/bin/cli/tray/tray.ps1index 35815dc00d..bd90f2903b 100644--- a/bin/cli/tray/tray.ps1+++ b/bin/cli/tray/tray.ps1@@ -11,7 +11,19 @@ $ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"$OutputEncoding = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8$script:notifyIcon = New-Object System.Windows.Forms.NotifyIcon-$script:notifyIcon.Icon = New-Object System.Drawing.Icon($IconPath)+if ($IconPath -and (Test-Path $IconPath)) {+ if ($IconPath.ToLower().EndsWith('.ico')) {+ $script:notifyIcon.Icon = New-Object System.Drawing.Icon($IconPath)+ } else {+ # Accepts .png and other bitmap formats via GDI+ handle conversion+ $bitmap = New-Object System.Drawing.Bitmap($IconPath)+ $handle = $bitmap.GetHicon()+ $script:notifyIcon.Icon = [System.Drawing.Icon]::FromHandle($handle)+ $bitmap.Dispose()+ }+} else {+ $script:notifyIcon.Icon = [System.Drawing.SystemIcons]::Application+}$script:notifyIcon.Text = $Tooltip$script:notifyIcon.Visible = $truediff --git a/bin/cli/tray/tray.ts b/bin/cli/tray/tray.tsindex c904bc17d2..f9e3c642e1 100644--- a/bin/cli/tray/tray.ts+++ b/bin/cli/tray/tray.ts@@ -29,9 +29,13 @@ const FALLBACK_ICON_BASE64 =export function getIconPath(): string {const isWin = process.platform === "win32";- const iconFile = isWin ? "icon.ico" : "icon.png";- const iconPath = join(__dirname, iconFile);- return existsSync(iconPath) ? iconPath : "";+ // On Windows prefer .ico but fall back to .png (tray.ps1 handles both via GDI+)+ const candidates = isWin ? ["icon.ico", "icon.png"] : ["icon.png"];+ for (const iconFile of candidates) {+ const iconPath = join(__dirname, iconFile);+ if (existsSync(iconPath)) return iconPath;+ }+ return "";}export function getIconBase64(): string {diff --git a/docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md b/docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.mdindex b64fdee1f5..839c04c3e9 100644--- a/docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md+++ b/docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md@@ -148,17 +148,18 @@ OmniRoute uses **SQLite** (via `better-sqlite3`) for all persistence. These vari## 4. Security & Authentication-| Variable | Default | Source File | Description |-| --------------------------------------- | --------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |-| `MACHINE_ID_SALT` | `endpoint-proxy-salt` | `src/lib/auth` | Salt combined with hardware identifiers for machine fingerprinting. Change per-deployment for isolation. |-| `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` | `false` | `src/lib/auth` | Sets the `Secure` flag on session cookies. **Must be `true`** when running behind HTTPS. |-| `REQUIRE_API_KEY` | `false` | API middleware | When `true`, all `/v1/*` proxy requests must include a valid API key. |-| `ALLOW_API_KEY_REVEAL` | `false` | Dashboard providers page | Allows revealing full API key values in the Dashboard UI. Security risk on shared instances. |-| `NO_LOG_API_KEY_IDS` | _(empty)_ | `src/lib/compliance/index.ts` | Comma-separated API key IDs that bypass request logging (GDPR compliance). |-| `MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES` | `10485760` (10 MB) | `src/shared/middleware/bodySizeGuard.ts` | Maximum allowed request body size. Rejects payloads exceeding this limit. |-| `CORS_ORIGIN` | `*` | Next.js middleware | CORS `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` value. Restrict for production. |-| `OUTBOUND_SSRF_GUARD_ENABLED` | `true` | `src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard.ts` | Block provider calls targeting private/loopback/link-local IP ranges. Disable only in isolated test envs. |-| `OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS` | `false` | `src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard.ts` | Allow provider URLs pointing to private/local networks (localhost, 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, etc.). **REQUIRED for self-hosted providers** (LM Studio, Ollama, vLLM, Llamafile, Triton, SearXNG). When `false`, the dashboard rejects validation of local URLs. |+| Variable | Default | Source File | Description |+| --------------------------------------- | ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |+| `MACHINE_ID_SALT` | `endpoint-proxy-salt` | `src/lib/auth` | Salt combined with hardware identifiers for machine fingerprinting. Change per-deployment for isolation. |+| `OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT` | `omniroute-cli-auth-v1` | `src/lib/machineToken.ts` | HMAC salt for deriving the local CLI auth token. Changing this value rotates all CLI tokens on the machine. See `docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md`. |+| `AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE` | `false` | `src/lib/auth` | Sets the `Secure` flag on session cookies. **Must be `true`** when running behind HTTPS. |+| `REQUIRE_API_KEY` | `false` | API middleware | When `true`, all `/v1/*` proxy requests must include a valid API key. |+| `ALLOW_API_KEY_REVEAL` | `false` | Dashboard providers page | Allows revealing full API key values in the Dashboard UI. Security risk on shared instances. |+| `NO_LOG_API_KEY_IDS` | _(empty)_ | `src/lib/compliance/index.ts` | Comma-separated API key IDs that bypass request logging (GDPR compliance). |+| `MAX_BODY_SIZE_BYTES` | `10485760` (10 MB) | `src/shared/middleware/bodySizeGuard.ts` | Maximum allowed request body size. Rejects payloads exceeding this limit. |+| `CORS_ORIGIN` | `*` | Next.js middleware | CORS `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` value. Restrict for production. |+| `OUTBOUND_SSRF_GUARD_ENABLED` | `true` | `src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard.ts` | Block provider calls targeting private/loopback/link-local IP ranges. Disable only in isolated test envs. |+| `OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS` | `false` | `src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard.ts` | Allow provider URLs pointing to private/local networks (localhost, 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, etc.). **REQUIRED for self-hosted providers** (LM Studio, Ollama, vLLM, Llamafile, Triton, SearXNG). When `false`, the dashboard rejects validation of local URLs. |### Hardening Checklistdiff --git a/docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md b/docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.mdnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..3a5ac77440--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@+# CLI Machine-ID Token++## Overview++OmniRoute CLI commands authenticate against the local management API using a+`HMAC-SHA256(machine-id, salt)` token sent via the `x-omniroute-cli-token`+request header.++This allows CLI subcommands (`omniroute status`, `omniroute providers`, etc.)+to call management endpoints without requiring the user to supply a JWT or+password on every invocation.++## How it works++1. `getMachineTokenSync()` reads the hardware machine ID via `node-machine-id`+ (falls back to an empty string on failure, disabling CLI auth).+2. It computes `HMAC-SHA256(machine_id, salt)` and returns the full 64-char+ hex digest — a deterministic, non-reversible token tied to this machine.+3. The CLI sends the token as `x-omniroute-cli-token` on every request to+ `http://localhost:<port>/api/...`.+4. The server (`src/server/authz/policies/management.ts`) recomputes the+ expected token with the same salt and compares via `timingSafeEqual` to+ prevent timing-based extraction.++## Security properties++| Property | Detail |+| -------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |+| **Loopback-only** | Accepted only when `Host` is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `::1`. |+| **Constant-time compare** | `crypto.timingSafeEqual` prevents timing attacks. |+| **Non-reversible** | HMAC output cannot recover the machine-id. |+| **No `always`-protected bypass** | `isAlwaysProtectedPath()` is evaluated before the CLI token check. `/api/shutdown` and `/api/settings/database` always require JWT. |+| **Non-exportable** | Token is never written to disk or logged. |++## Salt rotation++Set `OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT` to rotate the derived token without code changes.+After rotation, all CLI processes on this machine will use the new token+automatically. Useful after a process-list leak that may have exposed the+previous derived value.++```bash+# Persistent rotation (add to shell profile)+export OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT="my-secret-salt-2026"++# Verify new token is in use+omniroute status+```++Default salt: `omniroute-cli-auth-v1`++## Files++| File | Purpose |+| ----------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- |+| `src/lib/machineToken.ts` | Token derivation (`getMachineTokenSync`) |+| `src/server/authz/headers.ts` | `CLI_TOKEN_HEADER` constant |+| `src/server/authz/policies/management.ts` | Server-side verification |+| `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts` | Loopback host check (`isLoopbackHost`) |++## See also++- `docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md` — route protection tiers+- `docs/architecture/AUTHZ_GUIDE.md` — full authorization pipelinediff --git a/docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md b/docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.mdnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..382b55eb08--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@+# Route Guard Tiers++## Overview++All OmniRoute management API routes are classified into one of three protection+tiers. Classification is static, defined in `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts`,+and evaluated unconditionally on every request before any auth logic runs.++## Tiers++### Tier 1 — LOCAL_ONLY++**Enforced by:** `isLocalOnlyPath(path)` → loopback host check+**Bypass:** None — not overridable by JWT, CLI token, or `requireLogin=false`++These routes spawn child processes or execute runtime code. Exposing them to+non-loopback traffic would allow an attacker who obtained a valid JWT (e.g.,+via a Cloudflared/Ngrok tunnel) to trigger process spawning — a known CVE+class (GHSA-fhh6-4qxv-rpqj).++| Prefix | Reason |+| ------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |+| `/api/mcp/` | MCP server — spawns stdio bridges and SSE handlers |+| `/api/cli-tools/runtime/` | CLI tool runtime — executes plugin code |++**Response on violation:** `403 LOCAL_ONLY`++### Tier 2 — ALWAYS_PROTECTED++**Enforced by:** `isAlwaysProtectedPath(path)` → skip `requireLogin=false` bypass+**Bypass:** None when `requireLogin=false`; JWT always required++These routes are destructive or irreversible. Allowing them in a "no-password"+install would mean anyone on the same LAN could wipe the database or kill the+server process.++| Path | Reason |+| ------------------------ | --------------------------------- |+| `/api/shutdown` | Terminates the server process |+| `/api/settings/database` | Database export, import, and wipe |++**Response on violation:** `401 Authentication required`++### Tier 3 — MANAGEMENT (default)++All other management routes. Auth required unless `requireLogin=false` is+configured. CLI tokens can authenticate these routes (loopback + valid HMAC).++## Evaluation order++```+managementPolicy.evaluate(ctx)+ 1. isLocalOnlyPath(path)?+ → not loopback → reject 403 LOCAL_ONLY+ 2. isInternalModelSyncRequest(ctx)?+ → allow (system)+ 3. hasValidCliToken(headers)?+ → allow (cli) [loopback + timingSafeEqual HMAC check]+ 4. isAlwaysProtectedPath(path) or requireLogin=true?+ → isDashboardSessionAuthenticated?+ → allow (dashboard_session)+ → reject 401/403+ 5. requireLogin=false?+ → allow (anonymous)+```++## Adding a new spawn-capable route++1. Add the path prefix to `LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES` in+ `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts`+2. Add a test in `tests/unit/authz/routeGuard.test.ts` asserting that+ `isLocalOnlyPath()` returns true for the new prefix+3. **Never skip this step** — see Hard Rule #15 in `CLAUDE.md`++## Files++| File | Purpose |+| ----------------------------------------- | ------------------------------ |+| `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts` | Constants and helper functions |+| `src/server/authz/policies/management.ts` | Evaluation logic |+| `tests/unit/authz/routeGuard.test.ts` | Unit tests |++## See also++- `docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md` — CLI machine-ID token+- `docs/architecture/AUTHZ_GUIDE.md` — full authorization pipelinediff --git a/open-sse/services/compression/types.ts b/open-sse/services/compression/types.tsindex e5bdee7b47..aea6a54a44 100644--- a/open-sse/services/compression/types.ts+++ b/open-sse/services/compression/types.ts@@ -171,7 +171,16 @@ export const DEFAULT_CAVEMAN_CONFIG: CavemanConfig = {compressRoles: ["user"],skipRules: [],minMessageLength: 50,- preservePatterns: [],+ // Protect code blocks, inline code, file paths, URLs, and error/stack lines+ // from caveman compression so signal-carrying content is never mangled.+ preservePatterns: [+ "```[\\s\\S]*?```",+ "`[^`\\n]+`",+ "\\b(https?://\\S+)",+ "(?:^|\\s)(\\.{0,2}/[\\w./\\-]+)",+ "^\\s*(Error|TypeError|RangeError|SyntaxError|ReferenceError):",+ "^\\s+at\\s",+ ],intensity: "full",};diff --git a/src/lib/machineToken.ts b/src/lib/machineToken.tsindex 5ea3c76f01..af91785bed 100644--- a/src/lib/machineToken.ts+++ b/src/lib/machineToken.ts@@ -3,23 +3,31 @@ import nodeMachineId from "node-machine-id";const { machineIdSync } = nodeMachineId;-const DEFAULT_SALT = "omniroute-cli-auth";+const BUILTIN_DEFAULT_SALT = "omniroute-cli-auth-v1";++function getActiveSalt(): string {+ return process.env.OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT || BUILTIN_DEFAULT_SALT;+}function deriveToken(rawId: string, salt: string): string {- return createHmac("sha256", rawId).update(salt).digest("hex").slice(0, 32);+ return createHmac("sha256", rawId).update(salt).digest("hex");}let cached: string | null = null;+let cachedSalt: string | null = null;-export function getMachineTokenSync(salt = DEFAULT_SALT): string {+export function getMachineTokenSync(salt?: string): string {+ const activeSalt = salt ?? getActiveSalt();try {// machineIdSync(true) returns the original unhashed hardware ID.const rawId = machineIdSync(true);- if (salt === DEFAULT_SALT) {- cached ??= deriveToken(rawId, salt);- return cached;+ if (activeSalt === cachedSalt && cached !== null) return cached;+ const token = deriveToken(rawId, activeSalt);+ if (!salt) {+ cached = token;+ cachedSalt = activeSalt;}- return deriveToken(rawId, salt);+ return token;} catch {return "";}diff --git a/src/server/authz/policies/management.ts b/src/server/authz/policies/management.tsindex 63892b88b3..0388a198ad 100644--- a/src/server/authz/policies/management.ts+++ b/src/server/authz/policies/management.ts@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+import { timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";import { isModelSyncInternalRequest } from "../../../shared/services/modelSyncScheduler";import { isAuthRequired, isDashboardSessionAuthenticated } from "../../../shared/utils/apiAuth";import { getMachineTokenSync } from "../../../lib/machineToken";@@ -17,7 +18,8 @@ function hasValidCliToken(headers: Headers): boolean {const provided = headers.get(CLI_TOKEN_HEADER);if (!provided) return false;const expected = getMachineTokenSync();- return expected !== "" && provided === expected;+ if (expected === "" || provided.length !== expected.length) return false;+ return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(provided), Buffer.from(expected));}function hasBearerToken(headers: Headers): boolean {diff --git a/tests/unit/lib/machineToken.test.ts b/tests/unit/lib/machineToken.test.tsindex 4921456b91..addd7dc7ae 100644--- a/tests/unit/lib/machineToken.test.ts+++ b/tests/unit/lib/machineToken.test.ts@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ import { test } from "node:test";import assert from "node:assert/strict";import { getMachineTokenSync } from "../../../src/lib/machineToken.ts";-test("getMachineTokenSync returns a 32-character hex string", () => {+test("getMachineTokenSync returns a 64-character hex string (full SHA-256)", () => {const token = getMachineTokenSync();- assert.match(token, /^[0-9a-f]{32}$/, "token must be 32 lowercase hex chars");+ assert.match(token, /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/, "token must be 64 lowercase hex chars (HMAC-SHA256)");});test("getMachineTokenSync is deterministic", () => {@@ -20,3 +20,12 @@ test("getMachineTokenSync produces different values for different salts", () =>test("getMachineTokenSync with empty string salt does not throw", () => {assert.doesNotThrow(() => getMachineTokenSync(""));});++test("getMachineTokenSync respects OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT env var", () => {+ const before = getMachineTokenSync();+ process.env.OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT = "__test_salt__";+ const withEnv = getMachineTokenSync();+ delete process.env.OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT;+ assert.notEqual(before, withEnv, "env salt must produce a different token");+ assert.match(withEnv, /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/, "env-derived token must still be 64-char hex");+});