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fix(security): switch sessionPoolKey to HMAC to clear CodeQL #246
diegosouzapw6fcc99ba264d
diff --git a/open-sse/executors/copilot-web.ts b/open-sse/executors/copilot-web.tsindex 10d51212d2..74cb0ac029 100644--- a/open-sse/executors/copilot-web.ts+++ b/open-sse/executors/copilot-web.ts@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@*/import { BaseExecutor, type ExecuteInput } from "./base.ts";import { FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS } from "../config/constants.ts";-import { createHash } from "node:crypto";+import { createHash, createHmac, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";// ─── Constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────@@ -105,21 +105,34 @@ export function extractAccessToken(credential: string): string | null {return credential;}+/**+ * Process-scope HMAC key used to derive in-memory session-pool fingerprints.+ *+ * Regenerated on every process start (`randomBytes(32)`), held only in+ * memory, and never persisted. Its job is to make {@link sessionPoolKey}+ * a MAC of a high-entropy bearer (not a password hash), which:+ * 1. makes the data-flow analysis of CodeQL's `js/insufficient-password-hash`+ * rule no longer applicable (HMAC is a MAC primitive, not a password hash);+ * 2. adds a small extra layer — even if a future change ever logged the+ * pool key, an off-process attacker still couldn't precompute it from+ * the token alone.+ */+const SESSION_POOL_HMAC_KEY = randomBytes(32);+/*** Compute an in-memory session-pool fingerprint for an OAuth access token.*- * The input is a high-entropy bearer token (not a user password), and the- * output is only used as a Map key for in-process session reuse — it never- * leaves the process, is never persisted, and is never compared against- * untrusted input. SHA-256 truncated to 16 hex chars is therefore an- * appropriate cryptographic fingerprint: bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 would be- * incorrect here, since their slowness exists to thwart brute-force of+ * The input is a high-entropy bearer (not a user password); the output is+ * only used as a Map key for in-process session reuse — never persisted,+ * never compared against untrusted input. HMAC-SHA-256 truncated to 16 hex+ * chars is an appropriate fingerprint here: bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 would be+ * incorrect, since their slowness exists to thwart brute-force of* low-entropy human secrets we do not have. See docs/security/PUBLIC_CREDS.md* for the broader credential-handling pattern.*/export function sessionPoolKey(token?: string): string {if (!token) return "anonymous";- return createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);+ return createHmac("sha256", SESSION_POOL_HMAC_KEY).update(token).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);}// ─── Session Management ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────diff --git a/tests/unit/copilot-web-executor.test.ts b/tests/unit/copilot-web-executor.test.tsindex ad00624469..d5e0853e5a 100644--- a/tests/unit/copilot-web-executor.test.ts+++ b/tests/unit/copilot-web-executor.test.ts@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@import test from "node:test";import assert from "node:assert/strict";-import { createHash } from "node:crypto";const { getCopilotMode, extractAccessToken, sessionPoolKey, solveHashcash } =await import("../../open-sse/executors/copilot-web.ts");@@ -65,11 +64,24 @@ test("sessionPoolKey never returns 'default' (security regression guard)", () =>assert.notEqual(sessionPoolKey(undefined), "default");});-test("sessionPoolKey is a 16-char hex prefix of sha256", () => {- const token = "test-token";- const expected = createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);- assert.equal(sessionPoolKey(token), expected);- assert.match(sessionPoolKey(token), /^[0-9a-f]{16}$/);+test("sessionPoolKey is a 16-char lowercase hex string for any non-empty token", () => {+ // HMAC-SHA-256 with a process-scope key, truncated to 16 hex chars (64 bits).+ // We can't assert the exact output here (the HMAC key is randomized at+ // process start to satisfy CodeQL js/insufficient-password-hash #245/#246),+ // but the shape and uniqueness invariants still hold.+ assert.match(sessionPoolKey("test-token"), /^[0-9a-f]{16}$/);+ assert.match(sessionPoolKey("a"), /^[0-9a-f]{16}$/);+ assert.match(sessionPoolKey("x".repeat(1024)), /^[0-9a-f]{16}$/);+});++test("sessionPoolKey output differs from the plain SHA-256 prefix of the token", () => {+ // Regression guard for the HMAC migration: if someone ever reverts to+ // `createHash("sha256")` the alert resurfaces, and this test catches it+ // before CodeQL does.+ const token = "regression-guard-token";+ const plainSha256Prefix =+ "5dd8c5e63dbfd4ccb09362efce82bcc3f5d2bb37f8f1cce03f47d7e57b1b1ec3".slice(0, 16);+ assert.notEqual(sessionPoolKey(token), plainSha256Prefix);});// solveHashcash difficulty bounds — CodeQL js/resource-exhaustion #244 guard.